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Voluntary and forced migrations over the past century have given rise to the number 
of displaced peoples and nations who consider themselves diasporas.  The resiliency 
of these extra-territorial nations after displacement is something of a paradox in 
nationalism studies.  For diaspora, the nation is simultaneously local and 
transnational, divided and caged by the confines of state borders, often intermixed 
with other ethnic groups, nations, and cultures, and yet, undeniably, a singular 
community.  Through a comparative examination of the Assyrian and Chaldean 
diaspora in the United States, this dissertation uses boundary theory to explore the 
role of diasporic elites in making and sustaining a diasporic nation, and the events, 
identities, and ideologies that shape diasporic action.  It draws from twenty-nine 
interviews held with Assyrian and Chaldean leaders in Michigan, Illinois, and 
California, and with policy-makers, as well as research into congressional documents, 
policy papers, and press reports.   
 
The multi-ethnic fabric of American society is formative to boundary-creation, and 
yet challenges its retention, providing an open society for ethnic expression and civic 
and political engagement, whilst at the same time facilitating assimilation and loss of 
diasporic culture and identity.  Diasporic elites pursue institutional completeness to 
sustain diasporic presence in local societies, and cultivate national ideologies that in 
turn engender activism on behalf of the greater diasporic nation.  The Iraq War 
served as a catalyst to nation-building, providing the first political opening in decades 
for diasporic actors to mobilize on behalf of Assyrians and Chaldeans in the 
homeland, seeking constitutional recognition as equal members of the Iraq state.  
However, the impermeable, exclusionary Iraqi national boundary wrought in conflict 
instead posed an existential crisis, forcing Assyrians and Chaldeans from Iraq and 
forcing diasporic leaders to confront questions of what will become of their nation if 
the homeland is lost.  Revealed in the resulting political demands are two distinct 
strains of nationalism: that for resettlement into diaspora and continued integration 
into Iraq; and that for territorial autonomy within Iraq’s Nineveh Plain.   
 
This dissertation argues diaspora is a continuous, evolving product of boundary-
making, often the result of diasporic elite mobilization.  Diaspora is a nation not 
simply born of displacement, but formed through social boundaries encountered and 
made upon resettlement outside the homeland.  Nationalism is a significant 
component of diasporic nation-building, offering insight into political goals, 
ideologies, and the dedication of diasporic elites to sustaining an Assyrian and 








This dissertation examines the Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora in the United States 
at a pivotal moment in Assyrian and Chaldean history.  It considers specifically the 
role of diasporic leaders in working to create and sustain the diaspora within 
American society whilst sustaining ties to the diaspora’s homeland and its global 
population.  Political claims of the diaspora were significantly affected by the Iraq 
War, which offered an opportunity for diasporic activists to mobilize in demand of 
recognition and national rights within a democratic Iraq.  Political and national goals 
remain affected by the ethno-sectarian conflict that followed and still persists, which 
caused mass displacement of Assyrians and Chaldeans in Iraq and compelled 
diasporic activists to mobilize in support of their co-ethnics, demanding refugee 
admissions and local autonomy over the homeland as a means to preserve their 
national existence in Iraq.   
 
It is argued diaspora is not simply the byproduct of displacement, but made through 
interaction with the state and society of resettlement, shaped by the openness or 
exclusion the diaspora encounters and the desire of diasporic elites to build a 
diasporic nation.  Boundary theory is therefore used to understand how cultural 
practices, language, religion, and historical memories are drawn upon to define who 
the diaspora is in relation to its surrounding society.  It finds in contrast to the 
increasing exclusion experienced in Iraq, where Assyrians and Chaldeans were 
defined by their Christianity and unique ethnicity, upon arrival in the U.S. Assyrians 
and Chaldeans instead encountered relatively open borders and were able to 
integrate, often assimilating and losing the cultural attributes and identification with 
the diaspora.  Such assimilation challenges diasporic retention, a challenge 
particularly concerning to elites in the context of the ongoing crisis in Iraq and the 
absence of an Assyrian and Chaldean state.  Diasporic leaders thus work to find a 
way to balance integration with retaining enough cultural elements to stave off 
assimilation.  This is aided by building organizations, making political claims, and 
finding ways to make membership in the diaspora relevant and lasting.  To this end, 
diasporic elites aspire to build a measure of a diasporic nation integrated within their 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) entered Mosul and 
served the city’s remaining Christian residents with an ultimatum for noon on 19 
June: ‘We offer three choices: Islam; the dhimma contract - involving payment of 
jizya; if they refuse this they will have nothing but the sword’ (BBC 2014).  Christian 
homes and businesses were spray-painted with the Arabic letter nun – نن – 
representing nasrani or Christian.  Most Christians, of course, chose the fourth, 
unstated option: to flee, most to the Kurdish region or neighbouring states.  So 
effective was ISIL’s cleansing campaign that by the following Sunday, no church 
service was held in Mosul for the first time in 1,600 years; Chaldean Patriarch Louis 
Sako observed, ‘For the first time in the history of Iraq, Mosul is now empty of its 
Christians’ (Vatican Radio 2014).  Iraq’s ancient Assyrian and Chaldean populations, 
the country’s largest Christian communities, appeared effectively cleansed from 
northern Iraq, the empty churches a symbolic representation of a long trajectory of 
marginalization and displacement begun anew after the 2003 Iraq War.  The events 
that have since followed represent a systematic ethno-sectarian cleansing not simply 
of Christianity in Iraq, but of the Assyrian-Chaldean people.   
 
While media headlines captured the silent church bells and the destroyed ruins of 
Nimrud and the ancient Assyrian Empire to which Assyrians and Chaldeans claim 
lineage, missing was an understanding of how Iraq’s democratic transition left a 
population of more than one million prior to the 2003 War now clinging to existence 
in their homeland.  ISIL’s eviction order presented a succinct embodiment of the 
waves of ethno-sectarian cleansing Iraq’s minorities have endured following the 
removal of the Ba’ath regime, violence that too has emptied Baghdad and Basra of 
much of their Christian populations.  A century of intermittent ethnic cleansing has 
forced Assyrians and Chaldeans into diaspora and decades of Arabization policies 
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sought to wash their identities as a unique ethnic group; as they now face a crisis 
point, many fear their long-term survival in diaspora is an impossibility, burdened by 
assimilation and disunity.  As one diasporic activist described, this has come to be an 
existential crisis: ‘Kurds are invading our lands from the north.  They’re forcing 
people to denounce their Assyrianism…In Baghdad, the south, Mosul, Muslims are 
religiously cleansing Assyrians and Chaldeans…And there’s assimilation in the West: 
we are losing our language, our traditions faster than the speed of light’ (Taimoorazy 
Interview 2013). 
 
Assyrian and Chaldean hopes for a post-Hussein Iraq were not always so bleak.  
Democratization provided the first political opening in decades for Assyrians and 
Chaldeans to seek official recognition as unique ethnic and religious minorities and 
to secure equal, democratic rights within the new Iraqi political structure.   
 
The Iraq War thus stands as a defining turning point for this nation.  Lasting from 
March 2003 until the departure of American troops in December 2011, the U.S., the 
U.K., and their coalition partners predicated the war on Saddam Hussein’s possession 
of weapons of mass destruction, and, failing proof thereof, that his overthrow would 
bring democracy to Iraq and perhaps serve as a lynchpin for the greater Middle East.  
The war itself was shrouded in controversy, undertaken despite the rejection of the 
United Nations.   
 
Baghdad, and with it Hussein’s regime, fell in April, less than three weeks after the 
war began.  Attention turned to rebuilding Iraq’s government, infrastructure, and 
economy, controversial processes marred by the controversial nature of the war, seen 
alternatively as an occupation or a liberation.  As pressure grew from Iraqi leaders, 
the international community, and factions within American politics to hand over 
power and leave Iraq, the coalition-led government transitioned authority to an Iraqi-
led caretaker government in June 2004, which in turn drafted a permanent 
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constitution that was approved by a popular vote in October 2005, effectively 
establishing electoral democracy.  The constitution, for the first time in the history of 
Iraq, recognized Assyrians and Chaldeans as national groups and provided for their 
religious, linguistic, cultural, and administrative rights.    
 
However, the six-year presence of American troops that followed the 2005 elections 
belies the success of state-building.  The promises of democracy were effectively 
negated as Iraq’s political and security institutions deteriorated and the state 
descended into civil war.  The Sunni-Shia conflict for state power sidelined 
governance and minority protections, giving way to a climate of impunity.  The 
resulting persecution of Christian populations forced questions of how - and if - 
Assyrians and Chaldeans see their future in their homeland.   
 
In the north of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government’s territorial claims expanded 
outside its region, eager to correct losses suffered under Hussein and to strengthen 
its own national development.  The Assyrian and Chaldean ancestral homeland, the 
atra, in the Nineveh Plain, near Mosul, emerged as a strategic chessboard between 
competing Iraqi and Kurdish interests.  The region’s rich oil reserves, diverse 
population, and geographic placement created the conditions for an ongoing conflict 
that remains amongst the most deadly in Iraq.   
 
The question facing the Assyrian and Chaldean nation during the past decade, and 
again today, is therefore threefold: how to maintain its population, including identity 
and culture, in diaspora; what to do in the short-term to help those displaced from 
Iraq; and what to do in the long-term to protect and preserve its presence in Iraq.  
Found herein are two contradictory objectives: the first to enable refugees to 
relocate, particularly to the West; the second to establish a form of local autonomy, 
which most recently has taken the form of a Christian province in the Nineveh Plain.  
Political debate is at times vitriolic, undoubtedly stressed by the urgency of the 
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humanitarian plight and the fact there really is no one right answer.  Supporters of 
autonomy accuse those who support refugee admissions of bleeding Assyrians and 
Chaldeans from Iraq, of destroying the long-term existence of the nation; those who 
oppose autonomy fear it will create a ‘Christian ghetto’ by concentrating Christians 
into a single area, rendering the population vulnerable to further attacks.   
 
This debate is consequential for those in Iraq and those in diaspora who seek to aide 
their co-ethnics and have the ability to lobby for help.  The choices encountered are 
perhaps representative of those faced by a stateless people without any territory that 
is theirs alone - it is, as Ernest Gellner described, a choice to flee, assimilate, or 
pursue a nationalist option (Gellner 1983).  He describes the challenges for those 
who pursue the latter as including acquiring territory, reviving culture, and coping 
with contestation from those who also hold claims to the territory.  Thus, like the 
Jewish diaspora prior to Israel, present is a combination of all three choices 
happening at once, influenced by different national ideologies and pragmatic 
calculations.  As the Jewish reform movement in particular feared Zionism, the 
Chaldean Church most vocally opposes an autonomous region; Church leadership 
has also transitioned in recent years from asking the West to increase refugee 
admissions to opposing the departure of Chaldeans from the Middle East, perhaps as 
the depth and enormity of displacement have become realized.  The mainstream 
Chaldean diaspora in the U.S., however, remains the strongest supporter of refugee 
admissions.  
 
Assyrian nationalists often feel the crisis has proven prescient the statehood goals of 
Assyrians who survived the Ottoman genocide and feared integration into the Iraq 
state.  Theirs is, in part, an ardent, idealized nationalism for autonomy that until 
2003 could only be claimed in diaspora, removed from the Hussein dictatorship.  Yet 
notions of nationalism, integration, and self-rule remain contested within the 
diaspora, as well as between the diaspora and the Iraqi community.  That the 
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diaspora became politically engaged on behalf of Iraq reveals both a national 
attachment to the homeland and a core, motivating fear that diaspora alone is not 
enough for the nation to survive.  
 
The American diaspora is especially significant to the Assyrian and Chaldean 
population as its largest diaspora, including the largest Chaldean population outside 
the Middle East.  It represents a rich diasporic history, one which began a century 
ago and was built and sustained through successive waves of immigration and 
refuge, hosting a variety of experiences, understandings of the homeland, and 
ideologies.1  Yet over the past decades, migration has largely been from Iraq and 
homeland narratives have centralized on Iraq and the Nineveh region.2  This diaspora 
therefore holds a unique composite of roots and routes, being both generations 
removed and weeks removed from the Middle East, and yet has built common 
narratives as to who Assyrians and Chaldeans are.  Diasporic leaders have 
contemplated their nationalism, the diaspora’s continuity, and deeply understand the 
challenges and safeguards that come from being in diaspora.  It is the only diaspora 
where Chaldean-building has meaningfully occurred, reflecting the population’s 
trajectory from Iraq to the U.S. as much as the space and permissiveness of American 
society for such ethnic expression.  This latter point is central to this thesis: the social 
context of diaspora matters, and the American diasporic experience and its activism 
are unquestionably shaped by the multi-ethnic fabric of American society and the 
openness of its political systems.  As a long-time Chaldean activist commented:   
  
                                            
1 Migrant/refugee terminology is used herein to distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary displacement.  Assyrians and Chaldeans arriving in the U.S. are generally 
described throughout as migrants or immigrants, whilst refugee is applied specifically to those 
displaced by conflict or ethno-sectarian cleansing (and who often hold UN or State 
Department designation as refugees).  
2 For this reason, the Nineveh region, and Iraq generally, will be referred to as the 
Assyrian/Chaldean homeland throughout this thesis.  Recognizing the diaspora is comprised 
of members from Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, alternative terminology such as ‘country of 
origin’ risked being unclear.  Homeland best reflects the ancestral and national 
understandings of this population and terminology used by diasporic leaders.  
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In the diaspora, everybody is sticking to its own ethnicity and nationality, 
when he or she is unable to do that in their own country.  We come from a 
country…where freedom of religion, freedom of identity, is not very open...In 
Iraq itself, because people are being scrutinized, they are under pressure, they 
are persecuted, there’s a lot of fear.  These things do not surface that easy.  
But in the diaspora, we’re more outspoken.  We’re more clear about what our 
causes are and how we should pursue our causes.  So there is a difference.  
The environment itself is a deciding factor here.  The conditions of what’s 
going on, the circumstance itself, is a determining factor (Kassab Interview 
2012).   
 
The American diaspora is thus consequential to advocacy on behalf of the global 
diasporic nation; to advocacy on behalf of the Iraq community specifically; and is 
consequential for its ability to hold onto identity and culture as the homeland comes 
under increased threat.     
 
Diaspora, then, is a nebulous concept, but one that it is rooted in and bounded by 
state borders; it is planned, built, sustained, and politicized by pragmatic elites as 
much as it is idealized and romanticized.  This dissertation examines the work of 
diasporic elites to navigate social and political institutions in the United States and 
Iraq to secure an Assyrian and Chaldean national existence.  It finds nation-building 
is simultaneously local and international, in pursuit of a diasporic nation in the U.S. 
and an autonomous, self-governed region within the homeland.  It is argued that 
diaspora subverts traditional nationalism because it does not exclusively seek a 
territorial state, but rather seeks ways to nation-build within existing states amongst 
other nations, cultures, and identities.  Yet diasporic existence is precariously 
vulnerable, confronted by disunity, assimilation, and persecution.  The reality of 
statelessness in the face of crisis is consequential: there is no power to protect 
Assyrians and Chaldeans from marginalization, nor a haven to secure their existence.  
As Gabriel Sheffer observed, in contrast to diasporas with states, those without are 
fundamentally powerless and without means to protect and secure their language, 
culture, or identity (Sheffer 2007).   
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A core finding of this research, however, is that diasporic activism is not a constant 
pursuit of a state nor a sudden awakening of latent nationalism, but a product of 
shifting and changing boundaries.  The focus herein is thus on elites as political 
actors.  Boundary changes are formative to diasporic action: which boundaries, 
whether local, state, national, or of the homeland, have or can change; what criteria 
will define the boundary; how change affects the diaspora or its co-ethnics.  For the 
Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora, the Iraq War stands as a definitive turning point: to 
the extent Assyrian and Chaldean nationalism became salient, it was in response to 
the impermeable, exclusionary boundary created in Iraq after the Iraq War, 
marginalizing their co-ethnics, and by extension the diasporic nation, from their 
ancestral homeland.  To the American diaspora, renewed exclusion coupled with fear 
of assimilation produced an existential threat.   
 
Thus, this work finds diaspora is a continuous, evolving product of boundary-making.  
As elaborated below, the landscape of diaspora theory is vast, yet its typologies tend 
to be insular, framed around a single paradigm that overlooks the rich complexities 
within a diasporic population.  This thesis draws out a commonality of these 
frameworks, the socially-constructed nature of diaspora, to approach diaspora using 
boundary theory.  This enables a better understanding of the array of ideologies, 
nationalisms, and political goals that comprise a diasporic community, and of why 
and how diasporic boundaries are made and sustained.  Moreover, this work aims to 
better connect diaspora studies to nationalism studies by examining nationalism as a 
significant diasporic component.  
 
A primary challenge in studying this diaspora is the choice of terminology, its 
proverbial elephant in the room.  Assyrians and Chaldeans are one diaspora with two 
contentious names.  There is much to learn about these communities, their resiliency 
and national hopes, to which the name issue often feels like a distraction, but failing 
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to address it often leads to conceptual confusion as to which population is being 
referenced and if assumptions and findings are equally applicable across the 
diaspora.  Consequentially, undertaken here is a unique examination of the two 
branches of the diaspora, the Assyrian-identifying branch and the Chaldean-
identifying branch, in a comparative context to examine the intra-ethnic boundaries 
that sustain two distinct identities.  Recognizing that certainly nothing said herein 
applies to all Assyrians nor all Chaldeans, this thesis aims to understand what 
underlies these separate identities, and the perceptions and motivations of those who 
make political claims on their behalves.   
 
The Assyrian-Chaldean divide, as understood here, is a product of boundary 
contraction from within the diaspora.  This thesis takes the position Assyrians and 
Chaldeans continue to comprise one ethnic group whilst observing that Chaldeanness 
is both a uniquely Iraqi and uniquely American outcome of social, sectarian, and 
political factors.  This internal boundary first built upon an ecclesiastical division was 
further shaped by Chaldean reactions against assimilation into America, Assyrianism, 
and Catholicism.  Such changes are fluid and relational given the socially-constructed 
nature of ethnic identity, which may be ‘tenacious and change only slowly, over the 
course of many generations, while in other contexts, substantial shifts in the ethnic 
landscape may occur during the lifespan of an individual’ (Wimmer 2008: 984).  In 
studying these groups in comparison, this thesis contributes to better understanding 
the Assyrian-Chaldean diaspora specifically, and how nation-building occurs and is 








EXISTING ASSYRIAN AND CHALDEAN SCHOLARSHIP  
 
Despite their complex and resilient history, Assyrians and Chaldeans are an 
understudied population.  Scholarship regarding their modern experiences as ethno-
religious minorities in the Middle East or as a diaspora is infrequent.3  Moreover, the 
contemporary Assyrian-Chaldean relationship has not been given meaningful 
scholarly attention as the communities are often approached as either one population 
or Chaldeans are considered in isolation.  This research therefore provides a much-
needed contemporary look at internal dynamics within a population whose plight is 
ongoing and the outcome of which is uncertain.   
 
Most academic attention to date has focused on the Assyrian and Chaldean plight 
from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire through the 1933 Simmele Massacre in 
Iraq, with detailed histories including William Wigram’s Our Smallest Ally (1920), 
R.S. Stafford’s The Tragedy of the Assyrians (1935), and J.G. Browne’s The Assyrians: 
A Debt of Honour (1937).  Studies by Hannibal Travis (2010, 2006), Sebastian de 
Courtois (2004), and Joseph Yacoub (1986) further incorporate the WWI genocide 
into literature and historiography on genocide studies, documenting the depth, 
cause, and lived experiences of this tragedy.  Hirmis Aboona (2008) contextualized 
Assyrians under the Ottoman Empire, delving into the relationship between Assyrian 
tribes, the Ottoman State, and Kurds, noting a pattern of escalating violence prior to 
WWI.  Sami Zubaida (2000) considered the events that led up to Simmele, the 
incompatibility of Assyrian nationalism with the nascent Iraq State, and how 
Simmele has been explained and appropriated in the tragedy’s aftermath by 
                                            
3 The term ‘minority’ is used to situate their ethnic, linguistic, and religious status as a 
numerically small percentage of the population of Iraq.  Whilst there is contention within the 
Coptic community over the application of this term, such debate is arguably shaped by the 
context of political issues in Egypt; Assyrian and Chaldean leaders often use the term minority 
(El-Gawhary 1996).  The intent is not to stigmatize, but to examine the challenges of nation-
building and national existence against the political and social reality of being a small, unique 
ethno-sectarian population within the landscape of Iraq and the Middle East, a reality best 
captured by this term.   
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Assyrians and Iraqi officials.  The studies situate Assyrians as a unique national 
minority in search of security, a situation not dissimilar from the population today.   
 
Less is written about these populations under an independent Iraq, leaving 
unanswered questions of what happened to these nationalists after Simmele, if the 
population agreeably integrated, fled, or remained in isolation (See for example 
Tripp 2007, Polk 2005, Dodge 2005).  In part, this reflects barriers within Iraq 
throughout much of the 20th century in which Iraqi Assyrians and Chaldeans could 
not tell their stories.  John Joseph’s The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East (2000) is 
amongst the more comprehensive accounts of Assyrian and Chaldean history from 
the founding of the Church of the East and Chaldean Church through the 
population’s experience under the Ba’ath regime, stressing the generations of 
insecurity the population faced from land contestation with neighbouring tribes 
through state-sponsored oppression within Iraq.  More contentiously, Joseph argued 
Nestorians came to be Assyrians through the influence of Western missionaries by 
drawing upon missionary accounts of their interaction with Nestorians, an argument 
other Assyrian scholars question by drawing upon missionary accounts which found 
Nestorians describing themselves as Assyrian or Chaldean upon their first encounters 
– thereby perpetuating the cyclic nature of this debate (for such counter-claims, see 
Parpola 2004, Frye 1997).  Sargon Donabed’s recent publication (2015) brings much-
needed focus to Assyrians as a core component of the Iraqi state throughout the 20th 
century, illuminating how political and social events in Iraq affected Assyrians, 
inserting Assyrians into events like Anfal, where he articulates the losses endured 
therein.  Aryo Makko (2010) addressed identity and nomenclature amongst 
Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriacs, arguing the salience of the latter two is a by-
product of the failure of a secular Assyrian national revival under the Ottoman 
Empire and following the genocide.  Vahram Petrosian (2006) studied the rise of 
Assyrian political movements within Iraq, charting the political environment that 
spurred their formation and the difficulty of acting from within Iraq during this time.  
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Increasingly, there is effort amongst young Assyrian scholars to make Assyrian 
studies visible in academia.  The formation of the Modern Assyrian Research Archive 
at Cambridge University is one example of such efforts to contribute to expanding 
scholarship by building an online database of resources.  Likewise, the former 
Journal of Assyrian Academic Studies contributed research regarding a diverse array of 
Assyrian-related issues, with particular focus on linguistic heritage and ancient 
histories.   
 
Academic focus on the modern Chaldean experience in Iraq is more rare.  Ray 
Mouawad (2001) briefly contextualized the experience of Iraq’s Christians, including 
Chaldeans, in Iraqi society under the Ba’ath regime, finding emigration persisted 
despite decent relationships between the Church and the state and a somewhat 
favourable economic status of Chaldeans.  Anthony O’Mahony (2004a, 2004b) 
looked at the growth of the Chaldean Church in Iraq under the Ba’ath regime and the 
essential role of the Chaldean Patriarchs in facilitating comparative security therein.  
John Healey (2010) likewise considered the history of the Church of the East and the 
Chaldean Church, highlighting the role of Western missionaries in accelerating 
conversions to the Chaldean Church and establishing educational institutions that 
served to benefit the Chaldean population long-term after Iraq became independent.   
 
Regarding diasporic studies, research on the European diaspora is receiving recent 
attention in response to increased migration.  Notable is an ongoing project funded 
by the Humanities in the European Research Area, ‘Defining and Identifying Middle 
East Christian Communities in Europe’, which explores Coptic, Assyrian/Syriac, and 
Iraqi Christian communities in the UK, Denmark, and Sweden.  The Swedish 
community is a particular focus of new literature given it represents the largest 
European diaspora.  Naures Atto’s doctoral thesis (2011) offers a valuable 
examination of the migratory routes of Assyrians and Syriacs from Turkey and Syria 
to Europe, and observes the experience of the Swedish diaspora as one of a 
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‘Hostages’ and Orphans’ dilemma’.  She found the Assyrian-Syriac identity division 
permeates all levels of Swedish diasporic institutions, becoming representative of the 
competition between parties on both sides for hegemony – a case that offers an 
intriguing area of future comparison with the Assyrian-Chaldean experience in 
America.  Marta Wozniak (2015) looked at identity construction and contestation in 
the wider diaspora, as well as in Sweden specifically, where she likewise found 
significant polarization between Assyrian/Syriac identity despite common worries of 
assimilation as migrants integrate and the role of the ethnic churches stands to lose 
hold in such a highly secular society.  Önver Cetrez (2011) likewise noted a declining 
role of the Assyrian churches in Sweden amongst later generations, for whom the 
church became perceived more negatively compared to its role as an essential 
institution for first generation Assyrians.  As Atto outlines, there is also a variety of 
non-English works on Assyrians/Syriacs in Germany and the Netherlands (Atto 25-
30).   
 
Within the British diaspora, Madawi Al-Rasheed contributed several studies to the 
construction of ethnic and homeland narratives of Iraqi Assyrians in London, here 
defined as members of the Church of the East and numbering only 3,000 to 4,000 
individuals at the time of her research in the early 1990s (Al-Rasheed 1998; 1995; 
1994).  Finding increased Assyrian refugee admissions in the UK following the Iran-
Iraq and Gulf wars prompted first-wave migrants who settled in the 1950s to 
reconstruct their narratives as ‘refugees’ rather than ‘immigrants’, Al-Rasheed 
theorized the refugees represented a link to the existing community’s past and served 
as a memory-trigger for their own traumatic displacements (Al-Rasheed 1995).  She 
found, however, a contrast between Iraqi Arab refugees in London who possess a 
myth of return and Iraqi Assyrian refugees who possess a permanent sense of 
alienation – what scholars might today classify as a quintessential diasporic mentality 
(Al-Rasheed 1994).  
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The American diasporic population, whilst larger than its European counterparts, has 
received comparatively little scholarly attention.  Chaldeans are the specific focus of 
two studies: Chaldean Americans by Mary Sengstock (1999) and The Politics of 
Minority: Chaldeans between Iraq and America, the doctoral dissertation of Yasmeen 
Hanoosh (2008).  The former examined social structures and behaviours, drawing 
special attention to the role of family, religion, and ethnic occupation as essential 
ethnic networks; the latter interrogated ‘who the Chaldeans are’ by exploring the 
presence and revival of Chaldean identity in the Middle East and how contemporary 
understandings of Chaldeanness are depicted by Chaldean activists and authors in 
the nascent field of Chaldean literature.  Natalie Henrich and Joseph Henrich (2007) 
examined human cooperation utilizing a case study amongst Detroit-area Chaldeans, 
citing the high level of civic engagement amongst the community.  These studies 
leave unstated or underdeveloped how Chaldeans understand the relationship with 
the Assyrian community; however, that Chaldean identity is accepted 
unquestioningly underscores the successful integration of Chaldean identity into 
Detroit’s ethnic fabric.  The San Diego community’s relative absence in scholarship 
underscores its much smaller size until recent years.  
 
The Assyrian diaspora in America is also the subject of several studies.  Arianne 
Ishaya’s research presents an historical perspective of Assyrian migration and 
integration in America, with particular focus on the Urmia Assyrians to California, 
examining why immigration occurred and the ethnic institutions created after arrival 
(Ishaya 2010; 2006; 2003).  Similarly, Yoab Benjamin (1996) charted the waves of 
Assyrian migrations to Chicago as pushed by factors in the Middle East, noting the 
institutions and cultural celebrations that became and remained prevalent within the 
community.  Edward Odisho (1999) examined the erosion of Aramaic amongst 
Assyrian migrants arriving after WWI, contending such language usage follows what 
he cites to be a standard pattern of loss within three generations.  Erica McClure 
(2001), however, studying recent Assyrian language usage within the diaspora, 
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found Assyrian has become a defining national element, and thus language classes 
have become more available; nationalists increasingly use code-switching, or 
interspersing English-based communication with random Assyrian words, to mark 
their shared nationhood.  Sargon Donabed and Shamiran Mako (2009) looked at 
identity formation amongst Syriac Orthodox Christians, finding linguistic variance 
and religious leadership have cultivated a unique identity that precluded the small 
American Syriac diaspora from uniformly assuming an Assyrian identity.  They also 
tracked the immigration of Turkish Assyrians belonging to the Syriac Orthodox 
Church to New England after WWI, noting the role of community organizations and 
writings of community members undertaken in effort to retain Assyrian identity 
against the distinct Syriac identity that was emerging (Donabed and Mako 2011).  
 
A common thread amongst these diasporic narratives is the work of local populations 
to establish churches and civic institutions, and the coming together of the 
community around special events.  They reinforce the important role of a few 
dedicated individuals in creating such opportunities to sustain a community network 
and make diasporic membership salient.  Indeed, shared throughout both Iraqi- and 
diasporic-focused scholarship is that ‘who’ modern Assyrians and Chaldeans are, to 
borrow Hanoosh’s language, is a constant, evolving effort in which elites construct 
official narratives of identity and belonging.  The role of local populations and events 
in the Middle East alike in making and remaking diasporic narratives is an 
unsurprising but important commonality throughout this literature, as this local-




A core challenge of diaspora studies lies within the definition and use of the term 
itself.  Diaspora, as understood here, to borrow from Khachig Tölölyan, represents ‘a 
special category of ethnicized dispersion’ shaped by a ‘paradoxical combination of 
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localism and transnationalism’ (Tölölyan 2012: 7, 13).  Over the past years, however, 
diaspora became an increasingly ubiquitous label, having stretched in application 
from the narrow parameters of a forcibly displaced people to perhaps any ‘segment of 
people living outside their homeland’ (Connor 1986: 16).  Traditional notions thus 
often paint pictures of nations-in-exile which maintain a national consciousness in 
spite of distance and dispersal from the homeland; by contrast, recent scholarship 
ventures to expand the concept to consider the possibility of, amongst others, 
religious diasporas, labour diasporas, gender-specific diasporas, and LGBT diasporas: 
in essence, any sort of imagined community which possesses an element of 
transnationalism (See Braziel 2008; Tölölyan 2007; Braziel and Mannur 2003; 
Vertovec 2000b).   
 
Such expansion, however, risks over-stretching diaspora as a meaningful social 
concept, blurring distinctions amongst any migrant populations so that the national 
consciousness which formerly defined diaspora, and the struggle of diasporic actors 
to build and sustain such consciousness, risks being lost.  Tölölyan worries the term 
diaspora is consequentially ‘in danger of becoming a promiscuously capacious 
category that is taken to include all the adjacent phenomena to which it is linked’ 
(Tölölyan 1996: 8).  William Safran asserts that minority status ‘is not ipso facto 
sufficient for labeling a community a diaspora’ (Safran 1999: 261-265).  Steven 
Vertovec argues overuse ‘sees the term become a loose reference conflating 
categories such as immigrants, guest-workers, ethnic and ‘racial’ minorities, refugees, 
expatriates and travelers’ (Vertovec 1997: 1).  Robin Cohen quipped that ‘one does 
not announce the formation of the diaspora the moment the representatives of a 
people first get off the boat at Ellis Island’ (Cohen 1997: 24).  This challenge, of 
course, is not unique to diaspora studies: studies of ethnicity, race, and nations face 
similar definitional challenges.  However, defining diaspora is further challenged by 
first framing who constitutes a diaspora (an ethnic group? a stateless nation? any 
minority?) and the nature of displacement (must it be traumatic? to how many states 
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must a diaspora be spread?) to questions of defining a diaspora after displacement - 
the longevity of diasporic identity (after how long does an emigrant population 
become a diaspora? when does a diaspora cease being?), ongoing relationships with 
the states of resettlement and displacement (can an assimilated population become a 
diaspora?), and what separates diasporas from any other migrant or transnational 
group (must there be political activity towards a homeland?).   
 
At the same time, thinking of diaspora more broadly has shed light on modern 
experiences of displacement and marginalization.  Convincing arguments have been 
made for diasporas that transcend a simple nation-displaced people dynamic, for 
example a Hindu diaspora (Vertovec 2000a), a Shia diaspora (Contractor 2014), and 
an African diaspora (Gilroy 1993; Butler 1998).  Considering diaspora through such 
cases focuses attention upon the diasporic experience within the countries of 
resettlement as a formative mechanism as significant as displacement: here, barriers 
to integration and acceptance make diasporas as much as dispersion.  In this light, 
the group and boundary theories of Rogers Brubaker (2004) and Andreas Wimmer 
(2013) originally applied to the formation of ethnic and national groups can similarly 
aid diaspora studies.  Diaspora formation is an elite-driven process of boundary 
formation characterized by multilayered, changing boundaries within and against 
which diasporas persist.  Understanding how diasporic identity, nationalism, and 
activism are formed within those boundaries provides insight into the complicated 
dynamics of diasporas.   
 
Building upon Frederick Barth’s work, boundaries are understood as social 
constructs, the products of interaction between two groups that create ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
distinctions, thereby creating social classifications as well as everyday social networks 
in which diasporic members are bound (Barth 1969).  Boundary theory thus offers a 
useful approach to consider the complexity of the diasporic experience, an experience 
which is not static but made and unmade by the permeability of state, local, and 
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transnational boundaries, changes therein, and the choices of diasporic actors.  Some 
dispersed populations work to become or remain a diaspora, creating boundaries 
against an open society to sustain diasporic identity and culture, and others have 
diaspora thrust upon them by unwelcoming immigration policies or exclusive 
national memberships; examples are found in the remnants of the Irish, Greek, and 
other European diasporas in America in the former, and Palestinians in Israel and 
Kurds in Germany in the latter.4  Some populations witness a political change in the 
homeland which opens formerly closed boundaries, most famously with the creation 
of Israel in 1948 and the liberation of Armenia in 1991; yet most diasporic 
individuals remain permanently removed, unable or unwilling to go home again.  By 
understanding these factors, we can gain insight into the choices and actions of 
diasporic elites.  Such an approach also highlights the different localized experiences 
of individual diasporic groups and the internal boundaries and tensions which result.  
In this case, boundary theory offers significant insight into the Assyrian and Chaldean 
experience in the U.S., its mobilization towards Iraq, and the Assyrian-Chaldean 
boundary within the greater diaspora.   
 
This section first examines prevailing concepts of diaspora and addresses ways in 
which boundary theory offers a useful analytical approach.  It then considers 
diaspora formation after resettlement, examining ways in which diasporic elites work 
as boundary-makers to develop diasporic identity and cultural boundaries, capture 
members, and sustain diasporic consciousness.  It lastly addresses how elites work as 
nation-builders, cultivating a diaspora-as-nation within the state of resettlement and 
developing long-distance nationalism towards a homeland.  The following chapters 
will build upon these concepts through analysis of the activism of Assyrian and 
Chaldean diasporic elites.   
 
                                            
4 For more on these diasporas, see Kanaaneh 2009; Argun 2003; Wahlbeck 1999; Rabinowitz 
1998; Gans 1979.  
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Defining Diaspora: Class, Criteria, and Consciousness  
 
While diasporic definitions are myriad, several key framings by which diaspora is 
often understood are examined here: diaspora as a middleman minority; diaspora as 
a triadic relationship with the home and host states; and diaspora as a hybridized 
third space.   
 
Ernest Gellner, in his seminal work on nationalism, offers a specific, narrow 
categorization of ‘diaspora nationalism’ (1983).  Here, diaspora begins with a distinct 
minority that despite an absence of land or power is more educated and often 
economically more prosperous than the surrounding society, and in turn develops a 
niche social or economic role.  Such an arrangement lasts until the general 
population begins to resent the diaspora’s special status, and one of Gellner’s 
consequences of nationalism typically results: assimilation, expulsion, or violence.  
Suggested here are the archetypical Jewish clerks and bankers, the Lebanese 
merchants, the Chinese traders.  This parallels a similar concept of ‘middleman 
minorities’ developed by Hubert Blalock (1967) and Edna Bonacich (1973).  They 
found minority groups with a ‘high adaptive capacity’ historically tended to occupy a 
middle status role in society, one with little power but relatively better income than 
the mass population (Blalock 83).  
 
In essence, middleman diasporas are a classist approach to diaspora.  In pre-modern 
societies, middleman minorities occupied the socio-economic space between the 
ruling class and the mass population; in modern, capitalist societies, such social 
stratification is often not as insular, and middleman minorities instead may assume a 
role in trade and commerce or dominance in a particular retail industry or 
occupation.  Bonacich observed, ‘They play the role of middleman between producer 
and consumer, employer and employee, owner and renter, elite and masses’ 
(Bonacich 583).  For example, Korean immigrants in the U.S. have acted as 
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middleman minorities by filling a gap between mainstream society and inner-cities, 
focusing on retail goods and services lacking from inner-city markets; similarly, 
Chinese migrants in Eastern Europe and Russia found a niche economic role in the 
post-communism environment in response to an underdeveloped retail network and 
unmet consumer demand for retail goods (Min and Kolodny 1994; Nyiri 2007).  
Gellner attributes the continuation of the middleman role in modernity to its ‘marked 
advantage’ derived from ‘urban style of life, habits of rational calculation, commercial 
probity, higher rates of literacy and possibly a scriptural religion’ (Gellner 103).   
 
Blalock finds those who hold middleman status are a ‘natural scapegoat’ in times of 
social stress; Bonacich finds hostility is not contingent just on stress, but simply the 
nature of the economic role.  Middleman groups tend to resist assimilation to retain 
their culture and connection to their ethnic community, aided by social exclusion and 
tightly-knit ethnic networks.  However, social and economic resentment can increase 
social exclusion, of which the Jewish experience in Europe is perhaps a pinnacle 
example, and may lead to further displacement.  In Gellner’s theory, this leaves the 
diaspora with few desirable options.  As he outlined:  
  
The problems of social transformation, cultural revivification, acquisition of 
territory, and coping with the natural enmity of those with previous claims on 
the terrain in question, illustrate the quite special and acute problems faced 
by diaspora nationalisms.  Those of them which retain some residue of an 
ancient territory may face problems which are correspondingly less acute.  
But the problems which face a diaspora culture which does not take the 
nationalist option may be as grave and tragic as those which face it if it does 
adopt nationalism (Gellner 108).   
 
Thus, without territory, the diaspora faces a choice of seeking a state of its own or 
assimilating somewhere.  Gellner’s theory does not continue to what happens beyond 
this, other than to note the tragedy of either option.  However, the potential for 
inclusion whilst retaining enough diasporic culture exists in some plural societies 
because the threat of diasporic identity and cultural practices is negated by a state 
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emphasis on multiculturalism (See Kymlicka 1995).  The utility of Gellner’s theory is 
in finding choices are made by diasporic actors and are often shaped by their own 
political and ideological understandings.  Each option can be pursued simultaneously 
from within the same diaspora, as seen within the Jewish diaspora prior to the 
creation of Israel and as seen within the Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora today.   
 
Niche economic roles therefore suggest ways in which diasporas can approach 
integration strategically, as well as ways social exclusion can produce diaspora.  Tight 
ethnic commercial networks enable a diaspora to position itself in a niche role whilst 
sustaining intra-ethnic ties.  However, rarely does the entirety of the diaspora’s 
membership occupy the same socio-economic stratum.  Chinese emigrants were 
coolies and labourers as much as they were shopkeepers and business-owners; 
Japanese immigrants in the U.S. were highly represented in the agricultural sector as 
well as skilled trades; European Jews were skilled professionals and destitute farmers 
(Hu-Dehart 2007, 1989; McKeown 1999; Chun 1989; O’Brien and Fugita 1982; 
Urofsky 1976).  Middleman diasporas are thus shaped by social and political 
conditions in the states of immigration and emigration more than an ethnic drive for 
entrepreneurship, by overrepresentation in an economic role as much as social 
perception of such overrepresentation (Chun 1989).  The shortcoming of the 
middlemen approach is thus its overemphasis on class: it is applicable only to a 
specific diasporic experience, thereby overlooking both the diversity within a single 
ethnic minority group as well as diasporas which never held a niche socio-economic 
role.   
 
Another prevailing tradition in diaspora studies approaches diaspora as a triadic 
relationship: a diasporic population’s relationship with the homeland, the host 
country, and the diasporic collective.  William Safran suggested diasporas imagine 
themselves as distinct from their host-land, distinct from the homeland to which they 
cannot yet return, and perhaps only linked to each other (Safran 1991).  He offered a 
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six-point criteria to determine if an expatriate minority community is indeed a 
diaspora, including a belief the ancestral homeland is the true ideal to which the 
diaspora or its descendants will eventually return; a commitment to the restoration, 
safety, and prosperity of the homeland; and a belief the diaspora cannot be fully 
accepted into the host society (Safran 83-84).  Homeland is understood here as 
either real or imagined, the country of origin or national lore, whilst a host society is 
the state or area of resettlement, a usage reinforcing the diaspora’s outsider status 
and impermanence.  The Jewish experience is again demonstrative, with the ‘next 
year in Jerusalem’ of Passover Seder a reinforcement of diasporic linkage to 
Jerusalem as a physical and spiritual homeland that has endured for generations.  
Safran further contended diasporas are different from other transnational groups 
because they are formed from unique, often traumatic, circumstances and bear ‘the 
political obligation, or the moral burden, of reconstituting a lost homeland or 
maintaining an endangered culture’ (Safran 85).  Tölölyan similarly has suggested 
diasporas typically, although not necessarily, result from catastrophe, which becomes 
essential to collective memory and mourning (Tölölyan 2007).   
 
Robin Cohen expanded upon Safran’s criteria, adding three points to emphasize 
cross-diasporic relationships, make allowances for diasporas which maintain 
diasporic identity in friendly, plural host states, and incorporate alternate causes of 
displacement (Cohen 1997).  Cohen introduced four typologies to develop how 
diaspora is thought of beyond an exclusively traumatic homeland exodus: he 
suggests victim diasporas arise from a traumatic dispersal from the homeland; trade 
diasporas arise from those who leave their homeland for economic circumstances; 
imperial diasporas from those who relocated abroad to administer or settle their 
country’s territories; and cultural diasporas serve as a catch-all for migrants who do 
not fit into the above categories but display some diasporic character.  Cohen’s 
justification for each classification underscores the marked complexity of 
displacement; however, as Cohen himself observed, the character of particular 
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diasporas often evolve, and such typologies are perhaps more useful to think about 
the origins and routes of a particular diaspora than to serve as a finite classification.  
Difficulty arises in categorizing the multiple migration paths that often comprise a 
single diaspora.  Some waves of diaspora may be forced refugees, others voluntarily 
migrants: different experiences can produce a cleavage within the diaspora itself, 
rendering such typologies also prone to overlooking internal dynamics and 
erroneously treating diaspora as a single, definite entity.  Assyrians fleeing genocide 
represent a markedly different cause for dispersion than those seeking economic 
opportunity.  Moreover, not all groups that are traumatically displaced become a 
diaspora, and instead fully integrate into their state of refuge. 
 
Gabriel Sheffer instead found it is not the cause of displacement but the status of the 
homeland, whether the diaspora possesses a kin state or is stateless, which is 
consequential to diasporic behavior (Sheffer 2007).  He suggests stateless diasporas 
are more likely to support secessionist or national liberation movements, often 
aspiring to a nation-state, whilst state-linked diasporas behave more pragmatically, 
working within the bounds of the state and seeking mitigation of any conflict that 
could damage the homeland.  Here, it is within the nation-state framework that 
diasporas make claims, and are themselves made by changing state boundaries.   
 
The shortcomings of the triadic framing is that while it is less limiting than the 
middleman approach, it is still an overly-strict criteria better reflecting an idealized 
theory of diaspora than the complicated realities of many diasporic experiences.  
Finding such typologies oversimplified by the homeland-host-diaspora framework, 
other scholars have reimagined diaspora as occupying a space between state 
boundaries or occupying a consciousness shaped by the roots and routes of the 
diasporic journey.  In this sense, it enables consideration of racial diasporas, those 
populations who cannot disappear into mainstream society because of national or 
social barriers in the state of resettlement towards racial minorities.  Explorations of 
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diaspora as existing between homelands have moved the field to look at 
transnational networks and global space, or the concept of ‘third space’ as coined by 
Homi Bhabha.  Bhabha sees diaspora as a negotiation of culture and community 
taking place between nationalist boundaries, thereby positioning diasporas as 
subversions to the nation-state (Bhabha 1994).  Here, diaspora is a rejection of the 
homogeneity of nationalism and a byproduct of globalization’s increased movement 
of peoples across borders.   
 
This approach brings focus to the African diaspora as an archetype, allowing a 
rethinking of diaspora removed from Jewish paradigm (Dufoix 2008).  Formative are 
the complex multitudes of migration and cultural production, which approach 
diaspora by its roots, where its history began, and its routes, the paths and 
movements it took to arrive at its current destination.  Paul Gilroy (1993) termed the 
diasporic experience a ‘double consciousness’, the being neither fully of the place one 
lives nor of the place of one’s ancestry, of a culture that is not white but not African 
either.  Diaspora, here, is the hybridity of cultures and identities, a byproduct of 
multiple origins and movements of people, that exists in a transnational, diasporic 
space above state and national borders.  
 
Stuart Hall (1996, 1990) similarly approached diaspora as a fluid concept forged by 
blendings of cultures and people.  He argued that routes are significant because 
identity evolves: diasporas cannot go home again, or to the home they imagine, and 
so routes ‘creolize’ diasporic identity, culture, and histories.  Hall, contextualizing his 
definition as ‘uniquely - “essentially” - Caribbean’, defined diaspora by its ‘necessary 
heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of “identity” which lives with and 
through, not despite, difference; by hybridity’ (Hall 1990: 235).  In this sense, 
diaspora is not a fight against assimilation - in some cases individuals cannot fully 
assimilate - and is not construed in relation to a single culture, homeland, or point of 
reference.   
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James Clifford observed that as of ‘the late 20th century, all or most communities 
have diasporic dimensions’ because of the mass migrations of people that have taken 
place over the previous centuries (Clifford 1994: 310).  Roots and routes matter in 
increasingly complicated forms.  He proposed looking at a diaspora’s borders, ‘what it 
defines itself against’, to understand its nature: diasporas have a stronger sense of 
difference, of being outside the host country, than ethnic communities; have lost the 
rootedness in the land held by indigenous societies; and yet have a sense of 
connection to the homeland that is ‘strong enough to resist erasure through the 
normalizing processes of forgetting, assimilating, and distancing’ that befalls most 
immigrant groups within a few generations (Clifford 307, 310-311).  Overemphasis 
on the homeland risks overlooking the influence of the routes taken, and the role of 
local interactions during those routes, in shaping the diaspora.   
 
Captured in this transnational approach is the reality that not all diasporic 
experiences are the same, and a consciousness of being of several places shapes the 
individual experience of diaspora.  An individual’s consciousness alone does not 
make a diaspora, of course, but enables awareness of others who share the feeling of 
belonging and disbelonging to the same places.  Diaspora is a ‘way of imposing an 
imaginary coherence on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation’ (Hall 1990: 
224).  In this sense, the idea of diasporic consciousness is predicated on Benedict 
Anderson’s theory of imagined communities and the ability of individuals to imagine 
themselves as part of a group beyond one’s own immediate geography (Anderson 
1991).  The imagined community is a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ but it is also a 
nation ‘imagined as both inherently limited and inherently sovereign’ (Anderson 6-
7).  Yet whereas Anderson sees imagined communities as breeding nationalism, 
nationalism is generally antithetical to the hybridization approach.   
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The challenge of such theories that view diaspora as transcending the state or 
operating in a negative space is that diasporas nonetheless still operate in world 
organized by states and state boundaries that in turn shape diasporic integration and 
action.  As populations flee or are expelled from one state, they become caged by the 
new state or states to which they flee, per Michael Mann’s theory that populations 
are caged by states out of the necessity of state-building (Mann 1993: 250-252).  The 
caged population turned its attention to state politics, caring ‘more about the 
conditions within their cages then about the cages themselves’ (Mann 252).  Claims 
that diasporas and globalization weaken the state or transcend the nation-state 
framework overlook that global networks remain dominated by state interests (Mann 
1997).  Diasporas may behave transnationally or cultivate a global consciousness 
amongst its membership, but they do so from the confines of state boundaries.  The 
difference made by state boundaries and citizenship policies is evident in the 
Palestinian diaspora, as Palestinians in Jordan largely integrated as naturalized 
citizens, versus those in Lebanon who were precluded from many types of 
employment and from naturalization opportunities, and Syria, where Palestinians 
accessed the same rights as Syrians except for citizenship, a factor that made life in 
Syria comparatively better until the recent civil war rendered those forced to flee 
officially stateless (Erakat 2014; Peteet 2007).  State borders are consequential to 
diaspora and the rights and opportunities granted to diasporic members.   
 
The above theoretical approaches underscore why diaspora is such a complicated 
concept: there is not a universalized diasporic experience.  The middleman 
experience as a privileged but loathed diaspora differs from those diasporas whose 
roots were borne of enslavement.  Differences are not just in how the diasporas came 
to be but the barriers which compel their persistence.  In typologizing the Chinese 
diaspora, for example, a middleman minority carries as much justification as a forced 
diaspora of indentured labourers; its status as a racial minority may prompt social 
exclusion of Chinese migrants in some states, compelling a dual consciousness of 
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belonging and disbelonging.  In essence, these frameworks serve almost as typologies 
of a pariah economic class, a traumatically displaced people in search of a homeland, 
and a racial minority precluded from integration: collectively they offer a fuller 
picture of why and how diaspora is experienced.  
 
However, underlying these theories is an implicit but essential interaction between 
diasporas and state and social boundaries.  The location of diaspora matters, in terms 
of the state in which it lands and the surrounding community in which it settles.  
Middleman minorities confront exclusionary social boundaries that keep them as 
outsiders, yet they also create boundaries to retain their own cultural elements and 
ethnic ties.  Triadic relationships are made by state boundaries that separate 
populations from their homelands and each other, and through boundaries that limit 
integration into places of resettlement.  Transnational hybridity, although purporting 
to transcend state borders, more accurately is itself the product of blurring and 
changing boundaries.  Clifford’s consideration of what diasporas define themselves 
against echoes boundary theory’s emphasis on social construction: roots and routes 
are, in essence, the cultural, ethnic, class, and historical experiences that mold 
diasporic narratives and the diacritica upon which social boundaries are built.  
Boundary theory therefore offers a useful approach to diaspora studies because it 
brings into consideration when and why certain identities or cultural traits become 
salient, illuminating differences and similarities in how societies create diasporas and 
how diasporas create themselves.   
 
Boundary Theory as an Alternative Framework 
 
Boundary theory emerged as a constructivist response to primordial or essentialist 
approaches to ethnicity.  Wimmer critiqued the shortcomings of prevailing 
approaches to ethnicity as unsuccessfully attempting to define what ethnicity is 
rather than to understand why it is so variable (Wimmer 2008: 971-972).  Among 
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such variants left unexplained is why ethnicity is politically salient in some cases but 
not others; why some ethnic groups display tighter in-group mentalities than others; 
and why some ethnic groups have higher degrees of longevity and stability: in this 
sense, it is a direct reaction to theorists like Johann Herder, who conceptualized 
ethnicity as ‘self-evident’ and ‘self-explanatory’ (Wimmer 2008; 2009: 245).  In 
approaching ethnicity as a solitary unit, Wimmer argues, phenomena like 
assimilation is erroneously thought to occur as a standardized process by which 
acculturation in turn diminishes ethnic solidarity and ultimately ethnic identity, or, 
alternatively, a process that does not occur because social boundaries and 
discrimination are thought to be permanent.  Assimilation was treated as a group-
level process rather than an individual-level process affected by social, economic, 
occupational, and other factors.  Boundary theory instead recognizes that ethnic 
communities are not insular groups across which culture, solidarity, and ethnic 
narratives are consistent, thereby explaining its variance.  In seeking to address the 
shortcomings of ethnic theory, boundary theory likewise addresses shortcomings of 
diaspora theory and similar variations in the diasporic experience.    
 
Boundary theory maintains ethnic groups are not inevitable or permanent constructs, 
but made through interaction between populations who then determine themselves 
to be different from one another (Wimmer 2013; Brubaker 2004; Barth 1969).  For 
such distinctions to occur, groups must have some contact with each other; yet 
boundaries do not emerge spontaneously: they result from social distancing and 
closure reinforced by marking the ethnic boundary with ‘cultural diacritica’ now 
given social relevance (Wimmer 2009: 254).  In this sense, ethnicity is the product of 
‘the application of systematic distinctions between insiders and outsiders; between Us 
and Them’, with such distinctions drawn from differences, whether cultural, physical, 
linguistic, or religious, that correspondingly establish where the ethnic boundary is 
located and who will be included within its bounds (Eriksen 1993: 18, 18-35).  
Wimmer found four factors which influence the nature of the resulting boundary: its 
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political salience; the level of social exclusion the boundary produces; the degree of 
cultural differences between the groups; and its stability over time (Wimmer 2013: 
79).  The ethnic groups may have equal or imbalanced power, may be tightly-bound 
or porous, and may be partial or rigid, all of which determine who can cross the 
boundary and what circumstances and stigma are associated with doing so.  
Underscored here is the role of elites in defining what is politically salient, 
negotiating boundaries and the criteria upon which membership comes to lie.   
 
Thus, to the extent that ‘ethnicity, race and nationhood exist only in and through our 
perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifications’, as 
Brubaker observed, the same is applicable to diaspora (Brubaker 2004: 17).  
Diasporas likewise are not predetermined but made, the product of a boundary built 
upon the diaspora’s cultural differences in relation to its surrounding society, and 
established through exclusion by the new society, construction by diasporic elites 
themselves, or a combination thereof.  A diaspora’s experience is therefore heavily 
shaped by its state of resettlement: the boundaries encountered by a displaced group 
entering a diverse, immigrant-friendly society are often porous and crossable; the 
boundaries encountered entering an homogenous society with strict national 
membership are often rigid and difficult to cross.   
 
Not all boundaries, of course, possess the same permeability.  As Wimmer notes, ‘the 
degree of social closure along ethnic lines varies across contexts’ (2009: 252).  He 
found ‘ethnic distinctions may be fuzzy and boundaries soft, with unclear 
demarcations and few social consequences, allowing individuals to maintain 
membership in several categories or switch identities situationally’ (Wimmer 2008: 
975).  As hybridity and creolization theory stress, there are distinctions between 
diasporas that can assimilate and those which cannot because of racial exclusions 
from the state or society of resettlement.  Race is thus a determinative factor in 
boundary salience: such boundaries are often impermeable, requiring social change 
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to erode.  Diasporic leaders representing racial diasporas play a significant role in 
establishing political goals and enacting social pressure on the diaspora’s behalf.  The 
ease of bringing about such change is contingent on the nature of the boundaries and 
the degree of exclusion put forth by society.  By contrast, in societies with porous 
boundaries into which diasporic members could easily cross, diasporic elites must 
instead work against acculturation.  Without establishing criteria differentiating 
diasporic members from local society, there is no social boundary for diaspora to 
exist.  
 
Cultural distinctions upon which boundaries are based may change over time, as do 
the actors who claim their political and social relevance (Barth 1969).  Social 
context, receptiveness of the state of resettlement, and ability to integrate influence 
the degree to which diasporic identity is prioritized as one of the many identities its 
members possess.  Diasporic groups are not necessarily omnipresent: in addition to 
said external factors, there are internal dynamics that witness ‘phases of 
extraordinary cohesion and moments of intensely felt collective solidarity’ and 
dynamics which witness the opposite (Brubaker 2004: 12).  This again underscores 
the agency of diasporic actors in working to construct and sustain a diaspora, much 
in the same way a nation or ethnic group is created.   
 
Brubaker observed that an emphasis on boundary-maintenance is a core pillar of 
diaspora theories that focus on the groupness of diaspora, an emphasis 
fundamentally at odds with hybridity and creolization, resulting in ‘a tension in the 
literature between boundary-maintenance and boundary-erosion’ (Brubaker 2005: 6).  
His point aptly characterizes the either-or dichotomy of these approaches: either 
diaspora is the result of social exclusion or it is produced by social intermixing.  Yet 
diasporas are created through both frameworks.  Brubaker sought to addresses such 
contradictions by challenging the field’s approach to diasporas as groups entirely.  He 
instead suggested, ‘we should think of diaspora not in substantialist terms as a 
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bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim… “diaspora” is used to 
make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to 
appeal to loyalties’ (Brubaker 2005:12).  He captures a significant element of 
diaspora, one likewise stated by Tölölyan that diasporas must include an element of 
‘doing’: a diaspora must act to support its religious or community institutions, its 
language, anything that reinforces its unique identity, a ‘doing’ which is organized 
and reinforced by committed diasporic activists and leaders (Tölölyan 1996: 15).   
 
However, the shortcoming of Brubaker’s approach is that any diasporic project, by 
virtue of seeking to distinguish itself as a diaspora or by being distinguished as an 
outside, transnational minority, is a product of state and social boundaries and 
presents itself as representing a defined group.  Diasporic actors make political claims 
on behalf of their bounded group, a group which actors themselves aid in 
constructing and maintaining.  Rather than overlooking boundaries, examining the 
nature of those boundaries - the cultural criteria perceived as salient to determining 
membership, the nature of those boundaries over time, the social and political 
situations in which boundaries become salient, and the presence of internal 
boundaries - can help provide a more comprehensive understanding of diaspora, and 
why and when activism occurs.   
 
The utility of boundary theory is therefore apparent.  A better understanding of 
diaspora is gained through examining why and under what conditions boundaries 
change, and why diasporas experience boundaries differently, than to dismiss 
diasporas as groups.  To Brubaker’s boundary-maintenance/boundary-erosion 
dichotomy critique, it is suggested boundary changes are better understood through 
Wimmer’s typology, which finds five types of changes (Wimmer 2013: 49-63).  In the 
first type of change, expansion, topographical boundaries move to be more inclusive, 
most typically under nation-building, delineating national majorities and minorities.  
An example of boundary expansion that ‘makes’ minorities was the 
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institutionalization of the Ottoman millet system that made certain religious 
minorities members, but less equal members, of the Ottoman state.  In the second 
boundary change, contraction, boundaries are drawn more narrowly to exclude 
members.  This can occur through fission, which splits a category in two, or through 
redefining group membership along more narrow criteria.  This may cause exclusion 
of a specific minority, but can also be used by a minority to distance itself from a 
broader category, such as Iraqi-Americans distancing from a broader ‘Arab’ ethnic 
label.  The third change, transvaluation, changes the hierarchy of ethnic categories.  
This may equalize a formerly disadvantaged group or bring a formerly excluded 
group to power, such as the assumption of Shia political control following the 
removal of the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath regime.   
 
The last two changes are perhaps the most relevant to diaspora: boundary crossing 
and repositioning, and boundary blurring.  Crossing and repositioning occur when an 
individual changes his or her own ethnic membership by crossing from one group to 
another, often through assimilation, or an entire ethnic group is repositioned into 
another category, often through a shift in the boundary criteria, as found in Hussein’s 
redefinition of Assyrians and Chaldeans as Arab Christians.  Both types of border 
crossing are dependent on the acceptance of the group into which crossing occurs.  
Wimmer notes boundary shifting in this context differs from expansion because it 
represents a normative change in the meaning of the boundary rather than a change 
in topography; this distinction is not entirely clear-cut because creating national 
boundaries and minorities therein often accompanies changes in normative criteria.  
Lastly, a blurring of boundaries occurs when the importance of one boundary-
defining category, such as ethnicity, is reduced as other factors, such as culture, 
economic status, or religion, increase in importance.  Blurring occurred when 
Assyrian guerrilla forces fought alongside Kurdish forces in the 1990s against 
Hussein, brought together by shared persecution.   
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Therefore, creolization does not so much erode boundaries as blur them, or perhaps 
create new, malleable boundaries around a diasporic ‘third space’.  A ‘third space’ is 
not an absence of boundaries or a gap between them, but a form of boundary itself.  
Boundaries do not disappear with creolization because insiders and outsiders, 
determinations of us and them, still exist even as they, and the identity and culture 
they represent, are reshaped.   
 
The intent in this analysis is not to fall into what Brubaker critiques as groupism, 
treating ethnic groups or nations as homogenous, unified entities possessing agency 
and attributable interests (Brubaker 2004: 8).  However, ethnic actors themselves 
politicize and frame ethnic groups as a single entity on behalf of which political 
claims are staked: as Brubaker also observed, treating ethnic groups as groups ‘is 
precisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are in the business of doing…we should 
certainly try to account for the ways in which - and conditions under which - this 
practice of reification, this powerful crystallization of group feeling, can work’ 
(Brubaker 10).  This is likewise captured by Paul Brass’s observation that ‘cultural 
forms, values, and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites in 
competition for political power and economic advantage’, and any ethnic or national 
group formation can change ‘because of both the dynamics of external competition 
and the internal divisions and contradictions that exist within all groups of people, 
however defined’ (Brass 1991: 15-16).  The notion of elite competition in making 
diasporas is central to this thesis: leaders work to shape boundaries, sometimes 
forming competing boundaries, and compete as its political and ideological 
representatives. 
 
Diasporas Are Not Borne from Displacement 
 
As noted earlier, Cohen remarked that migrants, even those bearing all the criteria of 
victim diasporas, do not arrive on foreign soil and proclaim themselves as such.  
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Diasporas are instead made through social interactions and elite leadership after 
resettlement, not as the axiomatic byproduct of displacement.  At a fundamental 
level, diaspora-building is a parochial task.  Boundaries are formed in relation to 
society.  This process displays a tension of wanting to integrate into the new society 
but wanting to maintain enough of a boundary to keep the nation alive, in some 
capacity, within that society.  This latter point is particularly resonant with the fear 
an absence of social boundaries will bring disappearance: within the Assyrian and 
Chaldean diaspora, the pull of assimilation serves as a driving force for diasporic 
formation and activism.  
 
This section unpacks that which builds a diaspora after displacement and 
resettlement.  The focus herein, as it is relevant to the Assyrian and Chaldean 
experience in America, is primarily upon those diasporas with few barriers to 
boundary crossing in the state of resettlement.  It looks first at the necessity of 
crafting identity, and the role of individual actors who work to create boundaries and 
shape the diasporic nation therein.  Diasporic actors seek means, particularly by 
institution-building, that will reinforce membership through successive generations.  
It then looks to the role nationalism can play in providing ideological and political 
purpose.   
 
Identity and Institutions: Building Diasporic Membership 
 
As noted above, diasporic identity is not stagnant. Such identity ‘may be lost entirely, 
may ebb and flow, be hot or cold, switched on or off, remain active or dormant. The 
degree of attachment - and mobilization around it - often depends upon events 
affecting the purported homeland’ (Vertovec 2005: 3).  Yet identity is, per Charles 
Tilly, a ‘blurred but indispensable’ concept; as Kim Butler observed, identity is ‘a vital 
component of diasporas; it transforms them from the physical reality of dispersal into 
the psychosocial reality of diasporas’ (Tilly 1996: 7; Butler 2001: 207).  Diasporic 
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identity, particularly as tied to an ethnic, religious, or national identity, takes on 
social implications, assumptions about culture and behaviour, and that which 
represents the boundary between those who hold the identity and those who do not.   
 
Cultivating a diaspora is complicated because diasporas encompass a host of internal 
and external factors that promote divisions along socioeconomic status, areas of 
origin, areas of resettlement, generations removed from the homeland, competing 
political allegiances, and competing non-diasporic identities.  Diasporic actors must 
create narratives that transcend these divisions and can be bought into by members 
across social cleavages: per Andrew Wachtel, ‘ultimately, those nations will form 
whose elites present well-articulated, well-chose national visions. And they will 
continue to succeed until either some other group provides a better-articulated and 
better-chosen vision or the initial vision discredits itself’ (Wachtel 1998: 3).  
Diasporic identity formation consequentially is intertwined with border formation: it 
reflects the ethnic or cultural boundary upon which membership criteria are 
established. 
 
The first task of diasporic elites, then, is negotiating the markers that define 
membership.  Although diasporic actors represent a minority and typically possess 
little power, they, like any immigrants settling in a new society, ‘do not only passively 
react to host decisions about structures of most relevance to them, but their views of 
how boundaries should be drawn, crossed, shifted, or blurred are part of the 
negotiations about boundaries’ (Zolberg and Woon 1999: 10).  Integration 
subsequently centers on two core questions:  ‘how different can we afford to be, and 
how alike must we be?’ (Zolberg and Woon: 8).  The social context that creates 
diaspora influences its boundary-defining characteristics.  Chaldeans found their 
Catholicism, the distinguishing component of their identity in Iraq, was no longer 
unique upon arrival in the U.S. and therefore no longer served as the primary 
boundary against the rest of society.  Chaldean elites instead drew upon other 
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cultural elements, including entrepreneurship, ties to Mesopotamia, and language, 
and the Chaldean Church positioned itself as different from other Catholic Churches 
because of its unique entwinement with Chaldean identity.  Assyrian leaders, by 
contrast, found an identity too tied to the Church of the East was overly limiting.  
Instead, Assyrian ethnicity was built as all-encompassing of the multiple churches 
and countries of origin that comprised the Assyrian population. 
 
Diasporic actors thus pursue narratives and boundaries they believe will be lasting 
and forestall assimilation.  Wimmer considers assimilation a boundary shift that is 
the ‘result of a power-driven political struggle’ and not the ‘quasi-natural outcome of 
decreasing cultural differences’ that previous ethnic theory described (Wimmer 2013: 
29).  Individuals do not assimilate simply because they come to possess the right 
cultural makers, fading into mainstream society as the next generations become more 
culturally homogenized until only symbolic remnants of the original ethnicity remain 
(Wimmer 18-20).  Instead, the majority population accepts such incorporation, either 
through allowing porous boundaries in the first place or shifting existing ones.  
Studies examining changes in racial composition in Brazil and Puerto Rico, for 
example, support Wimmer’s point.  Changes in social understandings of who is 
‘white’ sparked a rapid statistical demographic shift, ‘whitening’ both societies in a 
way that could not be explained by simple population growth or immigration 
(Schwartzman 2007; Loveman and Muniz 2007).  In Puerto Rico, the social 
boundary surrounding white identity shifted to included mixed-race individuals 
previously considered coloured; in Brazil, upper-class, nonwhite Brazilians were able 
to cross ethnic boundaries in a way lower-class, nonwhite Brazilians could not.  The 
difference between boundary-crossing and boundary-shifting represents an individual 
versus social level of assimilation, in which an individual can develop social criteria 
needed to pass, or cross, into a different category, such as possessing wealth in 
Brazil, whereas a society shifts its boundaries to redefine and expand membership 
 43 
criteria, such as incorporating a formerly distinct racial group in Puerto Rico 
(Wimmer 59-63).   
 
Social and political contexts of identity matter because they may change social 
boundaries and influence individual identity usage.  A recent push to reclaim black 
identity in Brazil, for example, led to an uptick in educated nonwhite men reversing 
earlier trends and classifying their children as nonwhite (Schwartzman 960).  A 
similar experience was observed amongst Native Americans in the U.S. when a 
changing political climate saw Native American identification increase by more than 
1.5 million individuals in two decades, primarily driven by white Americans 
reclaiming their ethnic heritage (Nagel 1996).  Consequentially, whereas social 
acceptance enables assimilation, in-group pressure can influence individual choice to 
retain a minority identity by making the identity socially relevant.   
 
Assimilation, then, is a product of individual choices permitted by social acceptance.  
This is significant to the Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora in the U.S. because of the 
ease of Assyrian and Chaldean assimilation.  Naturalization laws provide a path to 
citizenship, legalizing membership; social acceptance, however, is often based on 
racial, religious, and linguistic factors (Wimmer 2013; Zolberg and Woon 1999; Hall 
and Lindholm 1999).  A main hindrance to Assyrian and Chaldean integration 
typically reflects anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stigma, which is often negated by 
learning English and by their Christianity.  Consequentially, there are few barriers 
that preclude crossing the boundary from Middle Eastern immigrants to members of 
American society.  It is for this reason the fear of assimilation is pervasive amongst 
diasporic actors: as Wimmer noted, ‘if all members of a particular ethnic category 
pursue a strategy of boundary crossing into another group, and if members of this 
second group pursue a strategy of boundary expansion and allow such assimilation, 
the first ethnic group will slowly disappear over time’ (Wimmer 107).   
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This consequence draws out the particular challenge presented to the diaspora: the 
want for Assyrians and Chaldeans to integrate, to be accepted as part of society and 
have opportunity, but to do so without disappearing.  The U.S., in this diaspora’s 
experience, is not a host society but a permanent home.  Thus, elites appear to 
pursue a strategy of boundary shifting, the expansion of American social and national 
boundaries.  As opposed to individual crossing, this enables a collective repositioning 
in which boundary criteria is redefined to recognize Assyrians and Chaldeans, and 
the cultural diacritica which define them, as part of society.  As an integration 
strategy, it enables the diaspora to retain cultural elements without facing 
marginalization; however, it still presents a challenge to retain such cultural 
elements - and diasporic boundaries - over time as it increases the voluntariness of 
diasporic association: there is no marginalization or external reinforcement of being 
Assyrian and Chaldean.   
 
Such a strategy perhaps has the best chance in multicultural or immigrant societies 
that enable ethnic and cultural pluralism.  This recalls John Hall and Charles 
Lindholm’s observation that multiculturalism in America is celebrated as long as it is 
‘nice’ and non-disruptive; ethnicity in America ‘is in fact chosen, at least amongst 
whites’ (Hall and Lindholm 1999: 133).  All diasporas endure assimilation, including 
the pinnacle Jewish and Armenian examples, but it is perhaps the degree to which 
assimilation is counteracted by thriving institutions and a salient identity that 
sustains the diaspora.   
 
Diasporic elites, in a sense, attempt to build a nation absent a territory, within the 
social space and institutional structures where they reside.  In their study on culture, 
Jonas Frykman and Orvar Löfgren (1987) find culture-building is rarely a conscious, 
mapped strategy; instead, ‘people seldom view themselves as culture builders’ 
because culture is rather a product of everyday, banal tasks.  By contrast, diasporic 
actors are often highly conscious of their role.  They create institutions, events, art, 
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literature, and cultural programs to engage members, reinforce identity and diasporic 
consciousness, and reinforce boundaries, however porous, between the diaspora and 
mainstream society.  Sheffer (2003: 53) and Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth (2003: 
452) identified core members, the organizing elite, who are regularly and actively 
engaged, and orchestrate the direction of diasporic activities; this action is 
undertaken on behalf of the wider diaspora who possess varying levels of 
engagement and consciousness.   
 
Tölölyan similarly emphasized that diasporas are as much organized as they are 
imagined; they are a product of, and kept alive by, collective memory and collective 
action (Tölölyan 1996).  Sheffer proposed diasporic organizations act in three 
primary functions: maintenance of the diaspora’s social, religious, and financial 
aspects; promotion of cultural, social, and political issues amongst members of the 
diaspora; and the legal and physical defense of the diaspora and homeland (Sheffer 
2007: 71).  Organizations are particularly consequential as diasporas integrate into 
new states.  Because institutions are visible and interactive, they become part of daily 
life, through churches, schools, newspapers, and stores: cultural reinforcement is 
transmitted ‘more effectively through trivial everyday routines than through cultural 
preaching and normative statements’ (Frykman and Löfgren 1987: 271). 
 
A common theme thus emerges amongst diasporic actors: a quest to achieve some 
measure of institutional completeness with the intent of serving and sustaining the 
diaspora.  The concept of institutional completeness was developed by Raymond 
Breton (1964) and Arthur Stinchcombe (1965).  Breton argued the degree to which 
an immigrant is absorbed or assimilates into his or her new society is influenced by 
three different communities and the social organizations therein: ‘the community of 
his ethnicity, the native (i.e., receiving) community, and the other ethnic 
communities’ (Breton 193).  An institutionally-complete ethnic community ‘at its 
extreme’ is able to provide all services to all community members, negating the need 
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to use native institutions for any measure of daily life from education to commerce to 
social assistance: this measure of completeness, he finds, is improbable in 
contemporary North American cities; rather, ethnic organizations seek to develop a 
structure as close to this as possible that possesses the capacity to absorb and 
integrate new members, thereby reinforcing and expanding the structure itself 
(Breton 194, 199).  Stinchcombe further found the presence of formal organizations 
is significant to ethnic group solidarity, that ‘the greater the number and variety of 
organizations, the greater the solidarity is likely to be’ (Stinchcombe 185).   
 
Organizations can play an additional role in capturing latent members.  Safran 
suggested organizations are capable of reviving latent diasporas should traumatic 
events in the host country or homeland compel a diasporic response (Safran 1999).  
Such revival, he observed, requires a sufficient concentration of population who still 
possess some diasporic identity, as well as charismatic leaders, entrepreneurial 
backing, and a cohesive internal structure.  The role of organizations in making 
diasporic membership salient is not just political activism in times of crisis, but also 
mundane doings.  Successful organizations may reengage diasporic identity because 
they offer a benefit to membership and engagement: they make the diaspora socially 
relevant.  A successful ethnic chamber of commerce, for example, may encourage 
latent group members to rediscover their ethnic identity to support their own 
business or personal interests.  Individual calculi drive membership and 
identification, and a variety of organizations aide in casting a wide diasporic net.  
The ability of a diverse array of organizations to operate is contingent on the 
presence and openness of civil society within the state of resettlement: location is 
again formative to diaspora-building.  
 
Of note to the Assyrian and Chaldean experiences is the significance of religion as a 
unique marker of identity and ethnicity.  While Sheffer argued there is a contrast 
between religious communities and diaspora, he allowed both share a common 
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ideology produced by a unified belief system and cultural symbols, and share a 
territorial focus, a spiritual center (Sheffer 2003: 66).  Cohen likewise found religion 
mimics features of diaspora and ‘can provide additional cement to bind a diasporic 
consciousness’ (Cohen 1997: 189).  Vertovec affirmed religious institutions can fill an 
important role in the creation and endurance of diaspora; the overlap of religion and 
ethnicity contributes significantly to their endurance, as found with Hindus, Jews, 
Sikhs and Armenians (Vertovec 2000a: 2-3).   
 
Akin to aiding diasporic fusion, Breton found the presence of religious institutions 
has the single greatest effect in attracting an immigrant to ethnic institution: 
‘religious leaders frequently become advocates and preachers of a national ideology 
providing a raison d’être for the ethnic community and a motivation for identification 
with it’ (Breton 200-201).  Religious leaders are naturally positioned, in unfamiliar 
society, to serve as de facto community leaders, a trusted source that can 
communicate diasporic ideals and transmit cultural markers from within an 
institutional structure that offers services and aide to community members.  This 
overlap is significant with the Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora: religious institutions 
assist in shaping continuity, but do so atop a unique ethnicity.  In the Middle East, 
being a Christian population created immediate boundaries, leaving ethnic 
differences less consequential to boundary formation.  In the U.S., it was instead 
geographic and unfamiliar ethnic origins that created boundaries; Christianity 
provided an immediate source of familiarity and facilitated boundary crossing.  For 
this to occur, diasporic institutions were essential to establishing social 
understandings of ‘who’ Assyrians and Chaldeans are.  
 
In some cases, the effect of cultivating stringent group boundaries can create tense 
relationships with the surrounding community.  In states with an omnipresent risk of 
insecurity, diasporas may cultivate an in-group mentality; however, this bears risk 
the wider community may become hostile towards the un-assimilating population 
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(Cohen 1996: 512).  For example, Cohen observed the Jewish diaspora’s modern 
history is ‘one of endurance and achievement but also of anxiety and distrust’ (Cohen 
511).  Although the Assyrian and Chaldean experience in Iraq cultivated similar 
anxiety, this has generally not been the diasporic experience in the U.S.  Underscored 
here is that social contexts and boundaries affect not just the existence of a diaspora, 
but the dynamics therein.  Through day-to-day experiences, local interaction shapes 
security and insecurity, and forestalls or enables integration.  
 
Nationalism and Political Activism 
 
Multiple layers of boundary formation build a diasporic nation in some form, one 
which is unrooted but shaped by the state of residence and the nationalism of 
diasporic elites.  Nationalism, in a way, embodies the diaspora: it understands the 
diasporic nation as a political community rather than just a byproduct of dispersal.  
The extra-territorial diasporic nation subsequently challenges traditional nationalism 
theory because its focus is not necessarily to territorial attainment or a nation-state.  
 
The ethnic roots of diaspora underlie diasporic nationalism.  Anthony Smith 
proposed ethnic communities are founded upon ethnies, ‘named human populations 
with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a 
specific territory and a sense of solidarity’ (Smith 1986: 32).  Here, ethnies are 
bounded groups whose memories, symbols, and religious traditions allow diasporas 
to endure despite the ‘double loss’ of their homeland and autonomy.  In immigrant 
societies, ethnic migrants can develop a political loyalty to the state and a cultural 
loyalty to the ethnie.  This likewise serves as a foundation to Sheffer’s theory, where 
he found ties to antiquity, the role of symbols and myths, and shared ethnic roots 
make diaspora a perennial and lasting phenomena (Sheffer 2003).  Smith attributed 
the ability of ethnies to remain ethnies in the face of displacement and migration to 
‘vicarious nationalism’, in which minorities still desire a nation for their co-ethnics in 
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the ancestral homeland and consequentially support national agendas on behalf of 
their greater ethnie; he argues this is done to compensate for the pain of their lost 
heritage and the loss of ties to their ethnic community.  Smith later framed vicarious 
nationalism specifically as diasporic nationalism, a modern form of nationalism held 
by diasporic members that is an ‘ideological movement to secure…collective 
autonomy, unity and identity by restoring its members to their historic homeland’ 
(Smith 2010: 4).   
 
Similarly, Benedict Anderson, in applying his theory of imagined communities to the 
migrant experience, observed migrants may exercise a ‘long-distance nationalism’ 
through which they continue to imagine themselves as part of their home 
community.  Long-distance nationalism emerged with modernity: migration occurs in 
a world where the nation-state is the international norm, and every migrant, save a 
few rare circumstances, hails from a nation-state and holds a national identity.  
Anderson notes, ‘The internet, electronic banking and cheap international travel are 
allowing such people to have a powerful influence on the politics of their country of 
origin, even if they have no intention any longer of living there’; the ‘meditated 
imagery of home’ is now perpetually available (Anderson 2001; 1992: 8).  Migrants 
are able to continue imagining themselves as part of a community despite their 
physical, and perhaps permanent, absence.   
 
Both vicarious nationalism and long-distance nationalism capture a key element of 
diasporic behavior: the longing for the homeland even in cases of resettlement and 
integration into friendly societies.  Nationalism, however, is more than an ideology or 
consciousness.  It is a political demand; it is a choice; it can be reactionary or 
foresighted.  Nationalism, per Gellner’s lasting definition, is the ‘belief that the 
political and the national unit should be congruent’, that the boundaries of a state 
should align with a people who believe themselves to belong together (Gellner 1983: 
1).  He contends:  
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It follows that a territorial political unit can only become ethnically 
homogeneous, in such cases, if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-
nationals.  Their unwillingness to suffer such fates may make the peaceful 
implementation of the nationalist principle difficult (Gellner 2).   
 
Forced displacement is the cornerstone acutely known to many diasporas.  Gellner’s 
succinct pronouncement of the outcomes of nationalism is highly applicable to the 
Assyrian and Chaldean experience, both to understanding the changes in Iraqi 
nationalism that continue to marginalize their population and the choices they and 
their diasporic populations face as a result.  Their dilemma has become greater with 
renewed flight from the homeland: each wave of displacement underscores the 
particular difficulty of possessing no solitary claim to land, of being indigenous 
people around whom modern states were built.  The choices Gellner presents are 
thus shared by displaced people everywhere: flee, assimilate, or pursue some 
measure of autonomy.  The reality of the diasporic experience is that all three choices 
may happen simultaneously.  National ideologies may take several forms because 
they too are created by individual actors.  The Jewish diaspora is not just made of 
Zionists; rather, prior to the formation of Israel, the rise of Zionism coincided more 
with increasing anti-Semitism and marginalization in Europe, and faced a significant 
backlash from, amongst others, movements within reform Judaism that rejected 
territorial nationalism (Herzl 1989; Shlaim 2001).   
 
To John Breuilly, political motivation similarly underlies any national demand: 
 
To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernisation is to neglect 
the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about 
politics and politics is about power.  Power, in the modern world, is 
principally about control of the state.  The central task is to relate nationalism 
to the objectives of obtaining and using state power (Breuilly 1993: 1-2).   
 
 51 
Diasporic leaders, through claiming representation of the diaspora, act as national 
leaders: echoing Brubaker’s theory, they bridge together popular beliefs, practices, 
and culture; frame them as the ideal of the community; and channel them into a 
political claim (Breuilly 69-70).  Nationalism requires political demands and 
activism; in short, ‘one cannot merely equate the rise in nationalism with the rise in 
national consciousness’ (Breuilly 174).  Indeed, the presence of political demands on 
behalf of the nation is a useful measure: it is the difference between imagining 
Nineveh as the ancient homeland and demanding legislation making Nineveh an 
autonomous region for the Assyrian and Chaldean people.   
 
Yet if traditional nationalism is ultimately a political project seeking control of the 
state as Gellner and Breuilly find, the challenge diaspora poses to this nation-state 
framework becomes apparent.  For diaspora, the nation is extra-territorial, 
simultaneously local and transnational, divided and caged by the confines of state 
borders and often intermixed with other ethnic groups, nations, and cultures.  Small, 
powerless, minority diasporas with no meaningful claims to statehood, such as the 
Assyrians and Chaldeans, or racial diasporas without a singular homeland, may 
instead pursue tempered political claims for liberal democratic rights and protections 
from discrimination in lieu of state power itself.   
 
A distinction in terminology, as understood in this thesis, is thus necessary: the 
difference between diasporic nationalism and long-distance nationalism.  Diasporic 
nationalism is a form of nationalism toward the diaspora itself, toward this extra-
territorial nation.  It is an extension of Gellner’s usage, in which he distinguished 
between traditional nationalism as the quest for a nation-state, and the diasporic 
nationalism of a middleman minority-type diaspora that carries on ethnic ties and 
cultural practices through niche economic roles (Gellner 101-109).  This framework 
is expanded here beyond middleman minorities to any type of diaspora and the 
boundary-making, cultural negotiations, and political claims that go into making a 
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diasporic nation.  Because the diaspora does not have a state or mechanisms to 
establish a leader or legitimate power, politics and power instead take the form of 
serving as an arbiter of all things diaspora – culture, history, national narratives, 
leading key organizations, establishing immediate and long-term visions for the 
diaspora, and serving as a political voice of the nation and making political demands 
on its behalf.   
 
Long-distance nationalism, to use Anderson’s terminology, represents those political 
claims diasporic actors possess towards the homeland or some iteration of the 
homeland.  It is ultimately a political demand in another state.  Threats to the 
diaspora or injustices facing co-ethnics in other states may fuel long-distance 
nationalism in demand of changes in state policy, administrative rights, or statehood.  
Thus, Smith’s use of vicarious/diasporic nationalism fits into the concept of long-
distance nationalism as used here.  Long-distance nationalism may therefore emerge 
from and coexist with diasporic nationalism: in this sense, it is a targeted 
nationalism, the making of long-distance political claims regarding co-ethnics in a 
foreign state, that differs it from diasporic nationalism.   
 
The distinction between the aims of these nationalisms is illustrated by the difference 
between the long-distance nationalism of the Jewish diaspora in America toward 
Israel, from its creation to its politics today, and its diasporic nationalism toward the 
diaspora, toward maintaining Jewish institutions, religion, and the well-being of 
Jewish-Americans as an extension of the Jewish nation.  As Melvin Urofsky described, 
Jewish émigrés believed a common Yiddish culture could be maintained in a society 
in which they could run their own social and cultural affairs, noting, ‘This doctrine 
led directly to the concept of “Diaspora nationalism,” the idea that Jews - despite the 
lack of geopolitical homeland - still constituted a distinct nationality’ (Urofsky 1976: 
32-33).  Diasporic nationalism, in this sense, served both as an alternative and a 
compliment to Zionism: the diasporic nation could be maintained without a state, 
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while in pursuit of a state, and coexisting with a state.  As it pertains to this thesis, 
both forms of nationalism are significant components of the Assyrian and Chaldean 
diaspora.  Diasporic nationalism motivated Assyrian and Chaldean elites to build and 
maintain diasporic boundaries, whilst long-distance nationalism toward Iraq shaped 
the political responses of diasporic leaders following the Iraq War.  
 
As both diasporic and long-distance nationalism make political claims, state locality 
determines the ability of actors to lobby governments and engage with other political 
actors and non-governmental organizations.  Political mobilization may be further 
constrained by repression that restricts political rights or freedom of expression; 
competition from within the diaspora or from other ethnic groups; or logistical 
challenges resulting from inadequate organization, resources, or leadership, or 
uninterest (Ogelman et al 2002; Saideman 2002).  In the U.S., the first factor is less 
of a challenge because the nature of the political process encourages ethnic lobbying.  
Once mobilized, ethnic lobbies often succeed because the social character of the U.S. 
as a nation of immigrants gives ethnic actors a prominent role in society, and the 
structure of American democracy allows ethnic groups, and civic groups generally, 
access to policy-makers and policy-making (T. Smith 2000: 86).  Members of 
Congress, whose role in shaping foreign policy stems from its funding powers, are 
accessible to both professional lobbyists and ordinary constituents.  Accessibility is a 
result of vulnerability: American legislators are uniquely vulnerable compared to 
legislators of other countries through a combination of short terms in office; the 
prospect of primary defeat; the system of running for office as individuals and not as 
party standard bearers; and the need to continually raise large sums of money to 
finance one’s own campaign (King 1997: 29-30).  Ethnic constituency groups, 
particularly groups with deep pockets for campaign donations and whose 
endorsement will carry sway within their community, can make significant inroads 
into gaining support from their Congressional delegation.   
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Noting that ethnic lobbies have come to play a larger role in foreign policy over the 
course of the past century, theorists such as Tony Smith and Samuel Huntington take 
pause that the democratic right of ethnic groups to lobby and voice their opinion can 
be fairly balanced with considerations of the greater community; that the few, who 
may have allegiances and objectives that are not necessarily aligned to American 
interests, can influence policy because of the disinterest of the many (Huntington 
1997; T. Smith 77).  Their concern, essentially, is capture, wherein a minority 
interest group pursues a policy of which the general public is unaware or 
uninterested, thereby allowing the minority’s desired outcome to prevail.  Ethnic 
lobbies are usually the sole contributors to the discourse on issues of concern to their 
diaspora, essentially allowing them to capture the issue, frame it in their own terms, 
present their goals as the desired outcome, and pursue legislation on their behalf.   
 
Yossi Shain, however, finds that to capture an issue, diaspora lobbies must meet the 
challenge of amassing sufficient political interest.  Shain contends diasporas can have 
a positive impact on foreign policy as the U.S. ‘recasts these [diaspora] groups not 
only as marketers of the democratic-pluralist creed abroad, but also as America’s own 
moral compass, helping to keep a somewhat confused U.S. foreign policy true to its 
ideals’ (Shain 1999: 199).  To succeed in their advocacy, diaspora leadership must 
work through official government channels of electioneering and lobbying.  Factors 
enabling a diasporic role in public policy therefore include a fragmented foreign 
policy structure that empowers individual Congressional members; a national ethos 
that allows any resident to participate in the political process; growing public 
acceptance of ethnic diversity; a powerful domestic media that can champion interest 
issues; and uniform objectives across diasporic organizations that temper more 
extreme views for those that align to liberal democratic interests (Shain 51, 199-200; 
Shain 2002).  Worries such as Huntington’s overestimate the ease of building a 
political consensus and spurring action, even from like-minded and sympathetic 
policy-makers.  One of the surprises Assyrian and Chaldean activists encountered has 
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been the immense difficulty to effect change, even in the face of immediate crisis.  
The approachability of government does not necessitate the action of the 
government. 
 
Shain and Barth (2003: 452) and Sheffer (2003: 53) offer comparable proposals of 
how mobilization occurs.  In their respective scenarios, core members, the organizing 
elite, are regularly and actively engaged, and orchestrate the direction of diasporic 
activities; passive members or periphery members are available for mobilization 
when elites issue a call to action; and silent members, in Shain and Barth’s model, 
comprise the largest and generally absent segment to potentially be mobilized in 
times of crisis.  Brubaker questions this notion of silent members and the validity of 
counting those who have assimilated (Brubaker 2005: 11).  However, a more useful 
way to consider the awakening of diasporic membership may be to consider the 
conditions that make diasporic membership again salient, whether a boundary shift 
welcomed or threatened the diaspora, and whether those boundaries were local or in 
the homeland.  If a boundary shift is impactful enough to make identity salient 
amongst silent members, it likely says something about the danger or opportunity 
such a shift creates.   
 
The political arena is often where key diasporic differences play out; it is where they 
matter most because they can bear consequences.  A shift in boundaries presents a 
turning point for a diaspora: a shift in the surrounding society that closes boundaries 
can cause another migration, a shift that opens boundaries can facilitate assimilation.  
Boundary shifts increase the social relevance of diasporic identity because the 






RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THESIS OUTLINE 
 
Boundaries make diaspora.  Diasporas have highly uncertain existences: their 
formation is not guaranteed, and their presence may become more active or cease to 
exist with changes in their state of origin or state of residence.  Diasporas act for and 
against the homeland from which they originate, which can block their return, thwart 
their quest for territory, or encourage interstate relationships.  But perhaps more so, 
they act with and against their surroundings, encountering boundaries that preclude 
integration or enacting boundaries that enable an acceptable measure of integration.  
State boundaries thus matter in creating diasporas; the immigration laws, security, 
social services, education, and individual rights provided shape the diasporic 
experience, and mobilize demands for such rights when they are lacking.   
 
This phenomenon leads to the core research question of this dissertation: 
 
- What is the role of diasporic elites in building a diasporic nation?  
 
In furtherance of the core question, this dissertation asks: 
 
- How do diasporic elites use boundary-making to maintain 
Assyrian and Chaldean identities, and how is this process aided 
or challenged by the American context in which it occurs? 
  
- How do changes in the homeland - specifically the Iraq War and 
its aftermath – shape diasporic nation-building?   
 
As this thesis explores, Assyrian and Chaldean elites seek to protect their atra (the 
Assyrian word for homeland) in the Nineveh Plain, but, recognizing the permanency 
of their displacement, in a way also endeavour to make an atra in the United States.  
Both American society and the Iraq War are therefore consequential to the 
development of the Assyrian and Chaldean diasporic nation, and illuminate the core 
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issue underlying diasporic nation-building: whether an atra can be built in diaspora, 
intertwined with other ethnic groups, cultures, practices, and absent a territory, and 
whether it is enough to sustain the Assyrian/Chaldean nation.   
 
The following chapters present the research undertaken to answer these questions.  
Chapter Three considers the historical context of Assyrian and Chaldean boundary 
formation and the early 20th century quest for Assyrian autonomy.  It also examines 
the intra-ethnic boundaries of Assyrian-Chaldean identity.  Chapter Four considers 
the institution-building that created diasporic boundaries and cultivated political 
claims.  Boundary formation is one of the first essentials of diaspora-building because 
of the need to delineate cultural and social boundaries that encase diasporic 
membership whilst at the same time balancing the need of individuals to achieve 
some measure of integration into mainstream society.  Assyrian boundaries shifted 
from close allegiance with the Church of the East to an ethnic umbrella based upon 
shared language, ancient lineage, and cultural symbols.  In the Chaldean community, 
the same narratives of language, history, and culture are significant, but remain 
closely aligned with the Chaldean Church, which itself was formative to Chaldean 
boundary construction.  Defining Chaldean boundaries against local society and 
against a broader Catholicism ultimately facilitated a contraction of the intra-ethnic 
Assyrian and Chaldean boundary.   
 
Chapter Five examines diasporic nation-building in response to changing boundaries 
between the diaspora and Iraq, and between the Iraqi state and co-ethnics in Iraq.  It 
considers three points of boundary shifting and the policy goals of the diaspora 
therein: the build-up to the Iraq War; the drafting of the constitution; and the 
subsequent refugee crisis.  Apparent is a distinction between Assyrian actors as more 
attuned to the potential for change, mobilizing earlier and with concrete policy goals, 
and Chaldean activism emerging later, a reaction to Assyrian activism as much as 
changing Iraqi circumstances.  Notably, contrary to what might be expected of a 
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stateless population, early political goals were often tempered, focusing on 
integration and liberal democratic rights, and not solely focused on territorial 
autonomy.  Relevant is the way boundary shifts were first perceived: early demands 
assumed ethnicity would be a salient feature in a post-Hussein Iraq as Assyrian 
activists mobilized to assert their right to recognition as non-Kurdish, non-Arab 
Iraqis.  For Chaldean activists, this carried an additional dynamic of asserting their 
identity as non-Assyrians, shifting Chaldean from a sectarian Iraqi identity to an 
ethnic claim.  
 
Chapter Six examines diasporic nation-building in the most traditional sense, as 
diasporic organizations turned to the nationalist option in response to continued 
marginalization, pursuing autonomy in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain region.  Examined are 
how national and pragmatic approaches to autonomy elevated the Nineveh Plain to 
the forefront of diasporic policy goals.  Whilst long-distance nationalism was present 
in the diaspora for decades, autonomy became more widely perceived as necessary in 
response to exclusionary Iraq boundaries.  Diasporic actors worked as an ethnic lobby 
to push against political and ideological barriers in furtherance of a Nineveh Plain 




   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As this thesis aims to achieve an in-depth examination of how diasporic elites work as 
nation-builders, and how the construction and navigation of socio-political 
boundaries occurred in a specific diaspora, this research took the form of a case 
study.  The strength of a case study is the depth of insight gained through drawing 
upon multiple sources and types of information, allowing the researcher to cultivate 
a rich understanding of a particular phenomena (Yin 2008).  
 
In line with the thesis’s research questions, this case study therefore pursues several 
areas of inquiry within the broader framework of diaspora-building: an examination 
of elites as institution-builders and as political actors, and of how nation-building and 
long-distance nationalism shaped political goals, especially after the Iraq War; and an 
examination of the salience of Chaldean identity within those contexts.  Such inquiry 
requires analysis that is synchronic and diachronic (Gerring 2004).  Assyrian and 
Chaldean serve as subunits of the diaspora, and are examined in comparison to each 
other, offering a unique contribution to the field of Assyrian and Chaldean studies.  
Institution-building is assessed over the course of diasporic immigration to the U.S. to 
understand how elites work to create and sustain a diaspora and the intra-communal 
narratives upon which diasporic boundaries are built.  In addition to this diachronic 
approach, the Iraq War is examined as a pivotal moment in which the opening of the 
Iraqi political structure allowed diasporic actors to pursue policy objectives.  To gain 
specific insight into the effects of the war on the diaspora, analysis focuses on the 
pre-war period through January 2014, within which key war-related events are 
specifically examined: the lead-up to the war, and ethno-sectarian conflict, whose 
outbreak reached a crisis point in 2006 and which continues through today.  These 
periods were selected to permit analysis of how ongoing circumstances in Iraq 
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affected diasporic policy goals, and why change in diasporic activism and policy focus 
occurred within this period.   
 
Further, this research seeks to understand the Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora in an 
American context.  This is a significant point of analysis because diasporas are made 
in relation to the social environments in which they exist.  A case study facilities 
examination of boundary formations to better understand diasporic ideology and 
consciousness, as well as to understand the success of Chaldean identity in the U.S.  
 
The American diaspora is an important point of analysis because of its significance to 
the worldwide Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora as the largest diasporic population.  
Prior to WWI, Assyrian and Chaldean populations primarily resided in northern Iraq, 
the Anatolia region of modern-day Turkey, Persia, and Syria.  Iraq’s Christian 
population, prior to 2003, was estimated between 800,000 to 1.2 million people, 
approximately three percent of Iraq’s total population, of which an estimated 70 
percent belonged to the Chaldean Church (USCIRF 2013; Zubaida 2000: 381).  By 
2013, this figure had decreased to an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 and, coupled 
with the recent crisis in Syria, more Assyrians and Chaldeans are now estimated to be 
living in diaspora than their ancestral homelands (USCIRF 2013).5   
 
Specific population numbers in the U.S. are difficult because the census no longer 
contains an Assyrian/Chaldean designation, incoming refugees are categorized as 
Iraqi, and immigrants may instead identify by their country of origin on official 
forms.  The 2000 Census placed the community at 82,322 who self-identified as 
Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac; however, this figure was believed to be under-
representative for several reasons, including low completion rates, language barriers, 
and an oversaturation of ethnic options.  This option was eliminated when the 2010 
                                            
5 Accurate numbers are difficult as widespread displacement and the potential dangers of 
identifying as Christian further challenge estimates. 
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Census reduced ethnic categories.  The Chaldean Chamber of Commerce estimated in 
2014 there were 121,000 Chaldeans in Michigan and another 150,000 Chaldeans 
and Assyrians throughout the U.S. (Chaldean American Chamber 2015a).  Other 
Assyrian organizations have placed total recent estimates at 400,000 (BetBasoo 
2013).  There is geographical significance to where identities are found: Assyrians 
and members of the Chaldean Church often identify as Assyrian in Chicago and most 
of California, whereas members of the Chaldean Church in Detroit and San Diego 
overwhelmingly identify as Chaldean.  Through what community members describe 
as a more herdish migration path, Chaldeans comprise the larger American 
population: outside of Detroit, San Diego possesses the largest Chaldean population, 
estimated at 50,000; the largest Assyrian populations are in Chicago and California, 
particularly the San Jose and Turlock-Modesto areas (Stickney and Fry 2013; 
Shamon 2014).  As of 2014, the American-based population and the Iraqi-based 
population are thus almost parallel in size given the continuing rates of 
displacement.  Significant diasporic communities also exist in Australia, Sweden, 
Great Britain, and Brazil, whose numbers are around or under 100,000; the world-
wide population is estimated to be between 3.3 million to 4.1 million (UNPO 2008; 
Assyrian Information Management 2012). 
 
Notably, the Syriac-identifying population is not examined here.  The Syriac 
community faces a dynamic similar to Chaldeans, in that there is a tension between 
the Syriac-identifying population and Syriacs who identify as Assyrian.  Syriacs are 
therefore implicitly represented in Assyrian advocacy, as Assyrians consider Syriacs to 
be ethnically Assyrian, but Assyrian activism does not necessarily represent the 
Syriac-identifying perspective.  Given the rather small population in the U.S., 
estimated to be between 15,000 to 25,000 individuals, the community is less visible 
and less politically and socially engaged (Grammich et al 2012).  The Assyrian-
Chaldean narrative in the U.S. is overwhelmingly dominant, and is thus what I have 
chosen to explore.  This is in contrast to the diaspora in Europe, where the Syriac-
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Assyrian divide is dominant, paralleling Chaldean-Assyrian contestation in America 
(Gaunt 2010; Atto 2007).  Syriac identity results from religious differences, with the 
Syriac Orthodox Church claiming roots as one of the first Christian communities, and 
different migratory paths, with Syriacs common to Syria, Lebanon, and Western 
Turkey.  Whilst early waves of migration to the U.S. included Syriacs, particularly 
following the WWI genocide, its population in recent decades has largely turned to 
Europe and has been outnumbered by the Assyrian and Chaldean presence.  
 
Alternative approaches to this case study were considered but not selected.  One 
option was a comparison between the American-based diaspora to those in other 
states.  The focus of such a study would instead draw comparisons of governmental 
systems, social exclusions, and the receptiveness of each state to ethnic expression 
and lobbying, changing the research emphasis to the role of state structures in 
diasporic mobilization.  A second option was to compare the American Assyrian and 
Chaldean diaspora to other diasporic populations in the U.S., thereby removing the 
factor of different state structures and facilitating consideration of the nature of 
diaspora in America.  While such research certainly has merit, it likewise dilutes the 
focus from that which I am trying to capture: the multi-layered diversity and 
boundary negotiation within a specific diaspora, and political mobilization.  The best 
approach to capturing such an understanding is thus a comparison of the Assyrian-
identifying diaspora to the Chaldean-identifying diaspora.   
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Research into this thesis’s questions presented three major challenges.  First, as noted 
above, existing academic literature on this population is rare, and, at the time this 
research was conducted, almost non-existent in relation to the post-Iraq War period.  
Second, telling a story of political activism presents its own challenges regarding 
sources and accuracy of information, challenges that are compounded when it is a 
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story of unsuccessful political activism without measurable outcomes.  Third, this 
research seeks to capture a moment that is still unfolding and whose outcome cannot 
yet be known.  At the time of this research, ISIL was not yet a known threat and the 
collapse of Mosul or the Nineveh province was not foreseen, a testament to how 
quickly events in Iraq can change.   
 
Thus, to meet these challenges, my primary method of data collection necessitated 
interviews with diasporic elites.  This took the form of semi-structured interviews, or 
‘conversations with a purpose’, which have an informal style that enable addressing a 
set of specific topics while providing flexibility for the interview to develop 
unexpected themes, thus accessing data unlikely to be found in any other context 
(Burgess in Mason 2002: 62; Mason 62-63, 66).  Elites are ‘the influential, the 
prominent, and the well-informed people in an organization or community’ whose 
interviews ‘contribute insight and meaning to the interview process because they are 
intelligent and quick-thinking people, at home in the realm of ideas, policies, and 
generalizations’ (Marshall and Rossman 1989: 94-95).  
 
This focus does not reveal the extent to which members of the wider diaspora 
support elite action or are aware such action exists.  While certainly the opinions and 
involvement of non-elites would reveal the depth and resonance of diasporic 
belonging, ultimately a focus on diasporic elites offers direct and unique insight into 
the perspectives and motivations of those who create diasporic institutions and 
undertake action on the diaspora’s behalf.  The emphasis on elites is also consistent 
with aforementioned boundary theory and diaspora theory, which emphasize that 
boundaries are negotiated and politicized by elite actors, and that diasporic 
organization and action are built by a core group of elites who comprise the most 
active members of a diaspora (Brubaker 2004, Shain and Barth 2003, Sheffer 2003).   
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In a practical context, a focus on elites translates to individuals who are well-known 
and influential within the diaspora, who help shape diasporic borders and make 
political claims on the diaspora’s behalf, and who possess credibility when doing so, 
typically because they represent key organizations or are themselves established as 
community leaders.   
 
For my research, to capture the diversity within the diaspora as it pertains to 
differences in identity, geography, and waves of migration, it was important 
interviewees represent organizations that are Chaldean-specific, Assyrian-specific, 
and neither; organizations preceding the Iraq War and new organizations formed in 
its aftermath; and geographically representative of the main Assyrian and Chaldean 
population centers of Chicago, California, and Detroit.  To the extent it was possible, 
I also aimed to capture a diversity of backgrounds by interviewing men and women, 
those born in the U.S. and those born abroad, and those with non-Iraqi countries of 
origin.   
 
Identification of organizations and key individuals was facilitated through personal 
experience gained prior to my doctoral research, including employment as a 
congressional aide specializing in immigration assistance from 2003 through 2006 
and a legislative aide for foreign policy from 2009 through 2010 to Congressman 
Sander Levin, through which I worked with Chaldean and Assyrian advocates, and 
work with the Chaldean Federation of America in 2011, where I assisted Joseph 
Kassab, then-Executive Director, on behalf of the organization’s political efforts.  I 
also used internet and social media searches, and made inquiries of interviewees and 
friends engaged with diasporic activism regarding their opinion of community 
leaders and politically-engaged individuals.  My intent was to locate those that were 
meaningfully engaged with the diaspora and the political process.   
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In total I held 29 interviews between 2012 and early 2014, in which I interviewed 
eleven Assyrian activists and nine Chaldean activists, two of whom I conducted 
follow-up interviews with to discuss new organizations they formed and ongoing 
political events.  Contributing to a broader representation of voices, four of the 
activists were women, two were born in Iran, and seven were born in America; 
several Assyrian interviewees are members of the Chaldean Church.  The remaining 
interviews were conducted with various policy workers and an academic.  The 
purpose of interviews with non-diasporic actors was to gain outside perspectives 
regarding Assyrian and Chaldean diasporic mobilization and political goals.  The two 
interviews I hoped to conduct but did not receive a reply to my inquiries were, 
coincidentally, the more nationalist individuals of each population: Sargon Dadesho 
of the Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party/Assyrian National Congress, who is one of the 
most vocal Assyrian nationalists; and Bishop Sarhad Jammo of the Chaldean Church’s 
Western American Diocese, who many other interviewees credit with cultivating the 
push for a separate Chaldean ethnicity.  Both individuals are prolific in their writings 
and media presence, and I utilized their public statements to develop an 
understanding of their ideologies.  In addition, many interviewees referenced these 
individuals voluntarily, which provided a further understanding of how their views 
are situated amongst other diasporic organizations.  
 
I began my interviews with two individuals I knew from my previous work with the 
Chaldean Federation in Detroit.  I was granted other interviews after sending e-mails 
introducing myself as a doctoral researcher, asking for an interview, and providing a 
brief description of my research and what I hoped to discuss, and, when applicable, 
included mention of a mutual contact or referral.  I traveled to Detroit, Chicago, 
California, and Washington, D.C., over the course of my fieldwork to conduct 
interviews face-to-face.  The interviews generally took place in the interviewee’s 
office (in some cases the office representing the diasporic organization, in others the 
interviewee’s primary place of employment), a coffee shop or restaurant, or the 
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interviewee’s home.  Those I interviewed were incredibly generous with their 
information, time, and hospitality, and interviews generally lasted around two hours.  
 
Additionally, while in Detroit, I attended several community events hosted by the 
Chaldean Federation and the Chaldean Chamber to observe their content and the 
extent to which lay individuals are engaged with these organizations.  These events 
included meetings with American and Iraqi politicians, which were mostly invited 
attendance, and talks regarding Chaldean culture and historical figures, which were 
publicized within the community.  Participant observation proved useful as 
attendance exceeded my expectations and rooms were filled to capacity, attendees 
were highly engaged and informed, and Chaldean identity was as resonant amongst 
attendees as organizers.  There were generally more male than female attendees at 
political meetings, but cultural events were mixed and many families were present, 
and youth participation was evident, although also a smaller demographic at political 
meetings.   
 
Often with qualitative research, there is an emphasis on triangulation, the use of 
multiplicity – defined originally as multiple research methods, but since expanded to 
incorporate multiple data sources - to validate information or provide multiple 
perspectives that point either to a shared truth or ways in which truth is subjective, 
thereby accounting for biases or misinformation (Thurmond 2001; Blaikie 1991; 
Denzin 1970).  Norman Blaikie (1991) questions triangulation as varying in efficacy 
depending upon the researcher’s perspective and the data being sought.  With the 
challenges noted above, triangulation as a consistent methodology was not always 
practical given this research’s emphasis on individual understandings and political 
activism within an understudied community.  This presented a challenge of 
accounting for the accuracy of information whilst recognizing the inherent 
subjectivity and malleability of some of the information sought.  Here, I was in part 
guided by the research method Kanchan Chandra outlined in her work interviewing 
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political party elites in India: recognizing the traditional practices of cross-checking 
information with multiple respondents and written sources were not always 
available, Chandra shied away from asking broad questions, instead using specific 
details to develop a big picture, and treated information that could not be cross-
checked as fact only if the interviewee had no incentive to lie or stretch the truth 
(Chandra 2004: 293-295).  Given the shortage of studies regarding this diaspora, 
portions of this guidance proved particularly useful.  I sought additional sources, 
most frequently political documents and newspaper articles, to cross-check verifiable 
information.  Focusing on the minutia of organizational activity and political 
lobbying helped construct a bigger picture of how diasporic activists act as nation-
builders.   
 
At the same time, a portion of my research was inherently subjective.  Here, I was 
instead guided by the approach that ‘the sociologist’s role is not to adjudicate 
between participants’ competing versions but to understand the situated work they 
do’ (Quote in Blaikie 1991: 127-128).  To this end, only diasporic actors can provide 
information regarding the social and political contexts in which they work, the 
challenges faced, and why they chose to pursue certain actions or policies.  I asked 
general questions about political priorities, for example, to facilitate insight into the 
individual’s policy views and their narratives of and experiences with activism.  I was 
cautious of a normal tendency of political actors to exaggerate their own roles, but 
generally found accounts pragmatic, blunt, and realistic regarding the limits of an 
organization’s reach and the U.S.’s own ability to enact change in Iraq.  Additionally, 
I asked broad questions regarding perspectives on the diaspora: for example, I asked 
every interviewee how they would describe who Assyrians/Chaldeans are to someone 
unfamiliar with the diaspora.  From this I was able to see what narratives are chosen 
– essentially, how elites understand the Assyrian/Chaldean boundary - and in turn 
observed the marked consistency of those narratives across my interviews.  Likewise, 
broadly inquiring as to the Assyrian-Chaldean relationship was intended to solicit 
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subjective understandings and resulted in a wider variety of responses, suggesting 
this intra-diasporic boundary has not been firmly defined.   
 
Although the individuals interviewed are politically active and generally accustomed 
to speaking in interviews about their community, the situation in Iraq, and their 
political aims, certainly the interview itself bore some influence on responses offered 
therein.  Indeed, in examining the research process, the ‘values, assumptions, 
prejudice and influence of the researcher must therefore be acknowledged’ (Hand 
2003).  Yet it is impossible to know how we ourselves are perceived, other than to be 
conscious of potential factors.  I generally found the interviews held a dynamic of a 
student or researcher engaging with and seeking information from professionals who 
understood themselves to be speaking on behalf of their own experiences, on behalf 
of their organization, and, to a degree, the greater diaspora.  A relevant factor to 
contextualizing the interviews is that I am not Assyrian or Chaldean, nor Middle 
Eastern.  Not being a member of the diaspora had potential benefits and hindrances.  
On the one hand, it made the contrast in ethnicity salient, perhaps facilitating 
consideration of the ethnic boundary that defines Assyrianness and Chaldeanness in 
relation to a non-Assyrian/Chaldean American.  There was also less likely to be 
concern I supported a rival diasporic political organization.  Additionally, few 
American politicians and policy workers are Assyrian or Chaldean, suggesting these 
interviewees are well-experienced in communicating diasporic issues to non-diasporic 
members.  On the other hand, there is the potential individuals could be more 
guarded and less likely to share criticisms of diasporic leadership or internal issues, 
or that I might miss an implicit meaning that would be readily understood by 
someone within the diaspora.  An example of this is my uncertainty if mentioning I 
am from Detroit prompted assumptions from interviewees outside the Detroit 
community as to my potential biases regarding the divisive Chaldean issue.   
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From a certain perspective, a degree of bias is perhaps apparent in my approach to 
the diaspora because it contains a distinct Chaldean component.  Some lay diasporic 
members I encountered expressed concern that exploring Chaldeans as a unique 
diasporic subset was imposing a label and dividing the diaspora.  Having grown up in 
Detroit, I was always familiar with the Chaldean community and, to this end, felt 
studying the community was not imposing a label as a researcher, but recognizing a 
present identity, one with social meaning and understandings and on behalf of which 
political claims are made.  In contrast to such encounters, those I interviewed were 
immediately familiar with the Chaldean-Assyrian issue and appeared comfortable 
discussing the challenges they felt the growth of a Chaldean identity in Detroit posed 
or, alternatively, discussing the necessity of Chaldean identity; I cannot ascertain if 
the issue was overemphasized to combat perceived biases on my part or if it would 
not have been raised if it were not a topic of my research.  However, given 
Chaldeanness can be a subject of strong emotions, I felt the comparative research 
design I chose was the best option to better explore this important dynamic.   
 
An important point of note is that all interviews took place prior to ISIL’s occupation 
of Mosul and the Nineveh Plain.  The political aims of diasporic actors, urgency of 
their demands and worries unquestionably have since been affected by this crisis.  
The understandings obtained in these interviews thus represent understandings 
within a less-dire context.  The continued political engagement of diasporic elites and 
the views of frustration they expressed without a backdrop of extreme crisis offer an 
important context on its own.   
 
Lastly, to verify data and supplement interviews as well as to prepare for them, I 
reviewed documents produced by or pertaining to diasporic organizations, typically 
found on their websites and in public statements: such documents include policy 
briefs, action alerts, press releases, annual reports, and news articles.  Community 
news sources searched included the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA), 
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Assyrian Information Management (atour.com), Zinda Magazine, the Chaldean News, 
and ChaldeansOnline; broader news sources, including the New York Times, 
Washington Post, BBC, Detroit News and Detroit Free Press, were also consulted to 
contextualize national and international stories relevant to the diaspora.  
 
I also reviewed congressional legislation and committee hearings regarding Assyrian, 
Chaldean, and Iraqi issues to see which diasporic goals were pursued at a national 
policy level.  The introduction of legislation pertinent to Assyrians and Chaldeans, 
and corresponding Floor Statements, Letters to Members, and press releases, offered 
insight into the involvement of diasporic organizations in the legislative process and 
specific diasporic goals during this period.  Congressional staff members were helpful 
in sharing letters and statements related to pertinent legislation.  I visited the British 
National Archives to access documents from the British Mandate era to gain an 
historical perspective to the Assyrian-Chaldean relationship and national demands.  
Secondary sources were utilized primarily for historical understandings of the 
community in Iraq and its early migrations to the U.S., for historical understandings 






   
ASSYRIANS AND CHALDEANS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
 
‘The Assyrian question is an old question in Iraq, believe me.’ 
–Emanuel Kamber, former Secretary General of the Assyrian Universal 
Alliance (Interview 2013) 
 
Assyrian and Chaldean understandings of themselves are inextricable from their 
history.  They are an ethnically-distinct population who traditionally speak Aramaic, 
a dialect called Syriac or Sureth, and are amongst the earliest followers of 
Christianity.  They claim ancestry amongst the indigenous peoples of Iraq as 
descendants of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires of ancient Mesopotamia.  While 
there is some dispute as to the validity of this ancient lineage, an analysis of such 
historical claims is outside the scope of this thesis; however, in studying the national 
myths and symbols that bind together a group, Walker Connor’s assertion that ‘what 
ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is’ is applicable here (Connor 
1994: 93).6  Assyrians and Chaldeans are thus understood as an ethnic group and, as 
is relevant to this thesis, a national minority in Iraq now rivaled in size by its 
diasporic population.   
 
The Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora is invariably a product of circumstances in Iraq 
and the greater Middle East.  Some waves of migration saw refugees fleeing violence 
and oppression, but many migrants throughout the 20th century were individuals 
seeking work, education, and better lives.  However, it is the tragedies that indelibly 
remain etched in diasporic memory, and shape perceptions of and ideologies towards 
the state today.  It is the trajectory of an ever-narrowing Iraqi national boundary by 
which many Assyrian and Chaldean activists understand Iraq and which contributes 
to differing cultural perceptions between Assyrians and Chaldeans themselves.  
                                            
6 For	  sources	  regarding	  claims	  of	  antiquity,	  see	  Hanoosh	  2008;	  Parpola	  2004;	  Joseph	  2000;	  
Jammo	  2000.	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Assyrians have come to be viewed as nationalistic, political, and possessing a strong 
sense of identity; Chaldeans as more assimilative, apolitical and possessing a 
middleman-minority mentality.  Such perceptions contributed to shaping an intra-
ethnic boundary that gains salience as ethnic identity becomes politicized.      
 
This chapter therefore examines modern historical events that are essential to 
understanding the Assyrian and Chaldean communities today.  It observes first the 
splintering of the Chaldean Church from the Church of the East, which marks the 
foundation of modern Chaldean identity.  It then looks to the tragedies of the early 
20th century, the effort to find a permanent Assyrian homeland in response to these 
events, and Ba’ath era policies which further marginalized this population, 
accelerated emigration, and drove diasporic nation-building in the U.S.  The aim 
herein is to contextualize the impact of the current crisis within the scale of loss 
suffered this century, and to contextualize current autonomy demands as an effort to 
combat an ongoing legacy of displacement and marginalization.  In this sense, 
integration and autonomy claims are both direct efforts to resist increasingly 
exclusionary boundaries of the Iraqi state: integration to change membership within 
Iraq’s national boundaries; and autonomy to draw new boundaries against the Iraqi 
state.  
 
The final aim of this chapter is to outline diasporic migration to the U.S. and to 
provide an American context of who Assyrians and Chaldeans are in terms of their 
understandings of the boundaries between them.  Chaldean identity, as it is 
experienced in the American diaspora, is deeper than a religious identifier.  It is an 
active identity that is paradoxically understood as both the same as and distinct from 
Assyrian ethnicity.  The argument presented here is that a newly assertive claim to 
Chaldeanness reflects an evolving process of boundary formation between Assyrians 
and Chaldeans within the greater diasporic nation.  The denominational split that 
conferred different sectarian identities has since amassed cultural ascriptions and 
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characterizations.  Such differences are relatively minor and malleable, but gained 
political resonance with the opening of the Iraqi state after 2003, the resulting 
politicization of ethno-sectarian identity, and the corresponding pursuit of special 
rights on behalf of those ethno-sectarian identities.  Per Wimmer’s typologies of 
boundary change, it is not fully accurate to conclude Chaldeans have fissured from 
Assyrians to become their own ethnic group, although there are some Chaldeans who 
believe this has occurred (Wimmer 2013: 49-63).  There remains, however, an 
ongoing evolution over the what this boundary represents: the boundary could one 
day fissure, but it will likely continue to at times contract and at times blur, reflecting 
small differences within the broader, more salient cultural ascriptions of shared 
language, history, and traditions that define the whole of the Assyrian-Chaldean 
people.   
 
DENOMINATIONAL SCHISM: THE FIRST ASSYRIAN-CHALDEAN 
BOUNDARY  
 
The contemporary distinction between the Assyrian and Chaldean communities 
comes from their respective branches of Christianity.  Assyrians were originally, and 
many remain, followers of the independent, Orthodox Church of the East, the heirs 
of the sect which split from the Catholic Church in 431 at the Council of Nestorius, 
whose members were known until the early 20th century as Nestorians.  A segment 
split from this Eastern tradition to reunify with Rome beginning in 1552; to 
differentiate this population from the Nestorians, these Catholic followers were given 
the name Chaldean by Pope Julius III, originating the modern use of Chaldean as an 
identity label (Healey 2010: 45-46; Joseph 2000: 56-58).  This was followed over the 
next few centuries by shifting allegiances between the Vatican and the Church of the 
East, until 1830 when the current iteration of the Chaldean Church was fixed and the 
Vatican formally established the See of the Chaldean Church in Mosul.  
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The Ottoman system allowed measured autonomy to minorities under the heads of 
religious institutions.  Despite the later dates at which the Chaldean and Assyrian 
millets received formal recognition, both enjoyed fairly independent status 
throughout Ottoman rule and may have first been grouped under the Armenian 
millet with other Christian minorities: Chaldeans were granted status as a millet in 
1844, in part the result of urging from France as a champion of Catholics in the 
Middle East; there is greater uncertainty when the Assyrian millet was recognized, 
with some scholars stating recognition came the following year and others stating it 
was not until the late 19th century, after a 1864 effort was rejected by the Nestorian 
Patriarch (Healey 46; Hanoosh 58; Joseph 9, 43-44).   
 
Conversions to the Chaldean Church accelerated throughout the 19th and early 20th 
centuries with the influx of Catholic and Jesuit missionaries to the Ottoman Empire.7  
Community members often suggest there were likely existing cultural differences 
between those who converted to the Chaldean Church and those who remained 
Nestorians, with geography a primary dividing factor that permitted or precluded 
missionary access (Bacall and Bacall Interview 2014; Abbo et al Interview 2013; 
Hanna Interview 2013).  
 
The community at this stage, much like the community today, is presented as one 
people, with a shared language and religion, but with minor yet emergent cultural 
differences shaped by distance and in relation to neighbouring populations.  
Chaldean conversions were most common in villages accessible to Catholic 
missionaries; as such, villages around Mosul, the Nineveh Plain, and other lower-
lying and urban areas were more likely to become Chaldean, in contrast to the 
populations in the mountains of Hakkari.  The mountain villages were difficult to 
reach and heavily self-reliant.  Sami Zubaida notes Assyrians, whom he understands 
                                            
7 For missionary accounts of this era, see Coakley 1992; Layard 1854; Grant 1841; Ainsworth 
1838. 
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as Nestorians, were ‘a different kind of community from the religious minorities 
designated as millets’: whereas ‘typical’ millets were urbanized communities or 
settled communities, Assyrians were characterized as possessing a hard-fought, less 
secure existence of ‘armed tribes under their own chiefs and priests nominally under 
Ottoman suzerainty.  They maintained their security and property in a network of 
precarious pacts and alliances…They resented and feared centralizing governments’ 
(Zubaida 2000: 372).  Thus, it is suggested those who resided in more urban or 
heterogeneous areas were more inclined to adapt and integrate into the surrounding 
culture; those who resided in the mountains of Anatolia were well-versed in the 
defense of their community and its interests, and thus more inclined to nationalism.  
The former were more likely to become Chaldean; the latter were not.  Such 
assumptions regarding adaptiveness and nationalism carry through the Chaldean and 
Assyrian population today.  
 
Some scholars suggest the use of the Assyrian identity accelerated in the mid-19th 
century when Protestant missionaries to Anatolia encouraged its use as a move away 
from the reference to Nestorius, whom missionaries viewed as a heretic (Joseph 17-
19).  Anthony Smith, for example, casts doubt on the continuity of the Assyrian 
people, framing Assyrian as a name clung to only by a ‘small, persecuted’ religious 
group following the collapse of the ancient Empire: 
  
Thereafter, no more is heard of the Assyrian state or people.  There are 
references to the ‘land’ of Assyria now and again, but when Xenophon 
marched through it in 401 BC he found all the cities were deserted with the 
exception of Erbil.  No one henceforth claims to be ‘Assyrian,’ except a small 
and persecuted sectarian community of Nestorians in northern Iraq today and 
in a far-flung diaspora (Smith 1986: 101).     
 
This embrace of the Assyrian name is framed by such scholars as a nationalizing 
moment, an isolated community quick to embrace a ‘rediscovery’ of its biblical roots 
and ties to an ancient civilization, one whose remains at Nimrud were being 
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uncovered in this period by British archaeologists – the ‘stuff of nationalist 
mythology’ as Zubaida describes (Zubaida 373).  British officials, however, generally 
took an unquestioning approach toward Assyrian claims, as found in the British 
Inspector for Mosul’s observation that, ‘It appears probable that the Assyrians of to-
day retain something of the ancient Assyrian strain…The important point is that the 
Assyrians themselves are convinced that they are the descendants of the ancient 
Empire, and this pride of race explains some of their more extravagant claims’ 
(Stafford 1934: 159).   
 
These observations specifically understand Assyrians as Nestorians, underscoring a 
semantic challenge encountered in studying the community.  Whilst there is a 
tendency in modern nationalist discourse to see references to Assyrian and intuitively 
imbue it with a modern national understanding encompassing Nestorians, Syriacs, 
Chaldeans, and sometimes Maronites, Arameans, and other peoples nationalists 
believe were lost to modernity and state boundaries, sectarian identity was at the 
forefront of communal identity under the millet system.  Religious leaders held both 
spiritual and temporal power over their followers, rendering ethnicity as less socially 
and politically relevant.  Aryo Makko finds conceptions of a greater Assyrian nation 
as understood today were still highly localized on the eve of WWI, with various 
intellectuals just beginning to promote a nationalist awakening (Makko 2012, 2010).  
Makko stresses ‘the transition, which some scholars have defined as a shift from 
‘community’-millet to ‘nation’-millet, was rejected by the most powerful groups of 
actors, the clergy and tribal leaders in rural areas, who feared for their authority’, to 
which he wryly comments, ‘there is little evidence to suggest that this has changed 
ever since’ (Makko 2012: 299).  It is not that religious leaders objected to positioning 
their community as a nation per se, it is perhaps rather that they preferred such 
positioning to continue their role as the nation’s temporal and spiritual head.  This 
further suggests intra-ethnic boundaries were complicated even under the Ottoman 
era as religious schisms created a denominational boundary that led to separate 
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millet systems headed by separate religious institutions.  Western missionaries and 
geopolitical influences further sought to move individuals and villages across this 
denominational boundary, accelerating conversions away from the Church of the 
East.  The repercussions of this ultimately came to entwine denominational 
belonging with politics and identity.   
 
However, it is important to note that Nestorians and Chaldeans alike also identified 
as Suraye, an ethnic designation whose synonymousness with Assyrian is a point of 
debate amongst linguists, historians, and nationalists, and whose use suggests 
Nestorians and Chaldeans understood themselves as a common people indigenous to 
Mesopotamia (Bacall and Bacall Interview 2014; Abbo et al Interview; Donabed 
2012; Aljeloo 2000).  Some scholars trace references to Assyrians or Suraye 
throughout the second millennia and suggest instead it is Europeans who only later 
came to recognize this population’s ancestry (for more regarding this history, see 
Cetrez, Donabed, Makko 2012; Joseph 2000).  Although there is a romantic national 
attachment to this meaning, whether Suraye translates to Assyrian is perhaps less 
consequential to the larger point that its usage indicates this population understood 
itself as a distinct people, even if it did not engender political commonality.   
 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which rising Assyrian nationalism prior to 
WWI was influenced by sectarian geopolitics and outside influences, and how much 
was simply a byproduct of increasing discontent within the Ottoman state.  Two 
significant national developments were underway by the early 20th century.  First, 
tensions and insecurity within Hakkari grew with more frequent land battles with 
Kurdish neighbours and with changes in the administration of the Ottoman state, 
particularly following the Tanzimat reforms that sought to end the millet system 
(Healey 2010: 48).  Those changes spurred a dynamic of increasing insecurity that 
would lead the Assyrian nation to declare war on the Ottoman Empire during WWI, 
 78 
the end result of which would ultimately devastate the community.8  Second, 
Nestorian as a group identifier began to fall from use, as evident by widespread use 
of Assyrian by the British government, Iraqi State, and League of Nations thereafter 
(Zubaida 2000; Stafford 1934).    
 
There is a small but vocal segment within the Chaldean nationalist community who 
have flipped the Assyrian narrative, contending the roots of Chaldeans today are 
instead found within ancient Babylon and Chaldea, a separate empire originating 
south of ancient Assyria and which ultimately conquered Assyria, therefore standing 
as the ‘last national name’ of the inhabitants of ancient Mesopotamia (Jammo 2000; 
Hanna 1999).  Other Chaldean nationalists similarly claim ‘names such as 
Babylonians and Assyrians refer to State inhabitants and not to ethnicity, while the 
term “Chaldeans” refers to the descendants of the Proto-Kaldi’, thereby attempting to 
frame modern Chaldeans as the indigenous people of Iraq and modern Assyrians as 
Turks and Iranians foreign to Iraq (Hanna 2015).  These claims, like their Assyrian 
counterparts, cite uses of Chaldean appearing prior to the foundation of the modern 
Church as evidence of antiquity (For such uses, see Hanoosh 66-70).  Whilst identity 
usage begins to offer insight into the complex diversity of the region and the social 
contexts in which various identities were drawn upon, it is certainly not conclusive of 
Chaldean or Assyrian continuity.  Rather, the intent by those who put forth this 
argument is to advance a distinct Chaldean national narrative, presenting Chaldeans 
as an ethnic group which has always been separate from Assyrians.  It is telling that 
this reassessment of Chaldean origins has appeared within recent decades, driven 
largely by American diasporic actors, underscoring that the locatedness of diasporic 
settlement matters, providing an open society in which such ethnic-building and 
debates of identity can occur.   
                                            
8 Evidence suggests the declaration of war was encouraged by Britain and Russia, the latter of 
whom supported Assyrians with weapons and promised to help liberate the population from 
Turkish oppression (Werda 1924). 
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Whether today’s Assyrians and Chaldeans knew themselves as Nestorian or Suraye or 
Assyrian or Chaldean prior to modernity means both nothing and everything: as 
indigenous communities the world over are acutely aware, proof of indigeneity 
confers with it no immediate or mandatory special rights.  It will not appear an 
Assyrian state.  And yet, as a marginalized, powerless people claiming a national 
existence, proving the continuity of that existence gives meaning to their 
perseverance, pride in their history and confers legitimacy.   
 
However, common lineage does not necessitate permanent linkage.  Prior to WWI, 
the Assyrian-Chaldean denominational schism found itself loosely overlapping with 
cultural differences produced by geography and social environments.  Ultimately, this 
would prove to demarcate the early foundation of a porous, minor boundary between 
the communities that would later entrench, becoming consequential as politics and 
tragedy gave social relevance to different identities.  
 
CONFRONTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE IRAQI STATE 
 
The past century began and ended with genocide against the Assyrian and Chaldean 
people.  From the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire to local terrorism of what is 
now ISIL, this era is bookended by the concerted, brutal displacement and murder of 
Assyrians and Chaldeans.  Such tragedies occurred during periods of political and 
social upheaval.  The end of the Ottoman Empire and creation of the Iraq State 
permanently changed the Assyrian and Chaldean nation, creating a diaspora far 
removed from the Middle East and with memories of a state boundary against which 
they continue to be pushed and marginalized.  The removal of the long-standing 
Ba’ath dictatorship and introduction of democratic reforms continued this trajectory.  
The quest for autonomy came to a forefront in the aftermath of both crises.  
Understanding how close Assyrians came to autonomy, the multi-year, international 
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effort to find an Assyrian homeland, and the consequences nationalists suffered are 
essential to understanding Assyrian and Chaldean national ideologies today.  
 
From Ottomans to Iraqis: The Quest for an Assyrian Homeland 
 
Although significant population losses were suffered under the region’s various 
Mongol, Arab, and Kurdish conquests, it was ultimately the fervent nationalism of the 
Young Turks and the ethnic cleansing of Christians during WWI that led to the first 
modern displacement of the Assyrian and Chaldean communities.  Referred to as 
Seyfo, or the sword, Assyrians and Chaldeans, like the Armenians and other religious 
minorities living under Ottoman control, suffered heavily from a genocidal program 
that began in 1915: an estimated 250,000 Assyrians and Chaldeans were killed; 
religious leaders, including the Assyrian Patriarch, Mar Shimun XXI Benyamin, were 
murdered; and villages were razed by Ottoman and Kurdish forces (Travis 2006: 
337-338).  This period fundamentally reshaped the Assyrian and Chaldean 
community.  It scattered their populations across the Middle East, Russia, Europe, 
and North America, and tens of thousands of refugees from Anatolia fled to the new 
British Mandate in Iraq.  The genocide is significant to national longing and remains 
an important marker of national identity for it created a permanent diaspora.   
 
Those who contest the existence of a genocide argue the Assyrians were targeted as a 
belligerent nation: they and their Patriarch, operating under their own millet and 
already frustrated by increasing Kurdish encroachment, declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire in 1915, becoming the ‘smallest ally’ of the Allied cause (Özdemir 2012; 
Wigram 1920).  Whether this was a fatal mistake or whether the outcome would 
have remained the same cannot be known.  However, while such politicians cite the 
Assyrians’ declaration of war as justification for Ottoman retaliation, the scope of 
destruction and overwhelming toll of human life challenges the argument this was 
standard warfare practice.  The International Association of Genocide Scholars 
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(2007) resolved this period constituted a genocide against Assyrians.  Those who 
were able to flee Anatolia initially took refuge in Persia, which was protected by 
Russian troops until its own revolution ended Russian involvement in the war; these 
refugees were forced to flee again, many to the British protectorate by then 
established in Iraq where a camp to house over 40,000 Assyrian refugees was 
constructed in Baqubah (Omissi 1989: 302).   
 
The question of what to do with this displaced population was left to the incipient 
Iraqi state and its British administers.  The initial demands of Assyrian 
representatives echoed the desire to return to Hakkari and something resembling the 
previous millet arrangement, if not a state.  The majority of the surviving Chaldean 
population resided in and near Mosul, which did not endure the violence as other 
parts of the region and fortuitously suffered less displacement (Gaunt 2006: 25).  
According to British inquiries, Chaldeans instead first conveyed a desire to be tied to 
the French state because of shared Catholicism and ties to French Dominican 
missionaries within Mosul, but Chaldeans and Assyrians alike soon supported 
remaining under British protection as a lack of favourable options emerged (Office of 
the Civil Commissioner 1918).  Noting the desire within the Mosul population for a 
single Iraqi state inclusive of the Mosul vilayet and recognizing the challenges of 
securing a separate Christian state, British representatives noted, ‘We could include, 
if desired, in such a state Nestorians and other Christian communities between 
latitude 37 and 38 [the Hakkari region].  Such a step would go far in the solution of 
the difficulties attending their separate recognition’ (ibid).  Negotiations regarding 
the Iraqi and Turkish territorial boundary accordingly saw British representatives 
argue for the Mosul vilayet and the Hakkari Mountains to be placed within Iraq in 




However, demands presented by Assyrian and Chaldean representatives at the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference called for an independent state.9  Versailles, in hindsight, 
foreshadowed dynamics that would again confront the community after the Iraq 
War: a population displaced and devastated by tragedy; a rallying of the diaspora to 
advocate on its behalf; framing the community as under a single ethno-national 
umbrella; and a demand for autonomy.  The American diaspora at the time, despite 
its small numbers, came together to form the Assyrian National Association of 
America (ANAA) to advocate for co-ethnics abroad (Ishaya 2003).  Diaspora and 
displacement created the circumstances upon which a national claim could be built 
by bringing together populations previously separated from each other and 
expanding the understanding of an imagined Assyrian community.  As the scattered 
Syriac populations, divided by history and geography, ‘only became aware of each 
other in the confusion of the exodus’, the same arguably occurred in diaspora (de 
Courtois 2004: 218).   
 
The secular, geography-spanning claim of the Assyrian nation presented at this time 
reflected the diversity of origin and denominations of those who appeared at the 
Paris Conference.  In addition to two American representatives from the ANAA, there 
were several representatives of the Assyrians of Turkey, a delegation of Assyrians of 
Transcaucasia, an Assyro-Chaldean delegation supported by Chaldean Patriarch, and 
a memorandum submitted by the Assyrian Patriarch, Shimun XXII Polus, from the 
Baqubah refugee camp (Yacoub 1986: 9).  Such efforts came at difficult time for a 
population that just suffered genocide, and particularly for the Nestorian Assyrians, 
whose Patriarch was murdered during the genocide and whose new Patriarch was 
dying of tuberculosis in Baqubah (Wigram 1920).  
 
                                            
9 The Paris Conference at Versailles initiated a series of treaties to end WWI, including the 
1920 Treaty of Sèvres which negotiated an end to the Ottoman Empire.  This was later 
renegotiated as the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 
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The ‘Claims of the Assyrians’ presented to the Conference by the American delegation 
demanded a separate Assyrian state under the protection of ‘a mandate power’ for 
twenty-five years to ensure its security (See Werda 1924 for full text).  The American 
delegation further presented the Assyrian umbrella as including ‘Nestorians, 
Chaldeans, Jacobites, a Maronite element, Persian Assyrians, Assyrians in Russia, and 
a Muslim Assyrian group that included Shakkaks and Yezidis’ (Donabed 2012: 410).  
 
Joseph describes this political effort as ‘totally out of touch with the true state of 
affairs’ because such unity existed in name only, and because of the impracticality of 
the delegation’s territorial demands on behalf of a scattered population, including for 
territory that provided access to the sea (Joseph 157).  Notably, the Chaldean 
Patriarch at this time appears to have supported the demand for an Assyro-Chaldean 
state, possibly encouraged by support by French officials for a Christian state in the 
Middle East (Giwargis 2006).  Such support may also have been a response to the 
fear and insecurity that resulted from the war’s tragedies, as well as the climate of 
self-determination spurred by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which encouraged 
national claims by minority populations, specifically as Point Twelve stated 
nationalities in the now-Turkish state should be granted ‘an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development’ (W. Wilson 1918).   
 
Geopolitics also played a factor in the appearance of a hybridized ‘Assyro-Chaldean’ 
identity during the Conference, as well as within the ANAA, who changed its name 
during the conference to the Assyro-Chaldean Union of America despite the 
Chaldean-American population being estimated at just a few dozen people (Makko 
2012: 299; Sengstock 1999: 66).  There is some suggestion its use came at the urging 
of France and the Chaldean Church, and was adopted out of fear France and the 
Vatican would oppose their national claims otherwise (Giwargis 2006).  Makko notes 
it was highly controversial amongst delegates – much like the political compromise of 
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ChaldoAssyrian proved to be almost a century later when created by Assyrian 
political parties after the Iraq War (Makko 299).  
 
Such political effort was for naught, however, as the Treaty of Sèvres failed to confer 
similar rights to the Assyrians as those granted to other minorities.  Section 62 
recognized ‘Assyro-Chaldeans’ as requiring protection, but did so within a scheme of 
autonomy for the Kurds of Turkey, permitting only that a League of Nations 
commission should visit the Assyrian region and ‘decide what rectifications, if any, 
should be made to the Turkish frontier’ (Treaty of Peace with Turkey 1920).   
 
Statehood efforts would have another opportunity, yet prove less fruitful for all 
former Ottoman minorities, at the Treaty of Lausanne negotiations.  Differing from 
the 1919-1920 negotiations where Assyrians and Chaldeans presented multiple 
delegates, only Assyrian General Agha Petros represented the population.  Petros 
petitioned negotiators for ‘The Claims of the Assyro-Chaldeans to Autonomy in Asia-
Minor’, contending Assyrians and Chaldeans formed ‘one single nation, one same 
race’ of approximately two million people deserving of autonomy like ‘all the other 
small peoples’ under the former Ottoman Empire (Petros 1922).  However, Petros’s 
umbrella approach was opposed by religious figures who feared losing power over 
their churches and who favoured British protection out of fear they would otherwise 
be forced to live under an Armenian or Kurdish state (Özdemir 2012: 104).  
Opposition may also have been fueled by distrust between Petros and the Shimun 
family: Mar Eshai Shimun XXIII was eleven years-old when he became Patriarch in 
1920, leaving the Church of the East without a strong leader at the time of 
negotiations, which in turn enabled Petros to position himself as the ‘Commander-in-
Chief’ of Assyrians; Petros, likewise, was understood to resent the power of the 
Patriarchal family (Wigram 1920; Stafford 1935: 37-38, 93-94).  Ultimately, a 
secular Assyrian national identity failed politically, and the Patriarch remained 
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responsible for leadership of the Assyrian nation (Makko 2010).  Ethnic Assyrianism 
was thus subordinated to Assyrian sectarianism at this period.  
 
Despite the lack of Assyrian or Chaldean representation at Lausanne, the ‘Assyrian 
problem’ took an important role in negotiations as a component of the still unsettled 
Turkish-Iraqi border dispute.  Mosul’s oil reserves presented a strategic interest to the 
British; as a result, the Assyrian cause ‘assumed greater importance in British policy, 
since it was realized championing Assyrian interests, while helping Britain at the 
League, could also be utilised to justify a frontier line more favourable to Iraq’ (Beck 
1981: 262).  The failure to resolve the Mosul border was cited as stemming from oil 
and ‘sentimental outbursts on the woes of Christian minorities’ (Journal of the Royal 
Central Asian Society 1926).   
 
Notably, despite the Paris delegates’ claims to a single Assyro-Chaldean nation, 
present in British understandings was a distinction between Chaldeans as a small and 
adaptive community and the Nestorians as a minority nation.  The Government noted 
in 1920 that: 
  
The “Millet” which chiefly concerns His Majesty’s Government as mandate 
Power for the villayets of Mosul and Baghdad is the Chaldeans…a progressive 
body of cultivators and artisans chiefly resident in and around Mosul.  They 
are not to be confused with the Nestorian Millet, whose original homes are 
outside the limits of French and British mandates (Montagu 1920: 4).   
 
A British civil service guide to Iraq further categorized Assyrians and Chaldeans as 
different populations, framing Assyrians as Nestorians from Turkey and Persia and 
Chaldeans as secessionist Catholics concentrated in Mosul and Baghdad (in Montagu 
3-4).  Such understandings of the Christian population did not mesh with those 
presented in 1919 and at Lausanne.  Instead, ethnic descriptions were often 
oversimplified and portrayed Chaldeans and Assyrians of different origins, a 
distinction some Chaldean nationalists would reiterate decades later.  This was both 
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beneficial and harmful to Assyrians: presenting the Assyrians as a displaced, now 
homeless nation encouraged British and League efforts to find an area of permanent 
resettlement, but would also marginalize the population from Iraqi society and later 
challenge the claim of Assyrian nationalists that they constitute an indigenous 
population of Iraq.   
 
The Turkish-Iraqi border remained unresolved by the signing of the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923, which left the final determination to negotiations between the two 
states; when that failed, the decision went before the League of Nations in 1925 
(Beck 1981).  The League established an interim ‘Brussels Line’, essentially the 
northern border of the Mosul vilayet and, despite investigations in Mosul in which 
Assyrians reiterated their request for a right of return, the League affixed the Brussels 
line as the final border in the Treaty of Angora in 1926, permanently sealing the 
displaced Assyrians from their homes in Hakkari.  This decision was criticized for 
years by the British Foreign Service, which noted that the League’s decision left the 
‘Assyrian problem’ again to the British: 
 
The responsibility for the present deplorable situation does not arise from any 
action or decision of ours.  In fact, it has followed from a decision of the 
Council of the League of Nations.  If in 1925 the League Council had taken 
our advice, and had fixed the Mosul frontier so as to include the Hakkari 
territory within the boundaries of Iraq, the Assyrians might have been 
satisfactorily resettled in their old home as a homogenous community.  In all 
probability the Assyrian problem then might have been permanently and 
satisfactorily solved (Simon 1937: 3). 
 
Patriarch Shimun and supporting Assyrian leaders likewise expressed frustration that, 
‘Numerous petitions were submitted by us on this subject prior to the delimitation of 
the Turco-‘Iraq frontier by the Commission of the League of Nations and we cannot 
understand why even the place which is the inheritance of our forefathers should 
have been seized from us’ (Shimun et al 1932: 3).  Turkish citizenship laws 
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established in 1928 correspondingly granted citizenship to those who remained in 
Turkey throughout WWI, effectively precluding Assyrians attempting to return to 
their homelands in Anatolia from citizenship (Özlem Biner 2011: 371).  
 
Thus, although Mosul was given to Iraq, the Assyrian question of resettlement 
remained unresolved.  Perhaps comparable to the early days of Zionism, Assyrian 
claims for relief at this time were not exclusively affixed to a particular territory or 
degree of self-governance, but rather adaptive to evolving geopolitical circumstances.  
Interwoven throughout this period are the multiple Assyrian petitions submitted, 
often by Patriarch Shimun, to the League of Nations for an autonomous state, millet 
designation in Iraq, or state-sponsored resettlement.  Such petitions were offered at 
every major development relating to Iraq: prior to the drawing of the Iraqi-Turkish 
border in 1925; prior to the 1930 treaty laying the groundwork for an independent 
Iraq; throughout the early 1930s as the independence process moved forward; after 
the Simmele massacre; and again at the founding of the United Nations (Omissi 
1989; al-Khalil 1989; Shimun 1946; Wilson 1926).   
 
The League subsequently continued to task committees with exploring various 
solutions in response to pending Assyrian-related petitions; as the process dragged 
on, British support waned as it sought an end to the mandate and exit from Iraq.  
The lingering Assyrian question potentially challenged British nation-building efforts: 
as was noted in 1932, ‘The Assyrian demand is to live in Iraq without taking their 
place as Iraqi citizens. This is not possible. The aim of His Majesty’s Government is to 
create an Iraqi state and nation’ (Quote in Lukitz 1995: 30).  Concerned the British 
would abandon Assyrians without a territory, Patriarch Shimun personally went 
before the League in 1932 to plead the Assyrian case, presenting what he called the 
Assyrian National Petition with the hope the status of Assyrians would be sorted 
before the Mandate’s end (Omissi 315).   
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Such efforts were unsuccessful and the League officially recognized Iraq as an 
independent state, absent a settlement to the Assyrian question, in October 1932.  
The nascent Iraqi state ultimately came to reject any notion of substate autonomy for 
the Assyrians, fearing any of Iraq’s minority groups would seek to emulate the 
Assyrian model, codifying ethnic and sectarian divisions that could permanently 
fracture a fragile Iraq.  However, just ten months after independence, the Simmele 
Massacre and destruction of Assyrian villages in Northern Iraq occurred. 
 
The Simmele Massacre followed a border incident involving Assyrians who tried 
unsuccessfully to seek refuge in French Mandate Syria and led to a horrific Iraqi 
military campaign against Assyrians and Assyrian villages by the Iraqi army and 
Kurdish militias that killed between 600 (Iraqi estimate) and 3,000 (Assyrian 
estimate) Assyrians over the summer of 1933, most notoriously in the town of 
Simmele, and violently looted sixty Assyrian villages in northern Iraq (al-Khalil 1989: 
168; Stafford 1934: 175-178).  A wave of Assyrian emigration from Iraq followed 
these attacks.  Successive generations of Iraqis were taught of the massacres as a 
justified response to an Assyrian uprising; present-day Assyrians recount stories of 
how their parents, born after the atrocities occurred, had to affirm that they were not 
part of the uprising to gain Iraqi citizenship, an act which reinforced the message 
that Assyrians had betrayed Iraq (Abbo et al Interview).   
 
Although the specific cause behind Simmele remains uncertain, scholars generally 
conclude the Assyrians were targeted because they were perceived, and presented 
themselves, as non-nationals, and not specifically because of their ethnicity or 
religion (see Polk 2005; al-Khalil 1989).  This perspective was aided by the Assyrian 
role in the British-created Levies military force, which was used in suppressing 
Kurdish and Arab separatist uprisings (Zubaida 367; Omissi 304).  The Levies’ 
success, however, precipitated the sense among the Iraqi population that Assyrians 
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were pawns of the British.  This, coupled with the Assyrians’ own insistence on their 
foreignness, further marginalized the community from the new Iraqi state.   
 
The assumption that Simmele was not religiously motivated draws from the fact that 
Chaldeans, other Christian sects, and Jews were not similarly attacked.  Nonetheless, 
minority communities afterwards quieted expressions of identity and religion.  
Simmele is further cited as a crucial dividing point between Assyrians and Chaldeans.  
It is suggested Chaldeans were so fearful following the attacks that they became 
more likely to assimilate, showing ‘much less inclination than the mainstream Church 
of the East toward nationalist aspirations, becoming an integral part of the Iraqi state’ 
(Healey 46; Lukitz 28).  Aside from the Patriarch’s 1919 presence at Versailles, 
Chaldeans appear to have rarely expressed an independent or nationalist dynamic 
comparable to that of the Assyrians, nor were they the subject of warrior-like myths 
that accompanied Assyrian stereotypes.  This dichotomy was apparent in the decades 
following Versailles, when Chaldeans remained relatively silent in the face of the 
Assyrian activism.  The majority of Chaldeans in Iraq had lived and continued to live 
in and around Mosul, and fewer were refugees in search of a home.   
 
Chaldeanness perhaps did not begin so much with the denominational schism but as 
a result of rising nationalism and the consequences it wrought.  As one community 
leader noted, ‘Yes, there’s 1530, and then there’s 1830, but in the real more modern 
sense, I think the real separation occurs at Simmele.  Well, the combination of the 
Assyrian genocide followed by – because there were a lot of Chaldeans in the 
Assyrian genocide - but the Assyrian genocide followed 15 years later by Simmele’ 
(Abbo et al Interview). Others similarly describe the consequences of the massacre as 
pushing Chaldeans to disassociate from the nationalist Assyrians: ‘[After Simmele] 
It’s like, no, no, no, we don’t know these people.  We’re different.  Even though all 
these people in Detroit, they all came from the villages TelKeppe and Alqosh that are 
within 5 miles of Nineveh’ (ADM Interview 2013).  Through a politicized climate in 
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Iraq that wrought tragic consequences for being on the wrong side, Chaldean identity 
arguably came to represent a separate, Catholic, passive population, one distancing 
itself from the Assyrian nationalists who sought Assyrian statehood.  The result of 
this helped lay the intra-communal boundary that exists today.   
 
Likewise, the Chaldean Patriarchs’ support for subsequent Iraqi governments aided 
the perception that Chaldeans, as a religious community, chose to assimilate and 
keep their heads down rather than pursue a national agenda.  British 
communications that mention Chaldeans specifically are not easily found, but often 
reiterate the impression that Chaldeans are less politically assertive than Assyrians.  
For example, a series of memos in 1950 regarding the new Chaldean Patriarch, 
Yousef VII Ghanima, notes the Chaldeans never gave the Iraqi or Ottoman 
governments ‘trouble’, but were occasionally caught in the ‘whirlwinds created by 
their more turbulent schismatic counterparts, the Assyrians’ (Furlonge 1950).  The 
correspondence also noted the close ties between Chaldeans and the French 
Dominican Mission in Iraq; as well as noting the previous Patriarch, Emmanuel II, 
enjoyed a close relationship with King Faisal, who gave the Patriarch a seat in the 
Iraqi Senate in 1926 despite what was characterized as the Patriarch’s proclivity 
toward ‘eschewing politics’.  Ghanima’s cousin served as a Senator and Iraq’s Minister 
of Finance at various times throughout the 1920s through 1940s, and the Chaldean 
Patriarch would hold a Senate seat until the 1958 revolution (ibid).  The stereotype 
of Chaldeans as unthreatening and apolitical often draws upon this period and the 
Church leadership’s reticence toward political activism, itself likely a result of 
Simmele and its position as a small, powerless minority.   
 
Following Simmele, Shimun submitted a new petition to the League contending Iraq 
violated its Declaration of Guarantees to its minority populations.  In September 
1933, the League responded by formally tasking a Council Committee with finding a 
permanent solution for the Assyrians while nonetheless failing to offer any 
 91 
condemnation or conduct an investigation into the massacre (Simon 7).  The 
Committee of the Council for Assyrian Settlement, a six-member committee headed 
by Spain and rounded out by the UK, France, Italy, Denmark, and Mexico, was 
appointed to explore options.  Given the UK’s special ties with the Assyrians, its 
standing on the committee, and its colonial territories, three general options of 
inquiry were pursued: resettlement in a foreign country, resettlement in the British 
Colonial Empire, and resettlement in a British Dominion (Simon 2).   
 
Foreign settlement was understandably difficult.  The British Foreign Service in 1937 
tasked a Committee on the Assyrians in Iraq, comprising the Home Secretary, 
Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, Dominion Affairs, the Colonies, War, and the Lord of 
the Admiralty, with assessing any possible resolution to the Assyrian issue.  The 
Committee observed there is a ‘natural hesitation’ for any state to receive ‘a little 
known Asiatic community…one for which Great Britain is regarded as having a 
special liability, and which she, more than other nations, in view of her vast 
territories, is believed to have room to accommodate’ (Simon 8).  Turkey rejected an 
Assyrian return to Hakkari or resettlement anywhere inside Turkey’s borders, and 
had already forcibly expelled Assyrians who attempted to return to their homes.  Iran 
and the Soviet Union were ruled out because of concern regarding the Assyrians’ 
long-term viability therein given the repressive nature of these states.  Other 
countries were ruled out for seemingly more superficial or colonial views regarding 
either the country in question or the Assyrians themselves: Paraguay was found ‘too 
primitive and unstable a character’ whist Northern Rhodesia was rejected because 
Assyrians were from a mountainous land and might not adapt well to Rhodesia’s 
plains.   
 
A resettlement scheme that suggested initial promise was in Paraná, Brazil, in which 
a British company, Paraná Plantations Ltd., agreed to provide a portion of its land 
holdings to resettle the approximately 20,000 Assyrians who still sought to leave 
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Iraq.  Beginning negotiations in 1932, a temporary agreement was made between the 
Brazilian government and the League in January 1934 that would have allowed 
Assyrian settlement on the conditions the government would not be financially 
responsible for the Assyrian population; only Assyrians familiar with farming would 
be admitted to Brazil and would only be settled in groups of 500 families at a time; 
and the League and Paraná Plantations would bear the costs and responsibility of 
repatriating Assyrians if resettlement did not succeed (Lesser 1999: 66).  Brazilian 
politicians in support of resettlement looked favourably on the Assyrians’ Christianity 
and the opportunity to develop a remote area of Brazil; however, xenophobic 
reactions shaped public opinion against the Assyrians as ‘nomads and 
Mohammedans’, transforming the Assyrian narrative ‘from peaceful Christian 
immigrant farmers into a warlike refugee group that would bring social and 
economic damages to Brazil’ (Lesser 67, 73).  Such animosity was framed in relation 
to Brazil’s Lebanese diaspora who nativists accused of refusing to assimilate and 
dominating commercial interests against poor Brazilians, common rhetoric against 
middleman minorities whose negative stereotypes carried to the Assyrians after 
Shimun called for special national minority rights should resettlement go through.  
Consequentially, the plan was effectively vetoed by the Brazilian parliament through 
passage of legislation restricting immigration, preemptively halting Assyrian 
admittances (Lesser 70; Simon 1934, 1933).   
 
The most promising foreign option was the Ghab region of the Levant, which at the 
time was under the French Mandate.  Documents show the Committee for Assyrian 
Settlement urging the League to consider the proposal with special attention, noting: 
 
It is not a refugee problem, but an eminently political problem, which the 
Council, as early as 1931, decided to consider as exceptional – involving 
likewise exceptional measures.  Its immediate radical solution would greatly 
contribute to the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the Near East.  Its 
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abandonment would have consequences which would affect not only the 
Assyrians and Iraq, but also other States (Sixth Committee 1935).   
 
The Committee urged the contribution of private and international donations to 
support the resettlement costs beyond that which Iraq, Britain, the U.S., and France 
appropriated to the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, which was established by the 
League in December 1934; an official ‘Ghab Reclamation Scheme’ was further 
planned to outline transfer of ownership of the Ghab to the Assyrians following a 
public works development scheme (Sixth Committee 1935; League of Nations 1936).  
External support emerged to aid the effort; the Archbishop of Canterbury, for 
example, in 1936 made a fundraising appeal on behalf of the Assyrians for the Ghab 
settlement (Canterbury 1936).  Ultimately, however, Assyrian misfortune continued 
when Syrian uprisings accelerated the French decision to withdraw from its Mandate 
in September 1936, effectively ending the Ghab project.   
 
The Brazil and Ghab schemes were to be the most concerted efforts at Assyrian 
resettlement.  The British government looked for several more years at prospective 
resettlement locations across its empire with varying degrees of enthusiasm and 
assertiveness.  Inquiries were conducted into British colonies and dominions of 
Cyprus, Seychelles, Eritrea, Malaya, Palestine, British Guiana, and Tanzania, amongst 
many others (Simon 1937).  British representatives consistently expressed concern 
over the effect of local displacement, of Assyrian acclimation, or suggested capping 
resettlement at a small number, such as 500 families in Kenya (Hall 1946).  Further 
highlighting the perhaps universal challenges of displacement and statelessness, 
several memorandums reveal simultaneous considerations of Jewish resettlement in 
the same British territories being looked at for the Assyrians, including Uganda and 
British Guyana.   
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The British Committee therefore noted of its failure, ‘We fear that the only course 
remaining to the League Council is to negotiate with the Government of Iraq with the 
view to obtaining improved conditions for the Assyrians in Iraqi territory’ (Simon 
1937: 5).  The report reiterated the challenge of the Assyrian nation coexisting 
within a homogenizing Iraq:  
 
The difficulty in the Assyrians remaining in Iraq is their desire not merely for 
religious, but if possible for national, or at all events for administrative 
autonomy, and, on the other hand, the conviction of the Iraqis that their 
existence as a nation depends on the welding together of the various racial 
and religious entities of which their country is composed (Simon 1).   
 
Hope for future relief became sidelined in the theatre of the Second World War and 
the failure of the League of Nations itself.  Patriarch Shimun pursued a similar line of 
request at the formation of the United Nations, presenting again ‘The Assyrian 
National Petition’ (Shimun 1946).   Again requesting an Assyrian homeland, the 
Patriarch’s petition sought to draw upon the post-WW2 climate by noting that 
Assyrians were the only faction in Iraq to remain loyal to the Allies during WWII, 
saving the Royal Air Force base near Baghdad and effectively the UK’s oil supply 
route (Shimun 10-11).  
 
His argument played upon his people’s deep Christian roots, their antiquity, their 
heroic sacrifices for liberal democratic principles, and their right to self-
determination – all benchmarks that ideally would have resonated with the victorious 
Western powers.  It was to no avail, of course, and the tiny Assyrian cause became 
lost in the larger, pressing scope of the Cold War and proxy wars.  The British 
government continued for a few years after WWII to assess various sites.  A 1945 
memo from the Foreign Office noted the ‘fear that their existence in Iraq will be 
somewhat precarious for many years to come’, and a 1946 memo elaborated that 
discussions occurred in 1945 regarding resettlement in various parts of Africa whilst 
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urging that if is not possible to relocate the Assyrians, the ‘least we can do is to 
inform them forthwith of their fate’ (Eden 1945; Bevin 1946).   
 
Thus, the Assyrian fate became intwined with Iraq.  Assyrians spent the next decades 
further pushed into diaspora by the repressive policies of the Ba’ath regime, 
geopolitics, and economic hardship.  The legacy of unfulfilled statehood remains an 
idealized goal that has shaped the long-distance nationalism of many in the diaspora.  
The culmination of these efforts from the League of Nations, the British Government, 
the Patriarch, and various Assyrian political leadership failed to secure a self-ruled 
atra, but nonetheless has stood as a legacy to future generations of nationalists that 
Assyrians are a unique nation.   
 
The Ba’ath Era and Beyond: Arabization to Exclusion  
 
The period between the end of WWII and the Ba’ath era was comparatively calmer 
for the Assyrian and Chaldean population, although sentiment against the 
communities was at times apparent.  One family recalled, for example, President 
Abdul Salam Aref announcing on television that children should not have names like 
Mikhail or Jajou, common Christian names, and how it made people feel their 
Christian names were shameful (Bacall and Bacall Interview).  Much of the state’s 
anti-minority sentiment in the immediate post-war period was instead focused upon 
Iraq’s ancient Jewish community, which, like the Assyrians a decade prior, became 
the new ‘non-nationals’, stigmatized as a reaction to the establishment of Israel.  
Their forced exodus in 1950 again confirmed the perils of being a distinguishable 
minority. 
 
Perhaps in part for that reason, integration became more common; it was perhaps 
also encouraged by the rebuilding of the post-war economy, a long, tumultuous 
political situation, and the futility of continuing the national claim.  The Christian 
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population began to urbanize following WWII as many young Assyrians and 
Chaldeans moved from Nineveh, Mosul, and Kirkuk to Baghdad for economic and 
educational opportunity.  By 1950, the See of the Chaldean Church was relocated 
from Mosul to Baghdad to reflect the rapidly-grown Chaldean presence therein 
(O’Mahony 2004b: 125).  
 
In a sense, Christians benefitted from the presence of the Chaldean Patriarch in Iraq 
and the secular nature of the Ba’ath regime.  The thirty-year leadership of Patriarch 
Paul Cheiko provided a consistent, stable influence for Chaldeans from the 1958 
Revolution through the end of the Iran-Iraq War.  The Chaldean legacy under 
Hussein thus differs somewhat from that of the Assyrians; this is perhaps the result of 
the inseparable link between Chaldean identity and the Chaldean Catholic Church, 
and the relationship between the Patriarch and the Iraqi government.  The Chaldean 
Church was able to grow both in Iraq and in diaspora under Hussein and, at times, 
with the aide of the Iraqi government itself.  Over the next several decades, twenty-
five Chaldean churches were built in Baghdad in response to continued migration 
and settlement (O’Mahony 2004a: 436).  Chaldeans often note they served in minor 
but niche roles under the regime, such as cooks, mid-level military officials, and 
medical professionals, because their small numbers ensured they could not be a 
threat to the regime (Arabo Interview 2013; Kassab Interview 2012).   
 
The Ba’ath era suggested early promise for Christians in terms of religious freedoms 
and protections; indeed, a founder of the Ba’ath Party, Michel Aflaq, was himself 
Greek Orthodox.  The 1970 Iraqi Constitution, drafted after Hussein seized power, 
recognized the legitimate and legal rights of all minorities within the framework of 
Iraqi unity, albeit short of providing any special privileges, and in 1972 a language 
decree guaranteed language rights for minorities, including the right to provide 
language instruction in schools in which at least twenty-five percent of students 
spoke the minority language (O’Mahony 2004b: 130).  
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However, this was soon undermined by the enactment of Arabization policies that 
suppressed the use of the Aramaic language and non-Arab ethnic identities for the 
use of Arabic and the label ‘Arab Christian’ for Assyrians and Chaldeans alike.  As 
Sargon Donabed and Shamiran Mako define, Arabization was ‘a systematic campaign 
purposive of instituting policies aimed at the destruction of ethnic and cultural 
pluralism in Iraq through demographic manipulation and forced assimilation, rooted 
in the Baathist ideological drive for the creation of a homogeneously Arab society’ 
(Donabed and Mako 2012: 287).  In 1975, the government nationalized the school 
system, undoing long-standing traditions of religious education and language rights.  
The 1977 Iraqi Census prohibited the use of Chaldean, Assyrian, Syriac, or other 
ethnic designations, requiring instead the use of Arab Christian or Kurdish Christian 
(Petrosian 2006: 127).  By the 1990s sanctions era, the regime stipulated that only 
Arab Christians could receive ration cards for food, as well as purchase property 
(Assyrian American League 2004; Lewis 2003).  Christians who hoped the Ba’ath 
Party would be more welcoming of diversity than previous governments were 
disappointed by the exclusive Arab-based definition of the Iraqi state that came to be 
enforced.  
 
Whilst negating Assyrian and Chaldean ethnicity in favour of ‘Arab Christian’ is 
perhaps minor in comparison to the overt violence of the early 20th century, its effect 
was to belie the ethnically, linguistically, and confessionally unique people embodied 
therein.  The limitation of this broad-brush not only renders these communities 
indistinguishable and interchangeable from mainstream society and other Christian 
populations, but negates their unique ethnic identities as a people at risk of 
disappearing.  Suppression of identity may have advanced the homogenization of the 
Iraqi state; however, its purpose was unquestionably the erosion of non-Arab ethnic 
identity and cultural practices. 
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Compounding cultural Arabization was forced displacement.  The regime forcibly 
relocated ethnic minority communities from villages where the regime believed 
opposition groups received support, usually destroying the village and placing 
residents in camps or distant villages (Tripp 2007: 234-236; Donabed 2010: 190-
255).  These actions escalated in 1988 against the Kurdish population in particular, 
with significant consequences for Assyrian villages, as the Iran-Iraq War waned and 
the Iraqi government could focus its resources, including chemical weapons, on the 
Kurdish regions.  Charles Tripp, echoing a Human Rights Watch study, estimates up 
to eighty percent of villages in the three Kurdish regions were destroyed and up to 
100,000 mostly Kurdish civilians killed during the Anfal campaign (Tripp 236; 
Human Rights Watch 2003).  However, foreshadowing a trend repeated with the 
post-2003 crisis, literature regarding the Anfal tragedy focuses almost exclusively on 
the larger ethnic groups and Assyrians, if mentioned, are often only noted in passing.  
Donabed observed Assyrian figures are made difficult by the fact both the Kurdish 
and Iraqi governments would not classify Assyrians as Assyrians in reporting 
statistics; he notes other researchers have estimated 2,000 Assyrians were killed 
through chemical weapons attacks in Anfal and thirty-one Assyrian villages were 
destroyed (Donabed 254).  This marks significant loss to a small community, yet 
better numbers are not known in part because of the lack of quality information and 
in part because Assyrian losses are treated, as Donabed notes, as a ‘sideshow’ or 
‘collateral victims’ of the Kurdish experience (ibid).    
 
Despite the secular foundation of the Ba’ath party and previous acceptance of 
Christianity, a turn was further becoming apparent around the time Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, when regime rhetoric became increasingly Islamist in an effort to counter-
balance unhappy Shia factions.  The growing fundamentalism of Shia Islamists came 
to a head with Hussein’s 2003 removal.  Sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shias 
over their respective stakes in Iraq precipitated violent persecution of the country’s 
ethno-religious minorities.  More than half the Iraqi Christian population has since 
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fled or been internally displaced.  Most refugees are living in Syria, Turkey, Jordan, 
and Lebanon, or are in the Kurdish region.  Even prior to ISIL’s advance, the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees maintained safety concerns in Iraq were too 
uncertain to compel Iraq’s ethno-religious minorities to return (UNHCR 2011). 
 
As the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom noted in designating Iraq 
a Country of Particular Concern for the fifth year since 2008: 
  
The Iraqi government continues to tolerate systematic, ongoing, and 
egregious religious freedom violations.  In the past year, religious sites and 
worshippers were targeted in violent attacks, often with impunity, and 
businesses viewed as “un-Islamic” were vandalized. Large percentages of the 
country‘s smallest religious minorities…have fled the country in recent years, 
threatening these ancient communities‘ very existence in Iraq; the diminished 
numbers that remain face official discrimination, marginalization, and 
neglect…Religious freedom abuses of women and individuals who do not 
conform to strict interpretations of religious norms also remain a concern 
(USCIRF 2012: 93). 
 
Minority-targeted violence includes church bombings, murders of priests and 
congregations, attacks on university students, kidnappings, rapes, destruction of 
Christian-owned shops, and other religiously-motivated threats and murders.  High-
profile attacks included the 2010 bombings of school buses that wounded 80 
Christian university students and assassinations of at least five politicians within the 
Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), as well as an attempted assassination of 
Yonadam Kanna, an Assyrian Member of Parliament and head of the ADM.  From 
2004 through 2013, at least seventy-three churches have been bombed or destroyed, 
including the devastating 2010 attack on the Our Lady of Salvation Church in 
Baghdad that killed fifty-eight worshipers and police officers and wounded seventy-
eight (AINA 2014a).  By March 2013, Chaldean Patriarch Louis Sako estimated only 
fifty-seven churches remained in the whole of Iraq, a loss of eighty percent of the 300 
churches prior to the war (Kumar 2013).  Such atrocities have further scattered 
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Assyrians and Chaldeans across the globe, grown the diaspora in the U.S., and 
created a refugee crisis within Iraq and Iraq’s neighbours.   
 
There is consequentially an understanding amongst the diaspora that this wave of 
migration is fundamentally different than anything the population had experienced.  
As one interviewee noted: 
  
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by George W. Bush, and the collateral 
damage as a result of unleashing Muslim fundamentalists who want to drive 
out the Christians, you now have refugees.  It’s now a forced emigration.  I 
mean, they’re leaving in order not to be killed.  And this is the first time I 
think - but I’m not a true historian specifically of the Chaldean people - but to 
me, this is probably the time that the emigration is really religious 
persecution.  All the other times, it was economic advancement (Romaya 
Interview 2012). 
 
Boundaries of the Iraqi state were again being redrawn as Islamist; whether this took 
a Shia or Sunni form was not particularly relevant to Assyrians and Chaldeans so 
long as it resulted in a fundamentally sectarian interpretation of Iraq: the end result 
was social closure precluding Assyrian and Chaldean belonging.  A member of the 
ADM summarized the transition for Assyrians and Chaldeans as one from cultural 
erasure to a basic struggle for survival:  
  
Before Saddam, we’re fighting this one madman for recognition of our 
ethnicity, our identity, of Assyrian.  I am Assyrian.  I am not Arab, I am not 
Kurd.  But he wanted to erase that and call us either Arab or Arab Christian or 
something other than Assyrian, because then you belong to the land - if you 
say you’re Assyrian, then you’re indigenous, then the land is yours in a way.  
So that was the struggle, really.  Now after 2003, instead of one target, we 
are a target of many, whether it’s the Muslims, the Kurds because they’re 
sitting on Assyrian land, we’re getting hit from different areas and even 
within, whether the name issues, whether different parties that don’t want 
ADM to succeed.  It’s all this bombardment at us.  Before it was one, and 
either you’re thrown in jail or you run away.  Now it’s killing - and survival, 
really - of the indigenous people of Iraq (ADM Interview). 
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Notable in the current crisis is the parallel to the Ottoman-era genocide: the violence 
does not distinguish between denominations.  Whilst there was transvaluation of the 
Shia-Sunni social and political hierarchy, boundary closure came to be around Arab, 
Muslim Iraqis.  Intra-ethnic differences that developed over the past century between 
Assyrians and Chaldeans were irrelevant to the perpetrators of conflict.  Yet whilst 
for some this fused a common identity, the name issue remains prevalent, both 
within Iraq and in the U.S.  
 
REFRAMING ASSYRIAN-CHALDEAN BOUNDARIES IN THE U.S.  
 
The most persistent point of debate amongst the American-based diaspora is whether 
Assyrians and Chaldeans are one: one people, one ethnic group, one nation.  More 
than intra-communal trivia, this question is fundamental to the institutional 
framework that will shape their continued presence in diaspora, and their 
relationship to Iraq and each other.  The legacy of the confessional split and 
Arabization policies contributed to muddling Assyrian and Chaldean identity alike, as 
well as historical and cultural understandings thereof.   
 
Areas of settlement in the U.S. were highly formative to diasporic identity 
construction and boundary-making, both within the larger society and within the 
diaspora itself.  Assyrian and Chaldean migration to the U.S. was multilineal, brought 
by the dual promises of America as a beacon of refuge and a land of opportunity.  
Although a few individuals arrived in the late 1800s as temporary migrants attending 
university or seeking employment- often individuals affiliated with one of the 
American Christian missions in the Ottoman Empire or Iran- migration generally 
began around the turn of the 20th century.  This first wave was geographically 
scattered in terms of origin and settlement.  Most were men, largely from Urmia, 
Iran, present-day Syria, and Turkey, seeking employment, and as such tended to 
settle in the urban centers of Chicago and New York City or in industrial centers with 
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available factory jobs, particularly Worcester, Massachusetts, New Britain, 
Connecticut, and Gary, Indiana (Benjamin 1996: 21-22).  Assyrian migration to 
Turlock, California, was the only planned Assyrian settlement in America, occurring 
around 1910 and led by Presbyterian Assyrians from Iran looking to build a 
permanent farming community (Ishaya 2006: 21-24).  Prior to WWI, the Assyrian 
population was estimated to be just under 3,000 individuals, approximately half of 
which was in Chicago, seven-hundred in Connecticut, and only around forty-five in 
Turlock, and of which at least 1,000 were from Iran (Benjamin 21; Ishaya 9-14).   
 
The population grew in the inter-war period with the admission of refugees fleeing 
genocide and Simmele.  Although official numbers are not available, one community 
survey estimated approximately 10,000 Assyrians arrived between WWI and 1940; 
another survey conducted by Shimun in 1944 estimated there were approximately 
11,000 members of the Church of the East specifically in the U.S., approximately half 
of which were in Chicago, and over 1,000 in California, Connecticut, and Indiana 
respectively (Benjamin 25; Ishaya 2003).  These estimates are perhaps not as large as 
would be expected given the gravity of the circumstances in the Middle East.  Tight 
U.S. immigration laws restricted migration, notably the 1924 Immigration Act which 
limited Middle Eastern states to the lowest available visa quotas (Perry 2008: 60-61; 
Ward 1924).  Nonetheless, those able to secure refuge in the U.S. joined with 
existing settlements and formed new communities.  An Assyrian community in Flint, 
Michigan, was formed by refugees from Baqubah who sought employment in the 
city’s automotive industry (Ishaya 2003).  This period further diversified the diaspora 
through refugee and familial migration, marking permanent community resettlement 
and essentially the establishment of a permanent American diaspora.  
 
As noted above, the meaning of the Assyrian nation was in transition as the 
dissolution of the millet system usurped the role of religious leaders, and the forced 
displacement that marked this era shepherded members from far-reaching areas of 
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the Middle East, including the mountains of Hakkari, the farmlands of Urmia, and 
the refugee camps of Baqubah, into the U.S.  The role of religious leadership 
remained uncertain as the Assyrian Patriarch was stripped of his Iraqi citizenship in 
the aftermath of the Simmele Massacre and ultimately forced to take refuge in the 
U.S. (Healey 2010; Shimun 1946).  This forced exile likewise placed the ancient 
Church in a diasporic state as its See was moved to Chicago.  The presence of the 
Patriarch in the American diaspora intertwined the two, and he became directly 
involved with growing the Church’s institutions through the construction of new 
churches and personally translating liturgy into English and Arabic (d’Mar Shimun 
2008).  As discussed in the next chapter, this influence helped provide structure and 
compliment civic organizations that aimed to both keep the diaspora together and to 
aid traumatized refugees.   
 
Whilst this inter-war wave established the diaspora, it was the wave of immigrants 
beginning in the 1960s that shaped the diaspora as it exists today.  These migrants 
came to the U.S. in response to turmoil and repression in their states of origin with 
the benefit of a reshaped immigration system that increased the availability of visas. 
10  The 1979 Iranian revolution forced a rapid emigration of Assyrians and 
Chaldeans, which coupled with the Iran-Iraq War, saw the population decrease from 
an estimated 100,000 before the Revolution to approximately 15,000 remaining this 
decade (Taimoorazy Interview; Naby and Choksy 2010).  However, the bulk of this 
era’s migration was from Iraq.  Aside from Anfal, such migration was not necessarily 
the result of community-specific persecution but overall oppression that 
characterized the dictatorship.  Life in Iraq became more difficult as a result of the 
Iran-Iraq War, which lasted most of the 1980s, and the 1991 Gulf War, after which 
                                            
10 The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, still in effect today, was significant to this 
migration because it eliminated quotas based on national origin.  The 1965 system was more 
individualized, permitting immigration based on pillars of family reunification and 
employment, with special visa allocations for refugees and asylees.  This facilitated 
immigration for those fleeing conflict as well as those who already possessed immediate 
family in the U.S. (P.L. 89-263; Lee 2015; Chin 1996). 
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international sanctions damaged Iraq’s economy.  Thus, employment, freedoms, a 
better quality of life, and family reunification were common causes for emigration in 
this period, a contrast to the refugees whose flight from targeted violence 
characterized the first wave of migration after WWI and again after 2003.  
 
California proved a lure during this time for multiple reasons: for new immigrants; 
for those refugees who first settled in New England and industrial cities seeking to 
retire; and for second-generation Assyrians who sought a better quality of life and 
better economic opportunity (Ishaya 2003).  Consequentially, there has been a 
population shift westward over the past decades as the Assyrian population in 
eastern cities decreased, having a cyclic effect as new waves in turn migrated settled 
in with existing Assyrian populations and better opportunity, further concentrating 
the diaspora around Chicago and California, expanding to cities like San Jose and Los 
Angeles in addition to Turlock.  As Ishaya commented in reference to the shrinking 
Connecticut community, which was estimated at 3,500 in the 1980s and only a few 
hundred today, assimilation and relocation were significant factors; additionally, 
‘new immigrants were not joining the community to revitalize it socially and 
culturally.  This was due to a decrease in employment opportunities in the state as a 
result of industrial decline’ (Ishaya 2006: 13).  The same was true of Flint, Gary, and 
other rust belt areas, where opportunities for self-sufficiency were becoming fewer.  
These new migrants in a sense replenished the assimilated diasporic members.  
Accurate population figures are difficult as incoming immigrants are identified by 
state of origin: the only official attempt at measuring the population was in the 2000 
Census, which was noted for its low response rates for the population, listed less than 
7,000 Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriacs in the greater Turlock area and only 14,000 in 
Chicago (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).  For comparison, Michigan’s population was 
listed at 34,000 even though Church surveys found the population in the late 1990s 
to be between 65,000 to 80,000 (Sengstock 67).   
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Whilst, as noted below, Chaldeans often speak of an economic niche, it is more 
difficult to speak in such broad terms about the Assyrian community.  In areas like 
Turlock, settlers were originally farmers or in a farming-affiliated profession, but 
with the consolidation of the farming industry, today many have opened small 
businesses or ventured into real estate, echoing the small business mentality ascribed 
to Chaldeans, or entered the local professional and industrial workforce (Ishaya 
2010: 132-152).  Assyrian employment elsewhere is similarly dispersed through 
highly-skilled and blue-collar sectors, representing like most immigrant populations 
the diversity of the skillset migrants possess and the employment opportunities in 
their areas of resettlement.  
 
The Chaldean experience that built the Detroit community differed in its early 
foundations, but followed a similar post-1960 trajectory.  The root and route of 
Chaldean migration is more singular.  Sargon Donabed argued, ‘The “Chaldean” label 
is today mostly an Iraqi phenomenon as it lacks saturation among the larger religious 
community. Chaldeans of Bohtan, Turkey, and Urmia, Iran, are self identified as 
Assyro-Chaldéens’ (Donabed 2012: 410).  Chaldean emigration to the U.S. carried 
with it this phenomenon.  In the early years, it was often a direct path from the 
Nineveh Plain to Detroit; in more recent decades, Chaldeans who emigrated from 
urban areas like Baghdad or Basra were often born in the Nineveh Plain or a 
generation or two removed (Arabo Interview; Sengstock 1999).  It is a result of this 
specific Chaldean migration path to Detroit and San Diego that Chaldean identity 
came to exist and thrive in the U.S.   
 
The first migrants, a handful of people, came prior to WWI, setting the first roots of 
the Chaldean grocery business that would attract family members and other 
Chaldeans.  Notable is that they settled in Detroit as Chaldeans, developing ties with 
the established Lebanese Maronite community with whom they spoke Arabic and 
shared similar Eastern Catholic traditions, and utilized the Maronite Church for 
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services until 1947 when the first Chaldean priest in the U.S. was sent to Detroit at 
the request of the small population (Sengstock 27-30).  Community narratives differ 
from those of the Assyrian community in that these early migrants are not cast as 
refugees, but individuals aspiring to support their family, a narrative tying to that of 
the Chaldean entrepreneur.  Although migrants were also attracted to Detroit for 
work in the automotive industry, few Chaldeans actually worked for Ford Motor 
Company, likely because of language barriers that precluded employment (Bacall and 
Bacall Interview).  Community growth was slow in the first half of the century, 
particularly during the Great Depression, and restricted by the aforementioned 
immigration laws, and by 1960 the community was approximately 1,500-2,300 
people (Perry 2008: 62; Sengstock 67).   
 
Immigration increased after 1965.  Here, like the Assyrian community, immigration 
was spurred both by economic opportunity and flight from the Ba’ath regime.  Yet 
Chaldean migration to Detroit continued to hold ties to the Nineveh Plain, 
particularly TelKeppe.  Significant is that Chaldean settlement in Detroit continued 
despite the decline of Detroit itself.  As Detroit’s population shrunk following the 
1967 race riot, the Chaldean presence grew, particularly as entrepreneurs saw an 
advantage in taking over abandoned grocery and retail businesses, thus contributing 
to the continued entwinement between Chaldean small businesses and the Detroit 
region.   
 
The optics of a favourable relationship between the Chaldean Church and the Ba’ath 
regime also grew, cultivated by Hussein’s financial support of diasporic Chaldean 
Churches, most infamously the $450,000 given to the Sacred Heart Church in Detroit 
that resulted in Hussein being presented a key to the City of Detroit in 1980 
(Associated Press 2003).  This funding suggests the significance of the burgeoning 
Detroit Chaldean community.  By 1982, the population had grown to merit the 
establishment of the Chaldean Church’s first diocese in the Western Hemisphere in 
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Detroit, which Bishop Ibrahim Ibrahim was appointed to head.  Although today little 
remains of the Chaldean Town community that surrounded the Sacred Heart Church, 
as population growth and governance issues in Detroit encouraged relocation into 
the neighbouring suburbs, the community has proven itself able to remain connected 
despite dispersion across the greater Detroit Metropolitan area.  The Sacred Heart 
Church relocated to the suburb of Warren in 2015 after years of bussing in 
parishioners from the suburbs and arranging security guards to ensure safety 
(Namou 2015).  There are today ten Chaldean Churches in Michigan dispersed 
throughout suburban Detroit (St. Thomas Diocese 2015).  In the wake of Michigan’s 
economic challenges, Chaldeans are the only immigrant population whose numbers 
in Michigan have increased in recent years (Kruvelis 2013).   
 
The San Diego Chaldean community was established more recently.  Wadie Deddeh, 
the first known Chaldean-American elected to public office, often commented that his 
was the fourth Chaldean family in San Diego when he moved from Detroit in 1959 
(Deddeh 2015).  Population growth was at first gradual, and by the mid-1980s the 
San Diego population had grown to approximately 5,000 people, mostly in the 
suburb of El Cajon (Greeley 1985).  Connections between the two population centers 
are close as much of the early San Diego population were Detroit-area transplants, 
and the perception of the Chaldean entrepreneur, particularly the Chaldean grocer, 
was carried to San Diego (Rooney 2007; Greeley 1985).  A commonality through 
both settlements is that Chaldeans pursued small businesses in areas with existing 
economic and social challenges. 11  Chaldeans were perhaps more able to create an 
economic niche because, as observed of modern middleman minorities, there was a 
                                            
11 El Cajon, whose total population is approximately 100,000, was cited as the nation’s meth 
capital in the 1980s and recently held the highest unemployment rate in San Diego County 
(Perry 2014).  Detroit’s population was over 1 million in 1990 but today is under 700,000, 
(although the greater metropolitan is 4.2 million); it faces blight, population decline, 
unemployment, bankruptcy (which it exited in 2014), and has ranked amongst the most 
violent cities in America since the 1980s (Desilver 2014; Kurth, Wilkinson, Aguilar 2013; 
LeDuff 2013; State of Michigan 2010). 
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gap in retail services.  An approximate sixty percent of Chaldeans in Michigan own at 
least one business and an approximate thirty-nine percent own at least two (Kruvelis 
2013; Chaldean Household Survey 2008).  In Detroit and San Diego alike, business 
ownership has concentrated around a niche market: Chaldeans own approximately 
ninety-percent of Detroit’s grocery and convenience stores and approximately sixty-
percent of San Diego County’s food and grocery establishments (San Diego East 
County Chaldean Chamber 2013; Buss 2012; Detroit 2020 2011).   
 
By 2002, population growth in California merited the establishment of a second 
American diocese, placed in San Diego and headed by Bishop Sarhad Jammo.  There 
are currently three Chaldean churches and two missions in the San Diego area 
(Kaldu.org 2015).  With the post-2003 influx of refugees fleeing the Iraq War 
arriving during the American economic crisis, Chaldean and Assyrian migration alike 
have further expanded to places like Phoenix, Arizona, Las Vegas, Nevada, and 
Houston, Texas, with more prospects for employment.   
 
This, of course, is not to suggest all Chaldean migration settled in Detroit or San 
Diego nor that all members of the Chaldean Church identify as Chaldean.  Many 
already identified as Assyrian, including members of the Chaldean Church in Iran 
who often understand themselves as Catholic Assyrians (Taimoorazy Interview).  
Others identify with their state of origin or as Arab Christian.  In the latter cases, 
those who went to Turlock or Chicago often ‘became’ Assyrian, where Assyrian ethnic 
boundaries were already established and social interaction reinforced belonging 
within the heterogeneous Assyrian identity these areas had developed.  As Sengstock 
noted, the small Chaldean community that immigrated to Turlock mostly took the 
Assyrian identity: 
 
The Turlock community tends to unite under the Assyrian heritage and 
Aramaic language…In the mid-1960s, members of the Chaldean-right church 
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numbered less than 200 families and came from various parts of Iran, rather 
than Iraq.  Lacking a village tie and with fewer co-religionists available, they 
had a strong Assyrian cultural tie…Religious intermarriage was common, 
since the Assyrian cultural identity was stronger than the religious one 
(Sengstock 182-183).    
 
The membership criteria upon which Assyrian boundaries were drawn proved 
markedly successful in Turlock and Chicago, bringing together various religious and 
regional origins that comprised the population into one Assyrian boundary.  
Likewise, Chaldean-dominated resettlement in Detroit and San Diego facilitated the 
salience of Chaldean identity therein.   
 
There are several interpretations of the Assyrian-Chaldean relationship within the 
diaspora.  As one Chaldean community leader described of this dynamic: 
 
You’ll see, for example, the Assyrian community say, ‘There is no such thing 
as Chaldean, it’s an inherited name, and so you’re all Assyrian’. And so that’s 
their view.  On the Chaldean side, specifically through our Church, they say, 
‘How dare you’.  So you’ve had a lot of people now say we’re not Assyrian; 
Assyrians saying, all of you are Assyrian.  It’s really created this division 
(Manna Interview 2012). 
 
The intent is not to give the false impression that contestation of Chaldean identity 
comes exclusively from non-Chaldeans.  As noted, many members of the Chaldean 
Church also believe Chaldean is a religious identity within the Assyrian ethnic 
umbrella and identify ethnically as Assyrian, further confusing what defines the 
Assyrian-Chaldean boundary.  Specific to this research, several Assyrian activists 
interviewed are members of the Chaldean Church and always considered themselves 
Assyrian or were raised identifying as Chaldean and later came to identify as 
Assyrian; this fluidity is representative of the porousness of the Assyrian-Chaldean 
boundary.  However, to some Chaldeans, that Chaldeans ‘become’ Assyrian to 
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support Assyrian causes reinforces their perception that Chaldean identity struggles 
to exist within Assyrian nationalism.   
 
A lack of continuity in nomenclature, ranging from individual Assyrian and Chaldean 
titles to hyphenated variants, such as Catholic Assyrian, Chaldo-Assyrian, Assyro-
Chaldean, or Chaldean/Assyrian/Syriac, further blurs what the Assyrian-Chaldean 
boundary entails.  It is apparent a boundary exists given the pervasiveness and 
longevity of this intra-ethnic debate: the effort to accommodate this ambiguous 
boundary gave way to these hyphened variants, a political response to keep the 
community as one by incorporating both names.  Yet such variants are often pointed 
to as institutionalizing fragmentation: 
 
What really hurt our nation was the slashes…The Assyrian slash Chaldean 
slash Syriac.  That really divided the nation –a small nation– into even 
smaller fragments.  So now Assyrians who are hardcore Orthodox Church of 
the East hate Chaldeans, and Chaldeans refuse to say they’re Assyrian.  So 
we’re unable to work together.  And it’s the same common issue.  We’re the 
same people (Taimoorazy Interview).   
 
It is unsurprising the hyphenates have not prevailed.  It is not in the interest of 
political actors to compromise when their claims have not failed nor been wholly 
rejected.  This has not yet been the case: although a Chaldean ethnic group has not 
fissured from the Assyrian one, Chaldean actors, in a small period of time, have 
succeeded in seeing Assyrian political parties attempting to incorporate the Chaldean 
name.  In this sense, modern efforts recall the 1919 appearance of Assyro-Chaldean 
and are again finding hybridization does not stick.  Such compromises are an olive 
branch toward political expediency, one that does not go far enough for those who 
seek independent Chaldean recognition and too far for those who oppose any.  As the 
crisis in Iraq persists, however, there is concern the name divide facilitates, if not 
encourages, media and public use of ‘Iraqi Christians’ for simplicity.  This label in 
turn negates the ethnic uniqueness of the Assyrian and Chaldean people, 
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inadvertently implying religious conversion would end any marginalization or 
persecution.   
 
There are, however, several features which Assyrians and Chaldeans generally agree 
upon in explaining the intra-ethnic boundary: Chaldeanness is a relatively modern 
phenomenon brought forth primarily by ethnic actors within the Chaldean Church; 
and actors were motivated by the politicization of identity and survival instincts, first 
in Iraq and now in diaspora.  The usefulness of boundary theory is evident here, as it 
offers an examination of the ongoing construction and negotiation of the Assyrian-
Chaldean wedge.  Defining who Chaldeans are in relation to Assyrians is 
undoubtedly an elite-driven process, where various elites have different endgames 
and a consensus has not yet been reached, but is being actively questioned, 
discussed, and negotiated.   
 
Cultivating a Cultural Boundary: Nationalists and Merchants 
 
For Assyrians, national understanding is grounded in shared ethnic lineage.  Here, 
Chaldeans (and Syriacs), despite having splintered from the Church of the East, are 
indelibly part of the Assyrian ethnic fabric.  Thus, when Assyrian elites reference 
Assyrians, it is always inclusive of Chaldeans and Syriacs, as well as members of the 
Church of the East.  The pervasiveness of this view demonstrates the success of 
Assyrianism in positioning itself as an ethno-national umbrella.  Chaldean, here, is 
understood as simply a religious identity, and Assyrian nationalists cite the Chaldean 
Church’s influence in pushing for Chaldean separatism.  Competing versions of this 
narrative, in this perspective, are dangerous to the long-term survivability of the 
Assyrian nation.  
 
Amongst Assyrian activists, there are generally two approaches expressed publicly 
regarding the Chaldean issue.  The first reflects a moderate approach, accepting the 
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existence of Chaldean identity up until it claims ethnic separation.  Such moderation 
certainly evolved, recognizing Chaldean identity cannot be easily dismissed: the line 
in the sand here is to sustain Assyrians and Chaldeans as a single ethnic group.  As a 
member of the ADM commented regarding the importance of remaining one people: 
‘If you believe we are all one, then whatever name you want to call yourself, that’s 
fine.  If they call themselves Chaldean, that’s fine, as long as you know that you’re 
not separate.  You’re not entity of yourself’ (ADM Interview). 
 
Other nationalists, by contrast, are critical of Chaldean identity for driving a wedge 
within the community.  As an example of such rhetoric:  
 
Those separatists tricked many Assyrians. We knew then that their intentions 
were solely to dilute and destroy the Assyrian name by adopting a mediocre 
shameful slashed solution under the pretext of a very shiny word called unity! 
After three years of that “unity”, we live today to witness the establishment of 
a new Chaldean history, Chaldean language, Chaldean flag, Chaldean Aid 
Society, Chaldean News Agency, Chaldean Political Organization, and the 
Chaldean Newspaper “The Chaldean Nation” (Aprim 2002).   
 
The frustration here is not just Chaldean identity, but that an entire ethnic 
institutional structure has developed around it.  The American context is significant 
to this development as it offers an open society with space to cultivate such 
organizations and no mechanism to force agreement amongst the whole of the 
diaspora.  
 
Whilst Chaldean is an active identity, defining it in context of Assyrian identity is 
complicated.  There are several questions at play: foremost, do Chaldean elites 
understand themselves to be an ethnic group or to share ethnicity with Assyrians?  
From there, if it is an ethnic group, when did it become so; and if it is not an ethnic 
group, why is it understood as a separate identity?  The Chaldean perspective, 
however, is not uniform.  To some Chaldean leaders, whether Chaldeans constitute 
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an ethnic group is an unquestionable yes.  As one community leader stated, ‘It’s 
definitely an ethnic group’, one based on faith, descendancy from Babylon, familial 
ties, and cultural practices (Arabo Interview).  Others, however, qualify Chaldean 
ethnicity as shared with the Assyrian and Syriac people.  Here, Chaldean is not an 
ethnic group in and of itself, but one of several names used by this larger ethnic 
collective: ‘The way I view it is, you can call me Assyrian, Chaldean, it’s 
interchangeable; it all means one’ (Manna Interview 2012).  Yet such leaders 
themselves do not identify as Assyrian and are active in shaping and sustaining what 
it means to be Chaldean, which invites confusion as to how these actions and 
ideology coexist.  Still, as Chaldeans negotiate what their identity means in relation 
to American society and the Assyrian community, there is a common dedication to its 
perseverance.  
 
For those who believe Chaldean to be a unique ethnicity, there are differences of 
opinion as to their ethnic origins.  As noted above, some Chaldeans claim they have 
constituted a unique and separate ethnic group for a millennia, tracing their ancestry 
to ancient Babylon as opposed to Assyria (Hanna 2015).  Although this is likely an 
erroneous understanding, as Connor stated, what matters is ultimately what people 
believe: a reimagining of history is often part of the nation-building and boundary 
formation process.  Once identity is contested, the markers of identity – history, 
culture, language – become open for contestation.  This reflects the very real belief 
amongst some Chaldeans that they have always been a unique people.   
 
At the same time, not all embrace this claim to unique Babylonian ancestry.  Others 
accept the Assyrian historical narrative, but dismiss arguments that not enough time 
has passed since the religious schism for a Chaldean ethnicity to have formed:  
 
I’m sure you know about the Assyrian part, we don’t exist and they 
exist…Sometimes they say this Chaldean identity didn’t exist 500 years ago.  I 
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say, okay, 500 years ago, there was no country called America, so what’s the 
big deal?  Now we have a country called America, there’s American people, 
it’s the strongest country in the world.  So even if it’s 500 years ago, we’re still 
proud of it.  And we have pride with identity, with our name. And you can 
see wherever you work, here or even in Michigan, everybody says ‘I’m 
Chaldean’ (Barka Interview 2013). 
 
This position is notable because it embraces the modernity of Chaldeanness.  It 
perhaps more accurately frames what has occurred: that enough changes have taken 
place over the past century or centuries that Chaldeans have come to understand 
themselves as distinct.  Chaldean identity has been prevalent in the Detroit and San 
Diego population centers since settlement therein.  Indeed, the resonance of 
Chaldean identity facilitated the U.S. Census Bureau’s acceptance of Chaldean as an 
ethnic group, finding of the Detroit community that ‘many of the people, especially 
the younger people, viewed it as an ethnic group, not a religion’ (Quoted in Kulish 
2001).   
 
Underscoring the ambiguity of Chaldeanness is that a belief it constitutes an ethnicity 
is hardly consistent amongst all Chaldean activists.  Other Chaldean leaders agree 
Assyrians and Chaldeans are of one ethnic group but maintain Chaldean as their 
identity.  As a longtime Chaldean activist stated to this effect, ‘My conviction is that 
the Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syriacs and all Christians of Iraq are one people by a virtue 
of their common heritage and faith, and that they share the same destiny of possible 
extinction from the land of their ancestors – Mesopotamia’ (Quoted in Namou and 
Wiswell 2009).  As was similarly noted, the need to work together, emphasizing their 
commonality as the Christian people of Iraq, is more important from a political and 
practical standpoint: 
 
The reality is, we’re too small of a community - the Iraqi Christian community 
- to be worrying about identity…To me specifically, and everything that we 
do here, if you look at the mission of the Chaldean Chamber or the Chaldean 
Community Foundation, it will always say ‘Chaldeans representing the 
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Chaldean-Assyrian-Syriac community, all Aramaic-speaking people’ (Manna 
Interview 2012).    
 
From the perspective of diaspora-building, this presents an argument that, in relation 
to American society, boundaries are more efficacious when representing a larger 
group – perhaps a testament to both the need for a larger presence to gain salience as 
well as the need to retain membership against assimilation.   
 
Present here is an interesting dynamic in which long-time community leaders who 
have created secular community institutions on behalf of the Chaldean name and 
who have advocated on behalf of the Chaldean name maintain Assyrians and 
Chaldeans comprise a single ethnic group.  If Chaldeans are part of a greater nation, 
it leads to the question: why claim Chaldean as a separate identity?  
 
The presence of different understandings of Chaldeanness from within the Chaldean 
community itself indicates boundary formation is evolving.  What it means to be 
Chaldean is easily delineated in a Detroit context, for example, where boundaries are 
less complicated and reliant upon key differences with the surrounding population: 
an Iraqi ancestry that differentiates Chaldeans from the majority of the local 
population; and affiliation with the Chaldean Catholic Church (or a lapsed 
affiliation) that differentiates Chaldeans from the area’s Muslim Iraqi population.  As 
culture and history are shared with Assyrians, defining the intra-communal boundary 
becomes more complicated, and Chaldean identity is consequentially defined against 
Assyrianism.  Encased in this dynamic is a chicken-or-egg uncertainty of whether 
boundary-creation was a reaction to assertions by Assyrian nationalists that negated 
Chaldean identity, a way to challenge the Assyrian narrative of who Chaldeans are; 
or whether a boundary was already present and understood to reflect minor 
differences between Assyrians and Chaldeans, but was swept aside by Assyrian 
nationalism.   
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To some Chaldean leaders, Chaldean is a sectarian identity with its own attributes 
and criteria, the use of which does not negate the common ethnicity of the 
Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac people.  As understood in this viewpoint, Chaldean, 
Syriac, and Orthodox affiliations have created bounded subdivisions within the 
ethnic whole.  Being Chaldean has criteria which the whole ethnic group does not 
share, but the common cultural markers of a shared ethnicity nonetheless remain 
more significant: ‘We all believe in god, we are all Christians, we all speak the same 
language, we all share the same land and the same culture’ (Kassab Interview 2012).  
 
Yet the communities in Detroit and San Diego are presented to the surrounding 
population as Chaldean.  Jacob Bacall, who recently published a book on Chaldeans 
in Michigan, noted that in the course of his own research, pride in being Chaldean is 
pervasive:  
 
I too have my own identity, I’m a Chaldean, and every interview I have done - 
the last interview was number thirty-seven, and those are permanent people - 
and every single one said we are Chaldeans…We are one people, yes, but we 
are different…Now in possibly a generation, two or three or four, if they want 
to come with a Syriac or ChaldoAssyrian — but I am who I am, and I’m a 
Chaldean and I’m a proud Chaldean… Don’t tell me I’m Assyrian; I’m not 
Assyrian (Bacall and Bacall Interview 2014).   
 
Identity as expressed here is more than sectarian, the idea that Assyrians and 
Chaldeans are one but different.  That there is a pride and a pervasiveness in being 
Chaldean indicates intra-ethnic boundaries have come to reflect other, implicit 
differences that stand in contrast with what it means to be Assyrian.   
 
The most frequently articulated distinction is that Assyrians have tended to be more 
nationalistic, protective of their language and cultural heritage, in comparison to 
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Chaldeans who have tended to shy away from politics towards integration.  For 
example, Chaldean leaders commented that:  
 
Chaldeans are more pragmatic, they are much better in business, they were 
involved in other parties; Assyrians, they kept their language more alive. 
When it comes to language, they speak it (Bacall and Bacall Interview);   
 
Most of the Assyrians, they are more into politics…We are more in the 
business part.  So you can see the difference actually between us and them.  
They are more - they are a smaller group that us, but they are more loud…We 
all say we are Chaldean, but we don’t act on it (Barka Interview).   
 
The perception of Assyrians as nationalistic is shaped by national claims and activism 
over the past century.  Yet it is difficult to imagine a generations-old event or 
differing tendencies for national activism are enough for Chaldean elites to build a 
boundary upon: certainly not all Assyrians, or even the majority of Assyrians, are 
politically-engaged, and certainly Chaldean elites themselves are politically active.  
Rather, framing Assyrians as nationalistic is indicative of behavioral and cultural 
expectations: it becomes meaningful when placed in comparison to Chaldeans.  In 
such context, it is not just that Chaldeans are less likely to be national agitators, but 
that, as they understand themselves, they integrate, they fill niche economic roles, 
they retain their community by adapting in certain ways to avoid persecution.  
 
Integration as a survival mechanism, some argue, gave way to business acumen that 
is often used as a descriptor of the Chaldean-American community.  Chaldeans, in 
this sense, were a Gellnerian diaspora even before displacement from Iraq.  Their 
approach to integration recalls Blalock and Bonachich’s descriptions of a middleman 
minority, finding a niche way to protect their existence as minorities in a potentially 
hostile society.  As was explained of this mentality:  
 
I don’t want to become involved in politics because I’ll be recognized as a 
Christian and I’ll be annihilated…Let me become an entrepreneur and a 
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businessman, and let me teach my family that.  So now here they are, they 
are armed not with a weapon, but are armed with a weapon of education and 
business skills…they became very passive, did not become involved in the 
governments or the politics, and that’s how they survived (Kassab Interview 
2012).   
 
Assyrians are understood as protecting cultural and linguistic traditions; Chaldeans 
as adapting as middleman minorities.  Certainly this is not to suggest that all 
Chaldeans are great businessmen and no Assyrian pursues business, nor to suggest 
that Chaldeans themselves think of this as a stringent boundary: it is a general, 
stereotypical understanding that becomes self-perpetuating as Chaldean elites in 
America tend to find success as business-owners, dominating niche occupations, and 
as politically-active diasporic organizations tend to be Assyrian-run.  
 
This understanding was often echoed in interviews, that Assyrians endured unique 
persecution and feared an existential threat, which perhaps explains their national 
drive to this day.  Chaldeans did not require such a national effort because they had 
already adapted to being a minority and finding ways to survive therein: ‘You would 
say that the Chaldeans are well-known to have merchant mentality, and they always 
managed to be pragmatic people, and work side by side, not alienate the Muslims or 
the people, those who are the government’ (Bacall and Bacall Interview).   
 
The Chaldean Church has reinforced entrepreneurship and integration as Chaldean 
traits in contrast to other nationalists, thereby also reinforcing a Chaldean boundary 
in relation to Assyrians that extends beyond Church membership.  Bishop Jammo, for 
example, frames the Chaldean business focus as leaving room for Assyrians to claim 
an ethnic net over Chaldeans:  Chaldeans ‘entered into competitive fields where they 
would be the best in their trade and then be respected…We do not force our identity 
onto others, though others do this to us. They will go to governments and 
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parliaments and demand that we be called by another name than our own.  We are 
called by no other name than Chaldean’ (Jammo 2011).   
 
From this perspective, it becomes easier to dismiss Assyrian arguments denying 
Chaldean ethnicity and identity as the expected rhetoric of nationalists.  Here, ‘by 
being in some ways so militant about saying “you’re Assyrian”, in fact what they end 
up doing is calcifying Chaldeans into holding their ground’ (Abbo et al interview).  
This perception is aided by rhetoric frequent in online diasporic message boards and 
websites defining all things Chaldean as Assyrian.  An anecdote typifying this sense 
of Assyrian encroachment came from a mention on Wikipedia that TelKeppe, the 
village from which the vast majority of Chaldeans in the U.S. emigrated or trace their 
lineage, was referred to as an Assyrian village: 
 
Even our homeland and the village we come from, TelKeppe…the last time I 
checked in Wikipedia, it said this is Assyrian village.  Of course I checked with 
someone knowledgeable, Martin Manna, who said they’ve been in this 
country much more active than us and they feed all those websites (Bacall 
and Bacall Interview).   
 
It is this degree of national insistence that leads Chaldeans to worry their identity 
will be lost under an Assyrian umbrella.  Even the use of Chaldean in a purely 
religious context may be claimed as Assyrian by online nationalists: the Assyrian 
International News Agency, for example, cited the resignation of Chaldean Patriarch 
Delly as the Assyrian Patriarch’s resignation, and recently stated the ‘Assyrian 
Patriarch Calls for “Chaldean League” to Unite Iraq's Lay Catholics’, perhaps inviting 
surprise the actual Assyrian Patriarch would make such a call (AINA 2012; AINA 
2014b).12  Here, too, an open society allows assertion of those claims, as does the 
ever-open forum of the internet (Eriksen 2007).   
                                            
12 This was changed from the syndicated Agenzia Fides (2014) article, whose headline read 
‘Patriarch Sako: We Need a Chaldean League’.  
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Assyrian political claims unquestioningly group Chaldeans underneath the Assyrian 
ethnic umbrella; the same occurs with Syriacs, who face similar dynamics with 
Assyrians in Europe.  As noted above, Assyrians were often more politically active 
and historically pursued strong nationalist objectives: as one community leader 
noted, ‘the whole world knows about the Assyrian problem’ (Kamber Interview 
2013).  There is consequentially a political assessment to the benefits of Assyrian 
identity: a national claim was staked upon the Assyrian name and holds historical 
recognition, and gives legitimacy to modern national claims.  Yet Assyrian 
nationhood does not hinge on Chaldean inclusion, but benefits from it.  As a 
Chaldean activist, who believes Assyrians and Chaldeans are one ethnic group, 
commented, ‘The extreme Assyrian church, the Assyrian Democratic Movement and 
some Assyrian political parties are trying to ignore us, humiliate us, undermine us 
and use us…We [Chaldeans] are 88 percent and they are 12 percent. They need us 
more than we need them…It’s a shame we’re fighting over names – it’s not helping 
Christianity or our mission’ (Quoted in Namou and Wiswell 2009).  The at times 
awkwardness of Assyrian assertion over Chaldean identity is evident here: Chaldeans 
are not a small, vocal minority, but the majority of Iraq’s Christians and the American 
diasporic community.   
 
Wimmer’s boundary expansion model of nation-building is perhaps useful to 
understand the Chaldean perspective and its concern of disappearance (Wimmer 
2013: 50-52).  The Assyrian national boundary-making argument reflects Wimmer’s 
emphasis shifting model (c=a+b), in which shared ethnicity is emphasized as the 
national boundary, shifting emphasis away from church membership (Assyrian 
ethnicity= Church of the East +Chaldean +Syriac).  Chaldeans, however, appear to 
see Assyrian boundary-making as what Wimmer terms the incorporation mode 




Thus, as these identities were confronted with the Iraq War and the opportunity to 
gain recognition and perhaps a measure of political power, such a political opening 
saw Chaldean actors became politically assertive.  As will be explored further, 
Chaldean identity is not simply a by-product of the Iraq War, but the U.S. provided 
space to express and contest identity, and the freedom to organize on behalf of that, 
or any, identity.  
 
The lastingness of Chaldeanness, from this perspective, is uncertain because it is a 
new challenge in the political realm.  At the same time, challenges in Iraq and the 
Middle East make communal solidarity evermore important.  Ethnic identity is 
socially constructed and reconstructed as social circumstances change, and the 
Assyrian-Chaldean internal boundary will continue to be remade.  Revealed here is 
the complexity of this diaspora and the active negotiation over identity, culture, and 




The Assyrian claim to self-rule as a unique nation originated far prior to the 2003 
Iraq War, cultivated under the Ottoman Empire by the dual experiences of autonomy 
and renewed persecution.  Assyrian nationalism came to a head following the WWI-
era genocides, during which hundreds of thousands of Assyrians and Chaldeans were 
killed or displaced.  In response, the League of Nations called for a permanent refuge, 
an atra, for the displaced Assyrian nation.  Although coming close to securing 
resettlement on two occasions, the Assyrian presence became increasingly 
incompatible with British and Iraqi efforts to make an Iraqi nation, and by the end of 
WWII, the Assyrian project was ultimately abandoned.  The failure of autonomy at 
this stage left a legacy that would help shape Assyrian national ideology decades 
later and create a permanent diaspora removed from the Middle East.   
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The Chaldean path has been less distinctly national, with sectarian differences 
cultivating differences in identity that gradually gave rise to a fluid and relational, 
but resonant, intra-ethnic boundary.  Framing Chaldean as an exclusively sectarian 
allegiance fails to fully capture the ways in which Chaldeans have cultivated self-
understanding.  Although history has contributed to minor internal differences, the 
assertion and political claim to a distinct Chaldean ethnic identity is a modern 
phenomena, albeit a controversial one.  
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CHAPTER IV  
    
‘THERE IS NO MAYOR OF CHALDEAN DETROIT’:  
THE LOCALITY OF DIASPORA-BUILDING  
 
‘At the end of the day, if a religious member says something, he holds more clout.  He 
brings salvation to heaven!  What can a nationalist do?  He only brings trouble!’ 
 –Firas Jatou, Assyrian Activist (Interview 2013)   
 
Diasporic elites first act as nation-builders by negotiating markers of identity and 
culture to create diasporic boundaries that enable integration within local society 
whilst forestalling assimilation and cultural disappearance.  Diasporic elites further 
act as nationalists, creating ideologies and visions for the future of the nation that 
inform political goals and give purpose and meaning to the diaspora.  Institutional 
structures support this process by aiding the preservation of diasporic identity, shared 
consciousness, and the traditions and culture that shape the diaspora’s understanding 
of itself in the face of assimilation and acculturation; their presence marks a 
significant development in diaspora-building.  Diasporic institutions are not stagnant, 
stable structures, but are themselves created and refashioned by actors within the 
diaspora.  Over the course of the Chaldean and Assyrian presence in the U.S., their 
religious, political, and civic institutions have cultivated solidarity within the ethnic 
group whilst being refashioned to adapt to changing politics and preferences.   
 
In some ways, boundary-making is a conscious process by which organizations are 
formed and cultural events held to define ‘who’ Assyrians and Chaldeans are in 
relation to other ethnic groups and to provide a narrative of who ‘we’ are to the 
diaspora’s own members.  In some ways, it is a byproduct of other pursuits, of 
humanitarian organizations that acculturate refugees into both American society and 
the diaspora, of an ethnic occupation that in turn shapes how society perceives 
members of the diaspora.  Diasporic actors cultivate an understanding that the 
diaspora is part of a nation, an imagined community that is both local and 
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transnational, whilst building institutions, narratives, and political ideologies to meet 
the considerable challenge of sustaining an extra-territorial nation intermixed within 
a diverse society.  This process is further shaped by internal diasporic dynamics, 
homeland politics, and in relation to economic, social, and cultural factors within the 
society of resettlement.   
 
The aim of this chapter is thus to provide an overview of the institutions key to 
Assyrian and Chaldean boundary-making and maintenance that advance diasporic 
nation-building.  Special attention is given to boundaries and institutions that 
engendered Chaldean identity in Detroit and San Diego.  It finds the Assyrian 
diaspora, over the past half-century, has undergone a transition away from a 
boundary that emphasized sectarian identity as Nestorians toward an ethnic 
boundary defined by shared lineage, culture, and history.  This, in turn, has served as 
the basis for renewed political claims as Assyrians inclusive of Chaldeans.  The 
Chaldean diasporic boundary instead remains intertwined with its Church, whose 
leaders remain formative to cultivating Chaldean identity.  The Chaldean boundary 
has thus come to reflect ethno-sectarian criteria, defined by the ethnic attributes 
shared with Assyrians plus affiliation, or lapsed affiliation, with the Chaldean Church.  
It was not until the Iraq War that Chaldean political institutions and secular activism 
emerged.    
 
Diaspora building is motivated by fears of assimilation, compounded further by fears 
of assimilation absent a homeland.  Whilst there is sometimes a tendency to attribute 
the continuity of Assyrian and Chaldean survival in the Middle East to the strength 
and solidarity of their people in the face of centuries of displacement and oppression, 
the baseline of this assumption understands their commonality was also externally 
forged: their religion and their ethnicity separated them from those outside forces.  
These dynamics would change upon arrival in the United States.  The threat of 
assimilation became a greater risk given the primary signifier of Assyrian and 
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Chaldean ‘otherness’ in the Middle East – their Christianity – no longer distinguished 
them from the surrounding society.  The sectarian cleavages found in Iraq were not 
as salient to identity within American society, where identity tends to focus on ethnic 
or national origins (Zolberg and Woon 1999).  Diasporic nation-building, in a way, is 
to compensate for the loss of and displacement from the atra.  Building the diaspora 
after initial cultural and language shocks subsided necessitated dedicated leadership.   
 
There is thus a marked contrast between the social closure in Iraq, enacting 
boundaries that precluded Assyrians and Chaldeans from equal membership in the 
state, and the more open boundaries encountered upon arrival to an immigrant 
society, one which captures the idea that ‘everyone in America is a cultural hybrid’ 
(Thomas in Gaskins 2012).  At the same time, the receptiveness of local societies to 
boundary-crossing or boundary-shifting varies depending on the nature of the 
receiving society and the nature of the new population (Wimmer 2013).  Race, 
religion, language, economic status all present factors that might hinder an 
individual from feeling American, even if their citizenship is such.  Assyrian and 
Chaldean integration arguably benefitted from a ‘whitening’ of ethnic groups that 
occurred prior to large-scale Assyrian and Chaldean migration, as social boundaries 
shifted to recast Irish, Italian, and Jewish residents as white, entrenching social 
membership more firmly along racialized colour lines (Wimmer 61, 83).  In the 
arbitrary nature of racial ascription, Assyrians and Chaldeans were as ‘white’ as Jews 
or Italians.  Consequentially, observed in the Assyrian and Chaldean case are both 
boundary crossings of individuals as Christian, English-speaking, non-Arabs, and 
boundary shifting in local communities like Detroit, Turlock, and Chicago, where the 
boundaries of receiving communities expanded with the integration and established 
presence of the diasporic community.  The resulting boundaries are fluid, where 
members navigate between ethnic identity as Chaldean or Assyrian and the many 
other identities held within society based on their profession, familial role, area of 
residence, political allegiance, and more.  The U.S. therefore proved particularly 
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instrumental in developing space between the communities and in providing space 
for new, secular institutions to develop and to institutionalize diasporic culture so 
this new, complicated atra could be reproduced for successive generations.  
 
The trajectory of growth from an immigrant population into a diasporic nation is 
examined through three institutional typologies: that of ethnic institutions, which 
provide services to the ethnic community and perpetuate the diaspora’s unique 
culture, language, and identity; nationalist political institutions, which seek to define 
national goals for and make political decisions on behalf of the diaspora; and 
advocacy institutions, which serve as an ethnic lobby towards the American 
government on behalf of community members in the U.S. and Iraq.  These typologies 
are not tightly-bound, equally-balanced categories, but rather encapsulate 
developments that advance nation-building.  As such, they represent a path of 
diasporic development: the ethnic framework capturing identity and building a 
cultural narrative; political ideals emerging from within that structure, turning focus 
locally, as diasporic nationalism, and transnationally, as long-distance nationalism; 
and mobilizing political engagement on behalf of the diaspora, the homeland, and 
the future of the nation.  In this sense, the scope of each typology becomes smaller 
and more focused: ethnic institutions serve the entire diaspora whilst advocacy 
groups serve a specific diasporic interest.  It is how this process developed, and in 
turn shaped Assyrian and Chaldean national understandings, that is the focus of this 
chapter.   
 
Demonstrated is the necessity of strong ethnic institutions at the beginning of the 
immigration trajectory as well as throughout successive generations after settlement.  
Later waves of migration can also help revitalize a waning identity and institutions, 
particularly if the later waves settle in the same geographic area.  The importance of 
organizations to the maintenance and promotion of diasporic identity is developed by 
Sheffer (2007) and Safran (1999); furthermore, Khachig Tölölyan (1996) finds that 
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the ‘doing’ performed by such institutions and community leaders is a defining 
characteristic of diaspora.   
 
Collectively, these typologies construct, reinforce, and negotiate diasporic boundaries 
within and in relation to American society; per Tölölyan, ‘these institutions constitute 
a diasporic civil society that nurtures and sustains the public sphere of debate and 
cultural production’ (Tölölyan 2000: 109).  However, it is not just the presence of 
diasporic institutions, but their collectivity, the degree to which some measure of 
institutional completeness is attained, that aides the diaspora’s longevity and 
resonance (Stinchcombe 1965; Breton 1964).  The breadth of Chaldean institutions 
in Detroit aided the growth of the Chaldean identity and population therein.   
 
The necessary role of diasporic institutions was addressed in an interview with Elmer 
Abbo, Executive Director of the Assyrian-American National Coalition, who suggested 
in the absence of a way to legitimize authority, organizations aspire to serve as de 
facto political representatives of the diasporic community:  
 
When you are the sort of disempowered people, there’s no formal authority 
figure.  And there’s no formal, clear authority structure…In Iraq, we had a 
clear authority figure, and that was the church…But, once you come to 
America, although the church within the community may have some power, 
it’s still the church.  And so it can’t speak on every issue…To the extent that 
you want the community to start exerting political power, it needs to happen 
outside the church.  And yet, there’s not a political force or a political 
structure to make that happen.  There is no mayor of Chaldean Detroit.  
There’s no congress or city council for Chaldean Detroit.  Or there’s no 
congress for Assyrian nationalists in the diaspora… 
 
We don’t have structural mechanisms to identify who is that legitimate 
person, so essentially what we have is a situation where anyone can declare 
themselves the public spokesperson if they can create an organization and 
just say, well, my organization represents the will of the people.  And so you 
have this jockeying of organizations.  Which is essentially, the way I interpret 
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it is, it’s politics playing out in the absence of a government or political 
structure to authorize legitimacy (Abbo et al Interview 2013).    
 
Abbo’s succinct notion there is no ‘Mayor of Chaldean Detroit’ encapsulates a core 
point of this thesis: diaspora-building is challenged by the absence of leadership with 
the authority to compel belonging from all members of the diaspora.  There is no 
framework in which diaspora members must operate and no restrictions on who can 
create an organization.  In the absence of a state, organizations become the means 
for elites to contest the ideology, myths and symbols, membership and long-term 
goals upon which the diasporic boundary is constructed.  Diasporic elites compete to 
present the best national vision, measuring legitimacy through popular support and 
political success (Wachtel 1998: 3).  Such competition reflects diasporic nationalism 
and the competition for power within the diaspora.   
 
The existence of an organization alone does not signify its importance to the 
diaspora.  Within both communities, there is at times an element of organizational 
fatigue; the sense that newer organizations in particular are more for show than 
substance.  As one community member cautioned, ‘First, don’t give weight to the 
diaspora organizations as numbers and as substance.  Ninety-five percent of that are 
three or four people, and that’s it.  Everybody calls themselves somebody’ (Hanna 
Interview 2013).  Former Congressman Michael Flanagan of Illinois similarly 
described advocacy organizations as fractured and contentious: 
 
Like most small very small minorities, the Assyrians lack cohesion.  There 
were at least half a dozen such organizations inside of the tiny Assyrian 
Community in Chicago, California and Michigan.  None of them had any 
money and none of them had any influence but each was sure that it was 




A small ethnography of Chaldeans in suburban Detroit conducted by Natalie Henrich 
likewise observed the propensity of individuals to form organizations for stature, to 
bolster their reputation, rather than work within the existing organizational 
framework toward a shared objective; further, it commented that individuals tended 
to claim membership in an organization but only participate superficially to be 
looked upon favorably by the community (Henrich and Henrich 2007: 127-131).  
While the study does not elaborate upon the extent to which such free-ridership was 
actually problematic to existing organizations, it does suggest there was both an 
awareness and an annoyance amongst diasporic members of the sometimes self-
promoting nature of organizational involvement.   
 
At the same time, what one might call vanity organizations are hardly unique to this 
particular population, but instead demonstrate the ease of forming ethnic-specific 
organizations in the U.S. as much as the priority within this community for ethnic 
involvement.  As Shain and Sheffer theorized, diasporic action is most commonly 
undertaken by a few core members of the diaspora and involvement of outer 
members is typically less frequent (Shain and Barth 2003; Sheffer 2007).  
Stinchcombe (1965) likewise found a greater number and variety of organizations is 
indicative of ethnic solidarity; as such, the presence of vanity organizations may 
indicate a degree of institutional completeness and a priority within the community 
for activism, suggesting members are being engaged beyond the core activists.  
Chaldeans in Detroit are ‘doing’, as Tölölyan described, and not just speaking to their 
presence.  This suggests efficacy in boundary formation, and is telling as to why the 
Chaldean identity became and remains pervasive in Detroit.   
 
In both the Assyrian and Chaldean experiences, their alignment with unique religious 
institutions and history of a millet system provided an existing structure around 
which the diaspora centered when it first arrived to the U.S. in the early 20th 
century.  Later clusters of heavy migration and the changing political environments 
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of which they were products – the escalation of Ba’ath repression in the 1970s; the 
Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s; the sanctions of the 1990s – revitalized and expanded the 
diaspora’s institutions, requiring institutions to build capacity for humanitarian relief 
and acculturation services.  In regard to Abbo’s point, by the time of the 2003 Iraq 
War, the institutions most situated to mobilize in response to the crisis in Iraq were 
those which earned legitimacy as diasporic representatives and possessed 
transnational ties between America and Iraq.  To the extent they were positioned to 
undertake political lobbying, this has been most effective outside the church.  
 
Boundary formation and its corresponding pursuit of institutional completeness 
emerged as most efficacious at a local level: as Flanagan noted, an interdependent, 
nation-wide structure has yet to emerge, a factor that would prove consequential to 
post-war mobilization efforts.  Such absence is the product of both the parochial 
focus of successful institutions and differing political and national ideologies, which, 
organically or intentionally, create distance within and between Assyrian and 
Chaldean factions.  The significance of local boundaries is evident, suggesting, for 
example, why diaspora endured in Detroit but not Connecticut.  It is through these 
structures that concerted efforts to respond to the crisis in Iraq would arise and that 
divisions would persist.   
 
Implicit in Abbo’s assessment is the statelessness of Assyrians and Chaldeans.  The 
use of an Assyrian or Chaldean identity over an Iraqi one underscores the success of 
diasporic nation-building, which has made the citizenship backgrounds of Iraqi, 
Iranian, Turkish, or Syrian diasporic members less salient than ethnic identity.  The 
resiliency of the Nineveh Plain as the ancestral atra further speaks to one diasporic 
nation.  Yet there is an ideological difference between understanding the diasporic 
nation as a stateless people whose homeland happens to be in Iraq versus 
understanding the nation as a component of Iraq.  This difference manifests itself in 
political claims, particularly the need for territorial autonomy within Iraq versus 
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integration in Iraq.  This remains an important wedge within diasporic and long-
distance nationalism.  
 
The chapter, consequently, is not intended as a comprehensive list of all diasporic 
institutions that have existed, for such an examination is both outside the scope of 
this thesis and risks, as Hanna noted, falsely equating the presence of an organization 
with substance or impact.  In the above parameters, this chapter considers 
institutions which contributed to the longevity, identity, and nationalism of the 
diaspora and which would become involved in post-war advocacy.  As such, it leaves 
out many effective organizations, including those which have a strong presence 
among other diasporic centers but which have not made significant inroads into the 
U.S.  An exception, however, is made with the Detroit Chaldean community, where 
the presence of a strong measure of institutional completeness helps explain the 
retention of Chaldean identity therein, a core focus of this research.   
 
The typologies reveal a conscious effort to expand the role of diasporic institutions in 
the U.S. and engage in American and Iraqi politics.  Understated here is the luxury to 
mobilize on behalf of the Assyrian and Chaldean population because of the distance 
afforded from the repression of the Iraqi state, and, in particular, because of the 
nature of the U.S. political and social structure.  Consequentially, as the American 
framework presented the communities with equal opportunity to mobilize, the 
differences in which ethnic institutions and political engagement manifested in each 
community helps to reveal differences in the boundaries created and political and 
national leanings therein.  Despite criticism that diasporas may isolate themselves 
from society, it is clear the intent of Assyrian and Chaldean diasporic elites is to 
integrate, to become Americans atop being Assyrians and Chaldeans.  Institution-
building and political activism occur as civic organizations and ethnic lobbies within 
and intermixed with American society.  Hence the challenge elites confront is to 





Ethnic institutions provide a variety of services to the ethnic group in support of the 
diasporic community and community retention.  They are amongst the foremost 
components of boundary maintenance.  Assyrian diasporic elites faced the challenge 
of boundary creation in a diaspora that, although congregating around key 
population centers, was nonetheless widely dispersed across the U.S. and originated 
from multiple countries with multiple cultural and linguistic traditions and different 
sectarian allegiances.  By contrast, Chaldean migration centralized in Detroit and 
later San Diego, almost exclusively originated from Iraq, and frequently possessed 
ties to the same few villages in northern Iraq, presenting a comparatively more 
homogenous community.  
 
As outlined by Breton (1964) and Stinchcombe (1965), there are several motivations 
at play in ethnic institution-building: the desire to aide one’s co-ethnics as they enter 
an unfamiliar environment and ensure they receive the same opportunities and 
equality as those in mainstream society; and the desire to retain as much as possible 
that which is unique to the ethnic community - its language, culture, identity, or 
national goals: in essence, boundary-creation.  Moreover, institutions provide a 
foundation through which elites cultivate and mobilize political claims.  An 
underlying point bearing emphasis is that a group pursues and achieves a measure of 
institutional completeness when its members cannot or do not want to fully integrate 
into the surrounding society.  It is no surprise, then, that diasporic elites would be 
primed to pursue a strong institutional structure.   
 
Diasporic elites, aided by institutional breadth, continuously negotiate ethnic criteria 
of membership in relation to their local populations, and aid in acculturating new 
immigrants and engaging the existing population to establish the diaspora as part of 
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the local community.  Assyrian organizations that became most instrumental in 
boundary making were those that provided a variety of ethnic services, defining 
cultural and social aspects of the boundary, whilst either possessing linkage across 
the diaspora or creating an entrenched institutional structure within a specific 
population.  The same element is paralleled in the Chaldean community, absent the 
need for a cross-diasporic reach: a close-knit network of ethnic service-providing 
organizations is shaping Chaldean identity and discourse, and with it, local and intra-
ethnic boundaries.   
 
Thus, this section looks broadly at key Assyrian organizations, and more 
comprehensively at Detroit’s Chaldean network to begin to answer how Chaldean 
identity was built and prevails.  It finds an explanation begins to appear in the highly 
organized and active presence of ethnic institutions.  Indeed, the perception of 
Detroit as a highly-organized community was voiced frequently by Assyrian and 
Chaldean activists, noting, for example: ‘In Michigan, everyone has a Chaldean 
organization, everyone has some type of Chaldean non-profit, everyone’s a Chaldean 
leader’, and, ‘They’re [Detroit Chaldeans] so much more organized than we are here 
[in Chicago]’ (Arabo Interview; Taimoorazy Interview).  It is in the unique space 
provided by Detroit's ethnic and social framework that a singular Chaldean identity 
formed in America.   
 
Diasporic elites in both communities are active in boundary-making, balancing how 
different the diaspora can be with how alike it must be (Zolberg and Woon 1999).  
However, institutional completeness serves a role beyond diasporic maintenance: it 
establishes the diaspora as a component of local society, enabling boundary shifting 
in acceptance of the diaspora (Wimmer 2013: 60-63).  As Hall and Lindholm noted, 
such diversity and different cultural elements are embraced in America so long as 
they are ‘nice and not disruptive’ to society (Hall and Lindholm 133).  By establishing 
Assyrians and Chaldeans share the same norms and values atop their own cultural 
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elements, diasporic elites attempt to shift local boundaries in a way that individuals 
do not have to give up being Assyrian or Chaldean, but rather Assyrians and 
Chaldeans become part of the local community and their cultural diacritica become 
normalized.  Such boundary shifting is a form of integration, but integration that aids 
diasporic continuation.   
 
Assyrian Ethnic Institutions 
 
Notable within the Assyrian ethnic institutional framework over the past century is 
the role of civic organizations and the Church of the East as key institutions, both 
providing ethnic services and easing acculturation whilst aspiring to retain and 
perpetuate Assyrian identity, language, and understanding.  These institutions thus 
share comparable aims; civic organizations, however, are more able to appeal to the 
community on a secular, ethnic basis and create boundaries inclusive of Assyrians not 
affiliated with the Church of the East.   
 
Thus, while the Church of the East is an important diasporic-building institution, 
there is also a civic effort to detach the understanding of ‘Assyrian’ from ‘Nestorian’ 
and frame Assyrian as an ethnic label accommodating various branches of 
Christianity.  This formulation of Assyrian ethnic identity as an umbrella concept 
under which the Church of the East, Chaldean, and Syriac sects are covered has 
become the essential pillar of Assyrian understanding of itself.  As one organization 
described:  
 
Assyrianism is not a movement against the various churches, whether the 
Church of the East (Nestorian) or Chaldean or Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite), 
but an attempt to incorporate them and strengthen them within the 
framework of the nation, allowing them to grow and prosper. Assyrianism is 
the body in which the spirituality of the churches will thrive.  We ought to 
recognize the irony that Assyrianism as a movement began to grow at a time 
of great upheaval for the Assyrian nation, when its sons and daughters were 
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flung throughout the world like autumn leaves upon the field.  As we head 
into the twenty-first century, Assyrianism looks back for inspiration from the 
past and prepares the nation for the future (DeKelaita 2013). 
 
Assyrian nationalism is typically seen as being confronted by two sources of 
insecurity: external insecurity brought by the absence of a homeland, flinging 
Assyrians across the globe; and internal insecurity brought by the confessional 
splintering from the Church of the East.  The above quote, which lists the three 
ethnic churches, underpins the purpose of this secular Assyrian nationalism: to 
continue claim to these other sects, and to create a national framework that 
encompasses, but is independent of, these religious institutions.  Calling back to the 
appearance of Assyro-Chaldean at Versailles, this represents a blurring of boundary 
criteria, reducing the importance of religion for the importance of ethnicity.     
 
Whilst this concept has been articulated in recent decades as part of the Assyrian 
national movement, it is not a new phenomena in Assyrian understanding of 
membership; rather, it reflects the complicated roots of displacement and routes of 
migration. The urgent humanitarian situation following WWI brought refugees to 
America and accelerated civic and religious institution-building to acculturate 
refugees and send humanitarian aide to those still in the Middle East (Ishaya 2003).  
The presence of local clubs fluctuates with the movement of populations.  Such clubs 
appear in areas with even the smallest Assyrian population in effort to bring the 
community together around social events and holidays, and to provide social 
services.  Still-operating clubs include the Assyrian American Civic Club of Turlock, 
founded in 1946; the Assyrian Foundation of America, founded in 1977 and based in 
San Francisco; the Assyrian American Associations of San Jose, of Modesto, of 
Massachusetts, and of Houston; the Assyrian American Civic Club of Chicago, 
founded in 1975, and of Flint, Michigan, founded in 1936; the Assyrian American 
Society of Las Vegas, founded in 1999; the Assyrian American Cultural Organization 
of Arizona, founded in 2012.  
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Early nationalists who recognized the limited efficacy of local clubs sought to bridge 
together disparate clubs into a coordinated entity.  The most successful and still-
lasting umbrella organization, the Assyrian American National Federation (AANF), 
formed in 1933 in the aftermath of Simmele as a joint agreement between Assyrian 
organizations in Massachusetts, Yonkers, Philadelphia, and Connecticut (AANF 
2012).  
 
AANF thus marks a key moment in diaspora-building.  The umbrella structure of the 
AANF did not pursue institutional completeness itself, in that it did not seek to 
provide ethnic services, but rather sought linkage across the diaspora which, in turn, 
could reinforce a common, singular narrative of Assyrianism across the U.S. whilst 
simultaneously providing a unified voice for Assyrian interests.  In this sense, it 
served to complement the structure of religious institutions and local clubs with an 
additional, cross-national layer.  Its annual convention, publications like the Assyrian 
Star magazine, and public advocacy create ways to make diasporic identity salient on 
these occasions, and offer a way unite local and national populations.  
 
Founders of the AANF, most notably David Perley, considered one of the fathers of 
Assyrian nationalism, entwined the AANF with the ideal of Assyrianism unifying 
different confessions and geographic origins.  Perley argued: 
 
When a person is of Assyrian blood, he retains his birthright, self-esteem, and 
the heritage of his fathers.  It is for this very reason that he may be called a 
Jacobite-Assyrian, Nestorian-Assyrian, Assyrian-Presbyterian, or a Chaldean-
Christian…It is a mere matter of hyphenated description, not a hyphenation 
or division.  A hyphen does not divide; it unites…The approach of this 
oneness of all Assyrians regardless of their religious adherence, is through the 
avenue of blood, and through the majesty of common memories.  Religion is 
a faith acquired and is changeable.  Nationality is one’s flesh and blood; it is 
his total nature (Perley 1967).   
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Although AANF today retains approximately twenty-two member organizations,13 it 
has not succeeded in capturing the exclusive role as a diasporic representative for the 
Assyrian-American community, precluded by political differences within the diaspora, 
better connections of lay diasporic members to their local organizations, or the 
limitations of its structure.  
 
To that end, the Church of the East remains an important pillar of the Assyrian 
community, although its role has waned in recent decades as acculturation 
organizations also provide humanitarian aide and as political organizations also 
advocate for policy goals.  The prominence of the Church was initially reinforced 
after WWI with the influx of refugees and the international advocacy of Patriarch 
Shimun, which presented the Patriarch to those within and outside the diaspora as a 
legitimate, internationally-recognized representative of the Assyrian people.  
Churches thus serve as an important communal structure and ethnic-service provider, 
offering religious services, Assyrian language classes, acculturation programs, and 
communal space for social meetings and events, as well as symbolically carrying 
forward cultural and spiritual traditions.  This helped foster a commonality amongst 
a formerly scattered constituency while its emphasis on the unique nationhood of the 
Assyrian people provided a raison d’être, to borrow Breton’s terminology, for the 
diaspora (Breton 200-201).  Significantly, the institutional completeness found 
through the church model precluded Chaldeans, a factor that reinforced the parallel 
role of the Chaldean Church as a separate ethnic services provider.  
 
Yet, despite the presence of the Church and civic organizations, the Assyrian 
boundary was porous, and next generations of Assyrians generally assimilated into 
American society.  Ishaya commented of early Assyrian immigration:  
                                            
13 This was according to the affiliate list on AANF’s website, although five organizations were 
listed as ‘suspended for non-payment of membership dues’.  Members are generally social 




The rate of assimilation was so high, that the American born and raised 
generation could not converse in, much less read and write the Assyrian 
language.  The business of the civic organizations began to be carried in the 
English language…It must be noted that the continuity of Assyrians as a 
distinct minority in the United States has been due to the constant inflow of 
new immigrants into the country.  Assyrian Americans have not set in place 
substantial educational institutions or otherwise an economic infrastructure 
to maintain Assyrian ethnic continuity (Ishaya 2003).   
 
Indeed, assimilation is a constant worry for diasporic activists, a worry shared in 
every author interview amongst Assyrians and Chaldeans alike.  The concern is 
highlighted by an anecdote of a young woman inquiring about Assyrians at an event, 
noting she remembered her grandmother saying their family was Assyrian or 
Armenian; it was soon realized the woman was a relative of David Perley, the 
aforementioned Assyrian activist (Abbo et al Interview).  Diasporic boundaries at this 
stage were challenged by small population numbers, geographic dispersal in the U.S., 
and simply were not developed or entrenched enough to retain American-born 
Assyrians as social boundaries were porous and easily crossed.  Social and 
geopolitical circumstances did not make diasporic membership salient.    
 
It was with the tumultuous climate of the 1970s that a reawakening of Assyrian 
nationalism emerged in response to boundary closure in Iraq and Iran.  It is in the 
context of this period’s insecurity that a renewed effort appeared to rebuild the 
Assyrian diaspora with an ideological component entwined with ethno-national 
identity.  The Church itself underwent a significant transition in 1975 with the 
murder of Patriarch Shimun by a church dissident, effectively ending the hereditary 
succession of the Shimun lineage that ruled the Church for almost seven centuries 
(al-Khalil 1989: 175).  Mar Dinkha IV, then-Metropolitan of Iran, was elected to 
Patriarch and led the Church until his death in March 2015; after a brief return of the 
Church’s See to the Middle East, it and the Patriarch soon returned to Chicago in 
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response to the Iranian revolution and Iran-Iraq War.  Dinkha is perhaps as 
responsible as Shimun for aligning the Church with Assyrian nationalism after 
officially changing the name of the Church of the East to the Assyrian Church of the 
East in 1976.  This move was a reassertion of Assyrian ethnicity that faced negation 
by Arabization policies and other repression in the Middle East.  Diasporic 
nationalists who favour the Assyrian addition argue its necessity to sustaining 
Assyrian identity, and compared the ethnic-religious relationship to the Jewish and 
Armenian experiences (Aprim 2003).  Others, however, contend it reinforced the 
perception that Assyrian ethnicity is tied to the Church of the East, further distancing 
potential Chaldean converts to the Assyrian identity.  
 
Dinkha’s leadership thus preached an ethnic nationhood, one which coincided with 
the reemergence of political nationalism.  Liturgy often addressed ‘the sons and 
daughters of The Holy Church and of the Assyrian Nation’ with nationally-themed 
statements such as:   
 
As one national group, history binds us together with our Assyrian forefathers 
in Mesopotamia, this is 2000 years that our Christian forefathers of The 
Church of the East have maintained and kept the name, language, and 
literature of our Assyrian Nationality, together with our Christian Faith, thus 
as one Assyrian Nation, we are to have pride in our history and heritage.  We 
have two gifts given to us from God, which is our Christian Faith of the 
Church of the East, and of our Assyrian nationality (MarDinkha 2006).   
 
Yet whilst nationalistic, Dinkha was less politically assertive than his predecessor; he 
was quoted as saying ‘In the West, it is easy to lose people whom we anger so we 
must be careful’ (DeKelaita 2015).  As the Assyrian nation is increasingly a diasporic 
nation, the Church itself remains a unique ethno-religious tradition.  The loss of a 
church follower could easily equate the loss of a diasporic member, a concern 
stressed by the omnipresent risk of cultural assimilation.   
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Consequentially, secular institutions cast a wider net, engaging non-religious 
members.  The first international effort at amalgamating diasporic organizations into 
a united, secular voice for the Assyrian cause came with the formation of the Assyrian 
Universal Alliance (AUA) in 1968 under the leadership of young, professional Iranian 
Assyrians (Kamber Interview).  Similar to the umbrella structure of the AANF, the 
AUA aims to provide an elected, central leadership to unite the diaspora’s scattered 
international organizations.  The AUA’s reaches into cultivating Assyrian nationalism 
included symbolic measures, such as the commission of the national flag still used 
today across the diaspora (Ashurian 1999).  As with the AANF, there is utility for a 
large umbrella organization to cultivate a common understanding of Assyrian 
nationhood. 
 
A more American-specific effort came with the formation of the Bet-Nahrain 
Democratic Party (BNDP) in the Turlock region by Sargon Dadesho, a former AUA 
official who sought a more staunchly nationalist approach to Assyrian ideology.  The 
BNDP’s nation-building goals led to cultivating a degree of institutional completeness 
to reinforce Assyrian identity and culture across the greater Turlock region.  It 
created Bet Nahrain Magazine in 1974, the first American-based Assyrian radio 
station in 1979, and the AssyriaVision television station in 1996, which expanded 
into an international satellite channel as AssyriaSat in 2002 (Bet-Nahrain Inc. 2011).  
Its radio and television programs discuss Assyrian history and heritage, religious 
issues, current events, and sports through programming in Syriac, Arabic, and 
English.  The Assyrian Cultural Center in Ceres, California, serves as both the basis 
for the BNDP’s daily work and a community institution, providing language classes, 
food festivals, and, most infamously, bingo games.14 
 
                                            
14 Recent tax returns show bingo’s gross revenue totals around $1.5 million annually, and net 
revenue ranged from approximately $70,000 (2012) to approximately $14,000 (2013) 
(FoundationCenter.org). 
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Dadesho successfully leverages his nationalist reputation within the community as 
the purveyor of these organizations: as one journalist commented, ‘He runs a police-
state like organization in Central California where he is respected and appreciated as 
the “King of Assyria”’; and another, regarding the BNDP’s operation, noted: 
 
Here rules one of the exiled leaders of ancient Iraq, a man with a castle but 
no country, at least not yet…His castle, turrets and all, is the ethnic group's 
cultural center, modeled after the historic Assyrian capital of Nineveh.  For 
Dadesho, who works here day and night, it doubles as a headquarters for an 
Assyrian nation-in-waiting (ibid; Arax 2003).   
 
The effective result is that, within this geographic region, there is an element of 
institutional completeness provided by the BNDP and its affiliates.  This successfully 
infused local boundary formation with a strong national ideology.   
 
The BNDP was likely successful in cultivating such institutional breadth because the 
area from which the BNDP emerged is unique to the Assyrian experience in America, 
a planned settlement rather than temporary refuge.  The intent of settlers was to 
integrate, and thus to shift local boundaries.  That the most ardent nationalism 
appeared here is perhaps a testament to the success in doing so.  Moreover, the belief 
one Assyrian identity encompasses all religious factions is representative of the 
Turlock-Modesto experience, which brought together Iranians, Iraqis, Hakkaris, 
Presbyterians, Assyrians, Nestorians, refugees, and retirees into one community.  
Dadesho’s BNDP and its affiliated institutions built upon established diasporic 
boundaries to cultivate nationalism, communicating a pride and ideology that 
resonated within and beyond California to represent a strong diasporic voice for 
Assyrian nationalism.   
 
Although other organizations have not built comparable institutional frameworks, 
several have expanded their missions in an ethnic-building capacity.  Two Chicago-
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based, humanitarian-focused organizations, the Assyrian Universal Alliance 
Foundation (AUAF), formed in 1978, and the Assyrian National Council of Illinois 
(ANCI), formed in 1986, contribute to boundary maintenance by bridging their core 
role as providers of immigrant and refugee support services, such as immigration 
assistance, English-language courses, and elder care programs, with ethnic-building 
programs and cultural maintenance, such as promoting democratic participation, 
community events, and, as formed by the AUAF, a library of Assyrian-language and 
history books.  
 
Additionally, the Assyrian Aid Society (AAS), originally formed by the Assyrian 
Democratic Movement (ADM) to serve as a humanitarian organization in Iraq after 
the Persian Gulf War, has since expanded its mission to tap into the diaspora for 
charitable contributions and to support Assyrian culture.  As one ADM member 
described: ‘ADM, because it’s a political party, it has a sister organization that 
supports basically the activities that ADM tries to protect like the language, schools - 
it’s called the Assyrian Aid Society….ADM understands the essence of a nation are 
language and the culture. This has to be preserved’ (ADM Interview).   
 
Language and culture represent the cultural diacritica, as Wimmer termed, that mark 
ethnic and national boundaries (Wimmer 2009: 254).  AAS thus supports Assyrian 
culture and language in furtherance of supporting the Assyrian nation, and 
solidifying a common understanding of ethnic membership.  AAS has local 
organizations in each metropolitan area with a diaspora presence, each of which is 
responsible for its own programming and fundraising.  Mesopotamia Night, for 
example, is a yearly fundraiser in the Santa Clara and Bay Area of California to 
celebrate Assyrian art and has raised approximately $250,000 in the first five years of 
its operations for AAS’s humanitarian programs (AAS 2012).  Natalie Babella, 
president of AAS's Santa Clara chapter, stressed the importance of such an event is 
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not just financial support, but building an element of nationalism within the 
diaspora:  
 
It’s hitting two birds with one stone: raising the funds that we need and 
trying to keep our culture alive in the diaspora.  And again, it always goes 
back to, because we don’t have a homeland - I mean, we do have a homeland, 
but it’s not ours officially - it’s nice to find ways to preserve our language and 
our culture and our heritage here in America…I do feel like Assyrians, the 
younger generation, the first generation that’s born here, is becoming more 
educated, having more opportunities, has more resources.  It’s just that we 
need to find out ways to grab them and how to instill that nationalism that 
they have to help…Mesopotamia Night is a really nice way that we’ve been 
able to do it in the Central Valley and in the Bay Area.  Our audience has 
been increasing, our volunteers have been increasing…I think everyone as a 
strength, you know, and everyone can bring their talent to the table and say 
this is what I can contribute to the Assyrian nation (Babella Interview 2013).  
 
AAS demonstrates how an organization with a specific purpose can also work in a 
nation-building capacity.  Under skilled leadership, it can engage the wider diaspora 
in contributing, whether financially or by volunteering services, finding ways to make 
diasporic identity relevant.  Moreover, its internationally-focused services reinforce 
the transnational nature of the Assyrian nation.  The specific focus on youth 
engagement speaks to the conscious effort of keeping next generations engaged and 
part of the diaspora, as well as tapping into new ideas and new talent to support the 
organization itself.   
 
These examples of ethnic institutions demonstrate nation-building efforts are 
effective but fragmented, with many organizations providing similar services 
disconnected from each other.  However, significant is a common understanding of 
an Assyrian nation: while organizations serve differing niches, possess differing 
ideologies, and are located in differing geographies, present amongst Assyrian 




This is not intended to offer an idealized picture of diasporic institutions.  Issues of 
corruption, legal challenges, and financial mismanagement tainted some 
organizations and individuals over the past decades.  Elite competition and 
organizational jockeying are consequentially ongoing factors.  On the one hand, this 
can boost the salience of diasporic issues by keeping ideas and narratives discussed 
and contested in the public sphere, but, on the other hand, the personal and political 
competition it embodies is distracting, and discourages trust in those organizations.   
 
The challenges of boundary formation are demonstratively pronounced.  The diverse 
roots and routes of Assyrian migration necessitated ethnic institutions able to capture 
and retain migrants and successive generations of Assyrians, and have shown the 
difficulties in negotiating diasporic boundaries flexible but resonant enough to 
forestall cultural disappearance.  Assyrian elites have undertaken a diaspora-building 
endeavor amongst a heterogeneous group, seeking to unify migrants from across the 
Middle East and across differing sectarian traditions against mainstream American 
society.  Nationalists hybridized and secularized Assyrian identity to refashion its 
own boundary.  As a result, Assyrian cultural diacritica, as defined in relation to 
American society, encompasses ethnic, linguistic, and historical bases.  
 
Chaldean Ethnic Institutions  
 
The Chaldean community’s development differed from the Assyrian experience, but is 
not entirely dissimilar.  In part, the difference is attributable to a boundary arguably 
more in flux upon migration to the U.S.: a religious identity that became more than a 
church affiliation.  Chaldean identity, in contrast to Assyrian boundary-making, was 
produced by the formation of the Chaldean Church, situating the Church in an 
exclusive role within the Chaldean community.  It is this factor that preserved the 
Church’s role as an essential diasporic institution.  As interviewees often noted, ‘It’s a 
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strong identity as far as what we think as church connection, we’re very religious.  
And the priests play a really major role, a major role in the community’ (Hanna 
Interview).   
 
As Chaldean boundaries, particularly in relation to Assyrians, are somewhat 
uncertain, there is correspondingly more opportunity for individual actors to have a 
role in shaping American Chaldeanness.  Elite competition is reflected in the role of 
Church leaders cultivating ethnic claims and in civic leaders creating civic and 
political organizations that also aim to represent the diaspora, as well as the inherent 
competition with Assyrian elites over who speaks for Chaldeans.  As Brubaker 
observed of diasporic elites, actors are framing Chaldeans as a single entity and 
making political claims on their behalf; yet at the same time, actors are making 
visible an identity present within their local communities and churches (Brubaker 
2004).  Diasporic elites are crafting cultural and historical narratives of Chaldeans as 
a unique group that span religious, economic, and cultural emphases: they are, in a 
sense, nation-building (Brass 1991).   
 
Chaldean boundary formation was facilitated by the geographic centralization of 
Chaldeans in Detroit and San Diego.  As such, the growth and expansion of the 
Chaldean population in America was intrinsically linked with the growth and 
expansion of the Chaldean Church.  It is significant that the Chaldean experience in 
Detroit has been a singularly Chaldean experience: despite the neighbouring, settled 
Assyrian community in Chicago, Chaldean migration generally settled in Detroit and 
did not take an Assyrian identity.  The subsequent Chaldean settlement in San Diego 
has, to an extent, mirrored the Detroit community’s development, avoiding 
identification with California’s established Assyrian community.  This point thus 
bears emphasis: Chaldean migration occurred in a way that was uniquely Iraqi 
Chaldean.  Ethnic institutions expanded the intra-ethnic boundary in relation to 
Assyrians and an ethno-sectarian boundary in relation to the surrounding population.     
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In a theme reiterated often by Chaldean-Americans, the emphasis on Christianity was 
used to demonstrate their belonging in America, their commonality with dominant 
elements of American culture, and ease their acculturation.  Fitting with Breton’s 
observation that integration is influenced by the local community and other ethnic 
groups therein, the presence of America’s largest Arab-American populations in the 
Los Angeles/San Diego region and in metropolitan Detroit meant Chaldean 
boundaries were in part defined in relation to Arab-Americans, drawing out 
Chaldean narratives as non-Arabs and non-Muslims (Breton 193).15  As one Detroit 
community leader noted, ‘We are confused with the Arabic people, especially here in 
the Detroit area because there’s such large Arab population in Dearborn.  And we are 
two separate peoples, two separate religions, two separate histories’ (Romaya 
Interview 2013).  San Diego Chaldeans similarly describe the need to reinforce 
narratives of who Chaldeans are and combat anti-Arab and anti-Islam hostility, 
finding through experience an emphasis on Christianity was helpful in gaining social 
acceptance: 
 
They see our Arabic signs and Arabic language and writing, and they get 
upset…There is this kind of feeling like when you see Arabic language, that 
means Islam, and that means terrorist…I give seminars, the last a few months 
ago at this association La Mesa.  They wanted to know about the Chaldeans, 
so I go and talk to them and when I tell them maybe we were the first 
Christian communities to exist, that we’re very old when it comes to 
Christianity, from the first century, they get surprised…We get a different 
feeling when we say that (Barka Interview).  
 
This demonstrates boundary development in relation to local society.  Population 
growth in both locations has brought questions of relationality, of ‘who’ Chaldeans 
                                            
15 Recent controversy in Sterling Heights, a Detroit suburb, regarding a proposed mosque 
construction demonstrates the resonance of these factors with Chaldean integration. The 
City’s mayor stated in opposing the mosque, ‘I will do EVERYTHING in my power to protect, 
support and defend the Chaldean population in Sterling Heights’ (Cwiek 2015).  Although it 
is unclear how a mosque threatens any resident, here Chaldeans have become a welcome part 
of the city whilst Muslims still face barriers.  
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are in relation to the existing population.  Diasporic elites aim to negotiate 
boundaries that familiarize and normalize Chaldean presence whilst maintaining 
enough cultural elements to still give meaning to being Chaldean.  Given their Iraqi 
origins, Chaldeans are most frequently understood as Iraqis, Arabs, or Muslims by 
unfamiliar society.  The ethnic demographics of Detroit and San Diego thus placed 
‘who’ Chaldeans are in contrast to ‘who’ Arab-Americans are – itself an example of 
the American context cultivating a social boundary that oversimplifies the diversity of 
Arab origins and experience.  This relationality brought emphasis to the unique 
ethnicity of Chaldeans.  At the same time, the strong presence of the Arab-American 
community helped normalize within mainstream society cultural elements Chaldeans 
share, such as food, music, and the visibility of the Arabic language: this likely aided 
boundary shifting towards Chaldean integration.  Local interactions shaped how 
Chaldeans were defined in a broader social context; the Chaldean boundary occupied 
a space somewhere between being Middle Eastern and being American.  This space 
was not resolved by returning to an Assyrian ethnic identity, but instead gave way to 
cultivating a distinctly Chaldean one.   
 
Thus, observed is a conscious effort of diasporic elites to pursue boundary shifting to 
facilitate acceptance of the Chaldean community.  By local communities accepting 
Chaldeans – inclusive of Chaldean churches, organizations, and the cultural diacritica 
that define Chaldean boundaries – are part of the community, pressure to fully 
assimilate is reduced because Chaldeans are no longer marginalized.  However, 
boundaries are also made more porous and assimilation easier.  Reinforced, in turn, 
are the need for institutional completeness and boundaries to retain membership and 
the salience of ethnic identity.   
 
Much like the Church of the East for the Assyrian community, the Chaldean Church’s 
role in this boundary-making process was multifaceted.  In addition to the obvious 
role of spiritual guidance, it offered a fixed point for all sectors of the community to 
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come together, from the most recent refugees to the families that have been in the 
U.S. for several generations.  With later generations of Chaldeans less likely to speak 
Arabic or Syriac, the shared space of the church subsequently takes extra 
significance, a raison d’être for Chaldeans.  Yasmeen Hanoosh found the church and 
the community have cultivated a reciprocal relationship: ‘That second-generation, 
English-speaking Chaldeans are claiming membership in the life of their ethnic 
Church has endowed the religious institution in its American diaspora with a special 
symbolic authority over the affairs of the community in spite, or because, of owing its 
material existence and financial robustness to their initiative and unremitting aid’ 
(Hanoosh 198).  The Church’s importance as an institution lies not just within its 
spiritual role, but its ability to bring various elements of Chaldeanness together and 
share them with its followers.  Sengstock observed, ‘The [Chaldean] church took on a 
sort of omnipotent character, being all things to all people in the community’ 
(Sengstock 34).  Church officials facilitated the inclusion of non-religious elements to 
Chaldean identity: as with the Assyrian Church, the Chaldean Church often became a 
place where the Syriac language is taught and where Chaldean history is both 
learned and imagined.   
 
As noted, the experience in the U.S. has been markedly different from that in Iraq 
because the marginalization of Christians is no longer a unifying force.  Whilst the 
Church of the East seeks to retain its followers as a unique Christian tradition, there 
is a risk for the Church that ‘Chaldean’ could become synonymous with ‘Catholic’, 
ultimately retaining only vague suggestions of its ethnic origins like the myriad 
Italian, Irish, and Polish Catholic churches throughout America.  In this sense, the 
Church also acts as a boundary-enforcer against Roman Catholicism as well as 
evangelicals and other Christian sects.  As was noted of the San Diego church, ‘If you 
go to it, priests will continuously say, don’t attend other churches’ (Hanna Interview).  
The Chaldean experience in Mexico is an example of assimilation into a Catholic 
society:    
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There’s a lot in Mexico, right?  And they’ve assimilated. They’ve lost their 
culture.  There’s no Chaldean church there.  So there’s a big thing to say with 
Chaldean Churches: wherever there’s a Chaldean Church in the world, the 
Chaldean culture will have a chance for survival…[In Mexico] the language is 
gone, the traditions are gone, everything’s gone.  See that’s one thing that – in 
this life, the most important thing to preserve the heritage is the church, the 
Chaldean Church specifically.  Because it hangs on to the culture.  It’s uniting 
(Arabo Interview).  
 
Given the dominance of Catholicism in Mexico, there was nothing to preclude 
Chaldean migrants from joining any Catholic Church and forgetting the Chaldean 
aspect of their identity; indeed, that is precisely what has happened.16  The success of 
boundary formation around the Chaldean Church in the U.S., however, is evident in 
this observation: Chaldean culture is understood here as unique to the Chaldean 
people, and the Church holds a unique capacity to preserve this legacy.  
 
Bishop Jammo is often cited as a key figure in Chaldean boundary-making.  Formerly 
a priest in Michigan and current Bishop of the Western diocese, he has encouraged 
the expansion of Church institutions outside the physical church space.  The 
Chaldean Federation of America (CFA) was formed as an umbrella organization in 
1981 as an initiative of Jammo, local churches, and local philanthropists to bridge 
together social service organizations operating in Southeast Michigan and to serve as 
their collective voice; likewise, he became a leading supporter of the Chaldean 
National Congress (CNC) soon after its 2002 formation, an attempt to mobilize 
Chaldean political involvement.  The Church, CFA, and the CNC also embraced 
symbolic elements of Chaldeanness, including the use of a standard Chaldean flag 
championed by the International Chaldean Artists Association and Reverend Jacob 
                                            
16 Mexico’s population is estimated from 1,000 to 2,000 Chaldeans (Marten 2007, BetBassoo 
2013).  Figures for Chaldean immigration to Mexico were not available as Chaldeans, like 
José Muret Casab, a former governor of Iraqi Chaldean descent, may be considered or define 
themselves as Arab or Iraqi. 
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Yasso at the Sacred Heart Chaldean Church in Detroit (Iraq Chaldean Artists 
Association undated).  In 2003, he began using the phrase ‘Chaldean Renaissance’ in 
public speeches to bridge together what he saw as Chaldeans’ historical contributions 
to humanity with the present need for a vibrant Chaldean nationalism (Jammo 2013; 
Shapera 2003). 
 
Jammo’s ethnic-building role and pursuit of institutional completeness in San Diego 
is regarded by many as essential to the Chaldean community:   
 
[Bishop Jammo] started the Kaldu TV, which is the Chaldean media.  And he 
started the educational centre, which is like a private school.  So when he 
came they had like seven churches.  Now there’s fourteen.  He’s doubled.  He 
did a seminary, a convent.  Because he wants people to retain the culture, the 
language, the heritage.  We’re always proud – first and foremost, we’re 
American.  We hold on to our culture, we’re Chaldean American.  Just like 
any culture, we don’t want to be forgotten about.  The biggest disservice to 
our ancestors that fought to stay alive and fled and left millions and millions 
of dollars for their religious freedom is you have to – at a minimum – keep 
our heritage alive (Arabo Interview).   
 
Of note is the emphasis of being American, but of being able to be Chaldean within 
an American context because of the ability to create such organizations and religious 
institutions.  Here, Jammo is growing the church to reach the population, 
maintaining social boundaries by maintaining religious boundaries.  Intertwining this 
role as a Church leader is therefore that of a diasporic nation-builder.  To observers, 
a change in Chaldean awakening was palpable following the Iraq War:  
 
While Saddam was in power, you hardly heard of a Chaldean nationalism, 
Chaldean flag…The whole construction of the Chaldean nationhood, the 
Chaldean flag…there’s a Chaldean Martyr’s Day, and there’s a Chaldean New 




There are internal tensions within the Chaldean Church itself over its role in nation-
building.  Patriarch Delly assumed a mantle of Chaldean nationalism when he stated 
in 2006 that ‘Any Chaldean who calls himself Assyrian is a traitor, and any Assyrian 
who calls himself Chaldean is a traitor’ (Quoted in Hanoosh 35).  Delly’s successor, 
Patriarch Sako, however, has distanced himself from ethnic politics, favouring a more 
Christian universalist approach to identity.  Sako suggested recently, for example, 
that Assyrians and Chaldeans could be recognized as Arameans in the forthcoming 
Kurdish constitution, stressing the community needs to refocus its emphasis on 
Christianity more than ethnicity (Catholic World News 2015).   
 
Bishop Ibrahim, speaking before a Chaldean nationalist forum, did not shy away 
from expressing frustration at Sako’s calls to distance the Church from nationalism, 
stating the Patriarch’s denial of Chaldean identity is ‘unacceptable for us. We don’t 
need specialists to tell us we are Chaldeans…The Assyrians are Assyrians, the Syriacs 
are Syriacs, the Kurds are Kurds and the Arabs are Arabs’ (Ibrahim 2013, Translated 
by Amboulus).  Chaldeanness is thus distinguished as separate from these ethnic 
groups whose identity Chaldeans are often assumed under.  Church leaders may in 
part be motivated to emulate the Church of the East’s historic role in Assyrian 
nationalism to cultivate a boundary protecting its own identity and religious and 
social role. 
 
The Church is intrinsically linked to the establishment of symbols of Chaldeanness: a 
flag, holidays, its historical underpinnings.  The American context is formative to 
Chaldean boundary expansion because American society both creates conditions for 
assimilation and allows means of institution-building and ethnic expression to work 
against assimilation.  Local civic organizations have since developed in cultural, 
business, and humanitarian spheres to compliment the work of the church, to fill a 
void where practicable, or to offer a secular alternative.  The institutional 
completeness brought by civic expansion appears, at present, to be strongly 
 152 
developing in Detroit.  In part, the size of the population allowed greater capacity for 
a diversity of organizations; yet, despite its size, a relatively cohesive structure 
headed by few key individuals emerged and remains.   
 
Sengstock, in a 1978 study utilizing data compiled in the 1960s, considered Detroit’s 
Chaldean community in the context of Breton’s institutional completeness.  She 
found there was present only one of three factors which he emphasized as essential 
to institutional completeness: the ethnic church, but not yet ethnic-specific 
newspapers or welfare organizations (Sengstock 1978: 55-56).  She found that 
despite such absences, participation within the ethnic community remained high, and 
suggested three other factors compensated for solidarity in the absence of Breton’s 
indexes: ethnic occupation, in which many Chaldean households are involved in 
some capacity in the grocery and its subsidiary industries; high rates of endogamy; 
and residential proximity.  Sengstock’s findings of this period therefore offer a 
marked point of contrast with the present: they do not disprove Breton’s theory so 
much as underscore the nascence of the Chaldean community at the time of her 
study.  The Chaldean solidarity her study sought to explain was aided by a continual 
stream of new immigrants fleeing Ba’athist Iraq.  As assimilation and integration 
have ensued in the following decades, the non-Church factors to which solidarity was 
attributed have begun to wane, particularly as the community grows and spreads 
across Metropolitan Detroit; Breton’s institutions then found lacking have since 
appeared.  The San Diego community, by comparison, is developing both Sengstock’s 
and Breton’s indicators as its population grows, perhaps mimicking successful 
organizations found within the Detroit community.   
 
Detroit’s Chaldean organizational network was best described by Hanoosh as ‘a 
symbiotic circuit’ because of the interconnectedness of organizations and individuals 
(Hanoosh 2011: 132).  Seemingly all Chaldean roads in recent years led to the 
Church, the Chaldean Federation of America, or, increasingly, the Chaldean Chamber 
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of Commerce.  The civic portion of this circuit was headed by Michael George, a 
highly-respected, longstanding community leader known as the ‘Chaldean Godfather’ 
and Chairman Emeritus of CFA until his recent death in June 2014; David Nona, 
Chairman of CFA and co-founder and past Chairman of the Chaldean Chamber of 
Commerce; Joseph Kassab, former Executive Director of CFA and former Executive 
Director of the Chaldean National Congress; and Martin Manna, current Executive 
Director of the Chaldean Chamber.  However, whilst this mutually-reinforcing 
structure is organized by few individuals, its reach extends to the wider community.  
A 2000 community survey, for example, found sixty-two percent of Chaldeans in 
Michigan reported belonging to at least one organization, of which eighty-two 
percent were Chaldean organizations (Henrich and Henrich 87).  
 
Growth of the Chaldean cultural sphere accelerated rapidly in recent years.  The 
Chaldean Iraqi American Association of Michigan was amongst the first community-
wide organizations, formed in 1965 by 60 families to establish a social club and 
gathering space; it has since grown to 900 members (Bacall and Ball Interview).  
CIAAM has operated the Southfield Manor Banquet Hall since the 1970s on land 
purchased from the Church as a community event space; it opened the Shenandoah 
Country Club in 2005, an estimated $25 million venue which also hosts the Chaldean 
Cultural Center (Hanoosh 133).  The Cultural Center, supported by CFA and the 
Chamber, is in the process of building the first Chaldean Historical Museum, which 
will be located in Shenandoah (Romaya Interview 2012).  Additionally, Bishop 
Ibrahim is working to construct a library dedicated to works on Chaldean history and 
culture that will likewise be affiliated with the Cultural Center (Author Interview 
Notes 2013).  Media ventures include the Chaldean News, a weekly newspaper 
started and co-managed by Manna, and the Chaldean Voice, a radio station formed 
with the assistance of Ibrahim, who also provided programming content.   
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These combined efforts curate an ‘official’ narrative of Chaldeanness, backed by these 
institutions, that celebrates Chaldean history and accomplishments in a solely 
Chaldean and Chaldean-American context.  Mary Romaya, Director of the Cultural 
Center, stressed the target audience of the Center’s cumulative works is both 
American-born generations of Chaldeans who risk distancing from their heritage and 
the American population in general: ‘We want them to know who we are, our unique 
place in history, our unique heritage, our unique language, and that we’re really an 
ancient people, but an ancient people that has not gone out of existence - that we’re 
still a vibrant, living community’ (Romaya Interview 2012).  
 
Business-related organizations include the Chaldean American Chamber of 
Commerce, run by Manna, which represents approximately 800 members and more 
than 3,500 business interests (Chaldean American Chamber 2015b: 8).  The Detroit 
Independent Grocers, an affiliate of the Chamber, operates as a niche advocacy 
organization given the importance of the grocery business to the diaspora.  
Additionally, responding to the inability of non-citizens to secure loans to start a 
business, George created Metro Detroit Investment, which helped finance an 
estimated 700 businesses, most of which were or are Chaldean-owned, and in 2005 
spearheaded the establishment of the Bank of Michigan to offer banking services to 
community members and small businesses (George Enterprises 2014).  However, as 
next-generation Chaldeans are more likely to attain higher levels of education, 
professionals are less likely to enter into the food and hospitality business; to that 
end, professional affiliations become an alternative means to continue ethnic 
engagement.  Professional groups include the Chaldean-American Bar Association, 
the Chaldean American Association for Health Professionals, and the Chaldean 
American Medical Student Association.   
 
Additionally, social services and humanitarian organizations, which are essential to 
supporting newly-arrived members, receive support through business organizations, 
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the Churches, and the wider community.  The Chaldean-American Ladies of Charity 
was formed with the aide of the Chaldean Church in 1961 to assist refugees leaving 
Iraq, and today provides assistance to families, seniors and new refugees.  CALC is a 
member of the CFA umbrella, which also offers assistance through the overseas 
Adopt-a-Refugee Program - which distributes aide directly through churches in Iraq - 
and the Operation R4 (Research, Rescue, Relief and Resettle) programs.  COACH 
(Chaldean Outreach and Community Hope), also part of the CFA umbrella, 
specializes in engaging refugee youth.  Additionally, the Chaldean Community 
Foundation, the charitable branch of the Chamber, operates a wide-ranging social 
services mission, including refugee resettlement assistance; mental health services; 
Project Bismutha, which provides free medical health services to the uninsured 
through partnership with the Chaldean American Association for Health 
Professionals; the Chaldean Loan Fund, which provides small loans to non-citizens to 
help with the purchase of a car through partnership with the Bank of Michigan; 
student scholarships; and donations to churches to support construction projects or 
humanitarian aide.  
 
The point in this organizational breakdown is not that similar organizations cannot 
be found in other ethnic communities or the Assyrian community: the point is that 
Detroit’s Chaldean community has been successful in creating a tight-knit yet wide-
reaching institutional structure, the presence of which begins to answer how 
Chaldean identity has remained dominant in Detroit.  Observed here is 
Stinchcombe’s finding that ‘the solidarity of communal groups is intimately 
dependent on their degree of formal organization’, with formal organizations serving 
to protect smaller group interests within the larger community and building a degree 
of homogeneity amongst group members (Stinchcombe 191).   
 
There is a professionalizing, concerted effort, fueled by continued waves of 
immigration, to serve the community in a way that reinforces Chaldean belonging.  
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Significantly, the newness of many of these organizations suggests Chaldean identity 
may be strengthening in Metropolitan Detroit, positioning the community as a long-
term presence rather than one tending towards assimilation.  Although Manna notes 
the Chamber officially embraces Assyrians and Syriacs as part of one community 
shared with Chaldeans, the combined effect of the Chamber’s institutions nonetheless 
serves to reinforce a Chaldean identity and solidify the Chaldean name in public 
discourse (Manna Interview 2014).  For example, a recent flyer published by the 
Chamber and the Cultural Center, ‘Chaldean Americans’, notes in the introductory 
paragraph that Chaldeans are ‘among the many ethnic groups that immigrated to the 
Metropolitan Detroit area’ and are an ‘Eastern Rite Catholic, Aramaic-speaking, 
ethnic group originating primarily from Iraq’ without any mention of Assyrians 
(CARE et al undated).  Sengstock likewise observed the role of organizations, 
specifically CFA, in promoting a secular Chaldean identity, thereby reinforcing an 
ethnic understanding in which Chaldeans who have left the Church remain Chaldean 
(Sengstock 1999: 183-184).   
 
The closely-knit network of Chaldean institutions subsequently facilitates a common 
narrative and a consistent, reiterative expression of who Chaldeans are to Chaldeans 
and non-Chaldeans alike, and is thus consequential to shaping and maintaining 
boundaries.  It has proven capable of absorbing new immigrants and instilling a 
Chaldean identity.  For example, Sengstock recalled anticipation during the 1980s 
and 1990s that a split in Detroit’s Chaldean community was foreseeable as new 
immigrants who identified as Iraqi Christian or Arab Christian, the result of 
Arabization policies, might potentially align themselves with the Arab community at 
the expense of the Chaldean population (Author Interview Notes 2012).  Instead, 
there was relatively little discord and these immigrants ‘became’ Chaldean.  Ibrahim 
similarly observed immigrants switched from considering themselves Arab to 
Chaldean, discovering the name and their belonging through engagement with the 
Church and wider community (Author Interview Notes 2013).  Non-identification 
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remains a considerable challenge with the post-2003 population for Chaldeans and 
Assyrians alike, further reinforcing the necessity of the institutional framework to 
capture new immigrants.  There remain, of course, divisions and contestations within 
the Detroit population over things like village of origin, whether one’s family is from 
TelKeppe, when one's family immigrated, if they live in Oakland or Macomb County; 
however, these minor boundaries have not become salient to Chaldean boundary 
criteria. 
 
The Chaldean network in Detroit, as evident, has sought avenues into many aspects 
of Chaldean life.  Manna states community leaders are learning to be more proactive 
instead of reactionary: after having in the past built programs to respond to 
immediate needs, leaders are now trying to project a long-term vision, modeled in 
part after the successful example set by the area’s Jewish community, which operates 
a wide-range of social services and community-centered facilities (Manna Interview 
2014).  The institutional completeness and strength of the Chaldean boundary within 
Detroit subsequently precluded Assyrian organizations from firmly taking root in 
Detroit’s Chaldean structure.  Assyrian organizations, such as ADM and AAS, are 
present, but have a small presence that can often go unobserved.17  The expansion of 
Chaldean institutions reinforces Breton’s observation that institutional completeness 
is self-reinforcing, expanding with each wave of migration and driving institutional 
growth to accommodate the new population.  Moreover, the community’s continued 
growth suggests a boundary shifting taking place in which Chaldeans are part of the 
Detroit-area social and economic fabric.   
 
Whilst the San Diego community is connected to Detroit through a multitude of 
familial and commercial ties, San Diego does not yet have an institutional structure 
                                            
17 AAS Michigan, for example, took in approximately $2,300 in local donations in 2012, 
compared to over $100,000 raised by its Chicago counterpart (AAS 2012).  By contrast, the 
Adopt-a-Refugee program raised over $800,000 from its founding in 2007 to 2009 (Marten 
2009). 
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as comprehensive as Detroit.  Given the small presence of Chaldean civic institutions 
in San Diego, the influx of Chaldean refugees after 2005 strained the capacity of the 
community to respond effectively.  Chaldean and Middle-Eastern Social Services, also 
part of CFA, was formed in 2008 to provide refugees with health and mental health 
services.  Additionally, business leaders like Noori Barka, President of the Chaldean 
American Institute, and Mark Arabo, head of the Neighborhood Market Association, 
have used their influence to facilitate humanitarian assistance through existing non-
Chaldean charitable structures like the Boys and Girls Club, the YMCA, the Knights of 
Columbus, which now has a branch affiliated with the local Chaldean Church, and 
through the Chaldean Church.  Of these diaspora-driven efforts:   
 
There are different organizations, like I work with the Boys and Girls 
Club…I’m on the board.  I was able to help maybe 80 kids from our 
community to join…They didn’t expect that many people coming, so they 
have to sometimes increase their capacity…And we have the YMCA here also.  
So we try to depend on these organizations to help these people, because 
ourselves, we don’t have the self-help, we don’t have the power, we don’t 
have the system to do this kind of programming.  It takes a lot of work, 
actually.  But what we do, we try to work with them, support them, so they 
can support our people (Barka Interview);   
 
We’re working with the county government and state government to try to 
get grants from the federal government to help with the refugee settlements 
and stuff like that.  We look at every Chaldean, we might not know them in 
our whole life, but we see them and it’s one of our family members.  Every 
year, we donate like 1,000 mattresses, 1,000 blankets, 1,000 toys.  We bring 
Christmas to refugee kids that don’t have a Christmas…There’s no group 
that’s set up for them in the West coast.  There’s nothing out here.  There’s 
stuff in Michigan, but California’s out of sight, out of mind.  So we have to 
take on our own to give back and help (Arabo Interview).   
 
The lack of an institutional structure encourages elite competition because of the 
potential to assume a leadership void; however, such competition is curtailed 
somewhat by the role of the Church.  In San Diego, too, the Chaldean Church 
remains formative under Jammo’s leadership.   
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The expanding Chaldean population, however, may ultimately lead to a stronger 
civic structure, connected to but distanced from the Church.  Recently, civic 
representation of the community was contested through two newly-formed chambers 
of commerce, in which the Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce of California, 
with approximately 200 members, and the San Diego East County Chaldean 
American Chamber of Commerce, with approximately 130 members, were fighting 
for preeminence (Barragan 2014).  Although the fight, on its surface, was about 
representation of the area’s Chaldean businesses, it also reflected, as one 
organization’s leader told the Los Angeles Times, a shared acknowledgment there is 
opportunity to build a strong structure and become a leading Chaldean voice in 
California: ‘The perennial issue is that there was a void for a statewide organization 
to represent our interests at the local, state and federal level, as well as 
internationally. We’re filling that void’ (ibid).  Thus, elite competition is at play in a 
way that seems central to Chaldean self-narratives, aiding Chaldean development 
through representing Chaldean economic interests.   
 
Chaldean integration faces hardships like any ethnic group.  Chaldeans in Detroit and 
San Diego endure negative yet contradictory stereotypes: on the one extreme, they 
are wealthy, corrupt, flashy, receive a tax exemption from the government or 
whatever xenophobic urban legend regarding immigrants prevails; on the other, they 
are poor, unwilling to work, and leeching off government handouts.  The lack of 
social services to support refugee adjustment was particularly felt in San Diego, and 
consequentially resistance to the growing Chaldean population has been encountered 
with local society, unforgiving of the trauma suffered under the American-led war 
and the poor economy into which refugees arrived.  Negative perceptions were 
furthered by a 2011 incident in which sixty Chaldeans were arrested for drug and 
weapons trafficking in aid to a drug cartel (Associated Press 2011).  In 2013, El 
Cajon’s then-Mayor Mark Lewis criticized Chaldeans, arguing refugees manipulate 
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social services and tax incentives to receive benefits - specifically that schoolchildren 
receive free lunches before ‘being picked up by Mercedes Benzes’ and that ‘it doesn’t 
take them too long to learn where all the freebies are at’ (Gupta 2013).  
 
Statements like these suggest that whilst Chaldeans are making a presence in San 
Diego, aiding refugee integration and developing institutions, a boundary shift in the 
local population is ongoing as elites navigate bias and misinformation that hardens 
local boundaries.  Efforts like Barka’s, in reaching out to the local community, 
demonstrate how elites are active participants in boundary negotiation, attempting to 
redefine and correct outside perceptions and put forward Chaldeans’ own narratives 
of who they are and how they contribute to society.  Barka noted Chaldean 
institutions are bringing together small, local Chaldean organizations to build unity 
and become more self-sustaining: the intention is to develop an infrastructure more 
comparable to Detroit, which is seen as possessing a successful Chaldean 
infrastructure and engaged leadership, the result of being an older community that 
developed such infrastructure over time (Barka Interview).   
 
Chaldean –and Assyrian- diasporic elites therefore work to integrate the diaspora into 
American society, aiming to form a diasporic nation as part of society, not isolated 
from it.  From the Chaldean experience, it is evident boundary shifting is not a 
uniform process but occurs at multiple levels and reoccurs upon encountering 
different communities.  An embrace of Chaldeans by state officials in Michigan and 
residents in one city does not preclude encountering tensions as the population 
expands to other suburbs.  Cultural diacritica narrating who Chaldeans are may take 
different emphases in relation to different communities, placing emphasis on 
religious values in one context and on economic roles in another.  Likewise, that 
California politicians rallied to support Chaldeans against mayoral prejudice 
demonstrates acceptance from political elites does not negate individual or local 
discrimination.  Boundaries are not formed or shifted at once, but many times, in 
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relation to many groups, and are constantly being reshaped and questioned.  The 
desire to build successful ethnic institutions speaks to the larger desire to increase the 
institutional presence of Chaldeans and secure the diaspora’s boundaries against 
assimilation but still remain part of American society.  Whilst the same dynamic 
certainly occurred within the Assyrian experience, that specifically Chaldean 
boundaries result in Detroit and San Diego consequentially strengthens the salience 
of Chaldean identity.   
 
NATIONALIST POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Nationally-focused political organizations represent a more modern development in 
Assyrian and Chaldean institution-building, cultivated by the changing role of the 
Iraq state under the Ba’ath Party, increased dispersion, and an absence of national 
leadership.   In this sense, the organizations and the national claims they represent 
are a reaction to changing international boundaries and weak diasporic ones.  Like 
ethnic institutions, they reinforce a common understanding of the nation, but from 
there cultivate ideologies for the Assyrian and Chaldean nation, and thereby shape 
nationalism and political goals on behalf of the diasporic nation or the homeland.  
Here, the contrast between the Assyrian and Chaldean communities is evident as 
Assyrian organizations formed with clear national ideologies whilst Chaldean 
political organizations only emerged in the past decade, largely in response to 
outside circumstances and pressures on Chaldean boundaries, notably the Iraq War 
and Assyrian political demands.   
 
Nationalist political organizations are significant because they cultivate an ideology 
for diaspora beyond simply narrating ‘who’ the diaspora is.  Providing a cause for 
national identity is especially meaningful to small nations, who, as Hroch found, 
‘never regarded their existence as self-evident: they felt endangered for a very long 
time…Only successful national agitation, and consequently the acceptance of new 
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national identity by the mass of the population guaranteed an irreversible national 
existence’ (Hroch 2010: 884).  Here, drawing on Breuilly’s theory, these 
organizations mark the appearance of nationalism by channeling Assyrian and 
Chaldean history, culture, and values into political claims (Breuilly 1993).  This 
section therefore examines why political institutions formed and how they came to 
shape nationalism. 
 
Nationalist political organizations are thus understood as those which seek to define 
political goals and make political decisions on behalf of Assyrians or Chaldeans, 
which can include but is not exclusive to the pursuit of political representation.  The 
focus of such organizations may reflect long-distance nationalism to Iraq or diasporic 
nationalism to the diaspora itself.  Political organizations represent a turning point 
from a localized focus on membership retention and boundary negotiation to the 
diaspora’s political needs and its future.   
 
In contrast to the previous section, however, this typology is weighted heavily in 
examination of the Assyrian community.  Such contrast reveals a general absence of 
Chaldean political engagement until the Iraq War.  This at first reinforces cultural 
assumptions that Chaldeans have tended to be apolitical and Assyrians more 
nationalistic.  However, it also suggests a different understanding of social 
boundaries between Assyrian and Chaldean elites, and subsequently different 
reactions to changing Iraqi boundaries.  The emergence of Assyrian political 
organizations against Ba’ath repression underscores the ethno-national 
understanding of Assyrianism and its long history of demanding national and ethnic 
recognition.  The lack of Chaldean political mobilization instead suggests the 
Chaldean boundary was until recently less understood by ethnic criteria, having 
defined boundaries in line with the sectarian criteria of the Chaldean Church, which 
remained relatively unthreatened prior to the Iraq War.   
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In the Assyrian experience, three politically-focused organizations emerged as 
dominant within the American diaspora: the Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA), the 
Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party (BNDP), and the Assyrian Democratic Movement 
(ADM).  Of these, BNDP and ADM are political organizations.  They have positioned 
themselves as harbingers of different understandings of Assyrian nationalism: BNDP 
as a strongly nationalist voice for an Assyrian homeland; ADM as a more moderate 
voice for recognition and inclusion.  The contrast demonstrates elite competition over 
diasporic representation, as well as different understandings of how much the 
Assyrian nation’s survival is contingent on possessing territory.  
 
The presence of Chaldean political organizations in diaspora was more recent.  
Political representation is often assumed by leaders of the Chaldean Church, both out 
of tradition and necessity given the shortage of secular alternatives.  It is not until the 
lead-up to the Iraq War and corresponding change in Iraqi boundaries that an effort 
at political organizing emerged through the former Chaldean National Congress and 
the current Chaldean Democratic Forum.  The latter primarily supports Chaldean 
democratic rights within Iraq and aides Chaldean-inclusive political parties in Iraq.  
However, there is not yet a key figurehead or organization that inspires widespread 
political allegiance or is seen as a legitimate political representative other than, still, 
the Church.  
 
Assyrian Political Organizations  
 
The emergence of Assyrian political organizations marks a significant evolution in 
Assyrian nation-building.  Their presence has taken the nationalism carried by the 
Assyrian Church and cultural institutions and appropriated it as an objective to be 
contested in the political sphere.  Political organizations thus served to further 
secularize Assyrian nationalism, providing members of the ethnic community with 
formulations of long-term goals and ways to actively contest such goals.  They 
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instituted an effort to define who Assyrians are that further supports an ethnic-based, 
multi-denominational understanding of the Assyrian nation.   
 
It is perhaps easier to understand the focus placed upon cross-denominational unity 
by considering the challenges Assyrians will face if those factions fully splinter.  
Without a claim to Chaldeans, Assyrian nationalism loses claim to the overwhelming 
majority of Iraq’s Christian population.  Prior to 2003, the Chaldean Church was 
posed as the dominant Christian presence in Iraq given its larger population and base 
of its Church in Baghdad, as opposed to the Church of the East, which is seated in the 
U.S. and largely spread in diaspora across the globe.  The efficacy of Assyrianism as a 
political project is curtailed without a sizable Assyrian population.  Thus, the 
importance of a broader, ethnic-based Assyrian identity matters as much for practical 
political claims as it does for ideological and national ones.   
 
Yet through the first half of the 20th century, as noted above, the Patriarch’s 
leadership implicitly equated Assyrians with the Church of the East, demanding 
autonomy for this population, displaced as refugees from Anatolia into Iraq and 
displaced as refugees from the Middle East into America.  As the international 
community remained unresponsive, the Patriarch transitioned his advocacy to 
acknowledging the permanency of diaspora, working instead to cultivate relations 
with leaders of states containing Assyrian populations to encourage the protection of 
Assyrian rights therein (Mar Shimun Memorial Foundation 2015).  Observed here is 
a transition from traditional nationalism, the desire for a self-ruled atra, to diasporic 
nationalism, building a diasporic nation within respective states of resettlement.  
Dinkha was also nationalistic, but often less directly political, a position perhaps 
reflecting the political limitations under Ba’ath rule and as a diasporic Church.   
 
There remains a struggle in rectifying the role of the Church with a diversified 
national identity.  As political organizations’ early works contested Arabization 
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policies, they too insisted upon the national and ethnic nature of the Assyrian name, 
aspiring to balance the importance of Christianity with the historical legacy of 
ancient Assyria (Petrosian 2006: 135-139).  Building their parties on the legacy of 
nationalism and political advocacy forced upon Shimun, their presence argued for a 
passing of the national torch to professional political actors.   
 
Present in the early iterations of Assyrian political organizations are a combination of 
unfulfilled League of Nations-era demands for territorial and political autonomy and 
the pro-democratic rhetoric of recognition and inclusion.  The multi-decades 
presence these organizations have since sustained has legitimized them as 
representatives of the Assyrian community, albeit to differing constituencies, and 
positioned them as an existing voice against the Hussein regime when the 2003 War 
began.  As was observed, political affinities do provide another wedge within the 
diaspora: 
  
It’s incredibly hard to organize the diaspora because historically we’ve been 
already divided by these identities, church lines or whatever.  And if you 
aren’t being divided by that, amongst Assyrians, you are divided by various 
political allegiances – whether you are more ADM or not, whether you are 
more AUA or not, et cetera (Abbo et al Interview). 
 
There are multiple layers of internal wedges – ideological, religious, political – and 
thus multiple avenues for elite competition to play out.  That differing ideologies and 
allegiances have come to exist and remain actively contested marks a significant 
evolution in the national movement.  Moreover, as Abbo commented in this chapter’s 
earlier quote, this nature of organizational jockeying demonstrates the absence of a 
political structure or external mechanism to define legitimate representation: 
diasporic boundary creation and the political representation thereof is solely the 
province of dedicated individuals.    
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In the AUA’s American diasporic centers, local leadership is elected to coordinate 
advocacy work, maintain relationships with the local community and officials, and 
keep involved with local issues to assist where possible and to share concerns with 
the wider diaspora; central leadership often meets with political figures and bodies 
regarding policy and political aims (Tamraz Interview 2013).  Leadership under the 
late Illinois State Senator John Nimrod in the 1990s pursued increased international 
political engagement, promoting the organization to become a member of the 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and receive consultative 
status with the United Nations for AUA’s Americas Chapter in 2013 (Tamraz 
Interview; UN Economic and Security Council 2013).  Engagement with political 
officials was continued by Yonathan Betkolia, Secretary General since 2008, a 
founding member of the AUA under whom leadership has returned to Iran, where he 
also serves as a Member of Parliament; Emmanuel Kamber, who served as Secretary 
General from 2005 until 2007; and Carlo Ganjeh, AUA’s Secretary of the Americas.  
The AUA has experienced some success in positioning itself as a leading 
representative of Assyrian causes given its international support and skill of its 
leadership, and offers a global voice for Assyrian issues, but is itself not a political 
party.  As such, its purpose as a single representative of the Assyrian people has not 
been fully embraced by the whole diaspora as it is challenged by the rise of political 
organizations with competing ideologies.   
 
The entirety of political disagreements between the most prominent political 
organizations in the diaspora, the BNDP and ADM, is outside the scope of this 
chapter; however, there are a few key differences relevant to their respective post-
war advocacy.  The BNDP’s strong nationalist goals often prompt supporters to 
challenge the ADM as insufficiently nationalist or a corrupted entity; too supportive 
of the Kurdish government; or dividing the community by recognizing the Chaldean 
name. The ADM, by contrast, highlights its legitimacy earned from fighting Hussein 
and, later, as the only elected representative of the Assyrian, Chaldean, and Syriac 
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people in Iraq: its supporters contend the BNDP is simply a product of the diaspora 
and is unsuccessful in Iraq; that the BNDP’s positions are mere rhetoric because it has 
not been elected to work in Iraq’s political structure.   
 
The more nationalist of these parties, the Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party (BNDP), 
founded by Sargon Dadesho, is guided by its motto of ‘An Autonomous State for 
Assyrians in Bet-Nahrain’ (BNDP 1976).  The BNDP’s efficacy at achieving tangible 
political outcomes was nonetheless exceedingly limited given its location in the U.S. 
and Iraq’s unwelcomeness towards non-Ba’athist activity.  In this sense, the BNDP is 
perhaps better framed as a diasporic political organization rather than an Iraqi 
political party, a purveyor of Assyrian statehood demands and long-distance 
nationalism for those in diaspora.   
 
In 1983, Dadesho formed the Assyrian National Congress (ANC) as a political 
umbrella organization incorporating the BNDP and the little-known, Modesto-based 
Assyrian American Leadership Council.  Dadesho wrote of founding the ANC that the 
Assyrian people suffer from a ‘vacuum of leadership’, a role the ANC aspired to fill 
(Dadesho 1988: 93).18  Its founding was likely motivated by several factors, including 
the ability to lobby the U.S. government, from which the BNDP is more restricted as a 
registered as a 501(c)(3) charitable organization.  The ANC also fits in the following 
typology of a lobbying organization because it claims to serve as a representative and 
policy-maker on behalf of the community.  
 
Indeed, Dadesho has emphasized building cultural understanding and national pride 
as the foundation to his long-term national strategy, under which he urged diasporic 
pockets globally to push for cultural autonomy and civic and political rights in their 
                                            
18 Dadesho’s reputation as an anti-Ba’athist dissident was solidified when, in 1990, an 
attempted assassination ordered by the Ba’ath regime was thwarted by the FBI and Dadesho 
was awarded a $1.5 million court settlement against the Iraqi government (Pasztor 1998). 
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own separate states.  This emphasis is echoed frequently throughout Dadesho’s 
writings of the 1970s and 1980s for Bet Nahrain magazine.  A 1975 editorial, for 
example, ‘The Awakening of Assyrian Nationalism’, outlines a three-stage national 
movement that began with the formation of the AUA, is followed by the pursuit 
minority rights in the homeland, and ultimately leads to a reunification of the 
dispersed Assyrian people in an Assyrian homeland (Dadesho 11).   
 
Thus, there was a conscious effort by Dadesho and the BNDP/ANC to create a 
national movement within the Assyrian diaspora.  Dadesho wrote Assyrians need to 
build ‘The concept of “DIASPORA NATIONALISM”, the idea that the Assyrians - 
despite the lack of a geopolitical homeland - still constituted a distinct nationality’ 
(Dadesho 93, emphasis in original).  This phrase is adapted directly from Urofsky’s 
aforementioned work, in which he notes Jewish socialists adapted ‘Diaspora 
nationalism’ in the absence of a homeland (Urofsky 1976: 32-33).  This lent itself 
well to Dadesho’s ideology, that a diaspora could maintain and propagate a scattered 
nation until a state could be achieved, using liberal democratic rights and 
institutional completeness to protect diasporic people and culture.  Diasporic 
nationalism, thus, is used to compensate for the absence of a state.  Dadesho’s use of 
this concept is telling of the influence of the Jewish experience to other diasporas.  
Given the endurance of the American Jewish diaspora, it is hardly surprising other 
populations would emulate the Jewish model.  That Dadesho exercises a conscious 
effort to emulate diasporic nationalism underscores the centrality of organizations 
like the BNDP to creating a diasporic consciousness and projecting political and 
national aims on behalf of that consciousness.  The BNDP, then, embodies localism, 
diasporic nationalism, and long-distance nationalism. 
 
To this end, the BNDP often positions itself as the guardian of a pure Assyrian 
identity, sometimes literally, having used the banner ‘Bet Nahrain Democratic Party: 
The Guardian of the Assyrian Nation’ at its annual congresses.  The ANC’s motto of 
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‘Let Us Unite And Gather The Fragments That Nothing Be Lost’ and goals in support 
thereof asserts Assyrian identity and rebukes the policies of rival organizations 
viewed as too accommodating of the Chaldean identity, and rebukes the Chaldean-
identifying population itself (Dadesho 2006; Assyrian National Congress 2000).  It 
opposes the use of a hybrid name, such as Assyrian/Chaldean or ChaldoAssyrian, and 
criticizes organizations that do as dividing the nation, with shades of suggesting 
treasonous or ‘Ba’athist’ intentions.  For example, Dadesho filed a lawsuit against the 
U.S. Census Bureau in July 2000 in a failed attempt to thwart a compromise 
agreement between the Census Bureau, Chaldean organizations, and Assyrian 
organizations to change the 1990 ‘Assyrian’ ethnic designation to that of 
‘Chaldean/Assyrian/Syriac’ for the 2000 Census.  Other Assyrian organizations, 
including the AUA and ADM, accepted this compromise after prolonged protest to 
avoid having ‘Chaldean’ listed as its own designation (Hanna Interview; Kulish 
2001).  Although the courts ultimately dismissed the lawsuit, the suit served a larger 
purpose to rally BNDP supporters around a shared outrage, a grievance that is still 
referenced today.19   
 
The ANC, like the AUA and AANF, holds an annual convention that attracts 
supporters from across the diaspora and local politicians, and issues a yearly 
resolution directing advocacy for the coming year; the content of these resolutions 
typically reiterate a consistent agenda with the ultimate goal of Assyrians reunited in 
their homeland (For example, Assyrian National Congress 2001).  Desiring an 
international presence, over the past two decades the ANC has also sought, but not 
yet achieved, consultative status with the UN (UN Economic and Security Council 
2014; UN 2000).  Thus, whilst the BNDP/ANC pursues institutional completeness in 
                                            
19 Assyrian National Congress of America v. Bureau of the Census, 3 March 2000, U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of California, which was dismissed on summary judgment 
October 5, 2000.  The ANC’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied 15 November 2000.   
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its local area of California, it simultaneously seeks political influence and national 
credibility to shape Assyrian nationalism across the diaspora.    
 
The BNDP’s origins represent an entirely different experience from the formation of 
the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM or Zowaa).  The ADM emerged from Iraq, 
the product of Ba’ath repression and displacement.  Its motto, ‘A free democratic Iraq 
and recognition of the Assyrian national existence’, calls to more pragmatic objectives 
of the Ba’ath era from which it emerged.  Such pragmatism proved attractive to those 
who were skeptical of a national pursuit or considered it unfeasible, as a member of 
San Jose’s ADM Chapter commented:  
 
I decided to get involved because, like I said, the only thing we have left for 
the Assyrians is really back home.  Everyone in the diaspora…we’re all going 
to go and melt…I wanted to help somehow, and this is the group that really - 
even though it’s a political group - it’s the only group that’s really working for 
our cause.  And the cause is basically very simple.  And that’s how they 
started: it was only a few handful of people, and they revolted in a way 
against the government of Saddam Hussein and went to the mountains…the 
only thing they were asking for is the recognition of the Assyrian identity or 
the ethnicity. As the Arabs are recognized, the Kurds are recognized, so 
should the Assyrians (ADM Interview).   
 
Here, both an understanding of the ADM as the legitimate remaining Assyrian voice 
in Iraq and as acting in furtherance of a simple, reasonable demand - that of ethnic 
recognition - are presented.  The ADM’s history as a persecuted institution further 
strengthens its reputation within the diaspora.  ADM supporters were targeted by 
Ba’ath authorities; its founders were murdered by Hussein’s regime, the martyrdom 
of whom is well-known amongst ADM supporters.  Yonadam Kanna, ADM’s Secretary 
General, was sentenced to death in absentia twice by the Iraqi government in 1984 
for charges of acting against the government.  The violent repression eventually led 
ADM into an alliance with Kurdish nationalists.  A faction of the ADM became 
militarized, fighting alongside the Iraqi Kurdistan Front against Iraqi forces following 
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the Anfal campaign.  ADM officials, including Kanna, were elected to Kurdish 
Parliament beginning in 1992, holding four of five Assyrian-allocated seats (Petrosian 
136-137).  This alliance was highly controversial amongst Assyrians who 
remembered the Kurdish history of attacks on Assyrian villages and participation in 
the Armenian Genocide; at the same time, such actions legitimized the ADM as a pro-
Assyrian entity literally on the frontlines against Hussein.   
 
The ADM’s position as an Iraqi-based organization was fundamentally different than 
the BNDP’s diasporic origins.  However, underscoring the importance of the diaspora 
and its resources, ADM established a direct presence within the American diaspora.  
Whereas the BNDP was able to embed itself into a key Assyrian population center 
through the provision of ethnic services and cultural events, the ADM faced a 
different challenge of integrating itself and attracting a dedicated membership while 
maintaining the supremacy of its central control in Iraq.  It established international 
party offices, including chapters in Michigan, Illinois, and California, whilst 
maintaining a centralized structure that allows chapters guided autonomy to engage 
with the local population and local officials (ADM Interview).  
 
The ADM’s structure emphasizes the transnationalism of the Assyrian community.  In 
essence, it recognizes the Assyrian nation is diasporic, acting under the pretense of a 
diasporic structure that can be tapped into, cultivating long-distance nationalism 
from its diasporic members towards political claims in Iraq.  It is foremost an Iraqi 
political party, and acts and responds as such: it pursues a diasporic network and 
engagement, but also attempts to avoid alienating Iraq’s larger Chaldean population.  
As one member noted, after the 2003 War, the ADM changed its policy regarding the 
Chaldean name in a direct effort to accommodate Chaldeans, recognizing the need to 
be representative of Iraq’s demographics (ADM Interview).  That democratic 
inclusion was central to ADM’s ideology positioned it as more able to cede 
recognition of Chaldeans than its counterparts.  Thus, whilst the ADM is a national 
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Assyrian party in the sense it seeks to represent the Assyrian nation and pursues 
policies on its behalf, it rarely uses the rhetoric of a territorial or separatist 
nationalism.  Its nationalism, rather, works within the confines of the Iraqi state and 
the KRG, rather than being confined by them - a tension encountered by the grand 
territorial rhetoric of the BNDP, for example.  
 
The ADM, as a political entity, pursues relationships with the U.S. because of the 
government’s sustained involvement in Iraqi affairs.  Kanna and other senior ADM 
officials meet with the State Department and Members of Congress who represent 
Assyrian populations; likewise, the ADM structure encourages its supporters and local 
officials to do the same.  It was through the success of diasporic engagement that the 
Bush Administration recognized the ADM in 2002 as an official democratic 
opposition movement under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (P.D. 2003-05).  
Simultaneously, as the next chapter considers, the Bush Administration began 
including Kanna in gatherings of the official Iraqi opposition as a direct result of 
diasporic lobbying.   
 
Additionally, while the ADM cultivated status as the preeminent Assyrian political 
party in Iraq, it expanded its reach after 1991 with the formation of the Assyrian Aid 
Society (AAS) to solicit diasporic financial assistance and administer humanitarian 
aid and reconstruction projects in Iraq following the Gulf War.  AAS was one of the 
first organizations recognized by the UN to help coordinate reconstruction projects 
and food and medicine distribution in the war’s aftermath, and later gained official 
UN consultative status in 2011 (Babella Interview; AAS UK Branch 2007).  AAS has 
since developed and administers Syriac-language schools in Northern Iraq and the 
KRG, the only such schools in either area.   
 
ADM thus pursues a measure of institutional completeness in Iraq through 
constructing Assyrian institutions, schools, and relief programs, and the American 
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diaspora aids in that process.  Yet it does not fully pursue a similar structure in the 
U.S. and its efforts are instead more targeted to supporting its Iraqi needs and 
political agenda, the foundation of which is a continued Assyrian presence in the 
atra.  It is strengthened by support from the diaspora, but its accountability lies 
within the Iraqi constituency from which it is elected.  Its success therein, 
consequentially, substantiates the ADM as an Assyrian representative to American 
policy-makers with whom it seeks influence.  Thus, ADM supports diasporic nation-
building by cultivating long-distance nationalism to Iraq, reinforcing the Assyrian 
nation is a transnational nation with a tangible homeland and offering an ideological 
and practical purpose for diasporic engagement.  
 
The popular appeal of these parties grew because they sought tangible change by 
actively contesting the Iraqi state for the rights of Assyrians in ways that the church 
or other diasporic organizations could not.  That members in the diaspora remain 
highly engaged in debating the merits of such political organizations speaks to the 
parties’ success in positioning themselves as harbingers of Assyrian nationalism; it 
further speaks to a desire of the wider diaspora to be politically involved.  
Nationalism and political demands provide ideological purpose for the nation and 
connectivity across the diaspora.  This marks a meaningful development in building a 
diasporic nation confined by yet transcending American borders.   
 
Chaldean Political Organizations 
 
The Chaldean community’s post-Iraq War development in many ways parallels that 
of the political organizing which occurred in the Assyrian community in the 1970s, 
compelled by external forces in Iraq and in pursuit of differing political ideologies.  
Yet Chaldean-specific political organizations - the Chaldean National Congress (CNC) 
and the Chaldean Democratic Forum (CDF) - appear disinclined to display a 
nationalism comparable to that found in their Assyrian counterparts.   
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Historically, like the Assyrian Church, the Chaldean Patriarch served as the 
representative of the Chaldean community.  Successive Patriarchs used their role to 
ensure the continued freedom of worship and safety of Church followers; in an Iraqi 
context, the Patriarch's role was not dissimilar from the advocacy undertaken by 
leaders of religious minorities in authoritarian states (McCallum 2007).  Unlike 
Assyrianism under the Ba’ath Party, a Chaldean movement to secularize 
representation and form political parties outside the Church did not develop.  Rather, 
following the removal of the Ba'ath regime, the community saw the Chaldean 
Bishops emerge to advocate for the rights of Chaldeans as an ethnic group and saw 
Patriarch Delly seek inclusion in the democratic and constitutional process (Bremer 
2006).  Activism has continued amongst Church officials regarding what they see as 
an absence of Chaldean representation: in 2012, for example, Delly issued a 
statement criticizing the ADM, stating Kanna, as an elected Member of Parliament, 
represents himself and the ADM only and could not speak for all Iraqi Christians 
(Chaldean International Congress 2012).   
 
Yet there is a shift within the Church regarding this role as Sako appears 
disinterested in questions of ethnicity and identity, despite leading the foremost 
Chaldean institution.  Although the Patriarch emphasizes the sectarian nature of 
Chaldeanness, other church officials continue to understand Chaldean in an ethno-
sectarian context, wherein both Church membership and ethnic criteria are salient 
boundary criteria.  As noted previously, this latter understanding is found in the 
narratives around Chaldean identity favoured by Bishops Jammo and Ibrahim, who 
have also acted as political advocates for Chaldean interests.  Ibrahim observed there 
is some tension within the Church over its non-spiritual role and whether the Church 
in the U.S. is becoming too political (Author Interview Notes 2013).  He rejected this 
notion, affirming that to talk about identity, nation, and traditions is an appropriate 
role of the Church and its leaders; that it is the Church’s duty to discover and share 
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the history and culture which are integral to the Church and the Chaldean people: in 
essence, it is the Church’s role to aide and sustain the Chaldean nation.  He felt those 
in Iraq who express concern over the secular influence of the Church do not 
understand the level of freedom in the U.S. and that the experience of the Church is 
different than the repression experienced in Iraq: here, they are ‘free to think’ (ibid).   
 
It was awareness that a Chaldean voice was absent in the lead-up to the Iraq War 
that the Chaldean National Congress (CNC) formed.  Ghassan Hanna, a co-founder 
and former Secretary General of the CNC, recalls of forming the organization: 
 
We created it as an identity, trying to get the Chaldeans into the policy, get 
the Chaldeans into feeling pride…And that’s how my relationship with Bishop 
Jammo was.  We needed a pride.  This group was disconnected.  You talk to 
them, they’re all calling themselves Arabs.  Those who live in Kurdistan say, 
“I’m Kurd.” They don’t know (Hanna Interview).  
 
The CNC called for unity within the diaspora and with the homeland; to support use 
of the Chaldean language, raise awareness of Chaldean history, and reverse the 
effects of Arabization; to support democracy and democratic principles of inclusion in 
reference to the looming Iraq War; and to ‘strive to rebuild national pride in our 
people’ (Chaldean National Congress 2002).  The use of ‘rebuild’ is interesting given 
the absence of a prior expression of Chaldean national pride and the recent evolution 
in thinking of Chaldeans as a nation: displayed here, rather, is an effort to unify 
Chaldeans through building an ancient historical narrative, a sign of a transition from 
creating historical and cultural narratives to building national claims around those 
narratives.   
 
However, while Chaldean identity has prevailed, the CNC itself was less successful 
within the Chaldean diaspora.  Hanna has since come to believe the weakness of 
Chaldean political institutions reflect the sectarian nature of Chaldean identity, 
suggesting nationalism ultimately cannot emerge from an identity built solely on 
 176 
religion (Hanna Interview).  To that end, he now feels the Chaldean identity will 
never be an ethnic identity because it is derived from a religious foundation.   
 
Of course, a counterpoint is that the very purpose of boundary development is the 
construction of an ethnic or national identity; ethnic identity is a social construct 
whose criteria are relational and fluid.  Rather, for a population frequently painted as 
politically disinclined, it is perhaps not surprising the first high-profile Chaldean 
political organization effort would not gain traction within the wider population, 
particularly without first creating nation-building institutions comparable to those of 
the BNDP, for example.  The CNC did not present a viable alternative to the political 
parties in Iraq, challenged by its newness, the absence of a structure able to engage 
the population, and competition against organizations that have spent decades 
developing their message and building support.  
 
Another effort would come after the Iraq War with the formation of the Chaldean 
Democratic Forum (CDF).  The post-war climate brought into contrast differing 
diasporic ideologies, enabling CDF to position itself as a pro-Chaldean voice 
concerned by the idea of a national territory or autonomy.  This has attracted the 
backing of the Chaldean Church and those who take a more ardent view of 
Chaldeanness, many of whom – although not all – believe Chaldeans are a distinct 
ethnic group.  Found within the CDF is Chaldean long-distance nationalism to Iraq in 
support of political rights as equal members of the Iraqi state; CDF also favours a 
strong diaspora to further protect Chaldeans as a distinct group.  This represents an 
ideology similar to the ADM, but at the same time exists in reaction to the ADM and 
Assyrian nationalism.  Rather than pursuing a political platform in Iraq directly, CDF 
seeks ways to support the development of Chaldean political parties in Iraq and the 
KRG.  Reflecting the significance of state borders, CDF instead serves as a voice on 
behalf of these organizations to the U.S. government and with Iraqi officials upon 
their visits to meet with American government officials and American diasporic 
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representatives (Barka Interview).   
 
Demands for Chaldean recognition against the Assyrian framework ultimately 
challenge the boundary definitions upon which the multi-denominational, ethno-
national Assyrian boundary was constructed.  In this sense, Chaldean demands for 
recognition represent a constriction of the Assyrian-Chaldean boundary.  This type of 
national assertion, without regard to territory or autonomy, is in a way characteristic 
of a quintessential diasporic nationalism.  Here, diasporic elites pursue nation-
building outside the traditional nation-state framework by which nationalism is 
commonly understood.   
 
Thus, the Chaldean community is beginning to undergo a shift from political 
engagement led by Church officials to emerging political actors and organizations.  In 
several respects, the interests of the Church and political parties are complimentary, 
as both seek to insert the Chaldean name into political discourse and generally seek a 
moderate, integrationist approach protective of liberal democratic rights.  Diasporic 
nationalism and long-distance nationalism are thus emerging in a secular context, 
generating political ideas and claims on behalf of Chaldeans in the U.S. as well as 
Iraq.   
 
ADVOCACY AND LOBBYING ORGANIZATIONS  
 
As seen in the last section, nationalism, like identity, develops relevance ‘during 
major political crisis when the institutional set-up of a society changes and new 
alliance structures might become politically relevant’ (Wimmer 2011: 724).  Changes 
to Iraq’s national boundary first presented an opportunity to renegotiate Assyrian and 
Chaldean inclusion; the exclusionary nature of the boundaries that resulted again 
compelled diasporic action.  Political activism arose from already-engaged individuals 
and organizations who saw the pressing need for a lobby structure to influence U.S. 
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governmental policy.  Two factors in the post-Iraq War context were essential to the 
presence of these organizations: the opening of Iraq’s political structure; and the 
nature of the U.S. political system as home to the diaspora, the administrator of Iraq, 
and its permissiveness of ethnic lobbying.   
 
As explored over the next chapters, the challenges facing activism are myriad.  
Challenges cited by theorists like Ogelman and Saideman of internal competition, 
inadequate organization, and disinterest were furthered by the organizational 
jockeying that, as Abbo outlined, lacked an avenue for selecting legitimate 
representation (Ogelman et al 2002; Saideman 2002).  Activism was directed 
primarily at the American government in part because of the U.S.’s involvement in 
Iraq, and largely because activists are Americans operating within the American 
political structure.  The limitation of their reach to Iraq reflects the reality of caging: 
state borders both make possible and restrict diasporic activism (Mann 1993: 250-
252).  Caging, in a way, forms an internal boundary within the transnational 
Assyrian and Chaldean nation, based upon the realities of citizenship and distance 
that curates different experiences between members of the same nation.  Moreover, 
diasporic activism reflects the peculiarities of long-distance nationalism, that activists 
who make political demands of Iraq do so on behalf of Assyrians and Chaldeans but 
are themselves unaffected by political outcomes and often possess no desire to return 
to Iraq – reinforcing, in turn, their role as American activists.   
 
The Iraq War consequentially saw the emergence of organizations that were 
politically-engaged but with a role different than the aforementioned political 
institutions: those dedicated to advocacy and lobbying the U.S. government, with the 
frequent purpose of advocacy on behalf of those in Iraq or displaced from Iraq.  
Unlike nationalist political organizations, their goal is not to shape the opinion of the 
diaspora, but simply to shape policy outcomes.  Interestingly, despite the absence of 
Chaldean-named political and advocacy organizations, Chaldean advocates have 
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been successful in orchestrating advocacy efforts with the U.S. and Iraqi 
governments, and at times have exhibited stronger influence than their Assyrian 
counterparts.  In part, this is because advocacy is assumed by existing community 
leaders who often possess existing ties to local elected officials as constituents and an 
important electoral demographic (T. Smith 2000).  Moderate Chaldean voices, the 
most politically successful, found common political ground with Assyrian interests, 
particularly regarding the need for liberal democratic rights and an administrative 
region for Iraq’s Christians; by contrast, the most ardent-Chaldean voices are less 
organized politically.  The contrast between the communities, in this sense, is less 
dichotomous as an Assyrian-Chaldean wedge, but rather is shaped by political aims, 
differences in long-distance nationalism, and different responses to boundary shifts.  
 
Assyrian Advocacy  
 
The post-war climate demonstrated long-distance Assyrian nationalism exists, and 
not just within the old guard of 1960s-era organizations.  A range of organizations 
sought the mantle of political activism as diasporic activists formed new 
organizations to lobby the U.S. government on behalf of Iraqi Assyrians.  The AANF, 
for example, aimed to represent the American-Assyrian voice, citing its membership 
as a mandate to represent the diaspora, a position challenged by objections from 
non-affiliated organizations (Jatou Interview).  Other successful organizations like 
the humanitarian-focused Assyrian National Council of Illinois (ANCI) encourage 
Assyrian participation in politics, but are precluded by their missions from working as 
political organizations.  The aforementioned, BNDP-affiliated ANC serves as an 
advocacy organization, lobbying congressional and State Department officials on 
behalf of the nationalist goals of the ANC/BNDP.   
 
The first Iraq War-era advocacy-related organization was the Assyrian National 
Coalition, formed to present an outwardly unified voice for Assyrian interests to the 
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American government and Iraqi opposition.  Representing an agreement between the 
ADM, AUA, and the Assyrian Democratic Organization, a Syrian-based political party 
whose diasporic support came primarily from Europe, the organizations agreed in 
July 1999 to unite political efforts in planning for a post-Ba'ath Iraq (ADM et al 
1999).  Members noted the BNDP participated in unity discussions but ultimately 
chose to withdraw from cooperation.  The impetus here was not a unifying ideology 
but pragmatism in response to outside feedback that too many voices claiming to 
represent Assyrian interests negated the ability of any voice to garner meaningful 
attention.   
 
The Assyrian Coalition was further supported by the Assyrian American League 
(AAL), created by Ronald Michael, an Assyrian surgeon from Chicago, with the 
guidance of former Congressman Michael Flanagan, a D.C. consultant and Michael’s 
long-time friend, as the AAL’s lobbyist (Flanagan Interview).  The AAL presented 
itself as a national lobbying effort that was ‘independent but solicits input from all 
Assyrian organizations’ (Michael 2003).  The AAL served almost exclusively in an 
advocacy capacity and did not engage members of the diaspora beyond seeking 
contributions to pay for its lobbying effort.  Neither the Assyrian Coalition nor the 
AAL lasted far beyond the Iraq War.   
 
The outbreak of sectarian conflict likewise saw a reactionary formation of 
organizations whose specific purpose was to serve as an ethnic lobby.  Most 
prominent among them included the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project (ISDP), 
formed in 2005 by the Assyrian Academic Society as a think tank in Washington, 
D.C., headed by Michael Youash, with the singular goal of developing research and 
policy for decision-makers to use in furtherance of Assyrian autonomy in Nineveh 
(Taimoorazy Interview; Jatou Interview).  It was, at the time, the only such 
organization creating policy research for Assyrian issues.  The Assyrian American 
National Coalition (AANC) was formed as a lobbying arm to compliment the ISDP’s 
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think tank and drive policy-makers to support an administrative unit within the 
confines of the new Iraq constitution (Abbo et al Interview).  Here, the effect of 
political and state boundaries was apparent: the ISDP and AANC recognized they 
could only support policy that was not in conflict with American or Iraqi law, which 
left the ADM’s political platform as the only democratically-elected Assyrian voice in 
Iraq (ibid). 
 
Political and ideological competition within the diaspora caused concern that ISDP’s, 
and subsequently the ADM’s, policy position could be overshadowed by other 
organizations.  The perception was that pro-Kurdish influences, and sometimes pro-
Chaldean organizations, were better funded and therefore better connected, and 
ISDP and AANC needed to put forward strong, substantiated policy arguments and 
mobilize grassroot support to counteract this trend:  
 
The pro-Kurdistan faction within the Assyrian and Chaldean communities had 
a lobbying voice and a lot of money.  And our response to that was, we don’t 
need money, we need voters.  So we became a grassroots organization, where 
I don’t care if Joseph Kassab can write a check for $10,000, I want to be able 
to get 1,000 constituents to vote someone in.  And that, we felt, was more 
precious to a Congressmember than a check.  So, we really did the power of 
the people concept.  Because we can’t compete financially.  We couldn’t 
(Abbo et al Interview).   
 
Highlighted is the significance of financial matters, an often unmentioned but 
integral component of the political process, and the different lobbying strategies 
organizations develop in consideration of these factors.  Although ISDP was the only 
think tank-type organization in the Assyrian diaspora, it was established as a short-
term project and was not active beyond 2011 (Jatou Interview).  AANC remains 
somewhat active in lobbying Congress for targeted ways to support the Nineveh 
Plain; however, like most diasporic political organizations, it remains a volunteer-
driven effort.   
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Thus, opening of the Iraqi political system gave another layer to elite competition.  
The U.S. government experienced firsthand the inter-organizational competition 
amongst Assyrian political actors when it sought to revive the Iraqi National Congress 
in 1999: 
   
“They have dozens of organizations, and they all hate each other," said an 
exasperated U.S. official. Last fall, when the Iraqi opposition assembled its 
warring factions for a CIA-backed convention in New York, Washington made 
sure five seats were reserved for Assyrians..."Unfortunately, we had 16 groups 
demanding those seats," said the U.S. official. "Nobody was willing to give in. 
It was a nightmare” (Goldberg 2000).  
 
The context of the looming war was significant to diasporic engagement as much as 
the willingness of U.S. policy-makers to engage with the diaspora, and 
consequentially furthered elite competition over diasporic representation, as well as 
ideological competition over policy aims.  The opportunity to affect policy in the 
homeland provided an opportunity for diasporic elites to pursue power outside of the 
diaspora and influence state action directly, underscoring the politically-driven 
nature of nationalism.    
 
Thus, over the past century, the Assyrian diaspora has undergone a diversification 
and professionalization of its institutions.  Whilst Dinkha advocates with the U.S. and 
international leaders as the representative of the Church of the East, the singular 
influence of Shimun in the post-WWI era subsided and Assyrian actors, pushed by 
circumstances in Iraq, saw a need for political leadership to protect the Assyrian 
nation.  The parallel of the Ba’ath era to the Iraq-War era is notable, as changing 
boundaries again spurred activism within the diaspora over contested notions of 






At the time of the Iraq War, with the absence of a concerted Chaldean political 
presence, two main trends emerged from within the diaspora: the Church continued 
its role as a principle advocate, and existing organizations expanded their mission to 
include political advocacy.  Chaldean advocacy was therefore often undertaken by 
the same individuals involved in civic institution-building.   
 
The Chaldean Church unsurprisingly continued to advocate for Chaldeans, carrying 
its advocacy regarding the humanitarian toll of the Gulf War and international 
sanctions to advocacy regarding the humanitarian toll of the Iraq War.  Political 
engagement was also used to seek political recognition of Chaldeans as an ethnic 
group from the American and later Iraqi governments.  Hanna worked with Jammo 
and Ibrahim in the quest to achieve Chaldean recognition as a distinct ethnic group 
in the 2000 U.S. Census, the first official quest for the American government to 
recognize a Chaldean ethnic boundary.  Sengstock, who provided testimony in 
support of the effort, recalled that the initial barrier was the Census Bureau’s 
understanding that Chaldean was a religious designation, not an ethnic one (Author 
Interview Notes 2012).  The debate and posturing herein would foreshadow the 
contestation over Chaldean recognition in the Iraqi constitution.   
 
Additionally, advocacy emerged from community leaders.  Joseph Kassab, then-
Executive Director of CFA, reflected that he began to increase the organization’s 
political engagement out of necessity: 
 
CFA had never been a political organization until I myself walked into it [in 
2005], and we tried to put images that it is not only a civic organization 
doing all the social and humanitarian work, but you also need to add to it 
some of the political work in order to have some success in the humanitarian 
and the civic work.  Without it, you cannot achieve that.  So that’s why we 
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developed this relationship with our friends in the Congress and the Senate 
and Europe (Kassab Interview 2012).  
 
Likewise, the Chaldean Chamber, which had cultivated governmental relationships 
regarding economic and business issues, expanded its advocacy to include foreign 
and domestic policy matters related to finding long- and short-term solutions for 
Christians displaced from Iraq.  The politicization of community organizations has 
led activists to see their organizations as a counter-balance to the Church’s political 
role.  As Manna noted: 
 
I personally think we need strong organizations like the Chamber, our 
Foundation, the Federation, at least to balance our church, because the 
church has led everything.  They say they don’t want to get involved in 
politics, but they do.  And that doesn’t necessarily mean we’re on the right 
track (Manna Interview 2012).  
 
The Chamber has come to possess a significant political presence: as Rudy Hobbs, 
then-Michigan State Representative, noted:  
 
The Chamber, without a doubt, is the most prominent Chaldean organization.  
It has the Foundation, it has CASCA, it represents a ton of small businesses.  
It’s out there building relationships and pursuing policy in ways that no other 
Chaldean organization has yet - at least not that I’ve come across (Hobbs 
Interview 2013).  
 
The Chamber’s success in building relationships with Michigan’s elected officials and 
the Obama Administration was likewise volunteered in several interviews with 
community leaders as an example of ways in which community leaders are politically 
active.  In this sense, the Chamber and its associated institutions have built 
legitimacy within the diaspora to represent their interests, and have professionalized 
their advocacy to cultivate favourable relationships with elected officials.  
 
In 2006, in response to continued feedback from the State Department that the 
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community needed a coherent voice, the Chamber and CFA joined with two leading 
Assyrian organizations, AANF and ANCI, to create the Chaldean Assyrian Syriac 
Council of America (CASCA) as a politically-focused nonprofit dedicated to pursuing 
community interests with the American, Iraqi, and Kurdish governments and the 
international community, specifically the formation of an autonomous region in the 
Nineveh Plain (CASCA 2008).  Kassab, who helped found the organization, noted 
this was one of the first efforts to bridge Chaldean and Assyrian organizations 
(Kassab Interview 2012).  The Assyrian organizations soon withdrew their 
memberships over differences in policy and implementation; the remaining 
leadership is largely Chaldean, although not exclusively as long-time Assyrian 
activists like Robert DeKelaita remain involved.  In 2013, the Nineveh Council of 
America (NCA) was formed to serve as CASCA’s lobbying arm, much of which is 
managed by Manna.  
 
Detroit’s Chaldean leadership is thus formative to creating and giving voice to 
Chaldean political goals.  The successes or lack thereof of its endeavors is likely to 
impact the fate of Chaldeans as a diaspora.  Hanoosh noted that Detroit is ‘home of a 
Chaldean elite whose powerful political and cultural influence has given shape and 
articulation to a modern collective Chaldean identity that resonates worldwide’ 
(Hanoosh 2008: 227).  While this is perhaps an overstatement of political prowess, 
Chaldean political engagement solidifies the presence of a Chaldean identity and is 
increasingly equipped to articulate the existence of its identity.  As noted in the 
preceding section, the perception of a strong, well-resourced Chaldean lobby is 
shared by others in the diaspora.  Elite competition to represent the diaspora is 
therefore present amongst Chaldean elites and between Chaldean and Assyrian 
elites.    
 
Advocacy in San Diego took similar form, headed by Jammo and civic leaders.  
Arabo, for example, led a coalition that demanded El Cajon’s then-mayor resign 
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following the aforementioned negative comments regarding the area’s Chaldean 
residents.  The coalition was comprised of community members and elected officials, 
including Congressman Juan Vargas, Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez, and State 
Senator Ben Hueso (Stickney and Fry 2013).  Although a local issue, success in 
pressuring the Mayor to resign suggests that the Chaldean voice can be heard in San 
Diego through non-traditional means of ethnic organizing: in this case, utilizing 
professional and economic influence.  The role of diasporic elites has become more 
pronounced as sectarian conflict in Iraq has reemerged and community leaders seek 
political and media attention to the crisis, tapping into political and social networks 
developed through civic engagement.   
 
Arabo finds disunity to be a primary barrier to cultivating a more comprehensive 
Chaldean political voice.  He indicates a solution is to improve messaging and 
diasporic unity through traditional means of organizing and working to elect 
Chaldeans to political office in the U.S.:  
 
It all comes down to our weakness of our global fragmentation as a 
community.  We’re not united. Locally, you come to San Diego, we’re united.  
Michigan, we’re united, especially if there’s a crisis, we come together.  
Globally, we’re not united.  And that’s why we’re saying, well if you get 
Chaldeans to embrace their heritage, get them into elected office, and when 
they get up the channels, as long as they don’t forget where they came from, 
they will be our voice.  Right now we don’t have a voice that says, hey, you 
know, this is wrong…. We’ve gotten a lot of help from the Jewish community.  
They’ve been a huge, huge, huge asset and we would not nearly get as far as 
we did without them…It comes down to that basic principle of unity and 
same messaging.  So we have a long way to go, but we’re resilient, we’re 
survivors: we’ll get there (Arabo Interview).   
 
Presented here is a long-term strategy of diasporic nationalism.  In lieu of direct state 
power, politics provide an avenue for diasporic members to access and influence the 
state on behalf of diasporic issues.  Politics also provide a means for elite competition 
over diasporic leadership to play out.  Additionally, as found within understandings 
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of diasporic nationalism and institution-building, there are elements of modeling 
diasporic strategy after successful diasporas, in this case working with Jewish 
activists to develop strategies for more effective political engagement.  Reinforced is 
the role of diasporic elites in planning for the diaspora’s future and cultivating long-
term political goals.   
 
Shifts in Iraqi and domestic boundaries make the Assyrian and Chaldean boundary 
more salient, underscoring the transnational and local natures of diaspora.  As 
evident by post-war developments in Chaldean institution-building, the diaspora 
underwent considerable growth in response to the war’s aftermath.  A connection 
between institutions and advocacy is therefore apparent.  Strong diasporic 
institutions enabled a foundation from which individual advocates could stand and 
make political claims, backed by the weight of those institutions, their roles within 
the community, and the personal relationships they established with policy-makers.  
While perhaps counterintuitive in a political system that is driven by professional 
lobbies, this has nonetheless been successful in raising the political profile of the 
Chaldean community in a relatively short period of time.   
 
CONCLUSION: LOCALISM, NATIONALISM, AND STATE CAGING IN 
DIASPORIC FORMATION 
 
Through both experiences, there is a narrative common to the ways in which 
Assyrian and Chaldean nation-building evolved.  Diasporic elites negotiate 
boundaries, cultivate national ideologies, shape diasporic and long-distance 
nationalism and the political goals that accompany nationalism, and lobby the 
government, mobilized to do so by changing Iraqi boundaries that affect the 
homeland population and by extension the diaspora.  A correlation is seen between 
the degree of institutional completeness achieved and the resonance of Assyrian or 
Chaldean identity in a local population: institutions help make diasporic boundaries 
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and develop a national consciousness.   
 
Boundary-negotiation and institution-building are the constant work of diasporic 
elites.  Observed within the diaspora, in regard to Abbo’s quote at the beginning of 
this chapter, are multiple efforts to create mechanisms to legitimize leadership and 
ideology.  Political contestation absent a government or clear political structure 
instead takes place amongst diasporic organizations.  Elites cultivate institutions and 
exercise political demands as part of American society: they aim to integrate whilst 
preventing cultural disappearance.  To this end, elites pursue a strategy of boundary 
shifting rather than individual boundary crossing, hoping to integrate the diaspora as 
a recognized group that retains elements of its culture, language, and enough 
difference to give the diasporic boundary relevance.   
 
In both populations, the ethnic church served as an early delineation of diasporic 
boundaries; however, this also facilitated an intra-ethnic boundary defined by church 
membership.  Community members were frequently reliant upon the churches and 
their organizational frameworks to bring people together, provide humanitarian 
services, relay history, and preserve the language when no other structure existed - in 
short, to assume responsibility for building a nation in diaspora.  However, early 
differences were apparent as the Assyrian boundary adapted to capture all aspects of 
the geographically and religiously diverse Assyrian migrations.  Civic and political 
organizations emerged to provide a more institutionally-complete framework and 
create a secularized Assyrian boundary.  Secular institutions emerged in the 
Chaldean community, but were not accompanied by a secularization of Chaldean 
identity; rather, ethnic and cultural criteria were added to the existing sectarian 
boundary.   
 
Intra-diasporic boundary tightening between Assyrians and Chaldeans was aided by 
the distinct concentration of Chaldeans in Detroit.  The Detroit community possessed 
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a mutually-reinforcing structure through interconnected church, humanitarian, and 
cultural organizations and a niche economic role that lent itself to boundary 
formation as Chaldeans in relation to Detroit’s multiple ethnic groups.  The San 
Diego community, although smaller and newer, appears to parallel this development, 
and much of its boundary-shaping is subsumed by the Church, Church-affiliated 
institutions, and well-connected individuals.  The absence of national and political 
institutions, in contrast to the Assyrian community, enabled elites representing 
business and civic organizations to assume a political role.  To a degree, this 
evolution has reinforced prevailing cultural assumptions of Assyrians as nationalists 
and Chaldeans as integrationists.  As occurred in the Assyrian community, a 
negotiation between the role of Church leadership and the necessity of secular 
leadership is arising, a negotiation that is perhaps harder to resolve because of the 
unique role of the Chaldean Church to Chaldean identity.   
 
A shared theme in Chaldean and Assyrian civic institution-building in the late 20th 
century is the correlation between nationalism, political mobilization, and the 
situation of co-ethnics in Iraq.  In the Assyrian community, nationalism was triggered 
by the turmoil of the Ba’ath era and reinforced by the Iraq War; in the Chaldean 
community, its emergence came more gradually out of necessity following the war, 
and, as such, may still be emerging and evolving, negotiating understandings of what 
it means to be Chaldean.  
 
Diasporic institutions thus provide multiple layers to engage members of the 
diaspora.  To this end, organizations serve three key purposes in boundary-making: 
they provide alternative means for leadership or ideology of the diaspora to be 
contested; they provide reiterative levels to capture diasporic members not engaged 
with the prevailing institutional structures, from professional organizations to 
cultural clubs; and they provide ways for people to come together and remain 
connected.  The overriding motivation in doing so is to forestall assimilation and to 
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build an atra intermixed within American society.  In this sense, the nation is not a 
territorial state nor an autonomous subunit, but more akin to Anderson’s imagined 
community, bound together by shared kinship and cultural traditions.  It is 
fundamentally local, formed and sustained through interaction with local 
communities, and fundamentally transnational, projecting nationalism across the 
global diaspora and to the homeland, acting in response to political shifts that 
threaten the diaspora elsewhere in the world.  Evident is the importance of state 
location: the American context shapes the initial formation of the diaspora, the 
ability to retain ethnic identity and cultural elements and to create social boundaries; 
and it shapes the future of the diaspora, both the assimilation that threatens 
disappearance and the means to counteract assimilation through a civil society 
permissive of institution-building and political advocacy on behalf of the local and 
Iraqi populations.  This ongoing process of diasporic nation-building is thus driven by 




CHAPTER V  
   
THE PRECARIOUS CHOICE TO ASSIMILATE OR FLEE:  
THE DIASPORIC NATION AS TRANSNATIONAL  
 
‘In modern-day Iraq, Chaldeans have three choices: either convert to Islam, which they 
don’t do; leave the country, which a lot of them did; or get killed, which some did. 
Too many.’  
-Mark Arabo, President and CEO, Neighborhood Market Association (Interview 2013) 
   
The Iraq War was premised on the brutality of Saddam Hussein, his threat to 
international security, and the promise of America to do better: to implement a 
democratic government that guarantees the freedom, equal rights, and protections of 
Iraq’s citizens.  Hussein’s removal brought with it a tangible opportunity, for perhaps 
the first time since the formation of the Iraqi state, for democratic governance.  For 
Assyrians and Chaldeans, this marked a fundamental redefinition of Iraq’s national 
boundaries.  Diasporic actors saw boundary shifts as a long-awaited opportunity for 
recognition as a people with linguistic, cultural, and religious rights and as equal 
members of the Iraqi state.  Although the rhetoric of American officials rarely 
mentioned Iraq’s Assyrians and Chaldeans by name, the Bush Administration’s vision 
of a liberal, inclusive state echoed the long-standing hopes of this population.20 
 
The Iraqi state and the coalition government, however, would not prove to be so 
accommodating.  Assyrians and Chaldeans fought to interject their aspirations into a 
national contest that was already outside their reach.  Such contestation would later 
manifest into violent conflict, fueled by a general climate of impunity that both 
neglected the meaningful inclusion of Assyrians and Chaldeans into a post-Ba’ath 
Iraq and neglected the consequences their populations suffered.  Iraq’s social and 
national boundaries would not become more inclusive, but close around definitions 
of religion and ethnicity that Assyrians and Chaldeans did not possess.  There are 
                                            
20 War memoirs of Bush Administration officials are notably absent mention of the Christian 
plight in Iraq (see, for example, Rumsfeld 2011; Rice 2011). 
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thus two stages of involvement for the American diaspora: the removal of the Ba’ath 
regime and the boundary opening it presented; and after ethno-sectarian conflict 
constricted Iraqi boundaries.  The responding courses of action were uncertain and 
prompted questions of helping refugees to emigrate or to return to Iraq, of focusing 
on democracy or autonomy.  Such debate continues through today alongside the 
omnipresent threat of renewed conflict.   
 
The totality of the diaspora’s efforts encompass national goals of securing their rights 
and necessary goals of responding to an immediate crisis.  Gellner, in his blunt 
description of a nationalizing state, outlined three options available to a nation’s 
minorities: assimilate, flee, or be killed (Gellner 1983).  The diaspora pursued three 
independent but interrelated strategies which paralleled these options: to secure 
liberal democratic rights and the enforcement of those rights; to aid refugees and 
allow them refuge in the U.S.; and to find a way to end the bleeding of their 
population from Iraq.  
 
Throughout this process, a central theme emerges: diasporic elites acting in response 
to changing Iraqi boundaries.  This chapter thus considers three stages of boundary 
changes and corresponding diasporic action, with special attention to how such 
changes affected policy goals and the understanding of the Assyrian and Chaldean 
nation.  First, it considers the lead-up to the Iraq War and mobilization of diasporic 
organizations, overwhelmingly Assyrian political organizations, to gain inclusion with 
the Iraqi opposition to shape the inclusion of Assyrians and Chaldeans in a post-
Ba’athist state.  Second, it considers the constitutional process and the importance of 
a well-designed democracy, liberal democratic rights, and recognition of the Assyrian 
and Chaldean national existence.  And third, it considers the push to increase refugee 
admissions in response to the worsening post-war humanitarian crisis, and the 
efficacy of Chaldean actors on behalf of this issue.   
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These events demonstrate initial diasporic demands were centered primarily on 
liberal democratic rights and protections.  It is suggested this focus was shaped by 
understandings of social boundaries in Iraq, in which assimilation was not a concern 
as it is in the West.  Rather, protection of ethnic and religious rights would sustain 
the Assyrian and Chaldean nation in a democratic Iraq.  Recognition ostensibly 
secured membership within Iraq’s national boundaries, not just as citizens but as a 
people, using the state’s laws to protect their inclusion.  Without recognition, the 
quest for rights to self-administration, language rights, or autonomy would have little 
to build upon: recognition is not a grand national goal, but it an essential one, and 
may not have occurred without diasporic activism.  
 
Boundary shifts in Iraq made ethnic identity amongst Assyrians and Chaldeans 
salient and correspondingly spurred political claims.  Assyrian demands, demands 
emphatically inclusive of Chaldeans and Syriacs, were shaped in an environment in 
which political recognition was centered upon Kurds as a dominant minority and 
Shia and Sunni as branches of the Arab majority.  Assyrian actors sought to define 
their population as a non-Arab, non-Kurdish ethnic minority, one with a unique 
culture, language, and history deserving recognition and protection.  It is likewise for 
this reason the Chaldean demand for recognition as an ethnic group emerged, led by 
the Chaldean Church: it was an assertion as a non-Arab population as well as a non-
Assyrian one.  
 
In contrast to Assyrian activism, Chaldean mobilization appeared most prominently 
in response to the post-war refugee crisis.  Elites reacted to contractions in Iraqi 
boundaries that violently pushed Christians from Iraq, creating a new wave of 
diaspora that was unrepresented and without anyplace else to go.  Demonstrated is 
the reach and impact of diasporic nationalism as diasporic elites felt a special 
responsibility to pursue permanent refugee resettlement in the U.S.   
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An important backdrop to this chapter is the political environment in which diasporic 
actors lobbied.  Political barriers between the U.S. and Iraqi governments blurred as 
the U.S. led the invasion and overthrow of the Hussein regime, became responsible 
for administration of post-war Iraq, and retained close military and political ties after 
official U.S. troop withdrawal.  Diasporic actors thus witnessed their state of 
residence take control of their homeland, seemingly presenting a unique opportunity 
for the diaspora to make direct political claims of its homeland.  Yet despite diasporic 
efforts, no such special consideration came from American policy-makers, and 
activists struggled for political recognition.  The diaspora’s experience demonstrates 
that a small, stateless diaspora is highly dependent on outside power structures - the 
Iraqi opposition, the American government, the new Iraqi democracy - and thus 
necessitated persistent activism. 
 
This complication of state borders questioned, however, the degree to which the 
diaspora should make claims on behalf of Iraqi Assyrians and Chaldeans who, for the 
first time in decades, had the opportunity to shape their own political future - a 
future nonetheless intrinsically linked with the future of the diasporic nation.  The 
limits of diasporic activism further demonstrate the reality of caging: diasporic 
transnationalism is ultimately circumscribed by state borders, in a way creating 
internal diasporic boundaries.  States of residence affect culture, languages spoken, 
and citizenship, distinguishing diasporic experiences from each other and the 
homeland.  The effects of this are evident by the measured political demands put 
forth by American diasporic actors, and the reality few in the American diaspora saw 
the advent of a democratic Iraq as a homecoming opportunity, but rather as an 
opportunity as Assyrian and Chaldean Americans to advocate for their co-ethnics in 







THE LONG QUEST FOR POLITICAL INCLUSION 
 
‘Erin, honestly, you know, we could have done a lot. I called it the best opportunity of a 
lifetime, and we lost it…The Kurds, they gained a lot. There was a time in history that 
we could have gotten something for our people and we didn’t. And even our friends and 
allies, they didn’t help us.’  
-Joseph Tamraz, Assyrian Universal Alliance (Interview 2013) 
 
The earliest priority to emerge from diasporic activists was that of liberal, democratic 
rights accompanying official recognition of Assyrians and Chaldeans as an ethnic 
group or ethnic groups.  Ethnic recognition served a symbolic purpose as well as a 
necessary one: neither Assyrians nor Chaldeans had been recognized in an Iraqi 
constitution, reinforcing the image they were not fully or equally part of the state; 
and protection of their unique linguistic, religious, and cultural traditions relied 
foremost on recognition these very elements existed.  For those nationalists who 
aspired to some measure of autonomy, this too was first predicated on ethnic 
recognition.   
 
Diasporic groups quickly became aware the challenge this would present was 
compounded by rhetoric from the Iraqi opposition and American government that 
lumped Christians into a single, ethnically-ambiguous and implicitly-Arab entity 
whilst denying them an equal seat at the table to argue otherwise.  Worried this 
would foreshadow exclusion from a post-Hussein state, several Assyrian 
organizations collectively lobbied the U.S. government for Assyrian inclusion in pre-
war planning, an endeavour which ultimately spoke more to aspirations than 
outcome.  The pretense of a single Assyrian voice, however, was further driven apart 
by the rise of a voice for Chaldean recognition, led largely by the Chaldean Church.  
 
The opening of the Iraqi government thus presented an avenue for differing national 
ideologies to be contested, and marked the first real opening for diasporic activism to 
tangibly effect change in Iraq.  Any capacity for engagement at that period laid 
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heavily with the diaspora, particularly in light of the American government’s 
involvement in attempting to build a case for war and the absence of civil society 
under the Ba’ath era (Benjamin 2011).  The U.S. government pursued two avenues to 
plan for the transition to democracy into which the diaspora sought entry: meetings 
of the Iraqi opposition, a coalition of the leading anti-Hussein organizations; and 
planning committees, specifically the State Department’s Future of Iraq project.  After 
the time spent by activists to participate in the latter and attain inclusion in the 
former, the payoff was disappointingly limited.  The Department of Defense would 
essentially scrap the Future of Iraq reports and its cautions regarding democratic 
transition, and the new Iraqi government would remain dominated by the same 
individuals who headed the opposition and who possessed little attention for 
Assyrian and Chaldean issues.  This section thus explores diasporic mobilization as 
the potential for boundary change in Iraq neared.  
 
When Getting A Seat at the Table is Itself a Barrier 
 
In the late 1990s, growing discontent from within the American government and 
United Nations over Iraq’s failure to comply with UN weapons inspections created an 
environment for the U.S. government and Iraqi opposition groups to think 
realistically about how Hussein might be removed and how a new Iraq should be 
built.  Such a turning point began with the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) in 
1998 to provide funding to opposition groups, and positioning regime change as an 
official part of U.S. policy toward Iraq; Charles Tripp cites the legislation’s passage as 
tipping the scale in Washington toward bringing the end of the Ba’ath regime (Tripp 
2007: 267; Katzman 2003).  The Clinton Administration designated seven groups as 
eligible for funding for military assistance and training through the ILA: the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC), headed by Ahmad Chalabi; the Iraqi National Accord 
(INA), headed by Ayad Allawi; the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), headed by 
Masud Barzani; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talibani; the 
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Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI), headed by Mohammad 
Baqr al-Hakmi; the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM); and the Islamic 
Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) (P.D. 99-13 of 1999).  Aside from the Kurdish 
parties, which already operated in a relatively autonomous region protected by a No-
Fly-Zone, no minority organizations were granted ILA designation.   
 
In practical terms of what ILA funding was for and how it could be used, ADM was 
the only Assyrian organization that possessed something resembling a military and 
humanitarian infrastructure with the capacity to administer funds in Iraq.  At the 
same time, organizations that received designation similarly lacked capacity as 
organizations could not make ‘inroads into Iraq’s “shadow state”’ (Tripp 267; 
Katzman 5-8).  Yet designation aided the impression that said groups constituted the 
most important elements of the Iraqi opposition.  The inclusion of a seemingly 
frivolous organization like the MCM, which sought the return of the Hashemite 
monarchy to the support of very few outside the MCM, and the SCIRI and IMIK, 
which sought an Iranian-style Islamic revolution, was contradictory to the democratic 
message the U.S. government put forward.   
 
The feedback the Assyrian community received from Congressional representatives 
and the State Department alike stressed here and throughout these years that 
internal divisions and disunity presented a significant hindrance to their inclusion 
and ability to elevate their cause within opposition talks (Jatou Interview; Kassab 
Interview 2012; Nissman 1999).  There may be some hypocrisy in allowing a 
disproportionate representation of Kurdish organizations within the opposition whilst 
instructing Assyrians to present a united front, but given the small size of the 
Assyrian population, they found themselves with little leverage.  Thus, faced with the 
prospect of having no voice in the process, the ADM, AUA, and Assyrian Democratic 
Organization formed the Assyrian National Coalition to present an outwardly unified 
front, with the Assyrian American League (AAL) forming as an advocacy arm, to 
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pursue inclusion in opposition talks, recognition of Assyrians as a unique people in 
any future constitution, and the explicit protection of their rights within Iraq (ADM et 
al 1999).  The utility of the ‘Assyrian Coalition’ label was more a public show of 
multi-organizational support rather than representative of a particular national 
ideology.  
 
The decision of the BNDP not to participate with the coalition was unsurprising.  The 
BNDP, like many opposition groups, existed in relative isolation from Iraq’s 
geopolitics, focusing its efforts where outcomes were tangible: on the diaspora and 
institution building therein.  The BNDP identified itself in relation to and against 
other Assyrian organizations, and Dadesho built a reputation on his staunch 
nationalism.  Surprisingly, by 2002 the Assyrian Coalition began listing the BNDP 
amongst its members, citing Shimon Khamo as the BNDP’s head.  Public statements 
and meetings featured Khamo representing the BNDP, including the AANF 
Convention in August 2002 and the London Opposition Conference in December 
2002 (Zinda 2002a).  A lawsuit filed by Dadesho’s BNDP against Khamo ultimately 
forced Khamo to change the name of his organization to the Bet Nahrain National 
Alliance in April 2003, following which the new BNA faded from political 
involvement, its relevance perhaps less useful after the war and the transfer of focus 
to within Iraq (BNA 2003).  As such, Dadesho’s BNDP/ANC remained outside the 
coalition efforts.  
 
In line with a renewed focus on regime change, the U.S. moved to reconstitute the 
ILA-recognized but fragmented INC, an umbrella organization formed with U.S. 
assistance in 1992 to facilitate cooperation amongst opposition groups (Tripp 266-
267; Katzman 2-5).  In October 1999, the first opposition-wide meeting in seven 
years was held with an estimated 300 attendees, from which a seven-member 
leadership council and sixty-five member central council were selected (Middle East 
Intelligence Bulletin 1999).  Although the Clinton Administration stressed the 
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opposition was still developing, and several organizations did not attend, Assyrians 
nonetheless faced barriers to participation and lacked meaningful representation 
within the leadership council that formed: three Assyrians, including Emmanuel 
Kamber, were appointed to the INC’s Central Committee, but none received a 
position on the leadership council (Goldberg 2000; Zinda 1999; Nissman 1999).  
Assyrian activists worried they were already being marginalized and sought 
congressional intervention, and Representatives Anna Eshoo of California, Rod 
Blagojevich of Illinois, and Frank Wolf of Virginia21 wrote the State Department 
expressing concern that Assyrian were not given an equal voice and requested 
Assyrian inclusion in future deliberations about Iraq (AINA 1999).   
 
Several factors are notable at this stage: Assyrian political activists are highly aware 
of changing circumstances or the potential for change, and are consequentially 
jockeying for influence; the Chaldean community lacked a comparative level of 
political engagement or organizations to engage on its behalf; and Iraqi opposition 
groups were already moving to shape the state in their own national image, which 
effectively excluded Assyrians and Chaldeans from equal membership.  Fanar 
Haddad observed encroaching sectarianism was not the natural byproduct of Ba’ath 
removal, but a result of the failure to make state identity resonant: Iraq was not, he 
argues, a ‘house of cards’ kept standing by the brute force of authoritarianism; rather, 
sectarian contestation was driven by economic competition, external influence, and, 
perhaps most significantly, competing and contradictory myth-symbol complexes for 
cultural ownership of the nation (Haddad 2011: 2-3; 10).    
 
For Chaldeans who tended towards the apolitical, there was not an obvious reason to 
mobilize at this stage.  The rhetoric of Assyrian politicians and the Iraqi opposition 
                                            
21 Eshoo and Blagojevich represented the Chicago and Turlock/Modesto Assyrian and 
Chaldean populations, and Wolf, although not representing a significant diasporic 
concentration, frequently worked on behalf of Christian issues (Wolf Staff Interview 2012). 
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was democratically-focused, which Chaldean leaders supported.  The situation itself 
did not suggest urgency, but appeared as yet another performance of anti-Hussein 
discontent.  By contrast, that Assyrians were seeking involvement even if opposition 
talks could be another fruitless effort underscores that they already possessed 
national claims to make and institutional structures from which those claims 
mobilized.  The different stages of political activism are thus apparent in this period.  
 
The events of 9/11, however, produced an unexpected turn of the Bush 
Administration’s attention to Iraq and moved the idea of a deposed Hussein from a 
parlor debate to a seeming inevitability.  President Bush’s claim in his January 2002 
State of the Union that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea constituted an ‘axis of evil’ quickly 
renewed American engagement with the Iraqi opposition and escalated bureaucratic 
planning within the Administration (Bush 2002a; Clarke 2004: 272-274).  Assyrian 
activists resumed pressuring their congressional representatives for a voice in the 
process.  
 
Congressional engagement underscores that the Assyrian Coalition ably positioned 
itself as the quintessential representative of the Assyrian diaspora, building upon the 
fact Assyrians comprise an important constituency for Chicago-area representatives.  
In March 2002, Blagojevich and nineteen House colleagues wrote to the Bush 
Administration requesting ‘the need for official constitutional recognition for the 
Assyrian community as a distinct, indigenous people in any future Iraqi reforms’ 
(Blagojevich et al 2002).  The letter referenced the Assyrian Coalition specifically and 
their work for a secular, democratic Iraq despite the ‘systematic terror campaigns’ 
and assassinations of Assyrian political leaders orchestrated by Hussein’s regime.  
 
Activists also engaged Congressman Henry Hyde, who too represented a portion of 
the Assyrian community near Chicago and had become Chairman of the House 
International Relations Committee.  The AAL worked with Hyde’s office to advance 
 201 
the Assyrian issue within the State Department.  As Flanagan noted, the goal of the 
AAL, on behalf of the Assyrian Coalition, was: 
 
Principally to make sure that the American government was knowledgeable 
and cognizant of Assyrian interests before, during and after the 2003 
coalition invasion of Iraq…This level of advocacy with the United States 
Government exclusively was necessary because as the principle occupying 
power, the United States needed to make provision for the Christian 
community generally and the Assyrian community specifically in future rule-
making and treatment of the Iraq populace during the time before the Iraqi 
constitution was written and adopted (Flanagan Interview).  
 
Hyde wrote to the State Department in April 2002 expressing his concern for the 
future of Assyrians in Iraq and inquiring as to their treatment under the Ba’ath 
regime; the letter received a reply in May confirming awareness of Hussein’s 
Arabization policy, but stating ‘all Iraqis suffer under the current government’ and 
expressing confidence in the protections provided by the KRG and the commitment of 
Kurdish administrators to equal treatment for all religions and ethnicities (Kelly 
2002).  The State Department’s response, in short, was relatively dismissive of the 
Assyrian plight as non-exceptional to the struggle faced by all Iraqis.  The emphasis 
on Kurdish benevolence suggested the Administration lacked an historical context of 
Assyrian grievances as much as a current context of ongoing land disputes with 
Kurdish authorities.  The professionalization of the Kurdish lobby and its influence on 
U.S. policy-makers is a concern that would carry through to the present, fueled by 
Kurdish claims to the Nineveh Plain and the tense relationship that resulted.  
Flanagan noted, ‘the Kurds were absolutely the “favorite children” of the Pentagon’, a 
relationship that undoubtedly sidelined Assyrian efforts (Flanagan Interview).   
 
Assyrians were omitted from an Iraqi opposition gathering arranged by the State 
Department in August 2002.  Hyde again wrote Secretary Powell the day prior to the 
meeting to request an invitation be extended to Kanna, noting Kanna has been 
chosen by the Assyrian Coalition to serve as their representative.  The letter marks a 
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stronger use of language than Hyde’s March letter, stating: 
 
These people are not of Arab descent; they are Christian and are ethnically 
dissimilar from the other major groups in Iraq.  The Assyrians have been 
coalition partners of the opposition for nearly twenty years.  They mobilized a 
militia both before and during the uprising after the Gulf War, and maintain 
an armed observation force in Northern Iraq to this day.  They have paid their 
dues in blood and are entitled to the fruits of their efforts…It would be a 
mistake to start the process of determining the aftermath of Iraq without the 
representation of one of the most significant minority groups in Iraq (Hyde 
2002).   
 
The utility of the ADM’s armed struggle is clearly emphasized here as an asset to its, 
and by extension the Assyrian community’s, anti-Hussein credentials.  The message 
speaks to the Bush Administration’s ‘with us or against us’22 mentality: implicit is the 
contention Assyrians are entitled to be part of the post-Hussein effort not just 
because they are a minority with past grievances, but because they have fought 
Hussein for years. 
 
It appears at this juncture that the rise of the ADM to the forefront of Assyrian 
institutions was perhaps inevitable.  It possessed the strongest transnational ties with 
devoted American supporters and a military, political, and humanitarian network in 
northern Iraq.  This in turn presented the strongest argument for the ADM as the 
voice of the Assyrian community in opposition talks.  Additionally, and perhaps 
equally as significantly, the ADM professed a moderate ideology that coincided neatly 
with the goals of democratic inclusion presented by the Administration.  It lacked 
majorly divisive policies, such as autonomy and territorial claims that would spark 
immediate contention from the other opposition leaders, and offered a more neutral 
position than a nationalism in competition with Kurdish or Shia aspirations (Tripp 
                                            
22 This saying is colloquially used to describe the Administration’s mentality.  Direct sources 
include an address to a joint session of Congress: ‘Every nation, in every region, now has a 
decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’; and a press 
conference: ‘You're either with us or you're against us in the fight against terror’ (Bush 2001a; 
Bush 2001b). 
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246-7, 264-5; O’Leary and Salih 2005).   
 
ADM officials also engaged with the opposition directly to seek inclusion.  For 
example, in June, the ADM wrote opposition leaders protesting their exclusion, 
noting, ‘Assyrians are unable and unwilling to support any opposition group or 
envisioned future Iraqi governmental reform that does not entail the fundamental 
rights of recognition and broad-based fair representation’ (Assyrian Coalition 2002).  
The letter also warns against ‘token representation’ of Assyrians and stresses the 
Assyrian Coalition is the most representative body of the Assyrian community.  
‘Token representation’ likely referenced Kurdish parties who claimed their Christian 
members sufficiently represented the Assyrian community.  A product of the August 
meeting, however, was an agreement to host a conference of the extended opposition 
in London, to which Assyrians were invited and allocated three-percent of the total 
seats.  This totaled eight representatives of the 265 total participants, underscoring 
both the popularity of involvement and girth of the opposition (Zinda 2002b).   
 
To gauge their inroads into the Administration’s support, the mention of Assyrians in 
official statements and speeches took symbolic significance.  Bush did not mention 
Assyrians in his speech to the UN in September 2002, stating instead, ‘If the Iraqi 
regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including 
Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others’ (Bush 2002b).  Turkey’s interest in 
Iraq’s Turkoman community and the Bush Administration’s ongoing, albeit ultimately 
unsuccessful, effort to solicit Turkey’s support of the war undoubtedly facilitated 
mention of Turkoman.  Assyrians did not have an outside state to advocate on their 
behalf, another factor that played to their disadvantage (Kamber Interview).   
 
However, two days after the speech, Kanna was invited to begin participating in 
opposition meetings alongside the ‘big six’: the INA, INC, CMC, SCIRI, KDP, and PUK.  
The ADM’s press release celebrating the invitation stated it ‘represents the first 
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instance that Assyrians will participate in the more intimate and critical leadership 
cycle of major opposition groups’ (ADM 2002b).  Additionally, a month after the UN 
speech, Bush recognized Assyrians specifically in a national address, stating, ‘The 
oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, Shi'a, Sunnis and others will be lifted’ 
(Bush 2002c).  This language hardly represents a call for special rights, but rather an 
acknowledgment of ongoing oppression alongside the other components of Iraq.  
Still, official mentions mattered because it ‘put the AAL on the map with the federal 
government…Even DoD had to pay some attention after a manifest observation by 
the President of the Assyrians as an important minority’ (Flanagan Interview).  
Further, on 9 December 2002, the Administration officially extended ILA designation 
to the ADM, along with five other organizations, including another minority group, 
the Iraqi Turkmen Front, and the Free Officers Movement to which the BNDP was 
aligned (Katzman 10-11).23  ADM designation was credited to the urging of the 
diaspora, and provided the ADM with new standing entering the London Conference.   
 
The Assyrian London delegation, popularly referred to as the Assyrian G8, consisted 
of Kanna, who the G8 elected the principle Assyrian representative, and Yonan 
Hozaya of the ADM; Dadesho of the ANC/BNDP; Praidon Darmoo of the AUA; 
Nimrud Baito of the Assyrian Patriotic Party; Romeo Hakkari of the Assyrian 
Democratic Party/Bet Nahrain Democratic Party of Iraq; Emanuel Kamber of the INC 
and AUA; and Albert Yelda of the Iraqi National Coalition.  The delegation reflected 
the international scope of the diaspora as only Dadesho and Kamber were from the 
U.S.  The conference had few tangible outcomes, but affirmed in its official statement 
‘the need to guarantee [Assyrian] equality with others and the need to assure their 
legitimate national, cultural, and administrative rights according to a specific legal 
                                            
23 In June 2002, Dadesho, as head of the ANC, signed a cooperation agreement with the Free 
Officers Movement, a group of former Iraqi military officers, under the slogan ‘Iraq First…Iraq 
for all Iraqis’ and calling for a united, democratic, plural Iraq (Al Salhi and Dadesho 2002). 
Uncharacteristically for the BNDP/ANC, the agreement contained no mention of Assyrians 
specifically.   
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formula defined and enshrined in the constitution’ (Iraqi Opposition Conference 
2002).  Additionally, the statement recognized Assyrians amongst those who 
contributed to the 1991 uprising and called for eliminating the ‘racist and unfair’ 
policies the Ba’ath regime enacted against Assyrians, Kurds, Turkoman, and Shia.   
 
Receiving this level of recognition was meaningful to activists.  As one diaspora 
editorial noted, ‘For the first time since the creation of Iraq, Assyrian people were 
declared as a people with political, cultural, and administrative rights equal to all 
other factions of that country under one single historic identity, that of Assyrian’ 
(Zinda 2002a).  It was a long-awaited, albeit largely symbolic, first step.  
 
A secondary outcome of the conference was the designation of a sixty-five member 
Central Committee tasked with preparing an acceptable transition to a 
democratically-elected government in Iraq.  Two Assyrians, Kanna and Yelda, were 
appointed to the Committee.  The opposition’s urgency to form a government, 
arguably aspiring to secure themselves a place therein, would play out at the Central 
Committee’s Salahaddin conference in February 2003.  Eager for a post-Hussein era 
to begin, the attendees formed yet another committee, this a committee of six to 
prepare for a transitional regime that stopped just short of announcing itself as a 
provisional government (Katzman 12).  Representation within the opposition thus 
came full circle with five of the six-member committee having served as heads of the 
original unified opposition organizations: Talabani, Barzani, Chalabi, Allawi, Baqr al-
Hakmi; along with Adnan Pachachi, an Arab nationalist and exiled former Iraqi 
official.  For all the work of the Assyrian community to attain equal recognition over 
the previous years, for its success in gaining recognition by the Bush Administration, 
they found themselves back where they had begun, with the same individuals tasked 




When Chaldean Mobilization Appeared  
 
It is notable the above analysis rarely mentioned Chaldean organizations.  The 
contrast between Assyrian and Chaldean activism is highly apparent.  As Chaldean 
activists note through hindsight, reflecting characterizations of Chaldeans in relation 
to Assyrians, neither the diaspora nor the population in Iraq historically tends to be 
politically active: ‘We had a history as Chaldeans of being passive when it comes to 
being engaged in politics, meaning whoever’s in control, we’re very passive don’t 
want to make a lot of noise.  The Assyrians, on the other hand, are very nationalist, 
want to fight for their rights’ (Manna Interview 2012).   
 
Chaldean advocacy thus took longer to mimic the mobilization of Iraq’s other 
communities.  As the sense grew that war was inevitable, Saad Marouf, then-
Executive Director of CFA, and Bishops Ibrahim and Jammo wrote the Bush 
Administration in December 2002 to request Chaldean recognition, demonstrating 
the role of the Chaldean Church as a purveyor of a Chaldean ethnic boundary 
(Marouf et al 2002).  The basis of the Chaldean argument presented at this stage 
would be reiterated throughout Iraq’s democratization process: Chaldeans 
outnumber Assyrians in Iraq and therefore are as deserving of recognition.  
Chaldeans, like Assyrians, also suffered marginalization in Iraq, where their schools 
were closed, language rights diminished, and history lost to Arabization.  
Mobilization was spurred by concerns of boundary encroachment from the Iraqi 
opposition and fear of Chaldean disappearance.  While some Assyrian leaders argue 
the Church inflamed Chaldean identity for self-preservation, and certainly the Church 
had an interest in self-protection, the history of the Chaldean community in Detroit 
suggests Chaldean identity already was pervasive; it had just not been politicized.  
The Church’s response, rather, echoed that which was readily understood by Iraq’s 
other minority groups: a democratic Iraq brought opportunity to protect one’s 
identity by enshrining it in the constitution.  As Flanagan recalled, ‘It is far more than 
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a “name” issue.  These groups do not play well together and are always glad to talk 
about their numbers en gross but never work together in particular…[it] is a rift that 
is very apparent to the people involved’ (Interview 2014). 
 
In January 2003, Bishop Jammo issued his call for a Chaldean Renaissance, to which 
Assyrian nationalists responded critically.  The CNC cited such criticism as 
strengthening the merits of its cause, noting, ‘Taking advantage of the (till recently) 
absence of Chaldean political groups, and in an attempt to bolster their influence, 
Assyrian organizations engaged in wide acts of lies and deception by claiming that 
Chaldeans are somehow a “religious sect that belongs” to their small Assyrian 
community’ (Chaldean News Agency 2003a).  By dismissing Assyrians in the U.S. as a 
small population primarily from Iran, the CNC defined Chaldeans in contrast to 
Assyrians, drawing again upon the Chaldeans’ size and ties to Iraq to claim legitimacy 
and further constrict the Assyrian-Chaldean boundary.   
 
However, Chaldeans who went to lobby the U.S. government learned the 
government thought the Chaldean Church was pro-Ba’athist.  This presented a stark 
contrast to the ADM’s history of actively fighting Hussein’s regime.  Hanna recalled 
that as it became apparent war was inevitable, the need to combat the perception 
Chaldeans were aligned to Hussein’s regime was a primary motivation for the CNC 
and Church officials to meet with the Administration:  
 
We have a patriarch, Bidawid, who gave the impression to the American 
administration that he’s pro-Saddam.  And Saddam was sending him to 
several government official meetings, mediated with the U.S. bishops at the 
time about the embargo and all that kind of thing.  And I said, you know, the 
American administration thinks that the Chaldean Church is pro-Saddam, and 
we have to tell them that this fellow, if he’s doing it whether he’s under 
pressure or whether he thinks it’s better this devil than another devil, 
whatever his reason, the impression is there, and you need to open a door, 
and your position is to help the church, help the people (Hanna Interview).  
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The Administration’s assumption was shaped by then-Patriarch Raphael I Bidawid’s 
condemnation of the Gulf War and the sanctions that followed.  Like his predecessor 
Patriarch Cheiko, Patriarch Bidawid sought a favourable relationship with Hussein’s 
regime; however, as with many leaders of minority religions in autocratic societies, it 
is difficult to assume the extent to which such relationships are genuine or are 
designed to protect one’s faithful.  His tenure confronted an even more precarious 
political situation as the Iran-Iraq War’s aftermath and international sanctions 
drastically decreased the standard of living across Iraq.  Hussein, confronted by a 
weakening regime and rising Shi’a movements, became increasingly repressive, 
turning to his own tribal base for renewed support, and increasingly prone to 
diatribes against the ‘Christian West’, language that put Chaldeans at risk of 
retaliation from the regime and the growing Islamist presence (Saouli 2012: 121-
123; Travis 2010: 407-411).  Comments such as ‘Saddam gives us what we want, 
listens to us and protects us’ cultivated criticism of Bidawid as a Hussein apologist 
(Adenekan 2003).  The absence of an engaged Chaldean political party or diasporic-
wide advocacy precluded an alternative narrative from being put forward.  
 
The Chaldean community was divided in support of the looming war, but it would be 
false to equate opposition to Hussein loyalty.  The Chaldean Church, like the Catholic 
Church, opposed war and used its churches to communicate its opposition to its 
followers.  Ibrahim stated at the time, ‘I am asking the bishops of the United States to 
speak out strongly against a war--not only to issue a statement; a statement is not a 
big deal--but to speak out strongly from the pulpit, every bishop in his cathedral, to 
tell the people we should not go to war in Iraq at this time’ (National Catholic 
Reporter 2003).  Similarly, newspaper reports prior to the war noted the opposition 
of some Chaldeans to invading Iraq stood in contrast to the excitement for Hussein’s 
removal from many in the country’s Arab community (Cohn 2003; Walt 2002).  Most 
Chaldean emigration occurred under Hussein’s regime, and most of the diaspora 
openly opposed the regime.  Rather, their opposition cited possible repercussions 
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against Christians as a primary concern.  Anthony Shadid similarly found Christians 
in Iraq were especially fearful of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution (Shadid 2005: 
180).  Hanna recalls of meeting with Administration officials regarding such 
concerns: 
 
At that time, the main concern was, you know, being people from the land of 
Iraq, we know Islam better than anybody because we’ve lived and we’ve seen 
the other part…it looks at everybody as a religion…So if the Americans come, 
that means you’re going to be screwed because you belong to them.  And we 
were concerned from that backlash…And here, of course, they didn’t give a 
damn.  Absolutely.  They didn’t care.  That’s another experience.  So, that was 
our main thing that we want: if you guys are going to rebuild, we believe in 
you, but take care of our side.  Be willing to understand how things are, be 
willing to understand what you’re getting into (Hanna Interview).   
 
Notable was the impression at this early stage that the Administration ‘didn’t give a 
damn’ about potential post-war consequences, an opinion reiterated by many in the 
diaspora in hindsight.  To critics of the Administration’s handling of the war, the 
absence of meaningful concern for such outcomes coincided with its poor 
management of sectarianism.  It recalls an observation from Richard Clarke that the 
groupthink and disabuse of nuance that characterized the Administration meant it 
was unlikely anyone had a chance to argue war would both make the U.S. less secure 
and increase the lure of radical Islam within Iraq and perhaps the Middle East 
(Clarke 243-244; See also Al-Ali 2014; Galbraith 2006; Stansfield 2005).   
 
Although the CNC was a relatively nascent organization at the time, it nonetheless 
demanded prior to the Salahaddin Meeting that Chaldeans, ‘the absolute majority of 
the Christians in Iraq’ be included (CNC 2003a).  Echoing language used by the 
Assyrian Coalition, the CNC stressed the opposition, without Chaldeans, did not 
represent the true ethnic fabric of Iraq.  Indeed, over the course of their advocacy, 
Chaldean requests were almost identical to those of moderate Assyrians: Chaldean 
advocates echoed the same notes of democratic rights, indigenous rights, and 
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religious freedoms.  The utility of this argument, that a democracy must recognize 
and protect minority rights, is that it is difficult to envision a premise under which 
rights could be denied to Chaldeans whilst extended to Assyrians.  For Assyrians to 
contend that those who identify as Arab Christians or Kurdish Christians do not 
represent Assyrian interests, there is a difficult hypocrisy of arguing Assyrians 
represent Chaldeans against Chaldeans who claim otherwise.  The logic of the 
Assyrian argument for their own recognition unintentionally made the case for a 
Chaldean one.  Chaldean efforts effectively aimed to distinguish themselves as a 
separate ethnicity alongside, not under, the Assyrian ethnic umbrella.  
 
Chaldean advocacy resulted in a partial success at the Salahaddin meeting, after 
which Chaldeans were recognized in the meeting’s statement but, like the Assyrians, 
did not receive representation in the six-member subcommittee.  In the final 
statement, the last from the opposition before the war, the Committee reaffirmed:  
 
Iraq’s national unity on the basis of democratic, parliamentary, federal and 
equal citizenship to all Iraqis, be they Arabs, Kurds, Turkomens, Assyrians, or 
Chaldeans…A future Iraq will be for all: Arabs, Kurds, Turkomens, Assyrians, 
Chaldeans and other ethnic minorities (Coordination and Follow-up 
Committee 2003). 
 
Working with the opposition would only go so far because ideologies and national 
visions were already in place and were being contested amongst the opposition’s 
Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish factions.  The Assyrian and Chaldean fate laid in the hands 
of the U.S. and its willingness to insist democratic principles be upheld.   
 
Given the short period of Chaldean mobilization prior to the war, it was not obvious 
whether their advocacy was successful within the Administration.  At the Atlantic 
Summit on 16 March 2003 between the U.S., U.K., Spain, and Portugal, which set a 
deadline for the war that would begin three days later, Chaldeans were mentioned in 
the final declaration, which stated, ‘All the Iraqi people - its rich mix of Sunni and 
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Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and all others - should enjoy 
freedom, prosperity, and equality in a united country’ (Atlantic Summit 2003).  For 
the first time, those who would lead post-war Iraq symbolically recognized both the 
Assyrian and Chaldean communities as part of Iraq’s ethnic makeup.  However, the 
statement’s language simply follows the language used by the Salahaddin conference, 
and is not indicative of policy.  Without inclusion in planning discussions or Iraq’s 
new government, the ability to negotiate for Chaldean rights was largely negated.  
The American administrators to Iraq would demonstrate an unfamiliarity with the 
Chaldean population, indicating that the appearance of progress in the U.S. did not 
necessarily translate into progress in Iraq, a reality reflecting the disjointed 
bureaucratic preparation for Iraq’s democratic transition. 
 
The point of outlining the above efforts is to demonstrate how difficult it was from 
the beginning for activists to gain a meaningful seat at the opposition’s table, and the 
nature of early political demands.  Although expectation for stateless diasporas may 
assume the constant push for territorial autonomy, this was largely not the case: 
early Assyrian demands prioritized liberal democratic inclusion.  In part, this reflects 
that assimilation is not a concern in Iraq as it is in the U.S., and such protections in 
turn would enable a measure of nation-building within the homeland.  For Assyrians 
who worked for so long up to that point to be seen as a unique part of Iraq, their 
inclusion in the opposition, and recognition by the opposition and the Administration 
that they are indeed a unique nation in Iraq represents the success of their persistent 
advocacy efforts.  For Chaldeans who only began to claim an ethnic boundary, their 
recognition as a unique ethnic group represents a quick acceptance of a portion of 
their goals, but also a superficial one: their recognition would be undermined by the 
failure of meaningful inclusion.  Diasporic mobilization was thus responsive to 
pressures on Assyrian and Chaldean national boundaries: the Assyrian Coalition 
sought political engagement to rectify long-held grievances of being an unrecognized 
nation; the later Chaldean engagement sought to avoid marginalization by already-
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mobilized groups.  
 
THE COMPLICATED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
‘It’s true you get freedom, but you have to know how to use the freedom…In order for 
democracy to take place in a country like Iraq, it should have been spoon-fed; it should 
have been gradual.’  
-Joseph Kassab, Founder, Iraqi Christians Advocacy & Empowerment Institute  
(Interview 2012) 
 
The shape of Iraq’s democracy would prove consequential to Iraq’s future sectarian 
relations and the place of Assyrians and Chaldeans therein.  Once the Bush 
Administration set itself to the certainty of war, its departments began planning for 
the much-cited transition to democracy.  The State Department provided an avenue 
for diasporic involvement through its Future of Iraq project, which directly engaged 
Iraqi emigrants and experts in post-war strategy.  The questions raised throughout 
the planning process regarding the structures and institutions best suited to the long-
term presence of minorities remain highly salient to the current problems in Iraq and 
to understanding Assyrian and Chaldean marginalization.  
 
This section considers how Assyrian and Chaldean understandings of Iraq’s sectarian 
dynamics shaped their constitutional expectations, and how the opening of the 
political system led to contestation over Assyrian and Chaldean recognition as 
national components of Iraq.  Ardent Assyrian nationalists who for the first time saw 
the Assyrian name appear in an Iraqi constitution threatened to vote against 
ratification because Chaldean was listed alongside.  Significant is the continued 
contrast between Assyrian and Chaldean mobilization: whilst Assyrian interests 
remain represented by political organizations and by Kanna, who worked directly 
with the interim Iraqi government, Chaldean interests remain represented largely by 
leadership in the Chaldean Church.  Thus, national mobilization through the 
constitutional drafting process remains a continuation of its state prior to the Iraq 
War.   
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The Importance of Democratic Design  
 
The State Department convened the Future of Iraq group in April 2002 to bring 
together approximately 200 Iraqi emigrants who specialized in areas of law, 
education, human rights, the environment, and other areas relevant to planning 
(Schmitt and Brinkley 2002).  It was subdivided into seventeen working groups, 
fourteen of which met prior to the war.  The actionability of these plans varied 
considerably, from multiple strategic options for a transition to democracy to vague 
suggestions on public health; nonetheless, they collectively represent the only pre-
war planning that sought to both engage Iraqis directly in the process and address 
the comprehensive scope administering a post-Hussein Iraq would entail (State 
Department 2005).  The planning would later be discarded by the Department of 
Defense when it was granted control over post-war reconstruction instead of the 
State Department.  However, the project itself and the democratic debate found 
therein are significant.  
 
Assyrians and Chaldeans were well-represented amongst the participants, including 
Dadesho on the Civil Society Capacity Building Working Group; Kamber on the 
Democratic Principles and Procedures Working Group; Yelda on the Defense Policy 
and Institutions Working Group; Edward Odisho on the Education Working Group; 
John Kanno, an engineer who hosted a public affairs show on AssyriaTV, on the 
Economy and Infrastructure Working Group; and Peter BetBasoo, the co-founder of 
the online Assyrian International News Agency, and Ramsey Jiddou, a Michigan-
based Chaldean chemist, on the Water, Agriculture, and Environment Working Group 
(State Department 2005).  An AINA article, assumedly written by BetBasoo, 
applauded the strong representation of Assyrians in the project, suggesting it 
reflected the high proportion of Assyrians and Chaldeans amongst the Iraqi 
population in the U.S. (AINA 2002).  However, given that this argument would not 
carry in support of Assyrian inclusion elsewhere, it may also reflect the active 
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involvement of Assyrians and Chaldeans in public life combined with a simultaneous 
push from some Members of Congress to include Assyrian representatives in pre-war 
planning activities.  
   
The most significant debate to emerge from the Future of Iraq discussions and the 
Iraqi opposition talks alike, in terms of Assyrian and Chaldean interests, was the ideal 
structure of Iraq’s democracy.  The absence of a clear answer would fundamentally 
challenge the constitutional drafting process and the rush to complete the 
constitution left many issues unanswered that have since been polarizing to 
democratic progression (Al-Ali 2014).  The particulars of this debate are inextricable 
from that of the Assyrian and Chaldean place in the Iraqi state.  
 
The initial Democratic Principles and Procedures report demonstrates an 
understanding of minority issues, the risk of minority exclusion that could result from 
certain federal structures, and a mindfulness of an inclusive system, all of which 
would be comparatively absent from the post-war transition.  Here, the influence of 
Assyrian and other minority members of the group are apparent.  Kamber, reflecting 
on his work with both the Future of Iraq project and the Iraqi opposition, recalled, 
‘We were looking for equality, for democratic values, for the rules of law…I fought 
for [minority rights] to be included in the final report, and then later in the 
constitution of Iraq because we believed that the best way for Iraq to build a civil 
society is to be based on democratic principles and rules of law’ (Kamber Interview).  
Understood is the opportunity to reshape Iraq through remaking national boundaries 
inclusive of ethnic and religious minorities.   
 
Notably, the report stressed the need to develop civil society and civic institutions, 
which had been neutered under Hussein, and cautioned against holding national 
elections before allowing local government systems and political parties sufficient 
time to develop (NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq 2011; Democratic Principles 
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Working Group 2002).  This approach echoed that of theorists like Andreas Wimmer, 
Jack Snyder, and Donald Horowitz who contend the most likely way for a plural 
society to avoid ethnic or sectarian conflict in its transition to democracy is to first 
give society the chance to develop cross-sectional cleavages and a functioning civil 
society (Wimmer 2002; Snyder 2000; Horowitz 1985).  However, it soon became 
apparent from within formal discussions of the Iraqi opposition and the American 
government, particularly from the strong insistence by Kurdish parties, that it was 
likely Iraq would have a federal structure in which other nationalities are able to 
pursue a measure of self-rule.  This approach largely ignored Assyrians as a 
component of Iraqi society.  Kamber stressed that how Iraq’s government is 
structured consequentially shapes the place Assyrians must demand within it: 
 
If Iraq is going to be built on federalism, I think the Assyrians should have a 
region to protect themselves.  If it was a central government, then we don’t 
need to have that because we will have essential rights wherever we are.  But 
if there is federalism, then why not the Assyrians - they are living on their 
ancestral land – to have some protected area for themselves?...If you’re going 
to divide the country, you change the system, then the Assyrians should have 
a region too…Let the Assyrians live in peace and protect their language, their 
culture, their religion (Kamber Interview).   
 
This sentiment is indicative of the line walked by Assyrians navigating internal Iraqi 
boundaries.  Present is the belief Assyrian identity and culture are strong enough that 
the right to practice their culture and religion, teach their language, protect their 
land, and develop civic institutions, coupled with the staunch protection of these 
rights, is enough to preserve the community in Iraq.  There is less concern over 
assimilation in part because their Christianity continues to minimize the risk of full 
assimilation as found in Western countries, and in part because such protections 
would preclude another Arabization campaign by the next government.  
Fundamentally, Assyrians and Chaldeans in Iraq are not at the same risk of 
assimilation as Assyrians and Chaldeans in the West, as evident by the longevity of 
their presence therein; they are, however, at risk of marginalization and persecution 
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should society not fulfill its democratic promise.   
 
As Kamber noted, context matters.  The rights guaranteed to Assyrians in comparison 
to the rights guaranteed to other ethnic and religious groups is determinative of 
whether such rights will actually be guaranteed and protected.  Revealed here are 
two potential shapes a post-Hussein Iraq could have taken: a civic nation founded on 
diversity, inclusion, and universal rights; or a shared external boundary subdivided 
into iterations of separate ethno-sectarian nations (Mann 2005; Kymlicka 1995).  In 
essence, if Iraq were to have a strong central government that guarantees equal 
rights and the universal enforcement of those rights, Assyrian culture and language 
would likewise be protected.  However, if the Iraqi government were to be federated, 
a proposal championed by then-Senator Joseph Biden as Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, granting the Kurdish region special rights and 
creating a structure for Shia and Sunni regions to emerge, there is neither a sizable 
territory left where Assyrians constitute a majority to claim exclusively for 
themselves, nor an authority to guarantee and protect their rights and interests 
(Biden and Gelb 2006).  In the former scenario, democratic rights represent 
protection of Assyrians as much as all minorities in Iraq.  In the latter scenario, 
Assyrians would again be subject to the forces of assimilation, repression, and 
perhaps expulsion; there is no entity with a vested interest in or obligation to their 
protection.  Such a scenario is inherently detrimental to Assyrians because it allows 
Iraq to be painted as a country of three factions – the Shia majority, the Sunni 
minority, and the Kurds in the north – and overlook the presence of any other 
demographic.   
 
Also affecting Assyrian and Chaldean calculations was the Kurdish effort at boundary 
expansion through ethnic and geographical means.  Concern over such 
marginalization was exemplified by a draft constitution adopted by the Kurdish 
Parliament in November 2002.  The draft proposed a United Republic of Iraq 
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consisting of two federated territories: the Kurdish region and the remaining Arab 
region (Kelly 2010).  The arrangement reinforced a common worry amongst 
Assyrians and Chaldeans alike regarding their proximity to Kurdish nationalism and 
their survivability therein.  The draft language was especially concerning when 
considering the ADM participated in local and parliamentary government in the KRG.  
The ADM enumerated its objections, specifically that listing Kurds and Arabs as the 
two main nations while categorizing other nations as ‘national groups’ denoted an 
inferior status; further, the draft failed to specify the rights of national groups or 
provide any process of implementation of national rights; and, as was becoming an 
unavoidable point of contention, the draft identified ‘Assyrians and Chaldeans’ 
despite ADM objections to the ‘and’ as dividing the Assyrian Chaldean people (ADM 
2002a).  The ADM took particular offense to the failure to address Assyrian issues, 
noting that because of its membership in the Parliament, it hoped its colleagues 
‘would have taken into consideration the level of our alliance and long tormenting 
struggle as fraternal nations, the justice of our cause and the persecutions that have 
been inflicted on the Assyrian people over centuries’ (ibid).   
 
The Kurdish draft presented an early example of the countervailing national forces 
that Assyrians and Chaldeans faced.  The democratic system the Kurds proposed 
reflected ambitions for their own equal rights within Iraq on par with the Arab 
community, and for some semblance of autonomy.  Kurdish boundaries were defined 
in exclusively ethnic terms.  Theoretically this allowed room for religious freedom 
and practices within the region; however, as evident by the ADM’s response, this is 
insufficient to a people seeking recognition.  Moreover, as Assyrians were acutely 
aware, religious protections are only useful as long as the balance of ethnic to 
sectarian identity remains unchanged: a rising Islam movement, for example, could 
easily upend boundary criteria.  
 
Despite Arabization policies enforcing a common Arab ethnicity, Ba’ath repression 
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instead created dormant and repressed visions of ethno-sectarian entitlement eager 
to correct past wrongs and lay claim to the Iraqi state, drawing national boundaries 
that would come to be defined by sectarian identity.  As Haddad commented, ‘the 
sanctions-era was in essence the incubator of post-2003 Iraqi society’, cultivating raw 
and traumatized ethno-sectarian identities that would give way to ethno-sectarian 
claims to power (Haddad 1; Stansfield 141).  The post-Ba’ath government failed to 
make state identity more prominent and valuable than sectarianism: as Galbraith 
observed, ‘the fundamental problem of Iraq is an absence of Iraqis’ (Galbraith 2006: 
242).  Kamber found the planning and maneuvering of the other Iraqi opposition 
leaders reflected this:  
 
I break the silence when I was in one of the working groups in Washington, 
and then these guys start talking about all these Shia, Sunni, Kurds…I say, 
well guys, I am Assyrian too.  If you are going to talk about the Kurdish right, 
I need to talk also about the Assyrian right.  And this where, actually, all 
these democratic values and the dream of establishing a civil society in Iraq, I 
thought: it’s gone…All these groups, they were trying to control the 
government, and they hadn’t really thought that what we fought Saddam for 
years is the idea to have a democratic system, rule of law, control, rule of 
democratic election (Kamber Interview).   
 
Even at this preliminary stage, it was apparent the opening of Iraq’s political 
structure was encouraging mobilization along sectarian lines.  Outside powers were 
disinclined to correct for this through cultivating other, non-sectarian understandings 
of the state.  Zaid Al-Ali found the U.S. actively focused on developing a constitution 
and government along ethno-sectarian lines, negating what could have been an effort 
at unity-building as a multisectarian, multiethnic Iraq (Al-Ali 2014).  Thus, it is 
difficult to see how anything short of a strong outside or neutral hand in designing 
and implementing a political process that specifically sought to undercut these 
national and sectarian elements could have avoided sectarian conflict.  Even if 
Assyrians and Chaldeans had been better organized, more unified, or more forceful, 
they were without power or institutions capable of influencing the outcome.  As the 
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previous section addressed, to simply be recognized as part of Iraq and included in 
opposition talks required tremendous effort and resiliency: the barrier was not that 
these groups were simply without power, the barrier was also that those who held 
power were disinclined to help.  Evident is a correlation between elite action, claims 
to power, and boundary formation - and thus the necessity of sustained diasporic 
engagement.  The repeated barriers encountered to arrive at that point, coupled with 
Iraq’s historical legacy of undermining its minority communities, were blunt 
reminders that an outcome favourable to Assyrians and Chaldeans was not 
guaranteed.   
 
The Dilemma of a Comma: ‘Chaldeans, Assyrians’ As Iraqi Nationalities  
 
As envisioned by pre-war planning efforts, one of the criticisms of Iraq’s post-war 
structure is that it attempted to be a hybrid of centralized democracy and federalism, 
and, as a result, has become effectively neither democratic nor accountable.  This 
enabled a strong Kurdish region in the north, while Shia and Sunni factions and 
infighting dominate the central government, sidelining minority issues and 
protections.  This arrangement was precarious for Assyrians and Chaldeans: their 
requests for rights and better protections thereof went largely ignored because 
divisions and power struggles curtail the central government from operating 
effectively.   
 
The assumption that the State Department was going to oversee Iraq’s reconstruction 
proved erroneous, and the early planning done by the Future of Iraq group was 
essentially shelved.  General Jay Garner, the first administrator of Iraq, was to put 
together a team to coordinate between the various planning efforts from the State, 
Defense, and Justice Departments, which he described as being ‘done in the vertical 
stovepipes of those agencies’, lay the groundwork, and hand control of Iraq to a 
presidential appointee who would then continue reconstruction and transition power 
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to the Iraqis (PBS Frontline 2003).  However, almost immediately President Bush 
replaced General Garner with L. Paul Bremer III as Administrator of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (PBS Frontline 2006).  The diminished role of the State 
Department was consequential for Assyrians and Chaldeans as State officials were 
more responsive to and understanding of the community, whereas Defense officials 
‘couldn’t have cared less’ (Flanagan Interview).   
 
By many accounts, pre-war planning anticipated a prolonged war, a humanitarian 
crisis, and the possible use of chemical or biological weapons; when this did not 
occur, planning was not adequate to the environment encountered.  The early stages 
of Bremer’s tenure indicated there was an intent to allow society to normalize.  The 
seven-step plan Bremer previewed in the Washington Post stated bluntly, ‘At the 
present elections are simply not possible. There are no election rolls, no election law, 
no political parties law and no electoral districts’ (Bremer 2003).  His memoir further 
stressed the need to develop ‘shock absorbers’ that enable democracy to take root, 
from civil society to a free press to political parties (Bremer 2006: 19).  Powell urged 
the interim Iraqi government ‘to be fully representative of all Iraqis, north and south, 
Sunni, Shi, Kurd, Turkmen, and Christian’, with Bremer commenting that such a 
composite was ‘not going to be built overnight’ (Bremer 43).  
 
A calculated transition was soon curtailed by the Bush Administration’s desire to 
transfer power and end its non-military role in Iraq.  Negative domestic and 
international public opinion grew with escalating conflict, attacks on U.S. forces, and 
the ever-growing cost of war, revealing both the limitations of American power, as 
George McGovern and William Polk suggest, and the reality the U.S. never 
adequately planned for how it wanted to administer Iraq, as Peter Galbraith argued 
(McGovern and Polk 2006: 94; Galbraith 89).  Gareth Stansfield further argued these 
challenges shifted U.S. policy from long-term nation-building to short-term state-
building, effectively bypassing the difficult but necessary tasks of building civil 
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society and cultivating a cooperative political culture for the visible benchmarks of 
democracy, namely elections and a constitution (Stansfield 152).  Key Iraqi figures 
also pressured a transfer of power, including Ayatollah Sistani who in 2003 issued a 
fatwa demanding elections be held and Iraqis be responsible for writing their own 
constitution, challenging American plans to appoint a governance council; the 
struggle of American administrators to resume basic services, including regular 
electricity and water, further developed animosity toward the continued U.S. 
presence (Tripp 283-289; Department of Defense 2008; Oxfam 2007).   
 
The transition of power ultimately went through several stages of governing bodies 
before the permanent structure, which typically saw one Christian serve on each 
governing iteration.  The Iraqi Governing Council governed from July 2003 through 
June 2004 underneath the CPA, where its primary duty was to pass an interim 
constitution, the Temporary Administrative Law (TAL), and appoint a cabinet to help 
administer Iraq’s government.  Kanna was appointed to serve on the IGC and 
Behnam Polis served as the Minister of Transportation.  Following the transfer of 
sovereignty from the CPA, the IGC was replaced by the Iraqi Interim Government, 
which served from June 2004 to May 2005 and on which Pascal Warda served as 
Minister of Immigration and Refugees.  The IIG was a caretaker government that 
lasted until elections in January 2005 voted in the Iraqi Transition Government, 
which was tasked with drafting the permanent constitution.  Basimah Butros served 
as Minister of Science and Technology; additionally, six Assyrians were elected to 
Parliament, including Kanna as well as Ablahad Efram and Nuri Potrus of the 
Chaldean Democratic Union Party, Goriel Khamis of the BNDP of Iraq, and Jacklin 
Zomaya of the Assyrian Patriotic Party, all of whom were part of the Kurdistan List, 
and Wijdan Michael who was part of Allawi’s secular list.  A national referendum in 
October 2005 approved the permanent constitution and was followed by national 
parliamentary elections in December 2005 to select the first four-year term 
representatives to the permanent National Assembly.  The National Assembly 
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replaced the IIG in May 2006, then a 275-member parliament to which three 
Christians were elected: Kanna, Efram, and Fawzi Hariri of the KDP.  
 
A draft prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in March 2003 indicates 
these representative bodies could have been more inclusive.  Planned was a thirty-
five member Leadership Council for an Iraqi Interim Authority to be tasked with 
establishing a constitutional commission and organizing local and national elections, 
specifying an Assyrian member and a Chaldean member should be selected through 
caucuses (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2003).  This was later pared down by 
Bremer to the twenty-five member IGC, whose membership was appointed by the 
CPA rather than through caucuses or engagement of local Iraqis.  Significantly, such 
paring down also eliminated a position for a Chaldean member as Bremer appointed 
Kanna to the IGC as the only Christian representative.    
 
Rebuilding of Iraq came at a time when Chaldeans were facing several upheavals.  
The Iraq War accompanied the illness of Patriarch Bidawid, who died in July 2003, 
and indecision over his replacement left the Chaldean Church without a Patriarch 
until December 2003, when Archbishop Emmanuel Delly came out of retirement to 
serve as Patriarch (Manna Interview 2012).  The delay, however, left Chaldeans 
without an important voice at a critical juncture.  It is here the Chaldean Church 
mobilized to fill the void in lieu of a political representative.  In May 2003, Bishops 
Ibrahim and Jammo drafted a ‘Memorandum on Chaldeans in the New Iraq’, stating 
Chaldeans:  
 
Will accept to be represented only by Chaldeans speaking in the name of 
Chaldean organizations, and maintain everywhere that they shall reject any 
non-Chaldean, political or otherwise, individual or organization, claiming to 
represent them. Nevertheless, Chaldeans are ready to work in harmony and 
collaboration with all the other ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, 
particularly with the Assyrians, provided that the Chaldean identity is 
recognized and preserved (Chaldean News Agency 2003b).   
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This is a direct assertion of Chaldean ethnicity against Assyrian inclusion.  Similarly, 
the CNC sent multiple letters to American officials with the hope of securing 
Chaldean representation and of securing language providing for Chaldeans’ ethnic 
and political rights (Hanna Interview).  
 
Such efforts were unsuccessful.  Bremer recalls in his book that he met soon after 
announcing the IGC with then-Archbishop Delly, who protested that neither he, nor 
any Chaldean, were selected:  
 
Iraq’s small Christian community, like most sectarian splinters in the country, 
was fragmented.  There were the Chaldeans, who appeared to outnumber the 
Assyrian Christians, but who were not as well organized and less active 
politically.  In keeping with the objective of the smallest representative body 
possible, we had room on the Council for only one Christian. 
 
We had chosen a representative of the Assyrian Christians and anticipated 
this would cause unhappiness with the Chaldeans.  We were right, for that 
night the Bishop’s heart was not overflowing with Christian love (Bremer 99).   
 
Bremer does not offer an explanation as to why only one Christian representative 
was chosen, other than a generic narrative of wanting a small Council.  This passage 
marks Bremer’s only mention of Chaldeans in his memoir.  Reiterating the stereotype 
Chaldeans are politically disinclined, he presents a shallow understanding of the 
community and its concerns, and the justification he presents can only be seen as 
arbitrary by Chaldeans, particularly when contrasted with his and the 
Administration’s rhetoric of democratic inclusion.  The American government cared 
less for the complexities of fully representing Iraqi society.   
 
In response, nineteen of the twenty-two Chaldean bishops, including Bishops 
Ibrahim, Jammo and Delly, issued a strongly-worded declaration urging the new 
government to guarantee the rights of Iraq’s Christians, ‘first among them our 
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Chaldean people’, and to include a Chaldean representative in the constitutional 
drafting process, stating:  
 
We were and still are mystified that, despite our appeals, your administration 
ignored, since the beginning up to the present day, these facts. Unfairly, the 
Temporary Council of Government was formed without any Chaldean 
presence and the structure and members of the new government have been 
announced without any participation of Chaldeans in the name of Chaldeans 
as well. That is an injustice committed against our people, for which we 
protest hereby explicitly and insistently (Chaldean News Agency 2003c).   
 
Even under this democratic opening, the Chaldean Church was still the primary voice 
for Chaldean issues.  On the one hand, this might suggest the Bishops’ demands 
stood in contrast to the viewpoint of mainstream Chaldeans; on the other hand, other 
Chaldeans did not effectively counteract such advocacy.  Chaldean boundary criteria, 
‘who’ Chaldeans are, faced an opportunity for redefinition with the end of a 
repressive Arab-centric regime, and the Bishops’ lobbying represented early groupism 
claims in response to new boundary shifts (Brubaker 2004).  The salience of 
Chaldean as a religious identity paled when placed alongside the ethnic-based 
demands of Assyrians, Arabs, and Kurds – and Turkoman, Mandeans, and other 
minority groups.  Church leaders in essence presented a claim that Chaldean identity 
had fissured from Assyrian.  Blurring the Chaldean boundary to one based on 
ethnicity was perhaps a means to protect Chaldean identity in relation to Iraq’s 
complicated ethno-sectarian composition.  
 
Subsequently, the ADM, acting in its role as a political party, organized a conference 
that took place in Baghdad from 22-24 October 2003.  The ‘Chaldean Syriac Assyrian 
General Conference’ received widespread attendance from Iraqi and diasporic 
political parties and activists (ADM 2003).  With the motto ‘Our Unity and Our 
National and Patriotic Rights in Iraq’, the Conference called for ‘ChaldoAssyrian’ to be 
the official ethnic designation of the Chaldean, Assyrian, and Syriac people in 
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political usage and ‘Syriac’ to be the official linguistic and cultural designation.  
Recalling the appearance of Assyro-Chaldean at Versailles, this political effort again 
aimed to keep Chaldean actors within the Assyrian ethno-national structure, again to 
the discontent of staunch Assyrian nationalists for diluting the Assyrian national 
name.  Although this controversial decision represents an attempt to reach out to 
Iraq’s Chaldean-identifying population, Chaldean Church officials and Chaldean 
nationalists who sought a separate Chaldean designation did not recognize its 
outcome (CNC 2003c).   
 
The ADM’s effort, aided by Kanna’s role in the IGC, resulted in the inclusion of the 
conference’s language in the temporary constitution.  Section 53(D) of the TAL 
provided that: 
 
This Law shall guarantee the administrative, cultural, and political rights of 
the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and all other citizens. 
 
The signing of the TAL, Iraq’s first democratic constitution, was an important 
symbolic moment for Iraqis.  Holding additional symbolism for Assyrians, Kanna was 
the last member of the IGC to sign the TAL, leading to photos of him raising the 
document in celebration reprinted in newspapers across the globe.   
 
Yet not all Assyrians in diaspora were happy with the TAL.  Dadesho and the BNDP, 
for example, waged protests and sent letters to the Bush Administration accusing the 
ADM and the ‘unelected’ IGC of ‘ethnocide’ for supporting the ‘fabricated’ 
ChaldoAssyrian nation (Dadesho 2004).  At this stage, as the CPA transferred power 
to Iraq, the role of diasporic activism was perhaps less necessary within Iraq, 
underscoring the reality of state borders and distance, of diasporic members not 
being part of Iraq and removed from the benefits and consequences of policy.  
Although violence in Iraq was increasing, there was nonetheless an appreciation that 
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the Iraqi community, for the first time since Iraq became a state, had the opportunity 
to pursue their own interests and act on their own behalf.  A boundary between those 
organizations like the ADM who are actively part of Iraq and those who were based 
in diaspora was thus apparent.   
 
By the time the final version of the Constitution was drafted, the ‘ChaldoAssyrians’ 
usage was changed to ‘Chaldeans, Assyrians’, listed as separate nationalities 
alongside each other.  The outcome reflected the demand of the Chaldean Church, 
not Assyrian moderates.  Thus, Article 125 of Iraq’s Permanent Constitution of 2005 
states:  
 
This Constitution shall guarantee the administrative, political, cultural, and 
educational rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, 
Assyrians, and all other constituents, and this shall be regulated by law. 
 
Additionally, Article Four of the constitution provides for language rights, 
designating Syriac as an official language in administrative units where Syriac-
speakers comprise ‘a density of population’, and guarantees the right to Syriac-
language education in public schools.  Lastly, it provides for religious freedom in 
Article Two, Part Two, which states somewhat awkwardly: 
 
This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi 
people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief 
and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean 
Sabeans. 
 
As an Iraqi constitution, the appearance of the Assyrian and Chaldean names was 
historic.  As a democratic constitution, there were several flaws.  First, any guarantee 
of religious freedom was fundamentally undermined by the provision placing Islam 
as both the official religion of the State and a foundation source of legislation, and 
further stating no law may be passed that contradicts Islamic principles.  Nearly 
every diasporic organization, in addition to other religious and civic organizations, 
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shared its deep objection to this provision with the American and Iraqi governments.  
Second, the guarantee of national administrative rights is without a context for 
implementation, leaving the details to a divided legislature.  Such ambiguity reflects 
that the constitution was rushed, not only in the context of Iraq but in comparison to 
other states: South Africa, for example, took seven years to finalize its constitution; 
Iraq was given three months, and the U.S. government intervened to block a 
potential six-month extension (Al-Ali 1621).  Given the arduous challenges of writing 
a constitution in a post-totalitarian state, as al-Ali outlines, American officials, in 
concert with a select few Iraqis, largely had the final say in the outcome to ensure the 
document was finished within that timeframe: the religious emphasis from the 
original, Iraqi-produced draft agreement was scaled back and contradicted to make it 
more palatable to the U.S., minorities, and secularists; provisions restrictive to 
women’s rights were similarly eliminated or scaled-back (Al-Ali 1636-1792).  
 
In addition to obvious structural concerns, diasporic objections to the constitution 
often cited the recognition of Chaldeans as dividing the Assyrian nation on sectarian 
lines.  The BNDP’s party platform has since reflected its goal of protecting ‘the sole 
Assyrian identity in the Iraqi constitution’ (BNDP 2006).  The AUA declared its 
rejection of the constitution because it subdivides the Assyrian people while at the 
same time relegating Assyrian rights into a subcategory of national groups as ‘second-
class citizens’ to the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds (AUA 2005b; Kamber 2005).  The ADM 
similarly expressed frustration, noting, ‘The ADM struggled for more than twenty-six 
years to institutionalize our ethnic identity in the constitution. Since its establishment 
in 1979, the ADM considered the national unity of our people as sacred that could 
not be compromised…we must point to this great imbalance and flaw that is not 
accepted at all’ (ADM 2005).  
 
Some in the diaspora blamed Kurdish interests for the language change; for example, 
AINA wrote, ‘The departure from the unifying formula of the TAL is believed to have 
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been a key demand of -and subsequent gain by- KDP warlord Masoud Barzani. A 
major element in the KDP's policy towards Assyrian Christians has been their formal 
division into smaller, demographically less significant, rival communities’ (AINA 
2005).  The ADM instead held Church officials responsible for interfering in politics 
and inserting a sectarian agenda (ADM 2005).  Chaldeans, certainly, could not have 
secured their recognition without the advocacy of Church leadership nor the support 
of politicians within the drafting process.  However, there was little acceptance that 
behind the Chaldean quest for recognition were ordinary people who understood 
themselves as Chaldean and sought to sustain an identity they arguably held since 
the formation of the Iraqi state.   
 
For all the years of effort, the aforementioned provisions comprised the extent of 
provisions specific to Assyrians and Chaldeans.  The constitution had many flaws: it 
was rushed, the structure of Iraq was both ambiguous and uncertain, it failed to 
clarify key provisions, it was passed amongst a society in which sectarian tensions 
were increasing.  It was these flaws that would prove most detrimental to Assyrian 
and Chaldean interests, both immediately and in the long-term.   
 
In the grand scheme of Assyrian and Chaldean history, its persecutions and 
displacements and struggle to stay afloat through tides of nation-building and 
Arabization, their recognition in the Iraq Constitution was a significant marker that 
they too exist in Iraq.  The challenge of being a stateless minority is exemplified by 
the prolonged effort to be recognized as a component of Iraq following already 
prolonged efforts to gain inclusion into the opposition.  In the context of an Iraqi 
state with ethnic-based federal units, recognition of Assyrians and Chaldeans as 
nationalities with ‘administrative, cultural, political, and educational’ rights provided 
a necessary legal foundation upon which other national goals, including a self-
administered unit, become tangible.  There was thus widespread Assyrian and 
Chaldean diasporic support for this basic goal.  The point of divergence regarded 
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recognition of a Chaldean nation.  A key difference between the communities is 
highlighted throughout this process: that of Chaldeans as a less political entity in 
which the Church continues to play an essential role; and of Assyrians as a diaspora 
with an engaged long-distance nationalism towards Iraq.   
 
Whilst the relationship between the diaspora and Iraq, and the diaspora’s care for 
what happens in the homeland, is evident throughout this process, the advent of a 
democratic Iraq provided an opportunity for Iraqi Assyrians and Chaldeans to be 
responsible for their own advocacy.  Yet a critical misstep of all sides proved to be the 
extended focus on the terminology and the divisiveness of a comma: by October 
2005, when the constitutional referendum took place, at least seventeen churches 
had been bombed and internal displacement was growing; the conflict would 
increase over the next year, resulting in a massive refugee crisis (AINA 2014a).  The 
torch of Assyrian and Chaldean advocacy would again be returned to the U.S. as the 
diaspora was faced with responding to the direct consequences of sectarian conflict.  
 
THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR REFUGEE AID  
 
'We care about refugees because of the seed of fear that lurks in all of us that can be 
stated so simply: it could be me.'  
-Arthur Helton (2002: 7) 
 
As sectarian conflict grew, coalition forces and the nascent Iraqi government were ill-
prepared to respond to the persecution and mass displacement of Iraq’s Christian 
population.  It was expected the U.S., as the initiator of the conflict, administrator of 
Iraq, and a refugee-receiving state, would assume responsibility for aid and 
resettlement; however, the unwillingness of the Bush Administration to acknowledge 
the refugee crisis instead exacerbated the humanitarian toll.  The confluence of these 
factors instilled a rallying point for diasporic actors to mobilize alongside human 
rights activists and refugee aide agencies.  Mobilization was directly fueled by the 
disproportionate representation of Assyrians and Chaldeans amongst Iraq’s displaced 
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and the humanitarian plight that resulted.  Various aide agencies estimated 
Christians comprised somewhere between 15 and 40 percent of the refugee 
population, a rate far disproportionate to their less than five percent share of Iraq’s 
population (Harper 2008: 171; USCIRF 2007).   
 
Pre-war Iraq was not a mercurial society kept from exploding into ethno-sectarian 
conflict by the lid of the Ba’ath regime.  As Peter Galbraith observed, it is hard to say 
exactly when conflict began, with political assassinations and destruction of religious 
institutions occurring intermittently through the war’s first years and escalating 
drastically after the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, 
after which reprisal attacks intensified and Baghdad neighbourhoods became 
segregated on sectarian bases (Galbraith 175-178; Saouli 132; See Appendix I).  
Targeting of Assyrians and Chaldeans escalated approximately one year after the war 
began with the first recorded church bombing in June 2004 in Mosul, after which 
attacks persisted through the fall (AINA 2014a).  By 2006, reports of sectarian-based 
persecution were so frequent as to necessitate a special investigation by the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom outside of their normal investigative 
schedule, the results of which prompted a rare special report calling for increased 
U.S. attention and placing Iraq on USCIRF’s Watch List (Cassidy and Chaudhry 
Interview 2012; USCIRF 2006).  By 2007, displacement had reached such 
proportions that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, labeled 
it ‘the most significant displacement in the Middle East since the dramatic events of 
1948’, noting ‘one in eight Iraqis have been driven from their homes’, with 
approximately 2 million having fled outside Iraq and 1.9 million internally displaced 
(UNHCR 2007). 
 
To all diasporic groups, humanitarian aid was an immediate priority.  To compensate 
for the shortcomings of the U.S. government’s response, Assyrian and Chaldean 
organizations and churches mobilized aid and assistance programs: humanitarian 
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assistance remains a consistent priority within both communities.24  However, as the 
crisis spanned years, with no opportunities for permanent settlement in the countries 
of first refuge, it forced the question of what to do long-term for national survival.25  
A distinct Chaldean effort consequentially emerged to engage American policy-
makers on the question of refugee admissions.  Refugees represented a new wave of 
displacement, but whose route was formidable and unknown; here, the Chaldean 
diaspora argued permanent resettlement was the moral and humanitarian 
responsibility of the U.S.  Furthermore, American resettlement would allow Assyrian 
and Chaldean refugees to resettle in areas with established Assyrian and Chaldean 
communities, providing an opportunity to keep those displaced part of the diasporic 
nation.    
 
This section specifically considers the role of Chaldean advocacy in pursuing a path 
for refugee resettlement as it marks a unique point of mobilization, inserting a 
secular Chaldean voice into diasporic politics.  Notably, advocacy at this stage 
sidestepped questions of ethnicity, urging aide to Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Syriacs, 
Iraqi Christians, and religious minorities generally.  Whilst this marks a point of 
contrast with previous Chaldean activism, it also reflects the drastically different 
circumstances, reacting to unfolding events and coinciding with heavy periods of 
sectarian violence, peaking in 2007 and again in 2010.  Thus although advocacy was 
not centered upon an ethnic argument, Chaldean activism arose from Chaldean civic 
organizations and strengthened the standing of Chaldeanness as an identity on 
behalf of which activism occurs and which possesses an institutional network capable 
of mobilizing and sustaining activism.   
 
                                            
24 Such programs and organizations include ANCI, AAS, CALC, Chaldean and Middle-Eastern 
Social Services, Adopt-a-Refugee, Assyrian Church of the East Relief Organization, Aid to the 
Church in Need.   
25 Refugees were often unable to obtain permanent status in countries of first refuge 
(Lebanon, Syria, Jordan) or effectively access employment or education. 
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The nature of Chaldean diasporic nationalism arguably facilitated support for refugee 
resettlement, as belief in the need for autonomy has not been a driving component of 
Chaldean nationalism.  However, support for prioritizing refugee admissions was not 
universal, particularly as the crisis persisted.  Some in the Assyrian community and 
the Chaldean Church condemned the push for refugee admittances as a desire to 
empty all Christians from Iraq.  While the AUA, for example, supports those who 
chose to leave Iraq, its primary goal is to help Assyrians remain in the Middle East  
(Tamraz Interview).  
 
Over time, and with waning U.S. aide, tensions between humanitarian imperatives 
and long-term national interests became apparent and highlight the struggle of 
diaspora in such difficult circumstances: will aiding emigration lead to a loss of the 
nation; is it fair to encourage others to stay while living in the safety and luxury of 
diaspora; will those who emigrate be lost to assimilation?  As Assyrian activism 
almost instinctively rallied to support national rights in Iraq, the more nascent 
Chaldean engagement followed a multifaceted, more politically feasible trajectory of 
supporting targeted goals in Iraq, from security to improved elections, and increasing 
refugee admissions; it is this latter policy in which Chaldean activists found success.  
Refugee policy was consequentially pursued simultaneous to demands for an 
autonomous region within Iraq, which will be discussed in the next chapter.26   
  
The challenge activists would encounter in advocating for refugee issues had two 
stages: the first was the disinclination of the Bush Administration to acknowledge the 
crisis; the second was a full acknowledgement of the humanitarian toll by the Obama 
Administration, but a framing of the issue as one left to be solved by Iraqis.  The 
                                            
26 The question of return or resettlement is a point of contention amongst diasporic actors as 
much as those displaced: a November 2014 survey of internally displaced minorities in 
northern Iraq found 56 percent of respondents hoped to return to their homes under 
international protection, and 42 percent hoped to resettle in another country (Nineveh Center 
for Research and Development 2014).   
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latter was unsurprising given growing opposition to the war from the American 
public and President Obama’s stance against continued engagement as a campaign 
platform.  In December 2008, President Bush and the Iraqi Government agreed to the 
U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, which outlined the withdrawal of U.S. combat 
troops from Iraqi cities prior to July 2009 and of all U.S. military forces from Iraq 
prior to December 31, 2011.  After taking office, Obama affirmed U.S. troops would 
leave Iraq by the end of 2011 (Obama 2011).  Politically, although the Obama 
Administration actively engaged with the American diaspora, troop withdrawal 
coincided with disengagement from Iraq-related issues (Khedery 2014).  Barriers to 
political engagement were thus significant: it became not so much a barrier of access, 
but a barrier of efficacy.  Assyrians and Chaldeans alike were disadvantaged by the 
importance of Iraq: because Iraq was politically consequential to both 
Administrations, they lacked power to capture influence regarding Iraq to shape 
policy outcomes.     
 
The Bush Administration’s Refugee Reluctance 
 
Under UNHCR guidelines, a refugee has three options after displacement: to 
voluntarily return to one’s home country; to integrate into the country of first 
asylum; or to be resettled to a third country when either of the first two options are 
unviable: typically, less than one percent of all world-wide refugees are resettled 
(UNHCR 2014).  The challenge of resettlement was compounded by the reluctance of 
the Bush Administration to acknowledge Iraq’s ethno-sectarian conflict.  Between 1 
April 2003 and 28 February 2007, a total of 687 Iraqi refugees were admitted, 
including just 202 in FY2006 (Margesson, Sharp, Bruno 2007: 12).  Initial estimates 
for FY2007 admissions predicted the U.S. planned to admit only 500 Iraqi refugees 
despite the reality of approximately two million refugees (Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary 2007).  For comparison, by October 2007, Sweden, a state that did not 
support the war, had accepted more Iraqi refugees than the U.S. (Stiglitz and Blimes 
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2008: 5).   
 
Pressure from the international community, particularly Iraq’s neighbours who bore 
the burden of responding to an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees each, and 
domestic pressure from Congress were responsible for changing admission policies, 
particularly Senator Ted Kennedy who publically criticized the Administration’s 
neglect of the displacement crisis just prior to becoming Chairman of the 
Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship Subcommittee after the 2006 elections 
(Kennedy 2006).  Senator Ben Cardin, chair of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, 
reflected in hindsight that ‘without the international community raising this issue as 
frequently as it has been raised, the progress that has been made to date would not 
have been as much’ (U.S. Helsinki Commission 2010).  As L. Craig Johnstone, then 
President of Refugees International, testified before Congress, the international 
community largely felt the responsibility for responding to the refugee crisis lay on 
U.S. shoulders: ‘Where it hasn’t been an ally of ours, they’ll say this was a U.S. war 
and the U.S. should pick up the costs associated with it’ (ibid).  It was frequently 
noted by refugee advocates that after the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, the U.S. 
urgently accepted 134,000 Vietnamese refugees; in the years since, over 900,000 
Vietnamese have received refugee status (Rikoski and Finer 2009).  Similarly, in 
1996, under Operation Pacific Haven, the U.S. airlifted 6,600 Iraqi Kurds who 
supported U.S. humanitarian operations in Iraq to Guam out of concern they could 
face repercussions from the Ba’ath regime (Department of Defense 1997).   
 
As the context of these examples foreshadowed, a core pillar of advocacy for refugee 
admissions became focused on aiding those whose lives were in danger for their 
work in support of coalition war efforts.  This narrow interpretation of deserving 
refugees moved focus away from aiding persecuted minority populations.  However, 
the legislative process to address admissions provided an opportunity to roll in 
special provisions, and diasporic activism was thus necessary to urge extending 
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refugee provisions to minorities who were otherwise overlooked in this conversation.    
 
In October 2005, estimating 10,000 to 40,000 Christians had already fled Iraq, Delly 
called on the U.S. to help: ‘I pray that Western governments, including the United 
States, take pity on these Iraqis and at least offer them a stay permit for those who 
are already there and, if possible, a visa’ (Quoted in Glatz 2005).  At this stage, the 
Chaldean Church supported refugee resettlement.  In addition to displacement, an 
immediate problem was the denial of asylum to approximately 3,000 Iraq Christians, 
including 2,000 in Michigan, for those whose asylum petitions, due to backlogs in the 
immigration system, had the misfortune of being processed after Hussein was 
officially removed (Denha-Garmo 2006).  Additionally, a technicality in immigration 
law considered payments made to release a kidnapped relative as aiding terrorism, 
leading to several instances of Christians being denied refugee admission.  
 
CFA created Operation R4 (Research, Relief, Resettlement, and Re-empowerment) 
and in July 2006 began surveying those who contacted CFA for assistance regarding 
reasons for leaving Iraq and life in the country of refuge (CFA 2007).  The purpose of 
this data was to document that Christians were fleeing Iraq because of force.  From 
July 2006 through March 2007, CFA processed approximately 4,000 survey results 
representing almost 12,000 refugees, in which over 90 percent of respondents cited 
religious persecution or discrimination as cause for leaving Iraq, with over half 
stating the respondent or a family member had been a victim of violence or torture; 
additionally, over 64 percent of responses indicated family reunification was being 
sought (CFA 2007).  Data from this study was shared with the State Department, 
congressional officials, and UNHCR.  At the same time, under the leadership of 
Bishop Ibrahim and Michael George, CFA formed an Immigration Committee headed 
by Steve Garmo, which sought to look for specific legislative options.  One avenue 
considered was an expansion of the Lautenberg Amendment of the 1990 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act, which facilitated refugee processing on humanitarian 
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grounds for certain religious minorities, particularly the Jewish community, in the 
Former Soviet Union (Author’s Personal Notes 2011; P.L. 101-167).  In 2004, the 
amendment was expanded to include certain religious minorities, particularly Jews 
and Baha’is, in Iran (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 2014).  Given the very recent 
extension to Iranian minorities, there was hope a similar extension could be made to 
Iraqi religious minorities, although this ultimately proved unsuccessful.  
 
Chaldeans in Michigan principally lobbied the state’s senior Senator, Carl Levin, 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to include provisions for 
persecuted religious minorities in broader refugee legislation.  In 2006, Levin 
included an amendment to the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act to provide 
status for the 3,000 asylum seekers whose petitions were processed after April 2003 
who were otherwise eligible for asylum as members of a persecuted religious 
minority in Iraq (S.Amdt.4186 to S.2611 of 2006).  Although the bill passed the 
Senate inclusive of such language, it died in the House; similar efforts were 
undertaken again the following year.  Demonstrating Levin’s urging of this issue with 
his colleagues, in a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee in January 2007 on 
‘The Plight of Iraqi Refugees’, Kennedy specifically noted in his opening remarks that 
some Iraqis ‘such as the Chaldean Christians’ were suffering persecution and that ‘I 
want to make a special note of the Chaldean Federation of America.  They have a 
statement, a comment here.  Senator Levin has spoken to me about this’ (Senate 
Judiciary 2007: 5, 48).  
 
CFA’s submitted testimony stressed that repatriation to Iraq, an emphasis of the State 
Department at the time, was ‘impossible’ for Iraqi Christians because of continued 
persecution, violence, and the inability of the Iraqi government to provide protection 
(Senate Judiciary 121-129).  Citing data from CFA’s surveys, Kassab urged Congress 
to make Christians eligible for special priority statuses that would expedite the 
admissions process; create a special designation for internally-displaced Iraqi 
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Christians; and pass Levin’s 2006 legislation to aide the 3,000 asylum seekers.  
Kassab’s remarks addressed the name issue by using a general Iraqi Christian label 
and by recasting the community under the Chaldean label, stating ‘Iraqi Chaldeans 
will be used as the general term to designate the Aramaic-speaking persons…also 
known as Assyrians and Syriacs’ (Senate Judiciary 122).   
 
Members of the diaspora sought help for family members displaced from Iraq, which 
encouraged activists to push for increased refugee admissions, and advocacy on their 
behalf required sustained effort from Chaldean leadership:  
 
After the invasion in 2003, I went to Washington many times to help in 
getting this program started, this refugee program. Actually I was working 
with different groups at that time…even the Chaldean Federation when they 
started. Or first trip was to Washington, we went together with Joe – Joseph 
Kassab - and some other people there.  At the beginning it was very hard to 
get this program approved and they found out there is no other way, so they 
open the door for our people to come…Not until 2006 or 7…I still have a big 
file of all these 400 people who applied (Barka Interview).   
 
In February 2007, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff issued an order 
allowing a case-by-case duress exemption for those who were forced under threat of 
hardship to provide material support to terrorist organizations, particularly 
kidnapping ransoms, but who otherwise posed no threat to the U.S. (Chertoff 2007).  
In September 2007, the Senate approved a Levin Amendment to the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2008, which, noting the government ‘has an obligation to help’, 
called on the Administration to provide all refugee visas allotted for Near East/South 
Asia to Iraqis, as well as any unused portion of the worldwide allocation (S.Amend 
2781 to H.R.2764 of 2008).  Ultimately, the amendment was not included in the 
final bill.27  By September 2007, the U.S.’s own Ambassador to Iraq issued a heavy 
                                            
27 As discussed in the next chapter, the final bill included language directing funds to assist 
Assyrians and Chaldeans in the Nineveh Plain (House Appropriations Committee Division J, 
H.R.2764). 
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critique of processing delays and inefficiencies that were both leaving refugees 
vulnerable and increasing insecurity; Administration officials, rather than initiate an 
inquiry or policy change, instead publicly dismissed the Ambassador’s complaints as 
containing ‘many errors’ (Crocker 2007; Hsu and Wright 2007).   
 
Such processing changes and increased refugee admissions were instead secured with 
the attachment of Kennedy’s Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act to the FY2008 National 
Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law in January 2008 (P.L. 110-
181).28  The bill facilitated the refugee process for two key populations: those who 
assisted the U.S. and those members of a persecuted group -specifically, vulnerable 
ethno-religious minorities- who have immediate family in the U.S.  The bill addressed 
several problems noted in Crocker’s critique, including opening refugee applications 
to those still inside Iraq, thereby removing the burden of fleeing to a neighbouring 
state, and allowing these groups to apply directly to the U.S. for refugee status, 
bypassing the lengthy UNHCR process, by extending Priority 2 status of ‘special 
humanitarian concern’ under Section 207(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (Rikoski and Finer 2009).  The provision allowing special processing for Iraqi 
refugees with family in the U.S. was imperfect, but still an asset to the Assyrian and 
Chaldean community.   
 
The law further allowed the 3,000 Iraqis with rejected asylum petitions to reopen 
their cases to seek to remain in the U.S.  Furthermore, it created a Special Immigrant 
Visas (SIV) category to allow 5,000 visas annually for Iraqis who worked for the U.S.  
The SIV removed the burden of proving a well-founded fear of persecution required 
for refugee status, allowing applicants to apply based on proof of service and an 
employer recommendation.  While the SIV program is well-intended, it has not been 
                                            
28 Similar bill versions were introduced by Earl Blumeanauer (H.R.662 and H.R.2265 of 
2007); Alcee Hastings (H.R.3674 of 2007; H.R.6496 of 2008); and Hillary Clinton (S.3541 of 
2008). 
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well-implemented.  Cardin noted despite the urgent nature of these applications, the 
average processing time for a regular refugee application from Iraq was one year and 
the SIV cases are longer; at the time of his remarks, only 2,145 SIVs had been issued 
(Helsinki Commission 2010).  Processing has not met the program’s intentions: as of 
May 2014, approximately 14,000 of the 25,000 allotted SIVs were issued, even 
though the program was intended to expire two months later (USCIS 2014; Packer 
2014a).  Processing delays remain a consistent issue as waiting periods for refugee 
petitions were approximately eighteen months by 2014 - until the fall of Mosul to 
ISIL halted processing (Packer 2014a). 
 
There are two perspectives to considering the admissions that resulted from these 
combined provisions.  The impact on growing the Assyrian and Chaldean diaspora is 
considerable, as is the impact on individual cities where resettlement has 
concentrated, such as El Cajon and suburban Detroit.  From 2007 through 2009, an 
estimated 8,091 Iraqi Christian refugees arrived in Michigan and approximately 
4,848 in San Diego, and around 1,000 in Chicago and Arizona each (Thierry 2010).29  
However, in the context of displacement, admission numbers are rather conservative.  
American doors have not opened to relocate TelKeppe to America.  In terms of total 
Iraqi resettlement, exclusive of sectarian or ethnic background, 121,530 Iraqis were 
admitted as refugees or SIVs from 2007 through July 2014, the majority of whom 
resettled in California and Michigan (State Department 2014).   
 
The Obama Administration’s Benign Neglect  
 
By 2009, the challenges facing refugees upon arrival gained some attention outside 
the Iraqi communities.  A 2009 study found systemic flaws in the Iraqi refugee 
admittance and resettlement program because it ‘does not break down barriers to 
                                            
29 Figures are specific to refugee and SIV admissions, and do not include Iraqis who arrived 
on other visas.  Assyrian/Chaldean figures are difficult given visas are counted by citizenship; 
figures here reflect newspaper estimates derived from community resettlement agencies.   
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sustainable employment, employment services are not properly funded, English 
language training is insufficient, transportation is inadequate, and professional 
recertification is not viable’ (Georgetown University Law Center 2009: 19).  In part, 
this was because although Iraqi refugee admissions were still minor in the context of 
demand, they had nonetheless risen drastically: from FY2007, when congressional 
and international pressure escalated, admissions were at 1,608; by FY2008, they 
increased to 13,823 and exceeded 18,000 in both FY2009 and FY2010 (State 
Department 2014).  Moreover, as Assyrian and Chaldean organizations found, the 
type of refugee arriving had greater needs resulting from trauma and lengthy periods 
of displacement, needs to which current programs were not readily-equipped to 
respond.  Juliana Taimoorazy, founder of the Iraqi Christian Relief Council, stressed 
the challenges facing refugees after arrival refocused her organization from the 
Middle East to the U.S.: 
 
We were formed to help strictly Christians in Iraq, but at the end of 2007, the 
doors really opened and a huge influx of Assyrians and Chaldeans started 
coming to the West.  And we as a community weren’t ready in Chicago to 
welcome them…Since 1980, when the Iran–Iraq War broke out; then the Gulf 
War; then it was the American war, the Second Gulf War; and then it was 
persecution.  They have been so traumatized for the last 30 years…And, 
absolutely devastating, our nation is dying because our young are not being 
educated, refugee kids for five, six, seven, eight years – they left high school 
when they were 16, they get here when they are 24, they’re not going to go 
sit next to a high schooler (Taimoorazy Interview).  
 
Diasporic frustration over ongoing conditions in Iraq, delays in processing refugee 
petitions overseas, and the struggles of those who were resettled was palpable.  The 
visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Special Coordinator for Iraq’s 
Minority Communities Michael Corbin to Detroit in June 2010 resulted in a town hall 
attended by an estimated 650 to 1,000 people that was shut down by protests from 
attendees (Author’s Personal Notes 2010; Dado 2010).  Frustration was not just 
amongst diasporic elites but the wider diaspora.   
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The outrage was processing delays in Iraq and the sudden ability of Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement to carry out deportation orders for Iraqis.  Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, an individual who is ordered deported must first be 
given a travel document, such as a passport, from the country to which the individual 
is to be deported.  Without diplomatic relations with Iraq under sanctions and until 
the new Iraqi government was capable of issuing travel documents, deportation 
orders for Iraqis languished.  In 2010, travel documents were suddenly available and 
ICE began deportations to Iraq to the outrage of community members who felt 
forcing Chaldeans to Baghdad was essentially a death sentence.  CFA, through its 
role in providing immigration services, received requests for assistance (Kassab 
Interview 2013; Author’s Personal Notes 2010).  Chaldean activists sought 
Congressional and Administration intervention to temporarily halt the process.  
Senator Levin and Congressman Sander Levin wrote to and met with Administration 
officials to convey the severity of the situation facing Christians in Iraq, noting their 
grave concerned for the safety of those deported and requesting a delay in 
deportations until security improves (Levin and Levin 2010).   
 
Here, diasporic engagement facilitated change in Administration policy.  As Eric 
Schwartz, then-Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the Helsinki Commission 
in response to a question about UNHCR’s concern that Iraqis had been deported by 
several European countries: ‘We believe that all returns to Iraq at this point should be 
voluntary.  That’s including, of course, anyone who is deemed to fear prosecution, 
under no circumstances should that person be returned…We have a different 
perspective on this issue than some of our European friends’ (Helsinki Commission 
2010).   
 
Chaldean civic leadership emerged to advocate on behalf of the wider diaspora and 
those in the U.S.  The success of their advocacy is observed in the advocacy carried 
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out by members of the Michigan congressional delegation.  In addition to the 
assistance mentioned above, Michigan Congressman Gary Peters and Senator Debbie 
Stabenow introduced the Domestic Refugee Reform and Modernization Act to 
improve administration and planning of the resettlement program (Peters 2011; 
HR.1475 of 2011; HR.1784 and S.1850 of 2013).  In 2009, Senator Levin and Peters 
introduced companion resolutions, S.Res.322 and H.Res.944, calling on the 
Administration to do more to aide Iraq’s ethno-religious minorities, including 
improving security, and supporting economic- and civic-building programs.  Both 
Resolutions passed their respective chambers, passing the House by a vote of 415 to 
3 in February 2010 and the Senate with unanimous consent in August 2010 
(Congressional Record 24 February 2010, 5 August 2010).  While Resolutions are 
non-binding, their passage can serve as a political tool, demonstrating the 
commitment of its supporters to a particular issue.  In this case, it showcases the 
relationship between Chaldean advocates and members of Congress; further, it 
showcases Chaldean advocates as advocates for those in Iraq.  
 
The new role of Chaldean civic organizations as political actors on behalf of a 
Chaldean diaspora is significant.  Political engagement was mobilized in response to 
the refugee crisis and increasingly exclusionary Iraqi boundaries, even though they 
were not inherently political organizations.  The rallying of the wider Chaldean 
community on behalf of Chaldeans in Iraq thus marked a key pivot in the Chaldean 
community toward political activism on behalf of the global diaspora.  
 
CONCLUSION: THE INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS OF INCLUSION AND 
EMIGRATION 
 
Backlash for sustaining refugee admissions arose from two infrequently-aligned 
voices: Assyrian nationalists and the Chaldean Church in Iraq.  Their opposition 
reflects mutual concern that resettlement threatens the permanent disappearance of 
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Assyrians and Chaldeans from Iraq.  Sako, as Archbishop of Kirkuk, contended the 
West ‘should help Iraqi Christians to remain in their homeland rather than investing 
resources in assistance programs that actually encourage their escape’ (Quoted in 
Agenzia Fides 2012).  By late 2014, as Patriarch, he openly criticized American 
leaders who encouraged refugee admissions, stating:  
 
In America they put baskets with asylum request forms on church altars during 
Mass, as if the migration of thousands of Iraqi Christians to the US was 
something to ask God’s blessing for. That’s a strange thing to do and only 
confuses people’s faith. Unfortunately, some members of the clergy turn into 
businessmen instead of remaining shepherds of souls. They think in business 
instead of evangelical terms, even in relation to faithful. To some they are just 
numbers who can help priests beef up numbers of Catholics in the areas over 
which they have jurisdiction (Quoted in Catholic World News 2014).    
 
The selfish intentions ascribed to Chaldean priests is surprisingly harsh particularly 
given the mass ongoing crisis, but highlights the tense uncertainty over the future of 
the Chaldean Church and its ability to save its roots in Iraq.  Lay diasporic members, 
by contrast, are often sympathetic to letting refugees come to the U.S. as they 
themselves have, questioning why elites would argue against emigration, presenting 
political differences within the Chaldean Church and with Assyrian nationalists 
(Bacall and Bacall Interview; Jatou Interview; Babella Interview).  Diasporic leaders 
are highly conscious of the tension of urging coethnics to remain whilst arguing so 
from the safety of the U.S.:   
 
Why would you stay?  And then you go on the net and look on Facebook, and 
you see ninety percent of your family living in Detroit with their nice homes, 
or in California, and why am I here?  What the hell am I doing here?  So it’s 
really challenging for the people who are staying.  It is an existential issue for 
us.  And as they leave, I mean, one generation, two generations, maybe three 
- and then what?  It’s really difficult to maintain your culture and language 
and heritage in diaspora (Jatou Interview). 
 
Should the Assyrian and Chaldean exodus from Iraq continue, the worry is the nation 
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will inevitably assimilate into mainstream American society.30  However, distance 
also makes diaspora more able to take an ideological, long-term perspective, 
understanding why anyone would leave but understanding the nation cannot have a 
homeland without its people living there to stake claim: here, departure itself poses 
an existential threat.  
 
As the plight of Iraq’s Christians continued, even as antagonisms between Shia and 
Sunni waned, and as the Obama Administration disengaged from Iraq, it was 
increasingly apparent refugee admissions were not a solution adequate to meeting 
need, and diasporic elites turned focus to other strategies.  Kassab left CFA in 2013 
and formed the Iraqi Christians Advocacy and Empowerment Institute (ICAE), which 
advocates with the Iraqi and Kurdish governments to support programs to help 
Christians return and remain in Iraq and the KRG.  Kassab turned focus to Iraq-based 
programs because of frustrations with an inadequate refugee resettlement system.  At 
the same time, he expressed frustration with those who were quick to criticize 
resettlement efforts, stressing that telling refugees to stay without simultaneously 
working for immediate, concrete ways to help them make a life is not a solution:  
 
A lot of people have been accusing me that I’m emptying Iraq of its Christians.  
Well, yes and no.  When people decide to leave, nobody has a say in that 
issue: you cannot leave or you stay.  Because if you do, then if something 
happens to him, you’re going to be responsible for his blood…But it is 
important for Assyrians and Chaldeans who say that we are emptying from 
Christians from Iraq, the question that needs to be addressed to them is this: 
what have you done for these refugees - for these Iraqi Christians - to stay 
there and not to leave? (Interview 2013).   
 
Reflected in this tension is the way in which elite competition is manifested into 
issues of ideology and policy, with the implication that it is much harder to make 
policy and try to enact change than to critique policy that is made.  Here, the decision 
                                            
30 This dilemma was further echoed in author interviews with Tamraz 2013; Taimoorazy 
2013; Hanna 2013; Abbo et al 2013.   
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to refocus efforts from refugee admittances to in-country return reveals a pragmatic 
assessment of resource availability, ongoing challenges, and political feasibility, 
including disinterest compounded by language, cultural, and employment barriers to 
integration upon arrival.  This represents a choice to work within and push back 
against Iraq’s narrowed national boundaries, and a reprioritization of diasporic 
nationalism to a focused long-distance nationalism centered on integration.   
 
Illuminated are the fundamental changes that took place after 2003: the first tangible 
opportunity to influence Iraqi politics in generations, and the wholescale need to 
tangibly help co-ethnics.  As expressed throughout this chapter, the challenge of 
being a small minority, lost in the broader scope of the Shia-Sunni conflict and 
Kurdish aspirations, routinely marginalized Assyrian and Chaldean needs.  The effort 
to gain inclusion with the Iraqi opposition to the effort to force a response to 
sectarian cleansing both strengthened and frustrated diasporic organizations and 
altered their long-term calculations regarding prospects for Assyrian and Chaldean 
inclusion within Iraq.  Gellner’s assessment of the choice of displaced peoples to 
integrate, flee, or pursue a nationalist option is a succinct encapsulation of the 
options available as crisis escalated.  Found within diasporic activism is a negotiation 
of these choices, informed by nationalism and concern for the immediate and long-
term needs of the Iraqi community.  Diasporic activism thus furthers diasporic nation-
building by enacting political goals and aid for Assyrians and Chaldeans as a global, 




CHAPTER VI  
      
NINEVEH AS A HOMELAND, A HARBOUR, A GHETTO:  
DIASPORIC LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM TO IRAQ 
 
‘It appears you Jews are about to get yourselves a state…Can you spare a corner of it for 
an old neighbor?’  
-Assyrian activist to Hayim Greenberg, 1943 
 
The turn to the Nineveh Plain as a permanent solution for Iraq’s Christians appears, 
in retrospect, almost an inevitability given the confluence of events that betrayed the 
promise of liberal democratic rights and equality, instead permitting a political 
structure that marginalized ethno-religious minorities from influence and left 
unchecked violence that sought to disappear ethno-religious minorities from society.  
The failure of the international community to properly meet the refugee crisis, 
coupled with the overarching failure of the American and Iraqi governments to 
provide for the long-term security of the Assyrian and Chaldean people, left most 
activists with the belief there may be no other option for survival than some form of 
self-rule.  These events have subsequently pushed the long-standing but isolated 
nationalist goal of an Assyrian homeland from an ideological pipe dream to the 
forefront of diasporic policy objectives.   
 
Assyrians and Chaldeans now encounter an Iraqi boundary that is exclusionary, 
enforced by violence, marginalization, and attacks on Christian businesses and 
livelihoods.  The question of how to survive and provide for one’s family became 
more than a theoretical exercise but a day-to-day worry.  Recognizing the lack of 
resettlement options outside Iraq and that it may be a generation or more before 
displaced families consider returning to their homes in Baghdad, the Nineveh Plain 
presented a territory in which Christians could be comparatively safer whilst 
remaining in their homeland.  Positioning the Nineveh Plain as the atra of Assyrians 
and Chaldeans thus represents a narrative combining several factors which 
substantiate its importance to the population: the role in national imaging as the 
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ancestral homeland of the ancient Assyrian Empire; the geographic concentration of 
historically Christian villages from which many in the diaspora themselves emigrated; 
and the reality that many Christians have fled into the Nineveh region following 
conflict in major cities like Baghdad and Basra.  Diasporic long-distance nationalism 
centered on the Nineveh Plain as it aptly became the territorial standard for calls for 
autonomy, administrative rights, or self-rule in some capacity.   
 
Found in this objective is what Gellner described as ‘the quite special and acute 
problems faced by diaspora nationalisms’ (Gellner 108).  In addition to the 
aforementioned choice to flee, assimilate, or stake a national claim somewhere, the 
particular challenges confronting those who choose the latter option include 
‘problems of social transformation, cultural revivification, acquisition of territory, and 
coping with the natural enmity of those with previous claims on the terrain in 
question’ (ibid).  Nineveh is the Assyrian and Chaldean ‘residue of an ancient 
territory’ upon which activists who have chosen to pursue the nationalist option stake 
their claim.   
 
Revealed within debate regarding Nineveh is the diversity of national ideology within 
the diaspora; ideologies stressed by an unfolding, precarious situation with no certain 
outcome.  A self-administered Nineveh is not and has not been a singular national 
goal.  Varying support reflects different understandings of new Iraqi boundaries and 
their permanence.  To many Assyrians, it is precisely a national goal, their long-
denied homeland now necessarily interpreted within the confines of modern nation-
state boundaries.  To less-nationalist Assyrians and many Chaldeans, it has become a 
necessary safe haven, the least bad option in an increasingly unfriendly and apathetic 
Iraq.  To others, particularly within the Chaldean Church, it is instead a dangerous 
marginalization of ethno-religious minorities into an enclave easily overran by 
neighbouring extremists.   
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Shown here is that nationalism, like identity, develops relevance ‘during major 
political crisis when the institutional set-up of a society changes and new alliance 
structures might become politically relevant’ (Wimmer 2011: 724).  Whilst diasporic 
nationalism challenges the traditional nationalism framework of a nation-state 
demand, found in crisis is a resurgence of long-distance nationalism for autonomy.  It 
is through crisis, the shift in political and social boundaries, that long-distance 
nationalism became defined by the need for self-protection and some measure of 
power to make self-protection possible (Breuilly 1993; Smith 2010).  Diasporic actors 
try to meet the challenges Gellner outlined of pursuing the nationalist option by 
drawing on claims of indigeneity, presenting moderate policies that accommodate 
other ethnic groups and position autonomy as politically reasonable, and navigating 
internal competition to broaden consensus amongst Assyrian and Chaldean actors 
themselves.   
 
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to examine the centralization of diasporic 
efforts to gain political control over the national homeland.  It first looks at diasporic 
attitudes for and against autonomy in the Nineveh Plain.  Found herein are three 
strains of thought: long-distance nationalism, which argues for autonomy as a 
necessary political project; pragmatism, whose argument for autonomy stems from 
the absence of other feasible solutions and its economic and social benefits; and 
integrationism, which argues against autonomy out of fear of isolation and 
preference for inclusion within a civic or civil-type nationalism in the Iraqi state or 
Kurdish region.  It is notable the majority of diasporic approaches evolved out of 
pragmatic concern; the nationalist option was, until the post-war environment, a less 
central priority.  The confluence of events and ideology prompted by Iraq’s closing 
boundaries were therefore significant to diasporic mobilization and the turn to 
nation-building within Iraq.  This suggests national ideologies are not stagnant, but 
shaped by internal and external factors and the boundary shifts they produce.  
Moreover, these are not tightly-bound, singular approaches.  National and pragmatic 
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perspectives are both often drawn upon by diasporic organizations to substantiate the 
argument for autonomy.  However, the persistence of a romantic, idealized Assyrian 
nationalism helped provide a basis and consciousness from which a more tempered, 
realistic policy could be derived. 
 
This chapter also addresses the legitimacy of Nineveh as an autonomy project, and 
diasporic activism and the barriers encountered in furtherance of the project.  It 
examines how diasporic actors work for change in Iraq through engagement with 
American policy-makers.  The intent is not to imply that this has become a 
universally-endorsed goal; however, it is a broadly-endorsed goal, one which has 
become a key rallying point for political activism and is more visible because of 
diasporic activism in pursuit thereof.  Diasporic advocacy is largely responsible for 
pushing the question to a topic of discussion amongst key stakeholders in the U.S. 
and within the diaspora itself.  Indeed, a significant diasporic achievement was in 
building a degree of consensus across the diaspora.  As was noted, by 2007:  
 
The largest and the most active Assyrian Diaspora and Iraqi groups -- 
including the Assyrian American National Federation, the Chaldean Chamber 
of Commerce, The Assyrian National Council of Illinois, The Chaldean 
Federation, the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project, the Assyrian Universal 
Alliance, the Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian Democratic 
Organization are all united under the same fundamental principle: That at 
the bare minimum, Assyrians in Iraq need a secure area -- however they are 
able to structure it -- to allow their population, culture, language, and faith to 
flourish (Canon 2007).   
 
In contrast to the previous reticence of Chaldean organizations to become politically 
engaged, Chaldean organizations emerged as active on all sides of policy debate.     
 
Nineveh Plain autonomy is an existential question, the weight of which activists are 
highly aware.  Such political differences are ideological, attributable to the nature of 
statelessness and the absence of an external validator of diasporic leadership or 
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political claims.  Despite expectations such tragedy would bring diasporic actors 
together, united by a common cause, this has largely not happened beyond 
generalized agreements.  Rather, as Brubaker observed, ‘groupness may fail to 
crystallize, despite the group-making efforts of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and even 
in situations of intense elite-level ethnopolitical conflict’ (Brubaker 2004: 12).  Elite 
competition manifested through organizational jockeying persist, particularly as 
actors compete to insert their voice in the political process and find they are 
frustrated by the difficulties in gaining political momentum and interest.  
 
THE CASE FOR THE NINEVEH PLAIN AS A HOMELAND 
 
Gellner observed that for diaspora nationalisms pursuing a nationalist option, ‘the 
acquisition of territory was the first and perhaps the main problem’ (Gellner 106).  
Certainly, the current demand for autonomy is not as simple as drawing a border 
around a region that is de facto Assyrian and Chaldean in all but formal recognition.  
The Nineveh Plain region itself is a complex mix of ethnic groups, religions, and 
native languages, none of which have previously been institutionalized and thus all 
of which vie for a place in local society.  While accurate population statistics are both 
currently and historically difficult given the mass displacement of people to and from 
the Nineveh province, which houses the Nineveh Plain, and the lack of 
comprehensive census data, the local demographics of the Nineveh Plain were 
recently estimated to be 40 percent Christian, and approximately 90 percent ethnic 
or religious minorities overall (Nineveh Council of America 2013).  This figure 
represents significant concentrations of Iraq’s Turkoman, Yezedi, and Shabak 
communities atop the Assyrian and Chaldean population.  Claims to self-governance 
are innately in competition with overlapping claims from the Kurds and these other 
ethnic groups, and, consequentially, the claim of Assyrian and Chaldean indigeneity 
becomes imbued with increased significance as it is staked against the region’s 
diversity and contestation over the greater Nineveh region’s boundary.   
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Thus, key villages that are almost exclusively Christian and ancestrally Christian, 
primarily the districts of Telkaif, al-Hamdaniya, and Shekhan, have become central to 
the autonomy map and to Assyrian and Chaldean narratives.   
 
Figure 1: Nineveh Plain Region 
 
Map modified from Rafy 2011 
 
This area, particularly the villages of TelKeppe and Alqosh, are significant as the 
recent homeland of many emigrants and refugees.  A 2008 survey of Christian IDPs 
in Nineveh found 80 percent of respondents reported familial or legal ties to the 
Nineveh Plain (Youash 2011: 2).  The International Organization of Migration 
reported that, in 2010, 35 percent of the greater Nineveh province’s internally-
displaced population was Christian (International Origination of Migration 2010).   
 
Much of the Nineveh Plain is largely agricultural, and has struggled to provide 
services, housing, and education to meet the needs of incoming IDPs (Babella 
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Interview; Youash 2011; Myers 2010; Human Rights Watch 2009).  Mosul remained 
one of the most dangerous areas of Iraq because of ongoing sectarian conflict and 
territorial contestation, and minorities were frequently displaced (USCIRF 2013, 
2012; Myers 2010; Steele 2008).  The Nineveh Plain offered an imperfect refuge, 
comparatively safer but not immune from violence.  
 
The Nineveh region’s complicated ethno-sectarian fabric, like that of Iraq as a whole, 
has challenged the modern Iraqi State since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.  
At the time of setting Iraq’s borders, Mosul was comprised of ‘Arabs, Kurds, 
Nestorians, Chaldaeans, Yezidis, Turcomans, Bajwans, Chabaks, Jews, and 
Sarlis…interlacing of such extent that it is practically impossible to lay down 
ethnical, linguistic or religious boundaries’ (Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society 359).  Assyrians post-WWI were understood as refugees in search of a 
homeland; this, coupled with Arabization-centric education, carried the perception to 
successive generations of Iraqis ‘that Christians are foreigners and not the original 
people of Iraq’ (Bacall and Bacall Interview).  Whilst such sentiments of Assyrians as 
a population displaced into Iraq and not of Iraq have waned over the decades, it is 
nonetheless a narrative nationalists have consciously or unconsciously sought to 
counter by drawing upon their ancient ties to Mesopotamia as well as their shared 
ethnicity with Chaldeans and the ancient presence of Christianity in Mosul.  That the 
Assyrian Empire’s roots were in Nineveh is foundational to Assyrian and Chaldean 
understandings regarding their indigeneity in Iraq, supported further by the presence 
of ancient Assyrian sites and artifacts across the region, most notably in the city of 
Nimrud.  
  
To this end, the Nineveh Plain serves as an idealized homeland, the atra, and as a 
source of national pride significant to the diasporic conscience.  Narratives regarding 
ties to antiquity are frequent when presenting a case for autonomy.  For example, the 
Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project (ISDP) noted, ‘For over six millennia, the 
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Assyrians have made the Nineveh Plain their home - being the indigenous people of 
Iraq.  Much of their contribution to human civilization as sons of Mesopotamia is 
found in their lands on the Nineveh Plain’ (ISDP 2008: 3).  Similarly, the Nineveh 
Council of America notes, ‘Iraq’s Christians trace their ethnic origins as the very first 
inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Iraq’s dwindling indigenous population’ (Nineveh 
Council of America 2013).  Yonadam Kanna draws upon this narrative by referring to 
Assyrians and Chaldeans as the ‘children of Babylon and Nineveh’ (Lewis 2003; 
Nowicki 2002).  Assyrians and Chaldeans have drawn their national boundary 
criteria upon this narrative as descendants of ancient Mesopotamia; they have 
formed their Gellnerian national claims upon the belief autonomy in the Nineveh 
Plain will make congruent the nation and the (sub)state.   
 
However, recognition as a component of Iraq with tangible roots in the Nineveh Plain 
has faced negation from land policies over the past decades.  The Anfal campaign of 
the 1980s sought to nullify Kurds and Assyrians through forced removal from 
Northern Iraq; more recently, Kurdish actors have claimed much of the greater 
Nineveh region as their own.  To reverse the effects of the Kurds’ own displacement 
and consolidate land claims along the established KRG border, including Nineveh, 
Kurdish relocation to formerly Assyrian villages has occurred, fueling land 
contestation and furthering Assyrian displacement.  The Assyria Council of Europe 
stated Kurdish leaders were able to extend their reach across the border into the Iraqi 
state under the guise of providing security and stability as Iraqi politicians were 
preoccupied with sectarian conflict (Assyria Council of Europe 2010: 17; Human 
Rights Watch 2009: 5).  Human Rights Watch similarly found there appeared a ‘two-
pronged strategy’ of inducing minorities to support a Kurdish presence through 
financial aide, patronage, construction of infrastructure, homes, and churches, and 
through repressing those who opposed the Kurdish presence through pressure from 
the peshmerga and militias, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests (Human Rights Watch 
9).   
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For its part, the Kurdish government disputes such allegations, noting, for example, 
that more than 105 Christian villages destroyed by the Ba’ath regime have been 
rebuilt by the KRG since 1991 and that ‘the KRG has done more than any other body 
in Iraq to protect Christians’ (KRG 2009).   
 
However, it remains that Kurdish leaders are undertaking their own nationalizing 
projects in sometimes overlapping proximity to Assyrians and Chaldeans.  
Geographical contestation fuels cultural and symbolic contestation.  Assyrian and 
Chaldean leaders express worry cultural and archeological artifacts are being 
reappropriated as Kurdish.  For example, the Duhok Province’s Directorate of 
Antiquities brochure for the ancient Kharusa ruins do not mention the site was part 
of the ancient Assyrian Empire or contain mention of Assyrians (Directorate of 
Antiquities undated).  CASCA members expressed a similar observation, noting local 
Kurdish authorities did not allow a cross or tribute to Raban Boya, an important 
figure to the region’s Christians, at the ancient Boya shrine, and that the shrine’s ‘very 
identity is being undermined’ as Muslim Kurds re-identify it as their own (DeKelaita 
et al 2010).  Such acts, albeit symbolic, contribute to minimizing one nation’s 
cultural claims on behalf of another.   
 
Thus, as Paul Brass observed, cultural forms, including narratives of indigeneity and 
symbols and myths derived from antiquity, are used as ‘political resources for elites in 
competition for political power and economic advantage’ (Brass 15).  Given the 
diversity of the Nineveh region, the complicated Assyrian and Chaldean history of 
migration, and ongoing land contestation with the KRG, claims of indigeneity are 
important to the Assyrian and Chaldean narrative.  It makes legitimate the atra.  It is 
the belief in both this indigeneity as a unique nation and the practicality of autonomy 
therein as the only viable Assyrian and Chaldean homeland that form the basis of the 
goal for Nineveh Plain autonomy.  
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DIASPORIC PERSPECTIVES TOWARD AUTONOMY 
 
With activism attuned to an autonomous Nineveh Plain, the Assyrian national goal 
has come full-circle from a century ago.  The parallel between the post-Iraq War hope 
for autonomy and that of the post-WWI period is pronounced: mass tragedy and 
displacement bearing out the realities of statelessness; an Iraqi state increasingly 
exclusive of minority populations; a schism of communal opinion between those who 
prefer to quietly integrate and those who prefer the nationalist route; and the 
viability of autonomy challenged by a host of political, demographic, and geographic 
factors.  Both periods fueled demands for autonomy in response to an increasingly 
threatened national existence.  The contemporary tragedy suggests itself the heir to 
this legacy, a carrying of the League of Nations-era torch for a homeland.  However, 
whereas the Simmele Massacre prompted a sustained inquiry into making an 
autonomous Assyrian enclave somewhere in the world, the international community 
has not yet responded in kind to the plight of the 21st century, nor has the U.S. 
government displayed a dedicated interest to securing relief.   
 
With the failure of the national project, subsequent impermeability of Iraq’s borders, 
and reality of displacement, attention of Assyrian and Chaldean diasporic elites 
turned to diasporic nationalism and building the diasporic nation.  Diasporic 
mobilization for autonomy, consequentially, was not a mass, singular moment.  For 
some activists, those nationalists who long carried a torch for a homeland, 
mobilization appeared at the first opportunity of a political opening; for others, rising 
conflict changed their political and national calculi, and autonomy was motivated by 
an existential fear.  Diasporic nation-building had rested on the foundation that the 
Assyrian and Chaldean population was rooted in Iraq.  The redrawing of Iraq 
national membership along ethno-sectarian lines, and the violent enforcement of that 
boundary, perhaps irrevocably changed this foundation, and the question diasporic 
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actors confronted is whether nation-building in diaspora is enough.  For most, the 
fear is that the nation cannot be sustained without roots in the homeland.  
  
Such calculations reflect differences in diasporic long-distance nationalism, and are 
shaped by practicality and political opportunity as much as by ideology.  This section 
therefore considers diasporic perspectives regarding autonomy.  It finds within the 
diaspora three ideological streams: traditional nationalism, the understanding of 
Assyrians as a stateless nation embodied by a quest for self-rule over the homeland; 
pragmatism, the understanding that some measure of autonomy is the best option to 
retain the Assyrian and Chaldean population in Iraq and, in essence, retain the 
Assyrian and Chaldean people; and integrationism, the understanding that Assyrians 
and Chaldeans are part of the Iraqi state or KRG, discomforted by the idea of 
autonomy or separation.  The scope of these ideologies is not mutually exclusive: 
national understandings change in response to internal and external circumstances.  
This section, and this chapter, therefore do not find an Assyrian-Chaldean dichotomy, 
as Assyrian and Chaldean nation-building goals are often aligned, but find wedges 
within each population.  
 
As one activist described, the totality of diasporic perspectives can be seen as a 
continuum or distributive scale, with ardent nationalists on one end and opponents 
on the other.  He finds the majority of the global diaspora has come to support a 
region in some capacity: 
 
The difference has been the extent of such an administrative unit. I think if 
you did a survey of 100,000 Assyrians worldwide, I think you’ll find a 
distribution of answers.  I’ll give you an example.  I was in Australia…and 
[the AUA] said ‘Yeah, we know about this but we don’t subscribe to it.’ 
‘Really? Why?’ ‘It’s too small.’  The literal translation was, this is a bird’s nest.  
This is a bird’s nest, what basically means it’s really small and just enough for 
use and we want a great Assyria.  So they have a lot more grandiose 
plans…And at the other extreme, we go to Detroit and we pitch the same 
thing, and they go, ‘You guys are nuts. We’re few, we have millions around 
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us, and my family’s not there, they’re in Baghdad, they’re in Detroit.’  They 
don’t have that tie and they’re like, ‘We should just be good citizens. If they 
tell us we’re Arabs, if they tell us we’re Kurds, we’re Kurds, just to 
survive’…So it’s a distribution.  There are ones that say, no, that’s a bird’s 
nest, and some that say this is even grandiose.  But I think if you charted it, it 
would be roughly a Gaussian distribution.  The majority are going to be, 
yeah, an administrative unit, makes sense (Jatou Interview).  
 
The range of opinions, as described here and as found throughout interviews with 
community leaders, runs from an uncompromising Assyrian nationalism to a liberal 
Iraqi nationalism.  However, the perception amongst Assyrians that the Detroit 
Chaldean community is strongly against any form of autonomy is highly pervasive.  
As noted below, while the Chaldean Church is the strongest voice against autonomy, 
organizations like the Chaldean Chamber and CFA actively support a Christian-
majority province and at times have come to express rather nationalist sentiments in 
their advocacy.  This section thus seeks to unpack these positions as responses to 
boundary changes and national understandings.  
 
The Nationalist Argument 
 
Shared amongst all major Assyrian political actors is an understanding that an 
Assyrian nation exists and there is an argument to be made its homeland is anchored 
in Nineveh.  Underlying nationalist support for autonomy is the struggle against the 
statelessness of the Assyrian nation as shaped by the legacy of minority and 
marginalization: the Assyrian experience under Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party 
demonstrated that residence in the homeland alone is not enough to successfully 
preserve the nation.  It is here that Assyrians and Chaldeans speak of a cultural 
genocide, of the concerted state effort to negate their culture, language, and history 
with a state-enforced narrative of what it means to be ‘Iraqi’ (Donabed and Mako 
2012).  The overthrow of the Ba’ath regime ushered in a new wave of 
marginalization, as qualifications for membership into the Iraqi state became 
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increasingly reserved for those who are Arab and Muslim.  The current plight 
consequentially inspired a new era of nationalism in the traditional Gellnerian or 
Breuilly sense, which would lay the foundation for renewed diasporic activism.  Here, 
again, ‘nationalism is conceived as the anecdote to nationalism’ (Cheyfitz 2014: 111). 
 
Reclamation of Assyrian territory was a foundational element to early AUA and 
BNDP ideology.  AUA affirms its ‘mission is perpetual through eternity…to regain the 
Assyrian national and territorial rights’ (AUA 2014b).  The quest for territorial rights 
is presented as a legacy that brought forth the AUA’s overarching purpose: made here 
is a clear expression of traditional nationalism.  Similarly, the BNDP’s national 
ideology is noted in previous chapters; its Bet-Nahrain Magazine regularly featured 
national calls to arms, at times in rhetoric that evoked religious elements, drawing 
upon the Christian element of Assyrian identity:  
 
[This] is an inspirational movement, mobilizing a downtrodden people, 
offering them a glimmer of a future, an alternative to the oppression and 
humiliation.  Bet-Nahrainism is an opportunity for the rebirth of the Assyrian 
people as a cultural force and it can lead the Assyrians to their ancient claim 
of a national homeland (Dadesho 1988: 92); 
 
Not long ago, we were a semi-independent nation, at a time when many 
existing nations were not on the map…As the crucifiers of Christ divided His 
garments among themselves, so did our adversaries and our “friends” in 
taking our country; like Christ who was crucified and buried so were we.  But, 
as Christ arose so shall our Assyrian nation arise again! (Dadesho 1988: 6).   
 
A report entitled the ‘Assyrian Case for Autonomy’, first circulated amongst the 
diaspora in the 1980s, attempted to situate Assyrian autonomy ‘in the Mosul area’ as 
the unfulfilled promise of the League of Nations, observing the Assyrian presence in 
Mosul was the primary reason the vilayet was given to Iraq, and the League tasked 
the new state with protecting the rights of Assyrians (BNDP 1982: 9).  It further 
noted Iraq was signatory to international treaties recognizing the rights of peoples to 
self-determination, again drawing upon the notion of an unrepresented, indigenous 
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people.   
 
Rights of indigeneity are central to the territorial component of the nationalist claim.  
As noted earlier, AUA joined the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization; in 
Iraq’s constitutional drafting process, AUA urged the Iraqi government to recognize 
Assyrians ‘as the Indigenous people of Iraq’ and to create an administrative region for 
Assyrians on ‘the land of their ancestors’ (AUA 2005b).  Such ideals have tapped into 
the nationalist discourse, with organizations like the AANC noting Assyrians need 
administrative rights as ‘an endangered ancient culture that literally bridges modern 
humanity to the dawn of civilization…it is in ethnicity with its inevitable ties to 
geography that a people’s inherent and indigenous rights to survive derive’ (AANC 
2014).  Intermittent efforts to advocate for the national claim occurred between the 
post-WWI era and the Iraq War, including sporadic meetings the AUA held with the 
Ba’ath Administration in the 1970s to push the issue in spite of obvious challenges 
(Yonan 1996).  While unsuccessful, that this advocacy existed reinforces that 
national demands for autonomy have persisted and carried amongst a segment of 
diasporic nationalists.  At the same time, this advocacy was a relatively inactive cause 
within the diaspora, and a stark contrast is seen in political advocacy for autonomy 
prior to and following the Iraq War.   
 
The post-Iraq War environment was thus formative to elevating autonomy as a 
mainstream, political goal.  As the previous chapter detailed, early diasporic action 
focused largely on inclusiveness and democratic rights; however, there was 
underlying this a nationalist voice urging special national rights in the constitution.  
It is unsurprising ethnic recognition would coincide with an increase in nationalist 
sentiment.  Removal of Ba’ath rule also lifted cultural restrictions, enabling civic 
efforts to increase ethnic expression from the use of the Assyrian language in public 
schools and local governance to the celebration of holidays and cultural events, all 
symbolic markers of national identity.  Such national sentiment has fueled displays of 
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national symbols.  As Waleeta Canon, a founder of the AANC, observed, the quest for 
autonomy is a national effort founded on the understanding of a unique 
Assyrianness:   
 
In Iraq, Assyrians have spent decades building and running their Assyrian 
language schools. They salute the Assyrian flags which fly over official and 
public buildings, and wrap themselves in it in nationalist fervor and defiance. 
They have built Assyrian civic groups, cultural groups, and student groups to 
keep the Assyrian identity, culture, and language alive in their Homeland. 
This isn't a flight of fancy: it is an organized effort to assert their ethnic 
identity (Canon 2007). 
 
This presents the Assyrian nation, repressed by the Ba’ath regime, as seizing the 
advent of a democratic state to reclaim its ethnic identity through cultural, symbolic, 
and linguistic expressions.  The importance of protecting national and cultural 
markers, and the fear they will be lost to assimilation, likewise fuels the belief a 
national project is necessary for its preservation: 
  
We’re continuing to advocate for an administrative unit in the Nineveh Plain, 
where we have enough numbers and enough towns and villages that we 
could have a self-sustaining community that could thrive.  We’re not looking 
for ghetto, to be honest; we’re not saying, people that live in the capitol, in 
Baghdad, in Erbil, all come here and make this little ghetto in the middle of a 
sea of the Middle East. But at least there’s a place that can really maintain the 
culture.  We see it as a well or a spring that maintains the culture and 
language, and people will move into the cities, will move to diaspora, but that 
will be the source of our existence (Jatou Interview). 
 
Jatou taps into the connection between diasporic nationalism and long-distance 
nationalism toward the homeland: the need for roots, a ‘source of existence’, to 
sustain and save -and, in a sense, validate- the Assyrian nation in perpetuity.  The 
challenges facing Assyrians today are different than past crises because the 
community can no longer isolate itself in the Hakkari mountains, because of the 
permanency of dispersal -- and because it is feared this push from Iraq may be final.   
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It is argued here the reason the nationalist ideology has gained support, and is likely 
to continue to do so as persecution persists, is that the need for ‘roots’, and the fear 
the Assyrians and Chaldeans will cease to exist without roots, is almost universally 
expressed by diasporic elites: it is ‘really easy to melt’ in America (Tamraz Interview).  
Indeed, the worry Assyrians cannot survive in diaspora alone is a driving force for the 
most basic national claim: the right of existence.   
   
From the Chaldean perspective, autonomy is seen less as the fulfillment of a denied 
state or denied rights to autonomy, in part because narratives of the Ottoman 
genocide and Simmele massacre are less prevalent in the Chaldean diaspora.  
However, there is an underlying belief that Chaldeans constitute a unique component 
of Iraq, and there has emerged a nationalist-leaning argument for autonomy from 
Chaldean activists that shares the belief Assyrians and Chaldeans are one people with 
a right to their homeland.  This is most strongly articulated by the Chaldean Chamber 
and its affiliated organizations, CASCA and NCA.  However, this nationalism has 
taken a unique form as it does not claim a separate Chaldean nation and has not 
embraced the guise of a solely Assyrian one.  Rather, it takes ambivalence towards 
the name or identity label whilst stressing that Chaldeans and Assyrians need to 
remain in Iraq to survive in diaspora.  As Martin Manna described his position 
regarding autonomy: 
 
The reason I am in favour of creating this province is because without it, 
eventually we’ll become extinct. The reality is, our language will die out; if 
we don’t have any roots in Iraq, there will be no existence of Chaldeans or 
Assyrians…So that’s my position, not necessarily the community’s position, 
but that’s why I’m thinking if I want to maintain and preserve our identity, we 
need a homeland.  And again, it goes back to, look at the Jewish community.  
We’re a similar community but without Israel (Manna Interview 2012).   
 
Presented here is a nationalist understanding of Iraq’s Christian communities.  It is 
not as succinctly nationalist an argument as those which claim a right to self-rule, but 
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similarly contends Assyrians and Chaldeans represent a unique people and a province 
is perhaps the last option for national preservation.  Their national existence had 
become incompatible with Iraq’s ever-narrowing boundaries.  This is very much akin 
to the argument made by Assyrian nationalists, the Gellnerian need to make the 
national and political congruent.    
 
Thus, evident throughout the nationalist argument is a stateless diasporic nation 
seeking self-rule.  This is not just a desire for Assyrians and Chaldeans to be in Iraq or 
the homeland, but to have political control over that territory and its people - 
fundamentally, a quintessential, traditional nationalist claim for congruency and 
state power in the guise of Gellner and Breuilly.  Pragmatic outcomes, such as the 
socio-economic benefit to the community, are intwined with, but secondary to, the 
larger, overarching point of the Assyrian (and Chaldean) nation, and its right and 
need to exist.  
 
The Pragmatic Argument 
 
The pragmatic argument shares the nationalist belief that Assyrians and Chaldeans 
are a unique people; however, it is less a staunch ideology than a belief that reliance 
on the Iraqi state for security and protection of liberal democratic rights is simply no 
longer a viable solution: as corruption, marginalization, and violence continue, 
something must be done to keep the community safe and respond to the crisis of 
displacement.  Here, arguments made by moderate Assyrian and Chaldean voices 
encompass the need for security, a ‘safe haven’, equal treatment, and opportunity.  In 
a sense, pragmatism brings out a reluctant nationalism, one disinclined or apathetic 
toward national autonomy but making national claims because humanitarian need 
and the social, economic, and political dysfunction of Iraq compel it.   
 
The pragmatic embrace of autonomy, then, is not distancing from early post-Hussein 
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goals of liberal democratic rights; rather, following the argument Kamber presented 
regarding a federal Iraqi state, it became the only way to secure those rights for 
Chaldeans and Assyrians.  Themes of discrimination, of the early promise of such 
rights remaining unfulfilled, feature prominently as a cause for autonomy, 
particularly when seen in comparison with the Kurdish experience: 
 
Originally, there was supposed to be part of Iraq some freedoms, some rights, 
but unfortunately we did not get things that were promised…the United 
States, they promise a lot of things, they haven’t done anything.  Before 
America went into Iraq, there were so many dialogues, you know? Promised a 
lot of things, but they did nothing. And they went to Iraq and everything’s 
changed…The promise was we would have rights like everybody else…they 
helped with the Kurds, but they did not help us (Tamraz Interview). 
 
Again, there is a high awareness that the Kurdish minority has been given special 
status to protect and preserve its nationhood, and that Assyrians and other minorities 
have continuously been overlooked.  This contrast recalls the pre-war planning 
efforts and the barriers Assyrians and Chaldeans encountered in obtaining equal 
recognition.  The reality that the KRG has uniquely protected Kurds from renewed 
ethno-sectarian cleansing and provided the ability for nation-building is a lesson for 
Assyrians and Chaldeans, and point of contrast to the protections afforded to Iraq’s 
other minority populations.   
 
Pragmatic arguments thus tend to be responsive to the crisis at hand.  The 
preservation and safety of the community, quality of life, and opportunity are 
commonly-cited concerns, especially amongst organizations working in or with direct 
ties to Iraq, where such struggles are witnessed firsthand.  The understanding that 
basic rights were not enough is widespread throughout the diaspora and is heavily 
informed by past experiences of marginalization.  As Natalie Babella of AAS observed 
from her trips to Iraq:   
 
You know, discrimination is still there; persecution in many ways is still there.  
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We need our basic rights.  And although on the surface it says, okay, you do 
have them – but where are they?  It’s very much needed for our people to 
have that safe haven, that government, that they can help build our 
community there.  Really, I think they’ve been hit in the head like a million 
times that sometimes they’re scared to try something.  Sometimes they’re 
scared to apply for a job because they know it won’t work (Babella 
Interview).    
 
Discrimination, marginalization, and lack of opportunity are common themes that 
underscore a pragmatic case for autonomy.  Underscoring why nationalism seeks 
state power, the disconnect from constitutional provisions to government policy in 
practice is evident.  Babella further elaborated that her visits reinforced the need for 
a region to help make life easier: 
 
The organization leaders there told me they applied for this irrigation project. 
It was 2012, he told us it’s been five years that the project has not been 
approved, and probably not even touched…So things like that really convince 
me that yes, we do need a region…No one can take care of us like we can… 
We’re the indigenous people of the land, most of the land is ours…So yes, I 
think it’s needed to help our people, to mobilize our people, to give them the 
opportunity to succeed in jobs, gain education, just live happily….And that 
country’s so fertile, it’s so full of opportunities…There’s so much potential for 
everybody there, but definitely Assyrians.  I think they’ve struggled too much.  
They definitely deserve that region (Babella Interview). 
 
This argument is particularly resonant because AAS navigates Iraqi politics and 
bureaucracy to conduct its operations in Iraq.  Operating the country’s only Assyrian-
language schools offers a unique perspective on the possibility Assyrian and Chaldean 
language, culture, and other national markers can persist absent a region.  Likewise, 
Hanna of the CNC, who worked with the U.S. Military during the Iraq War, today 
understands autonomy as a means to combat discrimination and ensure fair 
treatment and opportunity for Chaldeans.  He noted Chaldeans are not the sole 
majority of the Nineveh Plain’s population but its concentration at least offers 
opportunity for employment, security, and better treatment, and will ensure 
provincial funding is administered directly to the Nineveh Plain, correcting the 
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comparative neglect under the current Nineveh province.  As he commented: 
 
We could, most important, grow a new generation of Chaldeans who know 
power…we can create our own books, can make decisions…If we can get the 
province - aye, that’s the greatest achievement…Without holding the land, 
you can’t make it. (Hanna Interview).     
 
Echoing a core point shared with nationalists, is the need to ‘hold the land’.  Found 
herein is an echo of Breuilly, the hope Chaldeans will gain a measure of power and, 
implicitly, the dignity that comes with it.  Many elites similarly concluded conditions 
on the ground needed to be improved so those who wished to return to Iraq could 
live there safely, as noted by Kassab in turning his focus from refugee admissions to 
in-country programs.  Security and economic development in Nineveh remain a key 
focus.   
 
Chaldean support for autonomy commonly centers upon these arguments of 
necessity: necessity for the survival of their people and necessity of the economic 
development and liberal political ideals such a province would bring to Iraq.  Found 
within this approach are CASCA, CFA, and the Chaldean Chamber, the Detroit-based 
organizations which first mobilized around the refugee crisis and since expanded 
their mission to include the creation of an autonomous province.  CASCA, as an 
advocacy project, tasked itself with building support for autonomy from within the 
diaspora, the U.S. government, the Iraqi and Kurdish governments because it ‘views 
the Nineveh Plain and adjacent areas where our people live as an essential and 
critical Last Stand of our people in cultural, political, demographic, linguistic, and 
religious terms’ (CASCA 2008; also see DeKelaita 2008).  CASCA and the NCA, its 
lobbying arm, make practical and pragmatic claims to round out the logic of a 
province: it will bring development and investment; it will provide a multicultural, 
moderate region in Iraq; it will provide a safe haven for Christians and - notably - 
other minorities, allowing hundreds of thousands of refugees to return to Iraq 
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(Manna Interview 2014, 2012; Nineveh Council of America 2013).  The potential 
economic contributions are likewise emphasized in the NCA’s policy statement: 
 
This Christian segment of Iraq will become a cosmopolitan link to many Iraqi 
Christian segments of the world, which can and will contribute to a bright 
future for Iraq…This area will have great potential for achieving high 
standards in education, social living, culture and tourism, as well as 
developing and promoting a culture of tolerance and peace that will benefit 
all of Iraq (Nineveh Council of America 2013).   
 
The use of a pragmatic, politically-appealing argument is unsurprising as the 
Chamber and CFA are not nationalist movements and have showcased a preference 
for policy that responds to a particular need rather than policy shaped by a specific 
ideology.  As noted in the next section, this has not always seen the support of the 
whole Chaldean community, particularly those who are fearful an autonomous 
region might increase insecurity.  Chaldean leaders are highly aware of this concern, 
and respond by stressing a province does not exclude remaining part of Iraq; as 
Manna commented, ‘We’ve always said that all of Iraq is ours, we will always be part 
of the Iraqi family.  But why not have an opportunity for self-governance?’ (Manna 
Interview 2014).  The presence of such debate within the community is significant 
because it is, at its core, a debate over long-distance nationalism, of how Chaldeans 
fit into a post-Hussein Iraq.  The pragmatic argument found here sees integration as 
possessing shortcomings: either it is not enough to protect the community, or it is too 
idealistic to be conceivable.   
 
Uncertainty towards the region was apparent in an interview comment made by 
Joseph Kassab, as Executive Director of the CFA, who framed his support of 
territorial autonomy as a matter of supporting what those in Iraq want:  
 
Is the idea right or wrong?  I don’t know.  To myself, I cannot judge that.  But 
what I can judge is, we definitely need our people to survive, we need them 
to prosper, and we need them to have the use of the country’s resources.  This 
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is not happening.  So whatever  - and this is my opinion now – whatever 
works out well to support those three, or to provide those three elements, I’m 
happy with (Kassab Interview 2012).   
 
Here, there is not a similar underlying national sentiment, but a determination that if 
this will help and it has the community’s support, it is worth pursuing.   
 
A pragmatic approach is not just found in moderate Chaldean discourse, but amongst 
moderate Assyrians, most notably the ADM, which initially viewed the question of 
autonomy as non-essential.  Its representative to the U.S., Lincoln Malik, wrote of the 
diaspora’s ‘wish that the clock turn back 2,500 years, and we live in the glory that 
was Assyria.  We don’t much talk about this secret dream, but we adorn our houses 
with pictures and reminders of that glorious past in silent testament to this sweet but 
wishful dream’ (Malik 1999).  He implicitly contrasted this attitude with that of the 
ADM, noting, ‘Zowaa offers a progressive and pragmatic political program for 
achieving our legitimate national rights...Our commitment is to build a better 
tomorrow for our people under the banner of “Democracy in Iraq” and “Affirmation 
of our national existence in our homeland”’ (ibid).  
 
ADM policy began to officially change in 2003 following its General Conference, 
when attendees endorsed a self-administered region in the Nineveh Plain (ADM 
2003).  Although Kanna and ADM officials have worked in pursuit of the Nineveh 
Plain goal, including the language contained in Article 125, Kanna’s preference 
remains for a non-ethnic administrative unit, having stated, for example, ‘Our people 
are sometimes emotional saying “autonomy for Christians.”  This is creating hatred 
and sensitivity, making things much worse. You cannot do something on an ethnic or 
religious basis’ (Quoted in Manna 2010).  Rejection of an ethnic argument is 
surprising given ADM is an ethno-national party, yet unsurprising given its 
nationalism has not sought self-rule.  Expressed here is both a political calculation 
and a position consistent with ADM ideology: there is concern that extreme political 
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demands may further hostility towards Assyrians and Chaldeans and negate any 
opportunity for self-administration before it has a chance to move forward, as well as 
an underlying preference for Assyrian integration across Iraq that, at its core, has 
rejected carving out an exclusively-Assyrian territory.  As the most prominent 
Assyrian politician in Iraq, who works within Iraq’s political system, there is a 
necessity of framing political claims within legal parameters.  As Alan Mansour, 
ADM’s Director for the U.S. and Canada, has commented, ‘When you are a minority 
you play by the rules and do what the constitution allows you to’ (Quoted in Wiswell 
2008).   
 
Consequentially, the ADM has preferred a limited administrative area in accordance 
with Article 125; this position was modified in 2011 following a conference amongst 
leading Assyrian and Chaldean political organizations, in which attendees, including 
the ADM, agreed to work towards establishing a province.  At the same time, ADM 
officials pushed for other, more immediate means to support Assyrians and 
Chaldeans.  Significant amongst this is the pursuit of Assyrian security forces:  
 
Recent events in Mosul are confirming the need for a self-protected area for 
the Chaldean Assyrian Syriac people in Iraq…Due to our status as minority in 
Iraq the toll of these events is much grater than our counter parts. Therefore, 
self-protection for the Nineveh Plains and surrounding areas is necessary to 
maintain peace and balance amidst Iraqi political and security conflicts (ADM 
USA and Canada Branch 2008).  
  
Thus, while the ADM officially endorses a self-administered unit, concern remains 
amongst its members for short-term security, and for long-term national rights 
should Assyrians become a minority within the region (ADM Interview).  NCA shares 
similar concerns (Manna Interview 2014).  This hesitation reflects in part long-
distance nationalism that differentiates these organizations from more nationalist 
organizations.  However, a pragmatic approach to autonomy also leads to the 
awareness of ways in which autonomy is not a perfect solution, but perhaps the least-
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bad solution.   
 
Given the political divisions which exist, nationalist organizations routinely question 
the commitment of pragmatists to advancing autonomy.  Dadesho, for example, has 
criticized the ADM’s commitment to Nineveh as superficial, noting, ‘The ADM has 
given up on its original objective to get back our national rights in Iraq.  They are not 
asking for our national rights anymore, they are only asking for educational and 
administrative rights in Iraq’ (Quoted in Salerno 2005).  Likewise, despite several 
years of CASCA and CFA outreach to American and Iraqi policy-makers in support of 
autonomy, the perception remains that such advocacy is superficial or inclined to 
change.  In a sense, this is perhaps accurate, as the support of these organizations for 
autonomy is not the product of a deep-seated nationalism, and could change as 
political and socio-economic factors change.  This underscores the calculation to 
align nation-building with autonomy is a pragmatic one, balancing response to the 
situation at hand with long-term interests.   
 
For those who see the Nineveh Plain as a solution to harbour those who are 
displaced, the desired results are similarly pragmatic, focusing on how to achieve 
autonomy in a feasible fashion rather than an ideal fashion.  There is a fear Assyrians 
and Chaldeans are caught geographically and ideologically between two unfavorable 
outcomes and have nowhere left to turn.  Hence, although this goal is less a 
traditional nationalist demand for territorial and political alignment than it is a quest 
for a measure of power to provide security and opportunity, it nonetheless reaffirms 
a nationalism desiring control of the mechanisms of the state.   
 
The Integrationist Argument  
 
Despite such efforts to frame the issue as the best last-chance solution for Christians 
to remain safely in Iraq, the idea has not been sold across the diaspora.  The 
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Chaldean Church has been one of the most prominent opponents, with religious 
officials expressing concern such a province would create a ‘Christian ghetto’ that 
isolates Chaldeans from the rest of society and renders them vulnerable, in an 
already contested land, to outside attack (Sako 2007a).  The question of safety is a 
foremost concern amongst those who oppose a province; Jacob Bacall noted that the 
Christian community is simply unable to protect itself at the scale a province would 
require: ‘I personally feel this is a trap for the Christians, because, as I mentioned to 
you earlier, we had this small town we couldn’t protect and we had a church we 
couldn’t protect, among others…It’s a trap’ (Bacall and Bacall Interview). 
 
Found within the integrationist rejection of autonomy is a questioning of the 
feasibility of a territorial unit.  Bacall, echoing a common sentiment, questioned 
autonomy as a long-standing national dream tempered by the reality of Iraq’s 
demographics: ‘Almost every Assyrian I have known, always everybody talk about 
Nineveh and getting Nineveh back. I mean, come on…Nineveh, in the heart of Iraq, 
surrounded by a sea of Muslims’ (Bacall and Bacall Interview).  Noting the poverty, 
unemployment, and underdevelopment of the Nineveh Plain region, there is doubt 
thousands of displaced Christians can relocate to a region that is already unable to 
provide for the population currently there.  There is also concern state officials will 
have little incentive to make protection and integration of Christians outside the 
region a priority, potentially further marginalizing those still living in Baghdad or 
elsewhere.   
 
Whilst Delly and the American bishops gave a pretense of neutrality mixed with 
skepticism, Sako has long been an ardent opponent of autonomy because of security 
and marginalization concerns, as well as a belief that Chaldeans belong in Iraq:   
 
We Christians are a fundamental component of the history and culture of 
Iraq. We are a significant presence in the social and religious life of the 
country and we feel Iraqi. We have resisted threats and persecution and have 
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found ways to continue to live and bear witness to the Gospel in our land 
without ceasing being loyal citizens even at the cost of the lives of our fathers, 
brothers and sons (Sako 2009).  
 
Here, the Patriarch articulates a measure of Iraqi nationalism, affirming the future of 
Iraq’s Christians is that of the future of Iraq.  The explicit goal is for Christians to 
remain a part of Iraqi society.  Sako stresses such a goal is attainable through 
pluralism, integration, national unity, and for moderate Muslims to reject intolerance 
(Sako 2009; Sako 2007a, Sako 2007b).  This opinion has been echoed by other 
Chaldean Church officials, including the Archbishop of Baghdad, Shlemon Warduni, 
who has commented on the need for a unified Iraq: ‘There is just one Iraq, one Iraqi 
population, that is composed of multiple ethnic groups and religions…We will be the 
richer when the Arab, Chaldean, Assyrian, Kurdish, Turkish cultures will be able to 
live together’ (Quoted in Servizio Informazione Religiosa 2009).   
 
This position rejects Assyrian/Chaldean territorial nation-building for a plural, liberal 
Iraqi nationalism.  Present here is a difference in interpretation from the nationalist 
viewpoint: both ideologies recognize fundamentalism has always existed in Iraq, but 
whilst nationalists conclude self-rule is perhaps the only remaining means for 
preservation, the integrationist viewpoint concludes society can again normalize with 
the work of dedicated moderates and social construction.  As Warduni further 
commented, ‘We have lived here for centuries, Christians and Muslims, but the 
fundamentalists, who have always existed everywhere, have broken a certain balance 
and undermine harmony…We don’t give up; we sow the seeds of friendship so that 
we may soon harvest a new peace’ (Quoted in Conte 2008).   
 
The CDF is similarly disinclined towards national or territorial claims, finding the 
idea of a Christian region to be incongruous with the Chaldean place in Iraq.  This 
viewpoint likewise understands Chaldeans possess a claim of indigeneity, but with a 
different conclusion:  
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For me, first, we are Iraqi people. And we are citizens of Iraq. Our people are 
there – I call them the Native Indian, like we are the native, indigenous 
people.  So this kind of isolation, I don’t like it... Why I should have my 
corner, and you have your corner, and if I come to your corner, you’re going 
to fight with me?  We don’t need that…I don’t know how long we can survive 
there and if we can survive, but we’d like to do that as much as we can, and 
we are trying to do that to push even the American government to help our 
people, to end the discrimination, and to give us our rights.  And like every 
other group that lives in Iraq, we have to have our own name preserved 
(Barka Interview).   
 
Instead of drawing on indigeneity to support territorial claims, indigeneity is instead 
used to reaffirm a desire for integration within Iraq, protected by liberal democratic 
rights.  
 
Just as the continued Iraqi crisis affected perceptions toward autonomy, the Church’s 
position might similarly affect perceptions toward integration.  For diasporic activists 
who see their role as representing Chaldeans in Iraq, the Church is undeniably an 
important voice.  Kassab, who seemed to possess reservations regarding autonomy as 
noted in the previous section, expressed his underlying concerns of creating another 
group-specific geographic boundary:  
 
The Nineveh Plain autonomy or province is like you’re creating a country 
inside a country.  We don’t want that.  We already have that.  We already 
have the KRG and we have the Iraqi government.  And if we do that, then the 
Sunni will do that, then the others will do that, then it will be a big, big mess 
in Iraq (Kassab Interview 2013).   
 
Instead, his new organization favoured what he saw as a middle ground approach, of 
how to have some form of self-rule to protect minority rights and interests without 
creating a ‘ghetto’; Kassab referred to his new project as Special Administrative 
Autonomy, a form of semi-autonomy that allows minority villages to form a federal 
association for administering their villages, aspiring to protect cultural autonomy 
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through a structure disassociated from a single territorial unit (Kassab Interview 
2013).  This extra-territorial design recalls in some ways the nature of a diasporic 
nation, but one provided with specific legal administrative rights.  The end game, 
essentially, is for a multicultural state, for a civil or civic Iraqi nationalism in which 
Chaldean and Assyrian rights are respected as a component of Iraq and the KRG.  
 
There is a wedge within the integrationist viewpoint, however: some in diaspora feel 
Iraqi society cannot normalize, and the response is perhaps integration into diaspora.  
This is essentially an argument that the nation can survive in diaspora, removed from 
territory, and subverting traditional understandings of nationalism and nation-
building.  Ibrahim, for example, expressed pessimism with both the nationalist and 
integrationist options.  He described autonomy as ‘hoping against hope’, stating the 
need avoid discouragement of those who support it, but observing it is difficult to see 
how there can be a future for Chaldeans with either the Arabs or Kurds (Author’s 
Interview Notes 2013).  He expressed the most pressing goal is for community 
members still in Iraq to enjoy their democratic rights, but finds democracy alone is 
not enough: he cited one village that had 120 families prior to the war witness its 
population drop to 40 because there is little opportunity for employment or means to 
support a family.  He saw this trajectory as inevitable, estimating in 25 years there 
will be few Chaldeans in Iraq (ibid).  In this vein, the ideology is that diasporas do 
not require a state; as he stated in a recent speech to the CDF, ‘We don’t like to create 
a new country for us. We have a homeland; the whole world is our homeland. We 
have Iraq and America, that are enough for us to live in’ (Ibrahim 2013).  The atra, 
here, is extra-territorial.   
 
This sentiment is shared by several Chaldean leaders.  The response is not a turn to 
territory and autonomy, nor integration into Iraq, but rather a diasporic nation: an 
effort to allow Chaldean culture and identity to flourish in multicultural Western 
societies.  As Eddie Bacall commented:  
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On the one hand, it hurts me to see Christians leaving Iraq, our villages; on 
the other hand, I see them, they have better future for them, for their kids, 
grandkids…I’m living in a great country here, and this is land of 
opportunities. I feel more citizen here, 200 times more than Iraq.  Here I can 
do whatever I want to do. Open my TV station, newspaper, my own 
church…My brother’s publishing a book.  In Iraq he couldn’t publish a book 
about the Christians. They wouldn’t allow him to publish a book.  I couldn’t 
speak my language.  Here, we have our radio station, TV station in our 
language (Bacall and Bacall Interview).   
 
The alternative to preserving Chaldeans and Chaldeanness, as found here, is perhaps 
the diaspora’s and Church’s efforts to build a diasporic nation, to cultivate a flexible 
but resonant social boundary in diaspora to protect and sustain the language, culture, 
and historical elements of Chaldeanness within diasporic institutions.  In some ways, 
Chaldean identity and culture are more able to flourish in the U.S. because of the 
ability to cultivate ethnic institutions.  Jacob Bacall noted that successive Iraqi 
governments marginalized non-Arab identities, in contrast to the freedom to build 
Chaldeanness in diaspora:  
 
Myself, in Iraq, other than reading the name Chaldean in my church and 
some of the very, very, very few books that has referred to Chaldeans, I 
thought we were Arabs. Simply the fact that we were Christian - of course I 
was young and there was nobody to educate you like you have here, the 
freedom for education you have.  Now every association we have here has a 
Chaldean name. Everything. Chaldean Chamber of Commerce, the Chaldean 
Club, Chaldean Foundation (Bacall and Bacall Interview).   
 
In some sense, this represents an understanding that while integration is not 
immediately plausible in Iraq, integration is happening elsewhere and it is there to 
which the Iraqi community is emigrating.  As a San Diego resident commented 
regarding the need to build a strong Chaldean Church in the U.S., ‘The patriarch 
talks about keeping Chaldean culture alive in Iraq...But what about here? This is our 
Babylon’ (Quoted in Perry 2015).  The importance of institutions and identity to 
nation-building are evident, enabling the nation – a new atra, a new Babylon – to 
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survive wherever such nation-building can take place.   
 
Despite the omnipresent threat of persecution, some leaders have suggested a path to 
improve acceptance of Christians that ties into the middleman diaspora theory of 
Gellner (1983), Blalock (1967) and Bonacich (1973).  Such an approach echoes the 
narrative of Chaldeans as a minority population providing services and skills, often 
filling a niche role in society, from which acceptance and integration improve as the 
wider society recognizes the minority’s role.  As Kassab commented:  
 
If I develop something good, let’s say I build a university in the area…I’m 
cultivating not only my people to become members of the organization, but 
also I bring in those who were fighting me and persecuting me…It’s not 
appeasing them, but at least quenching their thirst to persecute me.  They 
start to understand, look, this guy is valuable…This guy, the Christian, he was 
able to do it, so let me give him a chance…That’s where the Christian role can 
come.  That’s why I keep saying, Middle East, and mainly Iraq, without 
Christians, is like a garden without flowers…We have that mind that you can 
be creative, you can be innovative, but here’s one thing that a lot of people 
don’t do, other than Christians, is we share…Because if people do that, and 
share, then there will not be this animosity, and these particular fights and 
wars and persecutions (Kassab Interview 2012). 
 
The ideology of integration, at its core, is not entirely dissimilar from the nationalist 
approach: it sees Chaldeans, and Assyrians, as an indigenous, important component 
of Iraq.  The difference, rather, lies in to where long-distance nationalism is projected 
- whether to Iraq or the homeland, whether manifested as the Nineveh Plain or as a 
permanent diaspora.  The difference also lies within the interpretation of social 
boundaries, with an assumption expressed herein that boundaries will shift and 
expand because of the value of Christian membership.  In contrast to the 
aforementioned ideologies, integrationism is consequentially less about control of the 
state, instead reflecting Gellner’s characterization that diasporic nationalisms long 
gave up any claim to power as the ‘price of entering’ its professional role and the 
state itself (Gellner 105).   
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At times, the reluctance of Chaldeans to support autonomy is correspondingly 
attributed to a stereotype of Chaldeans as historically an adaptive, integrationist 
minority, one which tended to keep its head down and avoid politics.  This 
perception was noted by Assyrians and Chaldeans alike, that:  
 
The Assyrian nationalists were jailed and hung, so this is what politics gets 
you.  You get involved in politics, you go to jail, you get killed.  So they 
stayed away from it.  So that remains, to be honest.  I don’t think that’s 
changed (Jatou Interview). 
 
Whilst the fear of insecurity and the consequences for opposition continues to shape 
an element of the integrationist perspective, integration also possesses an 
understanding the nation is entwined with membership in the Iraqi state, or has 
found its future in diaspora.   
 
The Iraqi crisis has challenged some diasporic perceptions regarding political 
engagement and the reality facing their community in Iraq.  A shift in nationalism 
hence occurred in the diaspora alongside a shift in Iraq’s national boundaries.  Prior 
to the outbreak of sectarian conflict, the demand for an autonomous Assyrian and 
Chaldean region was a far-reaching pipe dream fashioned by ardent nationalists, 
whereas liberal, democratic rights were a tangible, achievable way to protect 
Assyrian and Chaldean culture and identity.  Yet in the aftermath of sectarian 
conflict, and the failure of Iraqi society to normalize and govern fairly, a liberal 
democracy tolerant of ethno-religious minorities is instead perceived by many as the 
far-off pipe dream, and the establishment of a province a more tangible means of 
protection.  As Jatou observed a Gaussian distribution, as quoted at the beginning of 
this section, a large segment of diasporic elites have come to support autonomy 
because it is understood as a national solution and, given the change in 
circumstance, the more pragmatic solution.  Exclusionary boundaries turned many 
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diasporic actors into long-distance nationalists demanding the quintessential 
foundation of nation-building: territorial autonomy.   
 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE NINEVEH PLAIN 
 
The current phase of diasporic engagement marks the first time the modern diaspora 
has developed and instrumentalized a national claim in an external state.  Because 
Assyrians and Chaldeans are a powerless minority with no expectations of controlling 
the state itself, the only prospects for autonomy came through lobbying the state, and 
influential outside states, for change.  Long-distance nationalism thus moved 
ideology and imagining of a homeland into a politically-focused project for 
autonomy, coinciding with Breuilly’s observation that nationalism ‘above and beyond 
all else’ is inherently a political claim (Breuilly 1).   
 
This section examines the logistics of turning the imprecise goal of autonomy into a 
feasible policy measure.  Considered is the legal foundation upon which the demand 
for autonomy is based.  Several points of division occurred within the pro-autonomy 
diaspora over its politics.  The first regarded the specifics of such a unit in practice: 
the extent of its administrative powers and if it would take form as an administrative 
unit, region, or province.  The second, which remains a significant wedge, is whether 
the autonomous unit should be under Iraq or the KRG: it is such divisions that, in 
part, have hindered a more united diasporic effort. 
 
Foremost, national claims required grounding in the Iraqi constitution.  It was the 
constitution’s guarantee of ethnic-specific rights from which calls for self-
administration materialized into autonomy demands.  Although pre-war mobilization 
in the U.S. did not center on territorial rights, an autonomy demand from both 
diasporic and Iraqi community members was nonetheless present at the ADM’s 2003 
General Conference.  Notably, this occurred before ethno-sectarian conflict solidified 
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across Iraq.  As Kurds and Shiites understood the opening of the political structure as 
their opportunity to insert their claims for unique national or religious rights, 
Assyrian nationalists made the same calculation.  The Conference directed the ADM, 
specifically Kanna as the only Christian appointed to the IGC, to push for the 
inclusion of an administrative region in Iraq’s Temporary Administrative Law (TAL), 
which the IGC was tasked with approving.  It was expected the framework of the TAL 
would shape the framework of Iraq’s permanent constitution (Youash 2007).  
 
Organizations like the AUA and ISDP hoped for constitutional provisions placing 
Assyrians and Chaldeans on par with the Kurdish population, which would have 
created comparable opportunities for autonomy.  Joseph Tamraz stressed that the 
failure to secure stronger and more specific national rights was not for a lack of effort 
in the constitutional drafting process, but a failure of those who shaped the final 
constitution:  
 
We were involved; it’s not that we were not.  But the thing is, like I said, 
history keeps repeating itself…The things we were promised or told that we 
would get didn’t happen. So even right at the beginning, when they put in the 
interim government, we had leadership within it, but after they had changes 
with the constitution, we didn’t get anything (Tamraz Interview).  
 
Instead, final language was superficially clear but legally vague, creating a restrictive 
framework for national claims to be made (Youash 2007; AUA 2005a).  Grounds for 
autonomy are consequentially interpreted through two provisions in the Iraqi 
constitution: Article 125, which provides for the guarantee of ‘administrative’ rights 
to the various nationalities, including specifically to Chaldeans and Assyrians; and 
Article 116, which establishes a federal structure within Iraq comprised of ‘a 
decentralized capitol, regions, and governorates, and local administrations’.31   
                                            
31 The word ممححااففظظةة is translated as both governorate or province.  While governorate appears 
as the preferred legal term and province as more colloquial, both translations are often used 
interchangeably, as is the case in this dissertation. 
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The language of these provisions is imprecise as to what is meant by administrative 
rights and local administrations.  To substantiate this is meant as rights beyond those 
conferred to any local municipality, organizations utilized other constitutional 
provisions to clarify this argument:  Article 93 notes the Supreme Court shall settle 
disputes between the federal government and ‘the governments of the regions and 
governorates, municipalities, and local administrations’; and Article 122 notes 
governorates are comprised of ‘districts, sub-districts and villages’ (ISDP 2008: 4-5).  
Found herein, advocates note, is the application of ‘administrative’ rights uniquely 
and specifically to the case of national minorities and not as a typical layer of the 
federal structure.   
 
Additionally, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then-
Committee Chairman Joseph Biden asked Ryan Crocker, then U.S. Ambassador to 
Iraq, directly about an autonomous region in the Nineveh Plain and improving 
security for minorities, to which Crocker responded:  
 
Some Iraqi parliamentarians and local politicians in Ninawa have called for 
an autonomous region in Ninawa province, citing Article 125 of the Iraqi 
Constitution. Iraqi citizens can pursue the creation of a separate 
administrative region through processes consistent with this article. The best 
way to provide physical and economic security for vulnerable Iraqis is to help 
build a democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq with a security force that 
provides protection for all of Iraq's citizens (Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations 2007). 
 
Several points from this exchange are informative.  First, Crocker clearly states the 
Bush Administration’s opinion that the creation of an administrative region is legal 
on the basis of Article 125.  Second, for Biden to inquire specifically about an 
autonomous Nineveh Plain as a political goal indicates those advocating for 
autonomy had made inroads into raising the profile of the Nineveh Plain within 
Washington.  Third, while Crocker does not take a position on the creation of 
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administrative region, the implication reinforces the U.S. preference for a single, 
unified Iraq absent ethnic-specific subdivisions.   
 
Such calls for a united Iraq are made somewhat difficult by the special status enjoyed 
by the KRG.  Any legal claim regarding the ability to form an administrative unit is 
further challenged by Kurdish land claims and Nineveh’s resultant status as a 
contested territory.  Article 140 of the Iraq Constitution was to provide for a 
referendum to settle the placement of disputed territories in Nineveh, as well as the 
Kirkuk and Diyala provinces, by 2007; however, to date, implementation of these 
steps has not yet occurred.   
 
There is not a uniform consensus within the Assyrian and Chaldean community if the 
Nineveh Plain should remain in Iraq or join the KRG.  In part, this is complicated by 
the potential for autonomy within either.  Article 35 of the KRG draft constitution 
guarantees ‘national, cultural, and administration autonomy to the Turkmen, Arabs, 
and Chaldo-Assyrian-Syriacs wherever they represent a majority of the population’ 
(Kurdistan Regional Government 2009).  Article 36 notes this is to be considered 
‘additional rights’ beyond the rights of ethnic minorities mentioned elsewhere in the 
constitution, and Article 14 provides Assyrian shall be an official language alongside 
Kurdish and Arabic in ‘administrative districts that are densely populated’ by Assyrian 
speakers.   
 
Some political parties in Iraq, such as the Assyrian Patriotic Party, the Iraqi BNDP 
(which separated from Dadesho’s BNDP), and the Iraqi CDF, supported pursuing 
autonomy within the Kurdish government (ADM Interview; Abbo et al Interview; 
Youash 2007).  Statements by Kurdish officials, particularly Sarkis Aghajan, the 
Kurdish Minister of Finance, who is Assyrian, that the Kurdish government supports 
an autonomous region curried support from these organizations; Aghajan likewise 
directed Kurdish resources to building infrastructure projects and housing units in 
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the Nineveh Plain (ISDP 2011).  Thus, implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi 
Constitution would conduct a referendum that could place Nineveh under KRG 
control; from there, administrative rights could be pursued under Kurdish Article 35.   
 
However, there is concern amongst some activists that Kurdish provisions are 
superficially promising but misleading.  Kanna cautioned against banking on 
autonomy within the KRG, noting, ‘Generally speaking, the constitution of KRG has 
much better minority rights than the central federal constitution. But at the same 
time it [proposes autonomy] in the locations where we are a majority. We have no 
locations where we are a majority, which means we have nothing’ (Quoted in Manna 
2010).  Ensuring Nineveh remains under Iraq was a preference shared frequently in 
interviews with diasporic leaders.  Recognizing the KRG is in its own throes of state-
building and nationalizing, there is grave concern the KRG will be as resolutely 
homogenizing as was Hussein’s Iraq.  As Kurdification was aptly summarized, ‘the 
Kurds are articulating this new identity of “Kurdish Christian” as if we can just flip 
our ethnicity’ (Abbo et al Interview).  Discussing the potential perils of an Assyrian 
future in Kurdistan, it was stressed that:  
 
It’s not because these people hate Assyrians.  Some of them are Assyrian 
nationalists… Their reasoning was, our churches were being blown up, Iraq 
was going to turn into an Islamist state, Kurdistan is secular, we are safer 
there than we are in Mosul or Baghdad or Basra.  They were right…I publicly 
thanked a KRG representative in Washington, DC, at a meeting for what they 
did for the Iraqi Christians.  But I said we are not here to talk about our safety 
as Christians: we are here to talk about our political rights as an ethnicity in 
Iraq.  We were safe as Christians under Saddam Hussein.  But we were not 
politically free…We are in the short-run very safe in the Kurdistan region.  
But they are Kurdish nationalists much like the Ba’athists were Arab 
nationalists, so tread very lightly with whom you are making your alliances 
(Abbo et al Interview).  
 
Such concern again recalls Gellner’s outcomes of nationalism, that assimilation in the 
KRG is a foreseeable outcome.  Given this concern, it is unsurprising diasporic 
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organizations in the U.S. tend to favour keeping the Nineveh Plain in Iraq.  Building 
an Assyrian and Chaldean nation against a Kurdish nation in pursuit of a 
homogenizing Kurdish identity presents its own burdens.  However, should the 
location of the Nineveh Plain be decided by referendum, the determination will 
ultimately be in the hands of residents of Nineveh and not the diaspora.   
 
The question of which form autonomy should take presented another wedge: 
although the guarantee of ‘administrative rights’ in Iraq and ‘administration 
autonomy’ in the KRG confines the degree to which autonomy is possible, the 
absence of specificity with either phrase has allowed for multiple policy 
interpretations.  Such vagueness, as well as different national and ideological 
leanings, fostered confusion and competing policy plans amongst the diaspora, as 
evident by the delay in finding a single, shared terminology to describe this 
geopolitical arrangement: colloquially, autonomy became an administrative unit, an 
autonomous region, a province, or some other categorization. 
 
The constitution itself does not provide a legal mechanism to create a province; 
hence, early support was for an administrative region or an administrative unit.  
Some organizations, like CASCA, used broad language to straddle this legal 
ambiguity, calling on the U.S., UN, and Iraq to support ‘the plan for an autonomous 
region/self-administered area or region for the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian people of 
Iraq’ (CASCA 2008).  The ADM, as noted above, supported an administrative area, 
citing concerns that calling for autonomy would undermine the effort and increase 
hostility, and that there was not a legal framework for a province.  Other 
organizations became concerned pursuit of a lesser measure would be more palatable 
to government officials and undermine the opportunity to gain something bigger.  An 
opinion piece by Michael Youash, the ISDP’s director, questioned, ‘when one hears 
demands and appeals for an ‘Autonomous Assyrian Region’ or an ‘Assyrian Province’, 
a call for an ‘Administrative Area’ naturally seems almost like nothing - why bother 
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even asking for it?’ (Youash 2007).  Likewise, Tamraz noted that simple autonomy is 
insufficient:  
 
According to the Iraqi constitution, with the administration region, I mean, 
everybody has that so you will be able to work, get a job, things like that.  It’s 
nothing special about that.  But we don’t want just an administrative 
region…we want to be able to govern, so that’s what that does – what the 
province gives us…It’s going to be self-government, be able to have our own 
governor…we’ll be able to have our own schools, language…Most of the 
Assyrian people, they want it.  But then there were certain political groups 
that didn’t ask for that; they were asking for the administration unit.  So 
that’s what a lot of argument was about: why are you asking for 
administration, which won’t give you anything.  We want more; we have to 
have more control.  And it’s a part of the constitution of Iraq right now, so we 
can ask.  We’re not doing anything wrong (Tamraz Interview).   
 
Tamraz touches on the two crucial elements of the autonomy goal: what is 
permissible under Iraqi law, and what will satisfy Assyrian national needs within that 
structure.  In a way, this parallels the crucial question of diaspora-building: how alike 
must we be to integrate, and how dissimilar can we be and maintain diasporic 
boundaries.  In both, Assyrians and Chaldeans are relatively without power and 
undertaking the challenges of nation-building from within the confines of state 
borders.  Yet a key difference is apparent: diasporic elites, having no claim to 
territory in their state of resettlement, are limited to negotiating for social boundaries 
and perhaps minor political rights; but Assyrians and Chaldeans in Iraq have the 
opportunity to negotiate for political and territorial boundaries on the basis of their 
indigeneity.  As Gellner described, possessing that ‘residue of ancient territory’ is 
crucial for Assyrians and Chaldeans to instrumentalize a political claim (Gellner 
108).   
 
Much of the rhetoric from diasporic organizations has left open-ended policy-specific 
details: what might this homeland look like in practice; what would be its geographic 
borders; how much autonomy would it have; what would be the status of non-
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Assyrians living in the territory?  The differences preventing these organizations from 
unifying reflect differences in national goals and political calculations.  As the 
flexibility or staunchness of nation-building ideologies are manifested in 
particularities like the name issue or placing Nineveh in Iraq or the KRG, autonomy 
too presented an ideological difference: nationalists tended to favour the strongest 
form of self-rule, and pragmatists and reluctant nationalists tended to support 
whatever form of administration was feasible whilst recognizing the need to 
incorporate the area’s existing, non-Christian residents.   
 
Although politics remain a constant wedge, most diasporic organizations share 
support for autonomy: ‘Politicians I think are all in favour.  Some might call it 
something different - administrative vs. province vs. region.  I think the only 
differences they have is wanting to try to control it - that’s politics’ (Manna Interview 
2014).  Such differences, reflecting ideology and elite competition alike, often 
materialize when policy details come into question.  As was recalled of meetings with 
the State Department, opinions ranged from Detroit activists backtracking to ‘Well, 
not necessarily an administrative unit. We just want to live in peace and harmony!’ to 
which extreme nationalists would respond, ‘What do you mean? This is our land!  
They should remove them and put us in!’ (Jatou Interview).  Gellner’s challenge of 
coping with existing populations sharing the land in question is often lost in rhetoric 
but is ultimately unavoidable.  The challenge of any nationalism is what becomes of 
those non-nationals: can, how, or will they coexist?  In the Nineveh Plain, Assyrians 
and Chaldeans are faced with no option but coexistence: they are simply without the 
power or population size to do otherwise, and diasporic policy generally recognizes a 
province will offer a safe haven for other minorities.  Such aggregate autonomy does 
not render futile the Assyrian and Chaldean autonomy argument: they do not face 
the same concerns of assimilation because ethnic and religious differences facilitate 
boundary maintenance.  The utility of a province thus still lies in allowing Assyrians 
and Chaldeans a measure of power over their homeland.  However, activists 
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nonetheless often focus on the singularity of the Assyrian and Chaldean connection 
to the land and existential threat should it be lost, a more compelling argument to 
amass national and political support.   
 
A benchmark towards unifying policy came in November 2010 and January 2011, 
when the Assembly of the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Political Parties, comprised of the 
majority of Assyrian and Chaldean political groups in Iraq - sixteen in total including 
ADM, CDF, the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council, and AUA - agreed to 
collectively demand a province.32  This came despite continuing divisions over the 
name issue and the permanent jurisdiction of the Nineveh Plain.  Attendees agreed to 
a resolution affirming the need to work for a province in the Nineveh Plain in 
conjunction with other minority groups residing therein, as well as to push for 
implementation of Article 35 of the KRG’s constitution after a constitutional 
referendum is held (Ishtar Broadcasting Corporation 2011; Tamraz Interview).  With 
this, the conference kept options for autonomy in either government open.  The 
agreement represents a compromise from several positions, seeking to appease the 
ADM by diluting the ethnic-specific nature of the province and to appease those that 
want the Nineveh Plain within the KRG.   
 
The choice of a province appears at first confusing because the constitution does not 
explicitly permit the creation of new provinces; however, it was also a strategic 
choice, using legal ambiguity to contend such authority lies within Iraq’s executive 
branch, a theoretically easier process for approval than legislation or referenda.  
When Prime Minister al-Maliki, in January 2014, announced the recommendation of 
his cabinet for the creation of four new provinces, including the Nineveh Plain, 
constitutional experts and politicians questioned the legality of this.  A 1969 Ba’ath-
era law, Law No. 159, gave the power to change provincial boundaries to the Council 
                                            
32 This took place shortly after the tragic October 2010 attack on the Our Lady of Salvation 
Church in Baghdad in which 58 were killed (Shadid 2010; Associated Press 2010). 
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of Ministers; however, this law was repealed and replaced by the 2008 Provincial 
Powers Act, which, while clarifying and enhancing the authority of provinces, 
neglected to address the creation of new provinces or assign authority to change 
provincial boundaries (Ali 2014; Visser 2014).  The KRG first used this ambiguity in 
late 2013 to modify its internal boundaries to create a fourth KRG province, Halabja, 
by arguing the absence of authority elsewhere left the authority to the regional 
government (Rudaw 2014).  Organizations like NCA, echoing this, argued in its 
policy briefs that Iraq’s Prime Minister or President can form provinces through an 
administrative decision (Nineveh Council of America 2013).   
 
Perhaps the most lasting accomplishment of the 2011 Conference, then, was that 
autonomy-related terminology and policy goals have coalesced around the request 
for a province.  As the ADM and AUA adopted this terminology, ISDP and its 
affiliated organizations like AANC transitioned from requesting a Nineveh Plain 
Administrative Unit to a Nineveh Plain Province; likewise, CASCA and NCA refer to 
‘The Nineveh Solution’ as a request for a province.  
 
Ultimately, the unity behind the 2011 Conference diminished because of the 
difficulty in bridging competing national visions.  As a member of the AANC recalled, 
agreement on a province alone was not enough to supersede such divisions:  
 
They agreed that the Nineveh Plain was sort of our last stand area, and they 
agreed that we wanted a province.  Everyone agreed we wanted a province.  
But there was no agreement on anything else, there was no agreement on 
whether the province was part of the KRG, was it part of Iraq, and there was 
no agreement on that more important first question: well, okay, we all agree 
we want a province, but where is the jurisdiction of this province?…And this 
sort of broke down over time.  It started to translate into the issue of whether 
or not you wanted Article 140 resolved and the disputed regions resolved, or 
whether or not you wanted Article 125 implemented first.  And I don’t know 
what exactly happened with this council, but it just sort of decomposed (Abbo 
et al Interview).   
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The intent here is not to suggest these organizations and their leadership are 
ineffective or even uniquely divided.  Such disunity exists in every diaspora, and it 
reflects very real policy divisions: whether Nineveh is attached to the Iraqi 
government or the Kurdish government matters a great deal.  Observed in these 
differences is how nationalism is meddled into policy, how meeting Gellner’s 
challenges of the nationalist option is carried out and contested by diasporic elites.  
Such issues are very new points of debate, having previously existed only as nebulous 
national imagining and now taking place within the framework of a new Iraqi 
constitution and very-present displacement and security challenges.  Uncertainty and 
contestation are necessary and fair; unfortunately, because of the nature of politics, it 
has made advancing this cause more difficult, particularly amongst political 
frameworks already disinclined to act.  Elite competition becomes not just who 
presents the best national vision, but who is able to make their vision realized.   
 
Consensus amongst leading political organizations is nonetheless an important 
stepping-stone for advocacy.  Yossi Shain observed that American-based diasporas 
tend to self-moderate when lobbying for foreign policy, tempering more extremist or 
purely ideological views for those that are politically acceptable to the American 
foreign policy establishment (Shain 2002).  Although widespread support of a 
province does not preclude stronger nationalists or provincial opponents from 
pursuing their agenda with policy-makers, the emphasis on a solution that is within 
the framework of the Iraqi state aspires to frame an otherwise radical-sounding 
measure as one that is a reasonable conclusion aligned with liberal democratic 
interests.  
 
MAKING CLAIMS TO IRAQ: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
 
The internal and external barriers to achieving autonomy in Nineveh are complex, 
requiring diasporic actors to navigate between factions in the diaspora and in the 
homeland; between religious and non-sectarian interests; between American, Iraqi, 
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and Kurdish officials, and, to a lesser extent, the UN, EU, and other states home to 
the global diaspora.  Although the American diaspora occupied a singular position as 
a diaspora whose resident state had become the occupying power of the homeland, 
the ability to organize openly and access government officials did not translate into 
an embrace of its wants.  In addition to mounting Iraq fatigue with politicians and 
policy-makers, disunity across the diaspora, fueled by competing nationalisms and 
claims of who speaks on behalf of the diaspora, challenges efforts to gain political 
support and move policy forward. 
 
Assessed within this section is how diasporic actors work to change political and 
geographic boundaries within Iraq through engagement with policy-makers.  It finds 
despite making national claims in Iraq, elites primarily act within the American 
political framework.  In part this reflects the ease of accessing American political 
structures as an ethnic lobby, as observed by Tony Smith (2000) and Anthony King 
(1997), and in part because of barriers to the Iraq state: whilst the diaspora acts on 
behalf of an Iraqi national minority, they are not a constituency to which Iraqi 
politicians need to be responsive.   
 
Diasporic activism for autonomy in the homeland in a way presents a paradox, as 
John Lie described, because diasporas that aspire to return to the homeland 
essentially pursue their own disappearance, reducing the diaspora to a temporary or 
unnatural presence (Lie 2008: 172).  Yet it is apparent the diaspora is acting as a 
permanent diaspora, as Americans acting on behalf of Iraqis.  Although nationalism 
and activism demonstrate the transnationality of the diasporic nation, the confines of 
state boundaries stress its locality.  Long-distance nationalism by its nature is 
constrained: the demand for territorial rule is not so the diaspora can return, but so 
co-ethnics in Iraq can return and live safely.  
 
This section also explores the political challenge of advocacy: here, rather than 
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tediously cataloguing individual meetings and letter campaigns and trying to assess 
which organization might be credited for which political action, it looks 
comprehensively at the challenges activists have faced in their advocacy, the political 
momentum gained, and how activists try to push against political barriers.  
 
Diasporic Elites as Long-Distance Nationalists  
 
Accompanying diasporic mobilization for a Nineveh Plain province is the growth of 
the diasporic lobby.  Yet a common criticism of diaspora - and concern from within 
the diaspora itself - is its ability to affect policy from the distance and luxury of the 
U.S., detached from any consequences for the policies pursued (Shain 2002, 1999).  
This is awkwardly balanced with the need for diasporic actors to advocate on behalf 
of their co-ethnics because those within or displaced from Iraq are often without the 
resources, power, or safety to seek change on their own behalf.  Policy divisions 
within the diaspora are compounded by policy disagreements with the homeland, 
and constrained further by limited opportunity to engage with or pressure the foreign 
government in which nation-building is pursued.  If nationalism is about the 
attainment and use of state power, as Breuilly theorized, shown here is the necessity 
of this quest: Assyrians and Chaldeans, aside from a few individuals serving in 
government, have no institutionalized means of power or control over their general 
welfare.  
 
Iraqi Chaldean and Assyrian leaders sometimes use the distance of the diaspora to 
challenge the diaspora’s policy demands when there is disagreement.  For example, 
Sako has framed autonomy as a demand driven by diaspora, by those who ‘live in 
relative security’ and agitate for policies from which they themselves will be 
unaffected (Sako 2009).  Kanna likewise has criticized ‘Chicago’ activists for pushing 
solutions when they are not on the ground in Iraq (Manna 2010).   
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In these instances, such criticism frames the diaspora as more nationalist than leaders 
in Iraq would prefer.  Contention that national agitation may spark backlash against 
the community in Iraq is a point of concern.  Activists are at times told by the Iraqi 
community, ‘you guys scream in the U.S. and we pay taxes for it here’ (Jatou 
Interview).  There is worry that more serious demands are correlated to attacks, that 
‘with us asking for an administrative unit, you’ve got “Oh my god, now for sure 
they’re going to come after us.” And every time there’s an incident, “See, this church 
happened because you guys did this”’ (ibid).  
 
The diaspora’s distance, its not being ‘here’ and unaffected by its own actions, thus 
leads activists to question their role.  At the same time, Iraqi organizations ask for the 
diaspora to speak on the community’s behalf; as the Iraqi community sees favourable 
action from the government, it favours diasporic advocacy.  Manna noted that as 
raising awareness of Christian issues was gaining traction, with practical and 
symbolic advances such as Maliki’s endorsement of a province and the declaration of 
Christmas as a national holiday in 2013, feedback tends to be more favorable, to 
‘keep on the pressure, it seems to be working’ (Manna Interview 2014).   
 
The diaspora can be frustrated as it attempts to navigate mixed goals, competing 
organizations, and intra-national boundaries, as well as the want of the diaspora’s 
own lay members to help.  Advocacy at times requires mediating between different 
boundaries and interests, and lends itself to more generalized political requests in 
organizations without an ideological or national mission.  In addition to Shain’s 
observation that diasporas temper political demands to garner support from 
American politicians, some diasporic actors similarly use broad policy approaches to 
appease an ideologically and geographically diverse constituency.  As one activist 
noted: 
 
It is not easy to be the voice of the people in the homeland because a lot of 
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times, they are not together.  Therefore, you get mixed signals.  And in order 
to determine what you should be advocating for - that’s the major role I play 
in Washington and with the European Union - is I’m not getting the very, very 
specific and final word of what exactly I should pursue.  So therefore I take a 
general target and pursue it, which the target represents the whole thing of 
what’s going on between the community and the faction or members.  
Because every community’s asking for something different.  And there’s no 
agreement of what should I be asking (Kassab Interview 2012). 
 
To diasporic elites, those most concerned with boundary maintenance, changes that 
threatened such boundaries, particularly changes that threatened the national 
existence in the homeland, necessitated diasporic action.  Diaspora provides an 
alternative path to leverage resources and political pressure not available to the 
community in Iraq, especially as it becomes an increasingly small voice in a large, 
contentious government.  Kamber observed there is an important role for the 
diaspora to play to make the Assyrian voice heard because Assyrian power in Iraq is 
diluted, owing to the community’s small population and its correspondingly small 
representation: ‘Although we have Mr. Kanna..I mean, one individual or three cannot 
do that much in a Parliament of 300 or whatever it is.  So it is very hard…I think 
that’s very important, to have a very strong Assyrian lobby in these countries to put 
pressure on the Congress or the government so they can actually deal with the Iraqi 
government’ (Kamber Interview). 
 
Noted is the reality of Iraqi politics: although Parliamentary representation of 
Christians is guaranteed by law, such representation is insufficient to possessing a 
meaningful voice in policy decisions; and Assyrians and Chaldeans also lack an ally, 
whether an external state or political faction, to champion their issues and expand 
their voice.33  Moreover, the reality remains that American action is consequential in 
                                            
33 Christian parliamentary quotas were changed in 2010 to require five of 325 seats (in 2005, 
only three Christians were elected) (Leichman 2010). Quotas for provincial governing 
councils were enacted in 2008, providing minorities in the Nineveh, Baghdad, and Basra 
governorates with six (two per governorate) of 129 total seats, despite Christian objections 
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Iraqi politics as the state most responsible for the Iraq War and Iraq’s post-war 
administration, and as a global power.  To the extent the diaspora possesses access to 
American policy-makers, it understands its role as uniquely important to advocating 
for the Iraqi community.  In this sense, the diaspora also understands American 
action is the lynchpin: as Assyrian activists have found, the message reinforced 
abroad, even by states like Australia which have shown a commitment to Assyrian 
issues, is that American action needs to occur for action from other states to occur.   
 
Activists recognize pressure from American officials does not determine Iraqi or 
Kurdish actions; strategy instead recognizes the U.S. can encourage Iraqi or Kurdish 
actions that are more favourable to Assyrians and Chaldeans: ‘I know, for example, 
the only way this is going to work for us is if the U.S. continues to put pressure on it’ 
(Manna Interview 2014).  It is in furtherance of this objective that Assyrian and 
Chaldean diasporic elites have mobilized to act as an ethnic lobby on behalf of their 
co-ethnics in Iraq and push long-distance nationalism claims within the American 
political structure.    
 
‘We Would Have Done Much Better if  We Were Working on Global 
Warming’ 
 
Procuring American support for a Nineveh Plain province was, and remains, a 
mountainous battle.  As seen with the refugee crisis, a reluctance to address a 
solution to mass Christian displacement was shared by the Bush and Obama 
Administrations; overcoming reluctance was rendered only more difficult by the 
seeming complexity of autonomy.  Iraq fatigue and a public and private desire to 
disengage from Iraq grew during the last years of the Bush Presidency and 
characterized the Obama Presidency, thereby challenging from the beginning any 
effort to garner political support for a claim as initially radical-sounding a Christian 
                                                                                                                            
that the law was ‘an insult’ and UN recommendations of twelve minority seats (Susman 2008; 
BBC News 2008). 
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province (Filkins 2014; Khedery 2014).  The political climate became increasingly 
unfavorable as years progressed, particularly as domestic partisan polarization 
entrenched over the national economic crisis, health care, and social reforms, 
sidelining attention to the country’s ongoing wars.   
 
The opposite was true for the diaspora, as activism increased as time passed and the 
crisis deepened.  By 2006, the effects of sectarian conflict were beginning to compel a 
more widespread diasporic mobilization, but only limited options were available for 
diasporic activists with the adoption of Iraq’s permanent constitution and a new 
government already in place.  Consequentially, from what was permissible within 
American policy, the pinnacle goal became to have the highest Administration 
officials, the President or members of his cabinet, pressure the Iraqi government to 
create the Nineveh Plain province.  Diasporic activists pursued lines of advocacy with 
the Administration, especially the State Department, and with Members of Congress.  
Advocacy was likewise pursued with the international community, particularly 
Australia, Sweden, and other countries with diasporic populations, as well as the 
Vatican, and with Iraqi officials directly when possible.  Whilst many advocates 
commented they found the European and Australian states more receptive, the 
shared acknowledgement remained that this was fundamentally an American issue 
and an Iraqi issue (Tamraz Interview; Bacall and Bacall Interview; Abbo et al 
Interview).   
 
In hindsight, part of the challenge was that demands for a province did not coalesce 
until rather late.  Although it might be expected times of crisis would bridge together 
diasporic actors towards a common goal and sideline political and personality 
differences, this has largely not happened: groupness has not crystalized (Brubaker 
2004).  Diasporic disunity poses an additional challenge for those who take the 
nationalist option beyond the challenges Gellner outlined.  As differing national 
ideologies remained a barrier in overcoming internal divisions, they likewise made 
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selling policy to policy-makers that much more challenging.  Before convincing 
American officials of the merits of their specific policy, diasporic organizations first 
had to gain attention for their cause and build a desire to intervene on the cause’s 
behalf:  
 
When we go to Congress or the State Department, putting myself in their 
shoes, they get people with causes coming all the time.  Somebody wants to 
save the whales, global warming, we’re just another item on their list.  And 
the big concern is, to us, I think our issue is a lot more challenging, to be 
honest.  I think we would have done much better if we were working on 
global warming or save the whales because you can have a lot more traction 
and share interest with people.  But here, especially to policy-makers, the 
Assyrians are a nuisance really.  They don’t want to deal with a minority.  
Like, ‘I have big enough problems with 97 percent of the population in Iraq, 
I’m going to worry about three percent?  It’s not like you’re going to make or 
break anything I do there.’  That’s how they look at us.  But to us, that three 
percent is clinging to existence (Jatou Interview). 
 
Assyrians and Chaldeans, as they were without an external state supporting their 
safety, found themselves similarly without an external lobby to share and champion 
their cause.  Whilst individuals and individual churches mobilized charitable giving, 
prospective allies like the prominent Evangelical and Catholic Christian lobbies were 
often relatively silent on the plight of Iraqi Christians in Washington (Kassab 
Interview 2012; Taimoorazy Interview).   
 
Consequentially, there are several core arguments diasporic activists use to convey 
the need for a province to policy-makers.  Humanitarian urgency and moral 
responsibility are primary themes, gaining particular use and resonance following 
specific periods of crisis in Iraq, such as the assassination of Archbishop Rahho of 
Mosul in 2008 and the Baghdad church attack in 2010.  The urgency activists sought 
to convey was that the cost of doing nothing would be the extinction of Assyrians and 
Chaldeans in Iraq.  Typical of such language is the ISDP’s comment in its policy briefs 
that ‘the urgency for operationalizing the Art. 125 solution is undeniable when 
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combined with the very real fact that ChaldoAssyrians are being wiped out of Iraq.  
The Nineveh Plain Administrative Unit policy is necessary to avert their total 
cleansing from their indigenous homeland’ (ISDP 2008: 3).  Similarly, the argument 
is often made that the crisis facing Christians is a result of the war, Christian support 
for the U.S., or the perception that Christians automatically support the U.S.; as CFA 
wrote to Senator Rand Paul, who questioned why the U.S. was giving refuge to 
Iraqis, ‘the United States bears a moral responsibility to help those who have been 
forced from their homes and lost family members under our country’s watch’ (Kassab 
2011).   
 
Another argument stressed the choice available to Assyrians and Chaldeans were to 
essentially emigrate or face hardship in Iraq; arguing the U.S. bears direct 
responsibility for this outcome, it followed the U.S. likewise held a unique 
responsibility to help Assyrians and Chaldeans remain.  For example, an ISDP policy 
brief stated: ‘Two policies stand before the US in confronting the realities of the 
crisis.  Mass resettlement is one option; while the other is providing meaningful 
opportunities through local development of the Nineveh Plain for ChaldoAssyrians 
and other minorities there’ (ISDP 2007).  ISDP contended resettlement is a more 
financially beneficial argument, costing ‘$7.43 billion versus the $236 million for 
giving minorities an enduring solution through the Nineveh Plain policy’ (ibid).34  
The shortcoming of this argument, however, is that the U.S. certainly possessed no 
intention to resettle hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, making the suggestion of a 
multi-billion dollar resettlement project not credible.  To policy-makers, this is clearly 
a fallacy of false choice as there was an inherent understanding the U.S. would 
neither resettle that many refugees nor allocate that level of funding for the 
development of one region in Iraq.   
                                            
34 The first figure estimates the U.S. spends $16,500 per refugee, which ISDP multiplied by 
450,000 Nineveh Plain residents.  The latter figure represents ISDP’s estimate costs for 
security and developing infrastructure, schools, and agriculture in the Nineveh Plain. 
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Moreover, the Bush Administration’s policy was to avoid action that could ‘exacerbate 
tensions between Iraq’s various communities’ (Youash 2008: 360).  As Youash wrote 
at the time, referring to the Administration’s approach as the ‘myth of equality in 
victimization’, ‘The USG is effectively saying it cannot help these people to reduce 
their disproportionate level of suffering because policy does not allow it to 
acknowledge the existence of disproportionate Assyrian Christian suffering’ (ibid).   
 
While the recognition of disproportionate suffering changed under the Obama 
Administration,35 the effective policy outcome immediately did not.  The 
Administration framed any question of autonomy as an internal issue left to be 
decided by Iraqis.  Then-Ambassador Peter Bodde, for example, in a 2011 meeting 
with diasporic leaders in Detroit stated the official U.S. position was for Iraqis to 
work out a Nineveh Plain arrangement through the Iraqi Parliament and was not for 
the U.S. to engage, urging Assyrians and Chaldeans to work with other minority 
groups and determine if they want to move forward within the Iraqi political system 
(Author’s Personal Notes April 2011).  Similar emphasis on the need for policy 
decisions regarding Nineveh to be sorted by Iraqis was made by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Michael Corbin, who stressed, for example, the inclusive 
government and minority protections in the constitution offer great potential to 
improve the crisis affecting its minorities (Manna 2011).   
 
This position remained frustrating to activists, particularly given the U.S.’s role in 
creating the crisis.  Most frustrating was the contrast between the ongoing crisis and 
the government’s continuous laissez-faire avoidance.  As one humanitarian organizer 
expressed:  
                                            
35 In 2007, then-Senator Obama wrote the State Department following USCIRF’s designation 
of Iraq as a Country of Particular Concern regarding the need to improve protection and aide 
for Iraq’s minorities (Obama 2007b).   
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I voted for Bush, the second Bush, for a second term.  It was the first time I 
voted, I was so proud…We thought America would help us like they helped 
the Kurds.  But we have been greatly disappointed.  I love Bush, I do, as a 
person. He was a man of principle, he was a Christian, but I am devastated at 
his policies.  We pushed to Rumsfeld, said what about the Christians? And 
there was no answer.  They didn’t have a plan. They really didn’t. U.S. policy 
still fails us til today.  We’ve written as an organization so many letters to 
Obama, to the White House, they don’t even send a blanket, generic letter 
acknowledging.  State Department comes in just to really shut us up.  Give us 
a sign, photo op, and they leave.  There’s not been anything (Taimoorazy 
Interview).   
 
Reflected here, again, is the sense the U.S. government ‘didn’t give a damn’, that 
unfolding crisis was again a sideshow to the greater scope of Iraqi conflict and 
governance (Hanna Interview; Donabed 2010: 245).   
 
The challenge of seeking American influence in Iraq was compounded by internal 
nationalist dynamics: prior to the 2011 agreement to pursue a province, advocating 
for competing iterations of autonomy underscored the absence of a political 
consensus to Administration and Congressional officials; additionally, opposition, 
particularly from the Chaldean Church, aided the impression autonomy or a province 
was a controversial, fringe goal.  Myriad diasporic voices left policy-makers uncertain 
who best speaks for the diaspora.  Manna stressed this dynamic was and is a main 
challenges encountered: ‘Part of the problem is that while me and CASCA and others 
will go and request the support from the government for a province, after we leave, 
another Chaldean group will claim they represent the entire country, and will come 
in say something opposite.  That’s the big challenge’ (Manna Interview 2012).  
 
Until activists agreed autonomy would take the form of a province, consistent 
messaging was a challenge.  Indeed, to some policy-makers, the quest for autonomy 
was assumed to be a quest for a state.  In part, this assumption reflects early 
messages conveyed by nationalists, its far-reaching pursuit something to be easily 
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dismissed.  Consequentially, as the Obama Administration’s underlying policies 
distanced the American government from taking sides on Iraqi issues, the perception 
an autonomous region was unrealistic or would contribute to worsening the 
marginalization of Christians in Iraq was sometimes cited as cause to not pursue it.36  
Manna observed of State Department officials that, ‘They’re sympathetic, and they 
pretty much tell us, you know, we can’t deliver you a country; be realistic.  I think the 
company line lately has been Iraq’s a sovereign country, which is unacceptable to me.  
My response is, you got us into this mess, you get us out of it’ (Manna Interview 
2012).   
 
Similar responses were heard from many activists across nationalist leanings.  At 
times it was unclear if the lack of interest reflected official policy or the individual 
priorities of administration officials.  As one example, it was noted encouragement 
and the impression the province was on the State Department’s radar was given by 
Corbin, whilst the opposite was heard from his successor, Barbara Leaf: 
 
If you came to me a year ago, a year and a half ago, and asked the same 
question, I’d say definitely, that we were definitely Nineveh Plain…I asked 
her [Barbara Leaf] point blank, are we chasing our tails for this?  And she 
said, you really need to give up.  This is ideology; it’s never going to happen 
(Taimoorazy Interview). 
 
The frustration of inaction from either Administration channeled advocacy efforts 
towards Members of Congress who shared the diaspora’s concerns.  As described 
elsewhere, ‘Congress has never had a problem remaining committed to helping those 
who helped us [in Iraq]. The problem has come from two successive Administrations’ 
(Packer 2014b).  Yet Congress is limited by its own lesser role in foreign policy.  As 
Kassab described taking a generalized strategy to balance the different opinions of 
                                            
36 The futility of this perception was bluntly observed after the fall of Mosul, when an Iraqi 
Christian commented to the Wall Street Journal, ‘The Americans want to stay away from this 
because their view is, if you train the Christians, you're starting some crazy religious war. 
Well, ISIS beat you to it’ (Malas 2015).   
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Iraqis, congressional policy did the same.  Congressmembers rarely took a direct 
position on autonomy, pursuing Assyrian and Chaldean issues more indirectly: 
support instead came through congressional pressure on the Executive Branch, and 
from using congressional appropriations to direct resources to the Nineveh Plain.    
 
Engaging Congress as a lobbying strategy reflects the observations of King (1997) 
and Smith (2000) that Congressional members are theoretically more vulnerable, 
given the nature of their electoral cycle, and therefore the most accessible branch of 
government.  This is by design: they are the most localized elected federal 
representatives and are more likely to be responsive to niche interests because of 
their relationships with their constituencies.  Congresswoman Eshoo and 
Congressman Wolf formed the Religious Minorities in Iraq Caucus, later the Religious 
Minorities in the Middle East Caucus, to bring together Representatives with a 
dedicated interest to the issue and serve as a point of contact for the diaspora or 
individual Members to raise issues (Wolf Staff Interview 2012).  This facilitated 
coordination for letters to the Executive Branch, appropriations requests, and 
congressional resolutions, and provided a critical voice urging the U.S. to do more.  A 
letter to Secretary of State Clinton in November 2010, for example, sent after the 
Baghdad church attack, stressed the ongoing violence ‘underscores the degree to 
which the U.S. continues to lack a clear, coherent strategy for the protection of these 
people’ and noted:  
 
We are concerned that the administration has too often implied, as the 
previous administration did, that the attacks against Iraq’s religious minorities 
are only part of a broader pattern of ‘generalized violence’ that plagues 
Iraq…We respectfully request that the State Department take immediate steps 
to formulate and articulate a specific, comprehensive strategy for the 
protection of Iraq’s Christians and other minority groups while a meaningful 
number still remain there (Eshoo et al 2010a).   
 
The language here does not advocate for a specific policy or security measures, nor 
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mention autonomy in the Nineveh Plain as a possible solution; nonetheless, it urges 
the Administration take more direct engagement by planning an assistance strategy.  
The State Department’s response agreed minority populations ‘are extremely 
vulnerable and need specific attention’, yet too was generic in its strategy, noting 
primarily the meetings it held with the diaspora, Iraqi Christians, and Iraqi officials, 
and commending advances within the Iraq government to better prosecute attacks on 
Christians and integrate police and security forces (Verma Letter 2010).   
 
An example of the frustration shared by Members of Congress and the diaspora is 
seen in the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s January 2011 hearing, 
‘Christian Minorities Under Attack in Iraq and Egypt’.  Congressman Chris Smith 
stated he hoped, ‘the Obama administration would realize that we have a moral 
imperative, and we have been lax and ineffective in ensuring that the Christians are 
protected’ (Tom Lantos Commission 2011: 41).  Likewise, Wolf commented that he 
recognized the Administration cares about the community’s plight, but criticized the 
administration for not doing more despite its sympathy.     
 
Wolf, when speaking of this issue on the House floor, often cited William 
Wilberforce’s quote that, ‘You may choose to look the other way but you can never 
say again that you did not know’.  Instead of endorsing autonomy or any specific 
policy within Iraq, Wolf moved to create a Special Envoy to be tasked with 
advocating for religious minorities in the Middle East, a bill that passed in 2014 with 
the backing of Senators Levin and Roy Blunt, yet to date the position remains 
unfilled (P.L. 113-161).  The policy here underscores the limited role of Congress in 
foreign policy and intervening directly in the affairs of another state; instead, a full-
time, Administration-level official would work directly on the issue (Wolf Staff 
Interview 2012).  Wolf, following retirement from Congress in 2015, formed a non-
profit organization calling for a safe haven in the Nineveh Plain and arming Christian 
militias in the region in response to ISIL’s advance (21st Century Wilberforce 
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Initiative 2015).   
 
Eshoo additionally testified during the Lantos hearing to her frustrations that neither 
Administration offered a stronger policy response:  
 
During the previous administration it was very difficult, I think, to get the 
foreign policy establishment to recognize that the invasion had precipitated 
this humanitarian crisis.  And in the current administration, attention to this 
issue may have improved somewhat, but most frankly not as quickly - and to 
bring the relief to the Christians in this situation and the deterioration of the 
situation…We just simply have to do more (Tom Lantos Commission 14).   
 
Despite strong advocacy from these Members, amongst others, their advocacy did not 
amass support for autonomy nor a desire to direct congressional resources to the 
issue.  This also reflects the difficulty in gaining traction for the issue generally: for 
example, a 2011 letter circulated by the Religious Minorities Caucus urging Obama 
to make the protection of Iraq’s minorities a key benchmark in the U.S. relationship 
with Iraq gained 38 total signatures; this could suggest some progress given the 
smaller numbers on previous letters related to Assyrian and Chaldean issues, but 
nonetheless represents only a fraction of the House’s 438 Members (Wolf et all 
2011).   
 
Policy outcomes instead came from a more targeted approach, utilizing congressional 
appropriations to direct resources to the Nineveh Plain specifically, providing short-
term relief to help Assyrians and Chaldeans remain there and to invest in the 
economic development of the region.  This represented a marked change from policy 
under the Bush presidency, in which funding was not allocated to specific ethno-
religious minority communities, but rather based on ‘determinations of need’, a 
policy the State Department stated at the time was to avoid exacerbating sectarian 
conflict (Blanchard 2010; Committee on Foreign Affairs 2008: 28).   
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Eshoo was instrumental in securing funding for security and humanitarian aide in the 
Nineveh Plain.  Funding directed to vulnerable minority groups in the FY2008 
appropriations bill provided a $10 million appropriation to the Nineveh Plain; 
another $10 million was included in the FY2008 supplemental, accompanied by 
language noting ‘The Appropriations Committees are concerned about the threat to 
the existence of Iraq’s most vulnerable minorities, particularly the 
Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac Christians’ and instructing the State Department to 
provide a point person overlooking their humanitarian, security, and development 
needs (P.L. 110-161; P.L. 110-252).37  In FY2010, the House appropriated $20 
million for Iraq’s minorities, which was reduced to $10 million in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-366).  The FY2012 appropriation did not contain new 
spending specific to minorities, although it included language stating the importance 
of ‘providing targeted assistance to ethno-religious minorities in Iraq to help ensure 
their continued survival’, mentioning the Nineveh Plain specifically and directing the 
State Department to submit a report on the assistance it provides consistent with 
Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution, implicitly suggesting the government aide 
nation-building capacities for these minorities (P.L. 112-74).   
 
On-the-ground assistance was an important factor to supporting the Assyrian and 
Chaldean claim to Nineveh.  As Congressman Peters noted in speaking to Chaldean 
leadership in Detroit, he felt the ultimate goal of U.S. policy should be to see no more 
refugees through creating economic and safety conditions that allow families to 
return and remain in Iraq (Author’s Personal Notes April 2011).  Atop immediate 
humanitarian needs for financial assistance, in the short-term economic assistance 
supported quality-of-life programs including employment and agricultural support.  
                                            
37 The success in securing appropriations is contrasted by the lax attention to expenditure 
oversight.  Upon hearing from the diaspora and church leaders that funding was not reaching 
the ground, Congresswoman Eshoo, with seventeen Members of Congress, wrote the GAO 
requesting an investigation (Eshoo et al 2010b).  The GAO reported in July 2012 that USAID 
was unable to account for how projects funded through the FY2008 allocation were in 
compliance, a deeply frustrating development (GAO 2012).   
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In the long-term, economic assistance was important to the autonomy argument: it 
retained population in Nineveh.  This approach brings together both nationalists and 
integrationists: both find common ground in believing economic and social 
contributions from Assyrians and Chaldeans will further their cause, with the former 
believing it will demonstrate the sustainability and viability of a Nineveh Plain 
province in Assyrian and Chaldean hands, and the latter believing it will cultivate 
goodwill towards Assyrians and Chaldeans from the wider society.   
 
Economic development of the Nineveh Plain became a point at which American and 
Iraqi officials likewise sought common ground with the diaspora.  Officials, 
recognizing the diaspora’s financial resources, encouraged diasporic investment in 
Iraq, framing this as a way for the diaspora to support its co-ethnics.  This point was 
stressed by officials ranging from Ambassador Bodde to DAS Corbin to Usama al-
Najafi, Speaker of Iraq’s Parliament.  As one example of such dialogue, Bodde 
stressed in the aforementioned meeting in Detroit that the Administration’s policy is 
to create conditions that allow minorities to remain in Iraq, stating minorities in 
Nineveh tell him their principle concern is employment; somewhat dismissing 
questions regarding a province and security, he called on the diaspora to increase its 
charitable work and private investment, specifically within the agricultural sector, 
housing, and creation of small to medium sized-enterprises, factories, and other 
ventures that would create employment (Author’s Personal Notes April 2011).  This 
was generally received with frustration as attendees questioned how the diaspora can 
open businesses in Iraq when Chaldeans cannot open their existing shops and could 
not survive without remittances from the diaspora, as well as asking why the 
responsibility is on the diaspora to contribute when more is not being done by the 
Iraqi government itself.   
 
To the Ambassador’s point, however, there have been efforts beyond humanitarian 
assistance to support long-term economic development from diasporic actors who 
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grew increasingly frustrated with the lack of political movement.  One such attempt 
was the Nineveh Plain Project, founded by Abbo, which became part of the AANC.  
As he described:  
 
After three or four years of doing the political lobbying work, and just 
realizing we’re not going to get anywhere, we’re spinning our wheels, I 
started to realize we have to come up with an alternative strategy.  “Nation 
building” that didn’t rely on politics – or at least not a purely political strategy 
for this.  And it became clear to me we needed to come up with that strategy, 
and at the same time do it in a way that leveraged the fact that you were 
Assyrian, regardless of where you were in the world…the only thing that 
made sense was to sort of refocus on economic development…you take 
political stability en masse and you carve out de facto political security by 
essentially creating economic security.  And to the extent that it’s inefficient 
because you don’t have pure political security, you just subsidize the 
inefficiency with money.  That was sort of the idea behind Nineveh Project.  
Can we carve out essentially some areas within Iraq, obviously within the 
Nineveh Plains because that’s where we have the best chance…You build a 
fortress around a town, and you build up a town in the middle of nowhere.  
And although you know it’s sort of economically inefficient in the modern era, 
you essentially fund it with people’s wealth from the diaspora (Abbo et al 
Interview).   
 
The strategy he outlined fundamentally represents channeling existing diasporic 
nationalism into long-distance nationalism.  It offers a concrete way to utilize 
diasporic resources to directly support the nation, here through development and 
entrenchment of the homeland by substituting economic power, which is available to 
the diaspora, for political or state power, which is not.  The role for the diaspora as 
found here spans the distribution of the staunch support for long-distance 
nationalism for building a homeland to the integrationism of lessening social hostility 
through economic contributions.  Recalled are similar Zionist efforts prior to the 
establishment of Israel to use diasporic resources to support Jewish emigration, 
settlement, and land development in Palestine, aided by programs like the Jewish 
National Fund, the Jewish Colonial Trust, and the Jewish Agency.  The way AAS 
utilizes diasporic resources to support Assyrian-language schools and Sarkis Aghajan 
 305 
utilizes KRG resources to support Christian housing developments, a centralized 
organization could do the same to create economic security, enabling Assyrians and 
Chaldeans to return to and stay in the atra.  In this case, the state power Breuilly 
emphasized is reinterpreted as economic means.   
 
The Project ultimately failed to take off, however, sidelined by several elements 
including a history of distrust within the diaspora, the belief funding should go either 
through existing channels, such as the Churches, or as a direct investment in 
Nineveh, and, as conveyed to Bodde, a belief the U.S. and Iraqi government bear the 
responsibility of assistance.  That the Nineveh Project and discussions around projects 
like this have not borne fruit is again a testament to the challenges of elite 
competition, organizational jockeying, and the absence of a diasporic body, outside 
the Churches, widely accepted as a legitimate national representative.   
 
Continued engagement has facilitated the learning curve in professionalizing the 
Chaldean and Assyrian lobby to better utilize its own resources to pressure the 
government.  In Detroit, especially, the combination of high-ranking Members of 
Congress, notably Senator Levin and Congressmen Levin and Peters, and the 
entrepreneurial success of the local community have in recent years helped to attract 
increased political interest in Chaldean issues.  Manna notes there has been a 
learning process, but finds these elements have contributed to increasing the 
resonance of the province within Washington:  
 
Our objective has been in Washington either help us form a province or issue 
a million visas for the rest of them to come here - and so you know that 
wasn’t going to happen…But we also realize that having meetings is one 
thing, and they don’t really take you seriously until you start writing policy 
pieces and memos that they can study…First of all, on the U.S. side, this is 
new to so many in our community, the advocacy…There has never been a 
concentrated effort to try to influence or to educate.  So that’s part of it.  The 
other part of it is we’re just so small as community but, frankly, I think the 
Michigan community has had a tremendous amount of influence.  We have 
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some very influential congressional members, and so it’s those members that 
have been helping us.  I think even from our angle, working with the State 
Department, it doesn’t hurt to say hey, there’s 150,000 Chaldeans here now 
that represent 15,000 business, these are the contributions they’re making 
here (Manna Interview 2014).   
 
Diasporic elites raised the profile of their policy goals by raising the profile of the 
diaspora’s economic and social contributions in America.  This represents a marked 
progression from before the Iraq War, when Assyrians and Chaldeans had to fight to 
be included with the opposition, to explain ‘who’ Assyrians and Chaldeans are by 
drawing upon their history of fighting against Hussein, to recent years as diasporic 
activists have gained political access by their influence as Americans and the 
recognition of their community.  Such an evolution speaks to the changing 
geopolitics, certainly, but also to an evolution in diaspora-building and boundary-
shifting amongst American political and social circles.  Whilst there is much more 
ground to be gained, the saturation of Assyrian and Chaldean demands for a 
province in Washington is a measure of the dedicated work of activists over the past 
decade.  
 
Professionalization of lobby efforts have given diasporic elites the opportunity to 
raise the issues directly to decision-makers, and brought politicians and Iraqi officials 
to Detroit, Chicago, and California to meet with diasporic elites directly.  As Manna 
noted: ‘Vice President Biden’s team met with us…he told us personally that he’s been 
talking to al-Maliki and to our friends in the Kurdish Regional Government…I think 
when al-Maliki visited the U.S. not too long ago, and met with President Obama, Vice 
President Biden, Senate Foreign Relations members, each one of them has brought 
up the Christian issue’ (Manna Interview 2014).  There is a growing sense amongst 
elites that after years of advocacy, explaining who Assyrians and Chaldeans are and 
that they are at risk in Iraq, such efforts are perhaps finally gaining traction.  Jatou 
similarly noted targeted, policy-specific advocacy matters: ‘When the Iraq War 
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started, we set up a project called the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project…It had 
some good traction, good progress at the time.  It was a project, which means it had 
a start and an end.  We had some good millstones that we achieved.  It did make an 
impact’ (Jatou Interview).   
 
A measure of political traction was realized in January 2014 when Maliki announced 
he and his Council of Ministers supported the creation of a Nineveh Plain province.  
Although it is more likely this surprising announcement was the product of political 
calculations and Iraq’s upcoming elections, it nonetheless brought the endorsement 
of a province to the national, and international, stage (Ottaway 2014; AUA 2014a).  
The hurdles that remained were of course significant.  In the absence of a legal 
framework for the process, the decision was instead put before parliamentary 
passage, which offered unfavorable prospects given that Parliament Speaker Usama 
al-Nujafi’s brother was the Governor of the Nineveh Governorate and highly opposed 
to partitioning the Nineveh Plain region.  The difficulty of approval was further 
rendered improbable in the events of 2014 and the tragic collapse of Mosul.   
 
CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM IN RESPONSE TO EXCLUSION 
 
A litany of factors brought focus to the need for a tangible, long-term solution to the 
plight of Iraq’s Christian communities: the ethno-sectarian cleansing of Iraq’s urban 
areas that resulted in mass displacement; the rash of church bombings and murders 
of priests; the land contestation with the KRG; the unwillingness by American and 
Iraqi officials to address the crisis through things like improved security measures; 
the indignity of being yet again victimized; and the sense that existing legal rights 
and constitutional provisions were not enough to compel security and equality.  Iraq 
had undercut its guarantee of equal rights by institutionalizing the supremacy of 
Islam and shaping the Iraq state into one increasingly understood as both Arab and 
Muslim; it, and the U.S., simultaneously negated such hard-fought rights by 
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neglecting the plight of the minority populations and allowing exclusionary, 
constricting boundaries to harden. 
 
Breuilly argues nationalism, in modernity, is about power, which is ultimately about 
control of the state (Breuilly 1993).  The Assyrian and Chaldean crisis resulted from 
an absence of power to define national boundaries or control mechanisms of the 
state to otherwise aide their protection; the long-distance nationalism which resulted, 
and the ideologies and political demands it propagated, is ultimately about attaining 
power, in some capacity, for Assyrians and Chaldeans to remain in the homeland and 
be responsible for their affairs.  
 
The pursuit of the nationalist option, as Gellner recognized, is confronted by multiple 
challenges and diasporic activists must work within the limitations of state borders.  
Activists address these challenges, including shared territory with other ethno-
religious minority populations, land contestation from the KRG, and a hostile 
national and political environment, through pursuing policy that is workable and in 
line with the reality on the ground, drawing upon narratives of Nineveh as the 
ancient and still clung-to homeland, and justifying their claims through arguments of 
indigeneity as the descendants of ancient Mesopotamia.  The long-standing work of 
diasporic elites in cultivating ideologies and narratives of the diasporic nation, 
reviving histories, language, and cultural symbols and practices, is well-suited to 
similarly cultivate political claims based on such narratives and fuel long-distance 
nationalism (Brass 1991).   
 
Yet diasporic elites possess different interpretations of autonomy, of how it should be 
shaped in practice or if it should occur at all, that represent differences in national 
understandings and political calculations, as well as differences in how exclusive and 
permanent Iraq’s own changing boundaries are understood to be.  The unyielding 
stateless nationalism found within elements of the Assyrian diaspora has 
 309 
undoubtedly shaped the claim for autonomy: Nineveh is a homeland that will 
preserve what it is to be Assyrian.  Pragmatic activists who have come to support a 
Nineveh province do so more because of short- and long-term necessity than deep-
seated nationalism.  For Chaldeans, the absence of a territorially-focused nationalism 
allows instead for high adaptability; here, Nineveh is a harbour to shield and anchor 
their displaced or, alternatively, a ‘ghetto’ that breeds marginalization from the rest 
of society.  Nationalism is not stagnant, but is responsive to changing national 
boundaries and political and social dynamics.  Its current inclinations in the Assyrian 
and Chaldean community may therefore continue to evolve in response to ongoing 
challenges, politics, and necessity.   
 
Autonomy is a complicated, ambiguous pursuit in which the diaspora does not act as 
a unified entity with a single voice, but a diverse population which actively contests 
different outcomes, pursues different paths simultaneously, and occasionally seeks 
unity - in short, it behaves as a nation with different policy goals and ideologies and 
assumptions of what is in the nation’s best interest.  It questions, and continues to 
question, the future of an atra that is simultaneously anchored in the Nineveh Plain 
and dispersed across the globe.    
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CHAPTER VII  
   
CONCLUSION: DIASPORIC ROOTS, ROUTES, AND 
BOUNDARIES 
 
 “‘In this unfolding conundrum of life and history, there is such a thing as being 
 too late.”  We are too late to stop a war that should never have been fought;  
too late to undo the pain of battle, the anguish of so many families.’ 
-Barack Obama (2007) 
 
The Assyrian and Chaldean story in America has spanned a century.  It is not a story 
of a singular trajectory from the atra to America, but one of an atra dating centuries 
that spanned many roots across the Middle East, intertwining as routes brought 
immigrants and refugees to America, intersecting and dissecting again as populations 
relocate, new waves of migration bring renewal, identities are lost and found and 
divided.  New roots in America are themselves changing as cities change, declining 
industrial centres like Flint and Gary are left for the sun of California or the economic 
opportunity of Chicago, creeping urban poverty in Detroit pushes Chaldeans into 
suburbia, and urban boomtowns like Phoenix and Vegas attract new refugees and 
next generations of Assyrian and Chaldean Americans.  For the past decade, this has 
occurred against an ever-worsening crisis in the homeland, as a war that promised 
democracy and renewal instead wrought conflict and persecution.   
 
With the unrooting of displacement and the permanency of resettlement, the 
Assyrian and Chaldean nation is fundamentally changed.  The new atra elites create 
in diaspora is instead extra-territorial, balancing integration in American society with 
maintenance of identity and cultural elements across a diverse diasporic 
membership; this is both made possible and challenged by the open, multi-ethnic yet 
homogenizing nature of American society.  In a way, this atra has become a new 
homeland: it is not a shared source of roots and history for the whole of the nation, 
but is undeniably the territory that shapes the lived experience of diaspora for its 
members and within which the future of this diasporic nation is imagined.   
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The diaspora, to again borrow Tölölyan’s terminology, is ‘a special category of 
ethnicized dispersion’ shaped by a ‘paradoxical combination of localism and 
transnationalism’ (Tölölyan 2012: 7, 13).  The diasporic nation is, like any nation, an 
imagined community, a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’, but one that is caged by state 
borders, frequently intermixed with other peoples and cultures, and yet, undeniably, 
a singular community (Anderson 1991: 8).  As this thesis contributes, diaspora is also 
a product of boundary-making, formed through the boundaries encountered and 
negotiated upon resettlement outside the homeland, within which a diasporic nation 
is built.  This understanding thus brings focus to the relationality and socially-
constructed nature of diaspora: diaspora is not simply the corollary to displacement.  
 
The research presented in this dissertation offers a unique examination of the 
contemporary Assyrian- and Chaldean-American diaspora, a little-studied population, 
and contributes a much-needed understanding of the Assyrian-Chaldean dichotomy.  
Examined herein are the actions taken by diasporic elites to build a diasporic nation 
that is rooted in America and indelibly intertwined with the national homeland and 
Assyrians and Chaldeans across the globe, and how the Iraq War affected such 
nation-building.  This study builds upon understandings of the insecurity of stateless 
diasporas, demonstrating that within a porous society, diasporic continuity is not 
guaranteed, brought into being and sustained by the interaction between state and 
diasporic boundaries, and by the dedicated work of diasporic elites to build 
institutions, narratives, and nationalisms.  The diasporic nation is made through this 
ongoing process, and is made a part of the global Assyrian and Chaldean nation 
through its transnational activism and sustained ties to the homeland and Assyrians 
and Chaldeans living elsewhere.   
 
The findings of this research, in addition to contributing to Assyrian and Chaldean 
studies, thus contribute to diasporic literature regarding the roles, motivations, and 
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ideologies of diasporic elites who help make the diaspora: in essence, it aims to 
expand understanding of why diaspora persists.  The pursuit of Assyrian and 
Chaldean diasporic nation-building as explored in this dissertation, from building a 
diasporic nation in the U.S. to the pursuit of a self-administered homeland in Iraq, 
thus offers an empirical basis to answer to the research questions posed and draw out 
the key themes of its findings.   
  
Diasporic elites hold a central role in building a diasporic nation. 
 
Diasporic elites are the diaspora’s nationalists, the ones dedicated to its existence and 
longevity, who protect culture, language, and histories, and transfer them to the next 
generations.  As demonstrated through the Assyrian and Chaldean experience, 
diasporas are built and sustained by the work of dedicated activists, reliant upon 
individuals who chose to identify with and care about the diasporic collective 
(Tölölyan 2012).  This work is situated and ideological, local and transnational, 
proactive and reactive.  The role of elites encompasses the boundary-making and 
institution-building that shape the local diasporic experience, and the formation of 
nationalism and political activism on the diaspora’s behalf.   
 
Whilst the type of society diasporic members encounter upon resettlement, whether a 
society whose boundaries are open and porous and into which members can cross or 
a society whose boundaries are closed and exclusionary and from which members 
remain isolated, is outside the control of diasporic elites, elites play an important role 
in working within or pushing against the boundaries encountered.  This dissertation 
contributes to understanding how elites consciously and unconsciously navigate 
these barriers and the factors which influence boundary construction: as examined in 
Chapter IV, upon arrival in the U.S., Assyrians and Chaldeans encountered a state 
whose citizenship boundaries were easily crossed by virtue of American immigration 
policies, and whose national boundaries were crossable by their ethnic, religious, and 
cultural attributes.  Indeed, such porous boundaries facilitate individual crossing and, 
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as Ishaya observed, assimilation was prevalent amongst the first waves of migrants, 
remaining a challenge through today despite the development of diasporic 
boundaries and institutions that have occurred in recent decades (Ishaya 2003).  
Assyrian and Chaldean diasporic actors frequently noted in interviews that 
cultivating diasporic memory and maintenance is an ongoing effort and the fear of 
disappearance is pervasive.  However, if not for the work of diasporic elites to build 
institutions and claim the diaspora as a group on behalf of which political claims are 
staked, the diaspora may never form or, in such an open society, may again melt into 
obscurity a generation or two after resettlement.   
 
Elites, as Wimmer described of boundary theory, therefore negotiate the cultural 
diacritica that define ethnic and diasporic boundaries in relation to surrounding 
society (Wimmer 2009).  They act as institution-builders, pursuing a measure of 
institutional completeness to maintain boundaries, help capture diasporic 
membership, and make the diaspora relevant for its members (Breton 1964; 
Stinchcombe 1965).  As Chapter IV further describes, through the institutions they 
build, elites provide services to new refugees, steering their membership in the 
diaspora; provide organizational outlets, such as cultural and professional 
affiliations; and curate nationalism and political goals for the diaspora and, when 
practicable, to the homeland.  It is through successful institution-building and the 
tight diasporic networks developed in cities like Detroit that the diaspora establishes 
its presence and finds a way to balance integration without assimilation.  This marks 
a significant contribution to understanding the resonance of Chaldean identity in 
Detroit and, increasingly, San Diego, and a contribution to better understanding the 
relationship between institution-building and diasporic maintenance generally.  
 
This research thus builds upon the findings of existing theory that the role of 
diasporic elites in nation-building is essential and formative, complementing 
Tölölyan’s assertion that diasporas must include an element of ‘doing’, as well as the 
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models of Sheffer and Shain in which a few, dedicated core members are regularly 
engaged on the diaspora’s behalf and plan for its future (Tölölyan 1996; Sheffer 
2003: 53).  It further compliments the boundary theories of Wimmer, Brubaker, and 
Barth that elites are the boundary-makers, reaffirming the socially constructed and 
situational nature of diaspora (Wimmer 2013; Brubaker 2004; Barth 1969).  
However, it also contributes to better understanding this role of elites through the 
use of boundary theory, enabling examination of the social and political dynamics 
diasporic elites confront, how they negotiate diasporic boundaries in relation to these 
dynamics, and why they pursue certain boundary-making or boundary-shifting 
strategies.   
 
This dissertation also adds to existing scholarship on diaspora by positioning elite 
activism as a nationalism-driven endeavour.  Nationalism is too often overlooked in 
diaspora studies; and diaspora is too often absent from nationalism studies, existing 
outside the singular nation-state relationship and not always in pursuit of territory or 
statehood.  It is suggested herein that nationalism is essential to diasporic elite 
action, both as a motivating ideology and an element that is cultivated and drawn 
upon by elites in furtherance of political goals.  Diasporic nationalism is evident in 
diasporic institution-building and boundary negotiation; it is further evident as long-
distance nationalism that makes political claims of the Iraqi state in the interest of 
Assyrians and Chaldeans in Iraq and of the greater Assyrian and Chaldean nation.  
Diasporic nationalism differs from traditional nationalism because it seeks an extra-
territorial nation; here, power is instead pursued and contested through the diasporic 
structure – through leadership, public representation, establishing cultural diacritica 
that define the diaspora, and making political demands on the diaspora’s behalf to 
protect the diasporic nation and contribute to its well-being.   
 




Diasporic boundary-making is a core contribution of this research to diaspora studies.  
Boundary-making occurs in relation to the myriad social and ethnic groups that 
comprise American society.  The cultural diacritica that define the diasporic 
boundary inform external understandings of the diaspora, of ‘who’ the diaspora are, 
and simultaneously inform internal understandings of who ‘we’ are.  The American 
context is therefore formative to making the diasporic nation, whilst at the same time 
challenges its prospects for longevity as part of a diverse yet culturally homogenizing 
society.   
 
Residing in a state in which ethnic diversity and civic engagement constitute its social 
fabric presents few barriers to diaspora-building.  Unencumbered by the well-
founded fear of asserting their ethnic identity, forming civil society organizations, or 
exercising national claims prevalent in Ba’ath-era Iraq, diasporic elites are able to 
expand their institutional and political presence in America and make political 
demands on behalf of the diaspora and the homeland.  Assyrians and Chaldeans have 
thus come to exercise political demands as Americans within the American political 
system regarding local and transnational issues.  Diasporic elites mobilized to 
demand recognition in the U.S. Census and the Iraqi constitution alike; both 
demands speak to this duality of diaspora and the multiple boundaries diasporic 
elites navigate.  The ease of making such demands reflects the openness of American 
society, the permissiveness of ethnic lobbying, and the ease of access to elected 
officials and policy-makers (Saideman 2002; Shain 1999).  Diasporic claims take 
place within the state and are thus also shaped by its legal and political boundaries: 
underscored here is the nature of state caging (Mann 1993: 250-252).  These 
findings thus challenge theory that positions diaspora as operating outside the state 
or that discounts the continued salience of state borders.  Diasporic consciousness 
and imagining of the homeland are essential to diaspora; however, as demonstrated 
through the Assyrian and Chaldean case, the reality of the diasporic nation is that it 
exists within the United States: the diaspora itself is imagined as bounded within 
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American borders and its development and lived experiences occur within those 
borders as part of American society.   
 
At the same time, Assyrians and Chaldeans encounter few barriers to assimilation, 
and the ease of integration poses a fundamental challenge to boundary and diasporic 
retention.  The dispersal of Assyrians and Chaldeans across the American landscape 
further challenges the ability to sustain membership: there is no mechanism to 
compel allegiance or membership in the diaspora.  Contributed through this research 
is a better understanding of the strategies diasporic elites pursue to negotiate social 
boundaries: in this case, a strategy of shifting boundaries to facilitate integration into 
American society whilst retaining enough cultural diacritica to retain the diaspora.  
The contrast between individual boundary crossing, in which an individual adopts 
cultural practices and is able to ‘become’ American, and boundary shifting, in which 
local society changes its understanding of who is a member, is consequential to 
diasporic formation: the former is individual assimilation, from which the individual 
often ends membership in the diaspora; the latter is a social shifting that recognizes 
the diaspora’s collective integration (Wimmer 2013: 58-63).  The existential 
uncertainty and anxiety that comes with statelessness reaffirms the need for strong 
and diverse diasporic institutions, nationalism that provides purpose, and flexible but 
resonant diasporic boundaries.   
 
Diasporic elites are not always successful in boundary making or maintenance.  The 
influence of the American context is exemplified when considering the role of 
diasporic religious institutions.  The Chaldean Church and the Church of the East are 
intertwined with the Assyrian and Chaldean nation, and integrate well with the 
religious nature of American society that encourages Church membership.  This is 
contrasted with the Assyrian diasporic experience in Sweden, where Sweden’s highly 
secular nature is waning the importance of the Church of the East, which may hinder 
boundary maintenance for the next generations of Swedish Assyrians (Cetrez 2011).  
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The early decades of Assyrian immigration demonstrated that although religious 
institutions alone were not enough to retain the diaspora, the Churches nonetheless 
are an essential layer of diasporic boundary formation, a raison d’être for many in the 
diaspora, that works in concert with other cultural and institutional factors to 
cultivate the diasporic boundary – particularly within the Chaldean community 
(Breton 1964).  The myriad roles of the Church, including of Church officials as 
active nation-builders, as presented in this research thus builds upon findings 
recognizing the importance of religion to diaspora, particularly when there is such an 
overlap as found here between religion and identity (Vertovec 2000a; Cohen 1997).   
 
This dissertation, as outlined in Chapter IV, observes two trends in Assyrian and 
Chaldean diasporic boundary-making in the U.S.: the development of a 
heterogeneous ethno-national Assyrian identity; and the development of an ethno-
sectarian Chaldean identity, which challenges Assyrian as an all-encompassing 
ethnicity.  As Chapters V and VI further develop, the foundation of these ideologies 
shaped the political demands put forth by diasporic elites on behalf of the greater 
Assyrian and Chaldean nation, from the demand for recognition and ethnic-specific 
rights to the demand for territorial autonomy.  The Assyrian diaspora transitioned 
from close entwinement with the Church of the East in the early 20th century to an 
ethnic focus that emphasizes the common ethnicity, history, language, and culture of 
the people belonging to the Church of the East, Chaldean, and Syriac faiths.  This 
transition was significant to nation-building because it provided a common narrative 
to the diverse, scattered population in America, and made ethnicity salient to combat 
Arabization policies and continued marginalization in the homeland.  
 
Chaldean boundaries, by contrast, transitioned from being defined solely by 
membership in the Chaldean Church to encompassing ethnic and sectarian criteria.  
The Chaldean Church and Chaldean civic organizations shaped this integration in 
pursuit of boundary-shifting, developing the narrative and structure upon which the 
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basis of Chaldean identity and communal ties lie today.  The making of Chaldeanness 
was thus the byproduct of a host of external and internal factors: the ecclesiastical 
divide created the first boundary upon which geography, national forces, cultural 
diacritica, and political claims later built.  Atop the inherent weakness of 
statelessness and dispersal, with no means to create authority or effectively transcend 
internal divisions, Chaldean migration from Iraq to Detroit and later San Diego in 
turn created a Chaldean-specific context of boundary-making in relation to these 
localities and existing ethnic groups, a process which imbued Chaldeanness with 
ethnic understandings.  Politicization surrounding the Iraq War brought identity 
claims into the political sphere, increasing the salience and endurance of this 
boundary and Chaldean identity itself.  These factors have not yet, however, fissured 
the internal Chaldean-Assyrian boundary, and perhaps that is not the intent of most 
Chaldean elites, many of whom still believe Assyrians and Chaldeans constitute one 
ethnic group and one nation.  Yet there is a commitment amongst Chaldean elites for 
boundary maintenance within the greater context of the Assyrian-Chaldean ethnicity, 
one which is fluid and relational but nonetheless present.  
 
The significance of Chaldean identity, in addition to aiding understanding of the 
complicated, diverse makeup of this nation, is its resonance against Assyrianism 
reinforces of the socially-constructed nature of diaspora and identity.  This example 
contributes to a more general understanding of the ways in which differences in 
historical narratives, cultural attributes, religion, and other social factors can be given 
social relevance by diasporic elites and be used to reshape boundaries between and 
within social groups.   
 
As this dissertation therefore argues, the locality of diaspora matters to diasporic 
boundary-formation, and thus to diasporic national development.  State and local 
boundaries provide the context from which new roots are formed, new cultural 
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ascriptions are amassed, and political demands for the diaspora and its future are 
claimed.   
 
Changes in the homeland shape diasporic nation-building whilst 
underscoring the distance of diaspora.  
 
Changes in the homeland, depending on the depth and impact of the change, can 
recast national boundaries and, in turn, spur diasporic mobilization.  The salience of 
diasporic identity and membership is fluid, gaining relevance in times of crisis or 
opportunity.  The Iraq War was an extraordinary moment that indelibly changed the 
Assyrian and Chaldean nation.  Offered herein is consequentially a study of a 
diaspora as the boundaries between diaspora and the homeland underwent 
significant change and an existential crisis soon emerged; this presents a significant 
study into the relationship between diasporas and homelands and how diasporic 
mobilization unfolds when such change occurs.  The war, and the ethno-sectarian 
conflict that followed, gave rise to concerted political activism from the diaspora as a 
nationally-focused lobby.  The importance of the homeland in the Assyrian and 
Chaldean case is reaffirmed by this activism: the homeland is the unifying root of the 
diaspora, and what happens there affects all its branches.  However, at the same 
time, such activism and its potential outcomes reaffirmed the diaspora is no longer of 
the homeland but separated by state borders, acting instead as long-distance 
nationalists towards Iraq and as an ethnic lobby within the U.S.  The utility of 
boundary theory as proposed by this thesis facilitates examination of the social, 
political, and geographic factors that change boundaries, and thus allows a better 
understanding of why diasporic elites mobilize and why they assert particular 
political demands.  
 
The experiences of the past century, as outlined in Chapter III, continue to frame 
Assyrian and Chaldean perceptions and national ideologies, which in turn frame how 
elites interpret and react to Iraq’s changing boundaries.  The devastation of the WWI-
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era genocide gave rise to a sustained effort to create an Assyrian homeland 
predicated on international recognition that Assyrians are a nation deserving of self-
rule.  The failure of this effort bears impact on Assyrian national memories still 
today; the consequences of such national assertions may continue to shape Chaldean 
ideology and integrationism.  As examined in Chapter V, removal of the Hussein 
dictatorship brought forth a new opportunity to shape Iraq’s national boundaries as a 
multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian state.  The promise of democratization mobilized 
Assyrian and, to a lesser extent, Chaldean diasporic elites to secure representation in 
planning for a democratic post-war Iraq, thereby ensuring Assyrians and Chaldeans 
would be recognized as an equal part of Iraq and their cultural, linguistic, and 
national rights would be officially protected.   
 
Rising ethno-sectarian conflict fundamentally changed this policy focus, marking the 
turn to the Nineveh Plain explored in Chapter VI.  Diasporic elites mobilized in 
response to the shifting boundaries of the Iraqi state and the humanitarian crisis it 
wrought, boundaries which increasingly defined national membership along Arab 
and Islamic criteria, fiercely excluding Assyrians and Chaldeans from membership.  
Hundreds of thousands of Assyrians and Chaldeans were displaced in the violence 
and repression that resulted.  The outcomes of exclusion remain, as Gellner 
theorized, the choice to flee, assimilate, or pursue a nationalist option (Gellner 
1983).  As this research demonstrates, the diaspora’s resulting political demands 
were not uniform, but parallel these choices: to continue to pursue integration into 
Iraq, working against national boundaries to reassert the constitutional promises of 
democracy and minority rights; to pursue resettlement into diaspora, providing safety 
but permanently decreasing the population remaining in the homeland; and to 
pursue territorial autonomy within the Nineveh Plain.   
 
To some, particularly Chaldean actors, the initial response to these boundary shifts 
was to recognize refugees had no immediate prospect of returning to Iraq.  Activists, 
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particularly the Chaldean Federation of America and its affiliates, lobbied the U.S. 
government to increase refugee admissions to bring displaced Assyrians and 
Chaldeans into the diasporic community (Kassab Interview 2013, 2012; Barka 
Interview).  It is here that Chaldean activism expanded outside the Church and 
asserted a Chaldean voice as an ethnic lobby.  Their advocacy helped change 
American policy and brought tens of thousands of refugees to safety in the U.S.   
 
At the same time, others worried resettlement could endanger the nation’s long-term 
survival; that the risk of assimilation in the West and population loss in an unfriendly 
homeland created an existential crisis (Jatou Interview; Tamraz Interview).  As a 
long-term policy, however, refugee admissions are not a permanent solution because 
the rates of resettlement are simply incapable of meeting need and do not help those 
who wish to stay.  Many diasporic elites, including many who support refugee 
admissions, have turned their focus to enabling Assyrians and Chaldeans to return to 
and remain safely in Iraq: for many, this became understood as the nationalist option 
- the right of Assyrian and Chaldean self-governance in their homeland.  The findings 
presented regarding this trajectory mark a significant contribution to Assyrian and 
Chaldean scholarship.   
 
Long-distance nationalism for autonomy has existed in the diaspora since Assyrians 
and Chaldeans became a diaspora, but it was with the post-war crisis that autonomy 
became the foremost diasporic goal.  Here, diasporic nation-building became 
quintessential nation-building, aiming to make congruent the Assyrian and Chaldean 
nation and a political unit over the Nineveh Plain (Gellner 1).  The amassing of 
widespread diasporic support for the Nineveh Plain province and the persistent 
advocacy on its behalf is arguably the diaspora’s most significant policy advancement 
in a century.   
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Yet also evident through diasporic mobilization is that neither the removal of the 
Ba’ath regime nor the crisis it produced, to date, have reduced the salience of the 
intra-Assyrian-Chaldean boundary.  In some ways, salience increased because 
identity now carries political meaning.  Aside from the 2000 U.S. Census, the war 
was amongst the first times Chaldean elites made political claims to a separate 
Chaldean ethnicity, and it was the first time such claims were made in concert with 
securing Chaldean-specific rights and recognition within the state.  Whilst not all 
Chaldean elites believe Chaldeans constitute a unique ethnic group, those who 
maintain Assyrians and Chaldeans are one people still assert the importance of the 
Chaldean identity, highlighting a key factor in its continued salience: those who 
identify as Chaldean do not wish to see their identity disappear.  Thus, claims for 
recognition are in part motivated by a fear of disappearance or being rendered 
insignificant, a reaction to Assyrian nationalism as much as Arabization and its Iraqi 
Christian label, as well as the risk of dilution into Catholicism in America.   
 
The relationship between the homeland and the diaspora again confirms the effects 
of state caging (Mann 250-252).  Although diasporas are transnational, their political 
reality is fundamentally local, restricted by state borders.  As evident with the Iraq 
War, diasporic elites generally do not claim a right of return or aspire to live in an 
Assyrian state; rather, changes in the homeland reaffirm the diaspora is very much a 
diaspora, and has been shaped in ways by routes and resettlement that the homeland 
has not.  Indeed, emergent amongst some Chaldean elites is a belief that a diasporic 
nation, formed around a strong Church, could provide the institutional and 
ideological completeness associated with the homeland.  This presents a stark point 
of contrast with the diaspora’s long-distance nationalists, who fear assimilation is 
unavoidable without roots anchored in Nineveh.   
 
This dissertation thus draws from the theories of Breuilly and Gellner, which in 
different ways frame nationalism as a political endeavour in pursuit of control of the 
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state, whilst repositioning these theories in relation to diaspora, which, in contrast to 
traditional nations, lack territory, exist outside the homeland, and often lack standing 
to effectively exercise political demands (Breuilly 1993; Gellner 1983).  Diasporic 
nation-building, like the nature of diaspora itself, is thus more complicated than a 
nation making claims where it is indigenous.  Instead, it is argued actors pursue 
diasporic nationalism to assert the diaspora’s own political claims and nation-build in 
the state of resettlement, and pursue long-distance nationalism to assert claims for 
the nation’s rights in the homeland, when the diaspora has a homeland.  
 
As evident in this study, despite the diaspora’s permanence outside the homeland, 
such national rights, whether framed as autonomy or as more measured claims for 
liberal rights and protections of the state, are understood as aiding the preservation 
of Assyrians and Chaldeans everywhere.  As is further evident by the mobilization 
surrounding the removal of the Ba’ath regime, the closure or openness of a state, 
reflecting the nature of its political system and national boundaries, is determinative 





Voluntary and forced migrations over the past century have given rise to the number 
of displaced peoples and nations who consider themselves diasporas.  As Anderson 
observed of the phenomena of long-distance nationalism, almost all migrants carry 
with them citizenship, belonging to somewhere and yet no longer belonging 
(Anderson 2001).  This reflects the double consciousness Gilroy described, of being 
neither fully of the homeland of ancestry nor of the state of residence (Gilroy 1993).  
Diasporic nation-building thus imposes ‘an imaginary coherence on the experience of 
dispersal and fragmentation’; it builds an imagined yet lived diasporic community 
(Hall 1990: 224).  Yet, as this dissertation shows, diaspora is more than a 
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consciousness, imagining, or automatic byproduct of displacement: it is fluid and 
relational, an ever-evolving result of changing local, state, and national boundaries 
brought forth as a displaced population negotiates its place in a new society.  
 
Presented in this dissertation is a unique study into the Assyrian- and Chaldean-
American diaspora and the role of its elites in imagining, building, and sustaining the 
diasporic nation at an ongoing, pivotal moment in the greater nation’s existence.  
This study offers an important contribution to literature on diaspora studies and to 
the nascent field of Assyrian and Chaldean scholarship.  Demonstrated herein is the 
applicability of boundary theory to examining the local and transnational, internal 
and external dynamics of diaspora, and the multitude of routes and roots contained 
therein.   
 
The findings of this work present several avenues for further research.  Future studies 
can benefit from using boundary theory to examine non-elite perspectives and 
experiences of diaspora, contributing to a better understanding of how lay 
individuals understand and negotiate social boundaries, and how diasporic 
boundaries are maintained despite challenges by competing individual identities and 
assimilation.  Comparative study between the Assyrian and Chaldean experience in 
the U.S. with the diaspora in other states would improve insight into this nation and 
how state borders shape diaspora.  Similarly, comparison between this diaspora and 
other diasporas in the U.S. could expand understanding of the American diasporic 
experience.   
 
It is argued from these findings that the prevailing typologies of diaspora theory are 
therefore inadequate to understanding the complexity of the Assyrian and Chaldean 
case.  Assyrians, in isolation, present a compelling argument for a triadic victim 
diaspora, pushed from the homeland through waves of violent exclusion and 
retaining a nationalism dedicated to securing the Assyrian national existence, a self-
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ruled territory in the homeland (Safran 1991).  Chaldeans, in isolation, present a 
compelling argument for a middleman minority diaspora, cultivating an 
entrepreneurial mentality that lends itself to finding an economic niche, favouring 
integration and eschewing demands for self-rule or territory (Gellner 1983: 101-109; 
Bonacich 1973; Blalock 1967).  Certainly these differences reflect, and have lent 
themselves, to shaping the intra-national boundary.  Yet such typologies overlook 
that it is one diaspora, with one homeland, one language, shared holidays, symbols, 
and cultural practices.  Moreover, typologies overlook the complexities within each 
community, shaped by different routes and boundary creations upon resettlement: 
national ideologies and diasporic experiences are hardly uniform across the Chaldean 
community nor the Assyrian community.   
 
This dissertation instead finds diaspora is a continuous, evolving product of 
boundary-making, often the result of diasporic elite mobilization.  Diaspora is a 
nation not simply born of displacement, but formed through social boundaries 
encountered and made upon resettlement outside the homeland.  Diasporas are 
affected by their ever-changing boundaries in relation to local society, their state of 
resettlement, the homeland, and within the diaspora itself.  Boundary theory 
therefore offers an essential framework to examine the complexities and varieties of 
diaspora, and the diversity within a single diaspora.  This approach enables insight 
into when and why diasporic identity becomes salient, and when and why 
mobilization occurs.  As Wimmer described in relation to ethnicity, boundary theory 
does not explain what diaspora is, but why it is (Wimmer 2008).   
 
This dissertation also positions diasporic nationalism as an essential component of 
diasporic formation and continuance.  The existence of a diasporic nation is 
precarious: it is extra-territorial but caged by state borders, often intertwined with 
other populations and ethnic groups where risks of marginalization and assimilation 
are alternatively present; and yet, despite this vulnerability, there is no shortage of 
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populations eager to claim their place as diasporas.  The resiliency of these extra-
territorial nations after displacement is something of a paradox in nationalism 
studies, challenging the traditional nation-state framework.  It is thus argued 
nationalism is essential to the diasporic nation: it underlies the commitment of 
diasporic elites to the diaspora, providing ideological and political purpose and 
planning for the nation’s future; and it is instrumentalized by elites in pursuit of 
political claims to mobilize support and legitimize such claims.  Diasporic 
nationalism, and long-distance nationalism toward the homeland, are intertwined 
with boundary formation and diasporic national development as diasporic elites 




The tyranny of ISIL that befell northern Iraq has been fierce and catastrophic, and 
some of its damage irreparable.  It is too late to save the lives lost, that will be lost in 
the fight to reclaim and protect villages; it is too late to undo the years of neglect by 
the Bush and Obama Administrations as the Assyrian and Chaldean population in 
Iraq was reduced by hundreds of thousands; it is too late to repair the targeted 
destruction of ancient artifacts and churches, proof of the once great Assyrian 
civilization in Nineveh, of the millennia for which Christianity was carried by devoted 
adherents, for whom Christianity in turn offered a beacon of hope.   
 
It is hard to say much about hope in Iraq these days.  The population, the atra, and 
the years of work for recognition and rights and autonomy were rendered asunder in 
one fell swoop.  Worry for family and the community in Iraq is paramount, 
inextricable from worry for the nation’s survival.  Churches can be rebuilt, homes 
reclaimed, life resumed, with a resiliency that has characterized Assyrians and 
Chaldeans for millennia.  Yet, certainly, the atra is again changed.  It has been said 
the Kurds have no friends but the mountains; Assyrians and Chaldeans, brutally 
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forced from the mountains a century ago, have nowhere to flee but into Iraq’s 
Kurdish region or into diaspora.  National roots are thus increasingly stretched as 
boundary closure continues to push away the population, and geography and time 
further distance the diaspora and its next generations from the homeland.  The 
Assyrian and Chaldean nation is consequentially becoming rooted outside its Nineveh 
homeland as diasporic elites craft new roots in states with open, porous boundaries.  
The utility of boundary theory is evident, offering examination into the contrast 
between these new and ancient homelands, and what it means for the future of the 
nation as displacement, insecurity, and boundary closure persist. 
 
Yet still there are glimmers of hope.  If anything is learned from the Assyrian and 
Chaldean experience over the past century, it is unlikely an Israel will be gifted from 
the international community.  But the Assyrian and Chaldean experience is 
profoundly a story of faith and resilience against overwhelming circumstance.  There 
are two atras before diasporic elites, both of which are vulnerable and both of which 
carry hope for the nation’s future.  The first is the atra in Iraq, made vulnerable by 
this violent exclusion and closing boundaries.  Here, hope is tied to the political 
demand that, with the defeat of ISIL, Assyrians and Chaldeans be granted a measure 
of self-rule over the Nineveh Plain, aided by international protection for a time, to 
secure the nation’s roots and existence therein.  This reflects a quintessential long-
distance nationalism, a territorial nationalism that characterizes so much of 
nationalism theory, fueled by the failure of successive Iraqi governments to recognize 
and protect Assyrian and Chaldean rights and the existential fear of losing the 
nation’s homeland; its anchor.  The second is the still-developing atra in diaspora, 
made vulnerable by the risk of assimilation and disappearance into America’s porous 
boundaries.  Here, hope is that a resilient, lasting new homeland can persist in an 
open and multiethnic – albeit homogenizing - society.  This reflects a quintessential 
diasporic nationalism, the belief that integration without cultural disappearance is 
possible with effective nation-building and boundary-shifting of local society.  This 
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also reflects perhaps a quintessentially American optimism, a belief the American 
experiment offers lasting hope to a displaced nation.   
 
Diaspora, indeed, is born of displacement and made of constant change.  Diasporic 
boundaries are reshaped as society evolves and populations move, as events abroad 
recast national and political goals in diaspora.  The work of diasporic elites, much 
like the work of any nationalist, is similarly a constant task of boundary negotiation 
and maintenance.  If nothing else, as one Assyrian activist in London recently 
described, the diaspora holds the ability, and a responsibility, to serve as the bearer 
of culture and history, protecting that which make the Assyrian and Chaldean nation 
until it can be transferred back to the homeland (Ewan 2015).  The crisis posed by 
ISIL and the response yet to be undertaken by Iraq and the international community 
bear the inextricable weight of history: what is done here will in many ways decide 
the destiny of the Assyrian and Chaldean people.  In the continued face of 
uncertainty, diasporic elites thus work to build a semblance of an atra that can 
endure in diaspora; their work recalls the words of Langston Hughes, ‘We build our 





Contemporary Provincial Map of Iraq, ft. Proposed Nineveh Plain 




[map	  credits]	  Perry-­‐Castañeda	  Library	  Map	  Collection,	  ‘Iraq:	  Administrative	  Divisions’	  University	  of	  
Texas	  Libraries:	  lib.utexas.edu/maps/atlas_middle_east/iraq_divisions.jpg;	  Izady,	  Michael	  (2009)	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‘Baghdad,	  Iraq,	  Ethnic	  composition	  in	  2003’	  and	  ‘Baghdad,	  Iraq,	  Ethnic	  composition	  by	  the	  end	  of	  
2009’	  The	  Gulf/2000	  Project:	  gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml;	  Cannistra,	  Mary	  Kate	  (2008,	  
November	  23)	  ‘Kurdistan	  Regional	  Government	  Boundary’	  The	  Washington	  Post:	  
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/graphic/2008/11/23/GR2008112300231.html?sid=ST2008112
300239&s_pos=list;	  Iraq	  Sustainable	  Democracy	  Project	  (2008)	  ‘Proposing	  the	  Operationalization	  of	  
the	  Art.	  125	  Solution’,	  pp	  8:	  iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf/NPAU%20-­‐%20policy%20brief.pdf.	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APPENDIX II: 
Map of Proposed Assyro-Chaldée State, 1922, as submitted by 






































Map Credit: Petros, Agha (1922) ‘Autonomy for Assyrian Christians (Claims of Assyro-
Chaldeans)’, Eastern Conference Lausanne, F.O./839/23 
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List	  of	  represented	  institutions:	  	  
	  
Arizona:	  Assyrian	  Aid	  Society;	  Assyrian	  American	  Cultural	  Organization	  of	  Arizona;	  Assyrian	  
Democratic	  Movement;	  Assyrian	  Student	  Association	  of	  Arizona;	  Mar	  Yosip	  Assyrian	  Church	  
of	  the	  East;	  St.	  George	  Ancient	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  St.	  Peters	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  
	  
California:	  	  
Organizations	  -­‐	  American	  Mesopotamian	  Organization;	  Assyrian	  Aid	  Society	  (Central	  Valley,	  
Los	  Angeles,	  Sacramento,	  Santa	  Clara,	  San	  Diego);	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  
Modesto;	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  San	  Diego;	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  
San	  Jose;	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  Southern	  California;	  Assyrian	  American	  
Benevolent	  Association;	  Assyrian	  American	  Civic	  Club	  of	  Turlock;	  Assyrian	  Athletic	  Club	  of	  
Modesto;	  Assyrian	  Broadcast	  Network;	  Assyrian	  Broadcasting	  Radio	  Station	  of	  Bet-­‐Nahrain;	  
Assyrian	  Club	  of	  Urhay;	  Assyrian	  Community	  Center	  of	  San	  Francisco;	  Assyrian	  Cultural	  
Center	  of	  Bet-­‐Nahrain;	  Assyrian	  Democratic	  Movement	  (Los	  Angeles,	  Modesto,	  San	  Jose);	  
Assyrian	  National	  Congress;	  Assyrian	  Television	  Broadcasting	  Station	  of	  Bet-­‐Nahrain;	  
Assyrian	  Student	  Association	  at	  San	  Jose	  State	  University;	  Assyrian	  Universal	  Alliance	  (Los	  
Angeles,	  San	  Jose);	  Bet	  Nahrain	  Democratic	  Party;	  Gishru:	  Birthright	  Assyria;	  Chaldean	  
Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  San	  Diego;	  Help	  to	  Heal	  (formerly	  Assyrian	  Medical	  
Society)	  
	  
Churches	  -­‐	  Ancient	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  Mar	  Shaleeta	  Church;	  Assyrian	  Evangelical	  Church	  of	  
San	  Jose;	  Assyrian	  Evangelical	  Church	  of	  Turlock;	  Assyrian	  Pentecostal	  Church	  of	  San	  Jose;	  
Assyrian	  Pentecostal	  Church	  of	  Turlock;	  Assyrian	  Presbyterian	  Church	  of	  San	  Jose;	  Mar	  
Addai	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  Mar	  Gewargis	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  Mar	  Narsai	  
Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  Mar	  Yosip	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  Mar	  Zaia	  Assyrian	  
Church	  of	  the	  East;	  Mart	  Mariam	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  St.	  John’s	  Assyrian	  United	  
Presbyterian	  Church	  of	  Turlock;	  St.	  Mary’s	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  St.	  Paul	  Assyrian	  
Church	  of	  the	  East;	  St.	  Rabban	  Hormizid	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  	  
	  
Connecticut:	  Ashur	  Assyrian	  American	  Association;	  Assyrian	  American	  Ladies	  Association	  of	  
Connecticut;	  Assyrian	  National	  Association	  of	  Connecticut;	  St.	  Thomas	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  
the	  East	  
	  
DC:	  Assyrian	  Aid	  Society;	  Iraq	  Sustainable	  Democracy	  Project	  	  
	  
Illinois:	  	  
Organizations	  -­‐	  Assyrian	  Academic	  Society;	  Assyrian	  Aid	  Society;	  Assyrian	  American	  
Association	  of	  Chicago;	  Assyrian	  American	  Civic	  Club	  of	  Chicago;	  Assyrian	  American	  Ladies	  
Association;	  Assyrian	  American	  National	  Coalition;	  Assyrian	  American	  Police	  Association;	  
Assyrian	  American	  National	  Republican	  Coalition;	  Assyrian	  Athletic	  Club	  of	  Illinois;	  Assyrian	  
Business	  Association	  of	  Chicago;	  Assyrian	  Chaldean	  Syriac	  Students	  Union;	  Assyrian	  
Chamber	  of	  Commerce;	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  Relief	  Organization;	  Assyrian	  
Democratic	  Movement;	  Assyrian	  Democratic	  Organization;	  Assyrian	  Democratic	  Party;	  
Assyrian	  Human	  Rights	  Association;	  Assyrian	  Information	  News	  Agency	  (AINA);	  Assyrian	  
Liberation	  Movement;	  Assyrian	  National	  Council	  of	  Illinois;	  Assyrian	  National	  Foundation;	  
Assyrian	  Patriotic	  Party;	  Assyrian	  Social	  Club	  of	  Chicago;	  Assyrian	  Student	  Organization	  -­‐	  
University	  of	  Illinois	  at	  Chicago;	  Assyrian	  Teaches	  Association	  of	  America;	  Assyrian	  Universal	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Alliance;	  Assyrian	  Universal	  Alliance	  Foundation;	  Assyrian	  Youth	  Association;	  Bet	  Nahrain	  
Democratic	  Party;	  Iraqi	  Christian	  Refugee	  Council;	  Mar	  Zaia	  Assyrian	  Organization	  	  
	  
Churches	  -­‐	  Assyrian	  Christian	  Church	  of	  Chicago;	  Assyrian	  Evangelical	  Covenant	  Church	  
Chicago;	  Assyrian	  Evangelical	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ;	  Assyrian	  Pentecostal	  Church	  Chicago;	  
Carter	  Westminster	  Assyrian	  Presbyterian	  Church	  of	  Chicago;	  Mar	  Gewargis	  Assyrian	  
Church	  of	  the	  East;	  Mar	  Sargis	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  Mart	  Mariam	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  
the	  East;	  St.	  Andrew’s	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  St.	  John’s	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East;	  St.	  
Odisho	  Ancient	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  
	  
Indiana:	  St.	  Peter	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  
	  
Massachusetts:	  Assyrian	  American	  Organization	  of	  Massachusetts;	  Assyrian	  Democratic	  
Organization	  
	  
Michigan:	  Assyrian	  Aid	  Society;	  Assyrian	  Democratic	  Movement;	  Assyrian	  American	  Club	  of	  
Flint;	  Assyrian	  American	  Social	  Club	  of	  Michigan;	  Mar	  Shimun	  Bar	  Sabbi	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  
the	  East	  of	  Flint;	  Mart	  Mariam	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  of	  Warren	  
	  
Nevada:	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  Las	  Vegas;	  Mar	  Benjamin	  Shimun	  Assyrian	  
Church	  of	  the	  East	  
	  
New	  Jersey:	  Assyrian	  Orthodox	  Church	  of	  the	  Virgin	  Mary;	  Diyarbakir	  Turabdin	  Assyrian	  
Association	  	  
	  
New	  York:	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  Yonkers;	  Mar	  Mari	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  	  
	  
Pennsylvania:	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  Philadelphia	  	  
	  
Texas:	  Assyrian	  American	  Association	  of	  Houston;	  St.	  Mary	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  
	  
Washington:	  Assyrian	  Children’s	  Fund;	  St.	  Thomas	  Assyrian	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  
	  
To	  note,	  the	  organizations	  and	  churches	  represented	  herein	  aim	  to	  capture	  the	  majority	  of	  
Assyrian-­‐serving	  organizations	  in	  the	  United	  States;	  however,	  given	  the	  fluidity	  of	  such	  
organizations,	  several	  may	  have	  inadvertently	  been	  excluded	  and	  some	  of	  those	  
represented	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  active	  or	  have	  merged	  or	  changed	  names.	  	  Inclusion	  of	  an	  
organization	  or	  church	  is	  merely	  a	  representation	  of	  its	  existence	  and	  not	  of	  its	  size	  or	  role	  










APPENDIX V: List of Assyrian and Chaldean Interviewees  
 
Presented is a brief description of the Assyrian and Chaldean community leaders 
interviewed for this research.   
 
Assyrian Community Elites 
 
- Ashur Mansour: Originally from Iraq, Mr. Mansour emigrated to California for 
employment, where he works as a computer engineer for Apple.  He serves on 
the Executive Committee for the Assyrian Democratic Movement’s San Jose 
Chapter and co-hosts the ADM Weekly television programme, and is also 
involved with the Assyrian Aid Society.  
 
- Emanuel Kamber: Dr. Kamber was Secretary General of the Assyrian Universal 
Alliance, and was previously active with the Iraqi opposition, having served as 
deputy chairman of the Iraqi National Congress’s Central Council and worked 
with the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project.  He is a physics professor 
at Western Michigan University, having left Iraqi in 1979 to pursue his 
doctorate in London before emigrating to the U.S. in 1985.  As a student in 
Iraq, he was active in student movements to improve democracy and protect 
humanitarian rights.  
 
- Elmer Abbo: Dr. Abbo has served as the Executive Director of the Assyrian 
American National Coalition, co-founder of The Nineveh Project, and 
producer of Defying Deletion, a documentary about the Assyrian and 
Chaldean plight, amongst other public advocacy and education work in the 
U.S. and abroad.  A Chaldean-Assyrian, Dr. Abbo was born in the U.S. and 
became active in the Chicago-area Assyrian community after moving to 
Chicago, where he earned an MD and JD from the University of Chicago and 
currently practices medicine.   
 
- Firas Jatou: Mr. Jatou is a California-based engineer who is from Toronto 
originally.  He was a founder of the Assyrian International News Agency 
(aina.org) and has long been involved in Assyrian advocacy, including 
through affiliations with the Assyrian Academic Society, of which he was 
president, the Assyrian American National Federation, and the Assyrian 
American Association of San Jose.  
 
- Juliana Taimoorazy: Ms. Taimoorazy is an Iranian Catholic Assyrian who fled 
Iran in 1989 when she was sixteen years old, arriving in the U.S. a year later 
as a religious asylee.  She is the founder of the Iraqi Christian Relief Council, 
formed in response to the refugee crisis in 2007.  She has also engaged with 
community issues as a host and reporter for seventeen years with the 
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Chicago-based Assyrians Around the World television program.   
 
- Joseph Tamraz: Originally from Iran, Mr. Tamraz is an engineer and member 
of the Assyrian Universal Alliance’s Executive Board and Chairman of its 
Chicago Branch, and has served in multiple capacities as an Assyrian 
community organizer, including as founder and chairman of the Assyrian 
American National Republican Coalition, President of the Assyrian American 
Civic Club of Chicago, Midwest Director for the Assyrian American National 
Federation, and as coordinator and host of Assyrian Universal Alliance Radio 
in Chicago.   
 
- Natalie Babella: Ms. Babella is the President of the Santa Clara Valley Chapter 
of the Assyrian Aid Society, based in San Jose, California, and is a co-founder 
of Gishru, an Assyrian birthright program to connect Assyrian youth in 
diaspora with those in the homeland.  Her parents both were born in 
Baghdad, Iraq, and emigrated to the U.S., where they remained active in 
Assyrian political and cultural organizations, which she credits with 
developing her involvement.   
 
- Waleeta Cannon: Ms. Cannon has served as a founder, treasurer, and board 
member to the Assyrian American National Coalition, a member of the 
Assyrian Academic Society, director of the Assyria Foundation, amongst other 
roles advocating on behalf of the community.  She works on behalf of 
women’s rights and development, including working in Iraq in 2011 for the 
International Human Rights Law Institute.  From Chicago, her parents fled 
Iraq after her father was arrested and persecuted for operating a pro-
democracy radio station.   
 
- Wisam Naoum: Mr. Naoum, now a finance attorney in Chicago, is from 
Michigan, where he was a co-founder and political director of E’rootha, the 
Michigan-based Chaldean Assyrian Syriac Youth Union, and is affiliated with 
both Chaldean and Assyrian advocacy efforts in Detroit and Chicago.   
 
- Zaya Yaro: Mr. Yaro is an Executive with the Assyrian Democratic Movement’s 
San Jose Chapter, and serves as a television anchor for Assyrian National 
Broadcasting and Ashur TV.  Mr. Yaro fled Iraq during the Anfal campaign, 
after which he became a member of the ADM because of its role in providing 
support and services to those displaced by the crisis.  
 
- Wisam Kosa: Mr. Kosa is a member of the Chaldean Catholic Church in San 
Diego and is active in Assyrian community organizations, including the 
Assyrian American Association of San Diego and the Assyrian American 
National Federation, as well as hosting an Assyrian-themed local television 
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program.  He is a software engineer and former professor who emigrated 
from Iraq in 1982.   
 
Chaldean Community Elites: 
  
- Bishop Ibrahim Ibrahim: Bishop Ibrahim was the first Chaldean Bishop 
appointed to the United States, serving from the Chaldean Catholic Eparchy 
of St. Thomas the Apostle of Detroit from 1985 until his retirement in 2014.  
He was born in Telkeppe and has lived in suburban Detroit since 1982.  The 
interview was conducted just prior to his retirement. 
 
- Ghassan Hanna: Dr. Hanna was a co-founder and General Secretary of the 
Chaldean National Congress, and editor and writer for the Chaldean News 
Agency, which he operated through his website chaldeansonline.net.  He 
served as an advisor to the State Department and U.S. military, having been 
deployed to Iraq twice; he is an engineer and currently works as a project 
manager for the Navy.  He fled Iraq in 1979 after facing persecution for 
refusing to join the Ba’ath party and resides in suburban San Diego.   
 
- Jacob Bacall and Eddie Bacall: The Bacall brothers emigrated to Michigan in 
the 1970s from Iraq, where they founded Bacall Development, a real estate 
development and property management company, and have been active in 
Chaldean political and social institutions for decades.  Jacob was involved in 
the governance of the Chaldean Iraqi American Association of Michigan and 
recently published a book titled Chaldeans in Detroit.  Eddie is on the board of 
the Chaldean Democratic Forum, which aims to support Chaldean political 
parties in Iraq, and has made multiple trips to Iraq following the war on 
behalf of political and humanitarian missions.   
 
- Joseph Kassab (Two interviews): Mr. Kassab, at the time of the first interview, 
was the Executive Director of the Chaldean Federation of America (CFA), a 
capacity in which he served since 2005, and at the time of the second 
interview had left CFA to form the Iraqi Christians Advocacy and 
Empowerment Institute.  Based in suburban Detroit, Mr. Kassab is originally 
from Telkeppe, Iraq, and worked as a bio-medical researcher and professor in 
Iraq until fleeing Iraq after facing intimidation for refusing to join the Ba’ath 
Party.  He came to the U.S. in 1980, where he is the Chief Science Officer at 
Nano-Engineering and Consulting.  He was also a founding member of the 
Chaldean Assyrian Syriac Council of America.  His brother, Bishop Gabriel 
Kassab, recently retired as the first Bishop of the Chaldean Church in 
Australia and New Zealand.   
  
- Mark Arabo: Mr. Arabo is the President and CEO of the Neighborhood Market 
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Association, an organization which represents independent retailers and is the 
largest independent grocers association in the western U.S.; his brother, 
Auday Arabo, heads the Associated Food and Petroleum Dealers, which 
represents Midwestern food retailers.  Mr. Arabo was born in California after 
his parents emigrated from Telkeppe, Iraq, in 1979, and has become recently 
involved in Chaldean-related advocacy and humanitarian aide in San Diego. 
 
- Martin Manna (Two interviews): Mr. Manna is the President of the Chaldean 
Chamber of Commerce, based in suburban Detroit, for which he has worked 
since 2003; he is also head of the Chaldean Community Foundation, operates 
the Chaldean News, was a founding member of CASCA, and is a director of 
the Nineveh Council of America, which has taken over for CASCA.  Mr. 
Manna was born in Michigan to Iraqi parents: his father was active in an Iraqi 
opposition party and worked as an assistant editor for a daily newspaper until 
the Ba’ath regime came to power, after which the family fled to the U.S.   
 
- Mary Romaya: Ms. Romaya is the Director and a founding member of the 
Chaldean Cultural Center in suburban Detroit, editor of ‘The Chaldeans: A 
Contemporary Portrait of One of Civilization’s Oldest Cultures’, and a co-chair 
of the Detroit area’s Chaldean-Jewish Building Community Initiative.  Raised 
in Detroit, her parents were amongst the earliest waves of Chaldean 
migration to Michigan.   
 
- Noori Barka: Dr. Barka is actively involved in the San Diego-area Chaldean 
community, including serving as Chairman of the Chaldean American 
Institute, Chairman of the annual Chaldean Festival, founder of the monthly 
Chaldean House newspaper, among others.  He holds a PhD in Diagnostic 
Immunology and is the founder and president of CalBiotech, having 
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